

THE ORIGINS OF CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC*

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It has been well documented that structural changes in the capitalist world system during the second half of the nineteenth century generated profound consequences for peripheral economies such as those in Latin America and Africa. Improvements in transportation and the increasing demand for tropical consumer goods in the industrializing countries caused unprecedented growth in the production of tropical export crops and a consequent international movement of agricultural commodities. This widespread emergence of export agriculture for Western European and North American markets is the one reason why researchers can still employ a broad concept like the "Third World" to divergent economies and cultures in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Production of such crops as cotton, cocoa, tobacco, and coffee, which had previously been grown in many regions on a limited scale, expanded enormously in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹ The global character of these agrarian changes, however, should not obscure their regional peculiarities. Export agriculture (whether peasant- or plantation-based) arose within existing systems of social and economic relations, which had a decisive influence on the final outcome of this process of change.

Local influences are particularly clear in the case of the Dominican Republic, where diverse and complicated developments occurred in the export agricultural sector. Looking back from a twentieth-century vantage point, many scholars have viewed the large sugarcane plantations in the southeastern part of the country as the dominant element in the Dominican economy. But at the end of the nineteenth century, two different types of export agriculture existed. In the Cibao, the northern valley of the country, a decentralized peasant society evolved

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whose products were exported by a class of urban merchants. After a slump in tobacco prices in 1873, a shift to cocoa production occurred, but peasant production remained the base of Cibao society. An entirely different, plantation-based agriculture arose in the south that was characterized by a process of concentrating and monopolizing resources.

These two patterns of export agriculture not only influenced each other's development but also affected other regions. It is this interconnected process of agricultural change that will be analyzed in this article.

THE CIBAO: FROM TOBACCO TO COCOA

Following the expulsion of the Spanish colonial rulers, a Haitian interim government took power from 1822 until 1844 in the eastern part of the island of Hispaniola, the area that was to become the Dominican Republic. During this period, simple commodity production regenerated in the Cibao as thousands of small freeholders cultivated tobacco. At first the tobacco was sold in the recently opened Haitian market in the form of crude cigars and *andullos* (pressed tobacco rolls).² By the end of the Haitian period, however, German ships had begun to transport cargoes of raw tobacco to the Hanseatic ports of Hamburg and Bremen.³ Tobacco farming spread throughout the fertile valley. Peasant families lived scattered throughout the countryside and were largely self-sustaining. Because the Dominican Republic was sparsely populated and large landholding was virtually nonexistent in the Cibao, every producer could utilize as much land as needed.

Tobacco was grown in a rather unsophisticated way. Land was cleared by slash-and-burn techniques. No seed selection was performed, and tobacco leaves were dried and fermented in the open. All labor was supplied by family members, with much of the peasant family's energy being devoted to cultivating food crops. Whenever more labor was needed than a family could provide, the peasants resorted to a system of mutual cooperation, the *junta gratuita* or *junta de vecinos*.⁴ During the first half of the nineteenth century, the demand for tobacco in the European market was substantial. Because Dominican tobacco was considered to be of excellent quality,⁵ German merchants settled in the Cibao as soon as the political situation permitted, in the 1840s. They acted as buyers, brokers, and importers and also supplied money to the tobacco growers. Other mercantile houses ran their businesses from the Danish free port of St. Thomas.⁶ Overall, merchants from Hamburg and Bremen bought about 90 percent of Dominican tobacco in the nineteenth century.⁷ Between 1844 and 1860, fourteen of the sixteen exporting houses in Puerto Plata (the principal port of export) were foreign.⁸

The period between 1844 and 1861 was a time of considerable

economic activity in the Cibao. All tobacco was transported to Santiago, the center of the Cibao tobacco market. There it was classified and handled before being sent to Puerto Plata, where most of the foreign mercantile houses traded. A class of native merchants also developed. The commercial sector in Santiago consisted of two segments. At the top were the large-scale merchants who were influential in regional politics, predominant in economic affairs, and relatively wealthy. This stratum could be called a commercial bourgeoisie. Lower in the hierarchy, but greater in number, were the smaller city merchants, the *especuladores*, who possessed only minor capital and usually received advances from the export houses.⁹

Dominican tobacco passed through many hands before reaching Puerto Plata, partly as a result of primitive transportation. As late as 1870, no roads existed that were fit for carriages (*caminos carreteras*) nor any bridges to speak of. Goods and passengers were transported by horse or mule, and river transport was confined to *lanchas* (canoes). Until the 1880s, all transportation from Santiago to Puerto Plata was carried out by *recuas* (herds of some twenty pack animals), each animal carrying two *serones* (sixty-kilogram bags). It was a slow and risky enterprise: between 1870 and 1884, more than fifteen hundred animals perished en route.¹⁰ Because of the perils involved, the *recueros* developed into an identifiable occupation with a widely respected code of honesty.¹¹

Between 1882 and 1887, the Samaná-Santiago railroad was constructed, providing the first improvement in transportation in the Cibao area.¹² Santiago had to wait until 1897 for a railroad connecting it to Puerto Plata.

