

other parts of Europe and the parts of the USSR where central heating is used. Dienes also shows how electricity in North Bohemia is underpriced and how the local authority there fails to recover the social costs connected with the generation of that electricity.

Except for the section by Ihor Stebelsky on soil erosion and dust storms, and the section by Philip Micklin on the Caspian Sea, much of the material on the USSR either has already appeared in print (and sometimes in the same articles by the same authors) or is not especially insightful. Indeed, at times the material is contradictory, and the question arises as to how carefully the editor read the separate chapters. For example, Craig ZumBrunnen, on page 81, argues that some previous studies of Lake Baikal overstate the extent of its pollution. However, on page 5, the editor says, "Lake Baikal is nearly ruined from pollution. . . ." This is incomparably more of an overstatement than the citation ZumBrunnen portrays as alarmist.

It is not only Volgyes who tends to mislead. ZumBrunnen, in his essay on Lake Baikal, leaves the impression that the authorities will build a bypass for the emissions from the Baikalsk cellulose plant (p. 94). In actual fact, no matter how serious the inadequacies of the present treatment system, it is highly unlikely that such a bypass will be built. It is simply too expensive.

The reader also puzzles over ZumBrunnen's concern about "the workers of Buriatia, 30% of whom are directly employed by the timber industry." These workers, he suggests, would be affected if the cellulose plants were not built because he seems to assume that their jobs depend on the plant. However, the source he cites for the number of workers involved appeared in 1963 before the cellulose plants were built. Presumably, their jobs were created independently of the plants and, therefore, would not be affected by the failure to build the plants. Similarly, the reader puzzles over ZumBrunnen's lack of concern for the Baikal-Amur Mainline Railroad which promises to open up large portions of the shore of Lake Baikal to intensive industrial mineral development. All the pious promises to the contrary and all three laws regulating the use of the area around Lake Baikal will not stop the slow degradation of Lake Baikal as long as the Soviet government continues to put economic development ahead of ecological considerations.

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN
Wellesley College

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EAST-WEST TRADE: ILLUSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES. By *Zygmunt Nagorski, Jr.* Foreword by *Jean-François Revel*. New York: Mason & Lipscomb, 1974. xxv, 228 pp. \$9.95.

East-West trade is not a new subject. Some would suggest not only that it has been overreported, but that it is not even an important subject—for example, trade between the United States and the Soviet Union continues to be an insignificant share of the Gross National Products of both nations. Mr. Nagorski, however, has written a stimulating book in which he both provides useful new perspectives and identifies the factors contributing to the importance of the subject. The subtitle of the book, "Illusions and Opportunities," provides an accurate guide to Nagorski's approach. He finds the new relationship neither a bonanza for Western traders, nor a quick answer to Eastern planners' attempts to overcome economic backwardness. Yet, he sees mutually beneficial business for both sides.

In the introduction, Jean-François Revel points to the identification of historical parallels and of current contradictions, presumably in the East, as the primary contribution of the book. My reaction is different. I find the central utility in the assessment of change in the East—Poland, Hungary, as well as the Soviet Union—associated with East-West trade. One might ask whether there has been any qualitative significance or irreversible changes in the Eastern systems associated with East-West trade. Nagorski permits, but does not compel, the reader to answer yes. To Nagorski, the dynamics of East-West trade's impact on national systems are evident primarily in the East. He may assume that his readers are more familiar with the West, or that changes in the West are either slow in coming or less likely in the long run. On this emphasis, he is not clear.

This book does not fit easily into any niche. Perhaps that illustrates its value. I recommend it to readers of the *Slavic Review* as a fresh, sound approach to an important contemporary subject.

JOHN P. HARDT

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress

LE PROGRAMME DU COMECON ET L'INTÉGRATION SOCIALISTE.

By *Marie Lavigne*. Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1973. 389 pp. Paper.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA) was founded in 1949, after the Soviet Union had forced her new East European satellites to interrupt their traditional and close economic relations with Western countries and to direct their flows of trade into what Stalin had named the "Socialist World Market." During the first years of its existence, the CMEA served Moscow as an instrument to adapt these economies (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic since 1950, and formally also Albania) to the reconstruction needs and to the strategic priorities of the Soviet Union. In itself, CMEA had little, if any, practical significance for the economic development of the European member countries at that time.

Though exchanging economic experience, extending technical aid to one another, and rendering mutual assistance with respect to raw materials, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, and so forth, were declared tasks of CMEA from the very beginning, hardly any efforts had been taken to bolster the importance of these aims until the late 1950s. Specialization of production and coordination of long-term perspective plans, agreed upon by the members in 1956, showed only modest results during the 1960s. Since the power of the Council was restricted to recommendations, and the members, particularly Rumania, refused stubbornly to accept the Soviet suggestion to transfer national rights and competences to the CMEA (and thus give it a similar authority as the West European EEC), specialization agreements concluded by the member countries could never be enforced.

After many years of slackening integration the Soviet Union and other developed CMEA members apparently exerted considerable pressure on their partners for accelerated development and cooperation between them. After several years of debate, a "Complex Program intended to deepen and improve the cooperation and to develop the socialist economic integration of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance" was adopted by the twenty-fifth session of the Council in Bucharest in July 1971. Marie Lavigne's book is a commentary on this Complex Program, generally regarded by Eastern and Western