Still another reason existed for the mercantile class's failure to obtain effective control over tobacco production and supply: the decentralized structure of tobacco cultivation made it impossible to establish direct relations with every producer. The supply of tobacco depended on a highly diversified and disorganized network of middlemen called *corredores*. These local strongmen could exercise some degree of control over the peasants because they were the only source of credit. Pedro Bonó described the logic of this commerce:

[The peasant] sows the tobacco and offers to sell it to a shopkeeper, if the latter will give him what he and his family need. The shopkeeper does not have the means to do so because the revolutions have devoured his savings. But he recognizes good business and runs to the foreign merchant, whom he asks for an advance. The merchant, who already knows that the peasant has sown the tobacco and that it will only take four months for the tobacco to be dried and packed, gives the money to the shopkeeper with interest. The shopkeeper passes it on with more interest to the peasant, who is now able to look after himself and his family.¹³

In the second half of the 1870s, the tobacco world market became oversupplied with the enormously increased production of Brazilian and Dutch East Indian (Deli) tobacco. Falling tobacco prices were exacerbated by an economic recession between 1883 and 1896. The price of Dominican tobacco per *quintal* (forty-six kilograms) fell from between fourteen and twenty Dominican pesos in 1849 to nine pesos in 1872 and to four pesos in the 1880s.¹⁴ The merchant class did its best to shift the burden of low prices to the producers. The newspapers were filled with complaints about the poor quality of the tobacco and the incompetence of Dominican peasants, an ideal pretext for keeping the prices as low as possible. Tobacco prices fell so low that it became common knowledge that tobacco cultivation was no longer remunerative: "The price . . . of Dominican tobacco is so low that, considering the costs of packing, transporting, etc., very little or nothing remains for the producers."¹⁵ Moreover, merchants took charge of activities formerly performed by the producers, such as classifying and packing the tobacco. This shift represented an important step toward increased specialization in the tobacco sector and more effective control by the merchants. It also created a demand for the seasonal wage labor of hundreds of women to work for the merchants at low wages.¹⁶

Merchants also suffered from the economic recession. Profit margins went down, and the tobacco remained unsold on the wharf. But although several merchants were already bankrupt in the 1870s, the mercantile sector was hardest hit in the early 1880s. The number of commercial houses in Santiago decreased from twenty-five in 1879 to six in 1884.¹⁷ A newspaper article observed in 1882, "Three years ago the commercial sector in Santiago was embellished by twenty-five commercial establishments, which are closed today: a bitter contrast with yesterday."¹⁸ The resentment of the Dominican merchants against the "disastrous monopoly of Hamburg, which has reduced our commerce to poverty"¹⁹ grew stronger and stronger: "The German buyer abuses and reaps excessive benefit from the precarious situation of our exploited commerce. In order to fulfill its credit obligations and other compromises, it is obliged to accept the sales and auctions of that privileged group, who have long been increasing their millions, mainly at the cost of the Dominican producer."²⁰

Some merchants and government officials tried to find alternate markets for tobacco, but protective duties elsewhere stymied these attempts.²¹ Other solutions were consequently sought. Attempts to promote coffee and cotton cultivation failed, but cocoa cultivation in the eastern part of the Cibao provided an alternative to the unprofitable tobacco sector. The mercantile class, dependent as it was on import-export trade, desperately needed another export crop. It is therefore not surprising that merchants as well as officials played active roles in

introducing and distributing cocoa seeds and in stimulating cocoa cultivation in general.

The Ignacio González government (1873–1874) exemplified the active approach toward the agricultural sector.²² One of its first measures was to offer military exemption to any peasant who grew more than five thousand coffee or cocoa trees. Governors and merchants were simultaneously distributing seeds, printing leaflets, and giving technical advice.²³ All these efforts sought to create a new export sector that would maintain commercial activity and secure the inflow of currency and imports into the region. Government action was not sufficient, however. Only when merchants realized the importance of these efforts did real changes occur: “No one paid any attention to this important export item [cocoa] until the middle of 1878, because no one drank it in this city. Then Casimiro de Moya started to buy it at a high price in order to encourage the inhabitants. He did not earn much but still managed to export around sixty quintales. In 1879, despite the fact that several merchants were now buying cocoa, he exported more than two hundred quintales, and only God knows the results this year.”²⁴ García Godoy wrote in 1887 from La Vega, “People come flocking from all over, wanting to settle here, convinced of the brilliant future of the region.”²⁵

Cocoa production increased rapidly in the 1880s. By 1888, an estimated five million trees had been planted.²⁶ Production soared to more than half a million kilograms in 1888 and three to five million around the turn of the century.²⁷ Along with urban employment and the temporary railroad works, the cocoa sector created a regular demand for wage labor in the Cibao countryside. To a certain extent, the capitalist character of cocoa production resulted from the agronomic characteristics of the crop. A perennial, the cocoa tree takes four to five years to start producing. This time frame required producers to adopt a mentality geared toward long-term planning and investing. Toward the close of the century, some large-scale plantations were founded, most by foreigners. The best-known was La Evolución in Sabaná de la Mar, south of Samaná Bay. Founded in 1888 by the French firm Montandon, Descombes, and Company, it contained one hundred thousand trees tended by German immigrant labor.²⁸

But in general, cocoa became a Dominican-owned sector.²⁹ Production was overseen by peasant families or Dominican capitalists who had accumulated their money in the tobacco trade. Dominican enterprises also played a major role in the cocoa trade, which gave the Cibao commercial bourgeoisie the opportunity to consolidate and increase its strength. The De Moya, Grullón, Guzmán, and García family names became well known during this period and still are.

SUGARCANE PRODUCTION IN THE SOUTH

The southern part of the Dominican Republic experienced the most dramatic economic changes in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Under colonial rule, the southern region (the site of Santo Domingo, the capital) had been the home of the Spanish estates. These estates were the basis of the nineteenth-century economic structure characterized by large landholdings. The labor required for cattle raising and woodcutting was provided by semiservile tenants.³⁰ In the coastal regions around Bani and Azua, peasant families grew some sugarcane, partly as a food crop (in difficult times, it served as “el pan de los pobres”³¹) and whenever possible as an export crop. At this stage, sugar production was carried out solely by peasant family labor. *Tra-piches* (wooden mills) pulled by draft oxen were used to crush the sugarcane, mills with iron rolls being scarce. In 1871, between one and two hundred of these mills were reported in Azua and another hundred in Bani.³² These mills, plus those in the district of Santo Domingo, processed all sugar produced before the 1870s. Exact production figures are not available, but in 1870, sugar exported from the port of Santo Domingo totaled 1,306,147 pounds,³³ and 1871 exports from Azua exceeded 1,500,000 pounds.³⁴ Thus sugar exported from the southern provinces totaled no less than three million pounds.

The simple methods used to cultivate and process sugarcane required the labor of many peasant families. Visitors spoke admiringly of the vitality of this agricultural sector.³⁵ Sugar commerce, however, was almost completely dominated by foreign merchants operating from outside the Republic, mainly from Curaçao. They bought the sugar, transported it to Curaçao, and reexported it from there.³⁶ Consequently, the traditional Dominican sugar sector did not produce a strong native commercial class.

The last quarter of the nineteenth century brought many changes. Increased competition for tropical commodities among industrializing countries made controlling their production more attractive. In the Dominican Republic, this goal meant fostering sugar plantations that were mostly financed by Cuban and U.S. capital.

Certain developments during this period also stimulated sugar production. First, a series of “modernizing” governments stimulated capital investment and offered tax exemptions and other advantages to new enterprises. This trend started under the González government (1873–1874) and culminated under Ulises Heureaux (1883–1899). Political stability under the long Heureaux dictatorship guaranteed internal peace by means of a strong military apparatus. Second, thousands of Cubans emigrated during the Ten Years’ War in Cuba (1868–1878), bringing much capital, entrepreneurship, and know-how into the coun-

try. Third, Cuban competition was temporarily absent during the Ten Years' War, and the British West Indies suffered a structural crisis in its sugar industry due to soil exhaustion and loss of the political support of the British "sugar interests." Fourth, sugar prices on the world market remained high until 1883. Fifth, improvements were achieved in national and international transportation.

In a technologically backward economy, each humble technological innovation is viewed as world-shaking modernization. The reaction to the first stages of modern sugar production in the Dominican Republic proved no exception to this rule. The technology introduced in the 1870s was still primitive but was heralded as the coming of modern times. The *Gaceta de Santo Domingo* published a series of articles in the summer of 1877 entitled "En la elaboración del azúcar está la salvación del país."³⁷ Expectations ran high, especially among the weak commercial and entrepreneurial classes in the southern towns. They hoped that the new sector would provide them with a power base for supplanting the old landowning establishment.

Not surprisingly, the first more capital-intensive attempts to cultivate sugarcane occurred in the north, then the economic heartland of the country. In 1872 a Cuban immigrant named Carlos Loynaz founded two *ingenios*, San Marcos and La Isabel, a few miles from Puerto Plata.³⁸ Although these plantations did not use steam power, they opened prospects for a new age. The enterprise was financed by Cuban and U.S. capital and had an office in New York. Land was purchased, bridges constructed, and capital invested in housing and tools. Local cultivators were encouraged to grow sugarcane, which could then be crushed and processed on the two *ingenios*. The enterprise was organized according to the Cuban *central* system. Dominican peasants accepted the obligation of delivering sugarcane to the *ingenios* under a contract stipulating the conditions.³⁹ For a short while, the enterprise became an example used by opinion makers to lament Dominican lack of initiative and foresight. *El Porvenir* editorialized, "Mackerel, tobacco, wood, and salt cannot be the only items in our commerce; sooner or later we have to break the monotony that we have accepted until now." The newspaper devoted the rest of its lead article to Loynaz, who acquired a saintly image.⁴⁰ He was eulogized for daring to invest his capital and for breaking with the "odious practice of cent after cent." Although Loynaz went bankrupt within two years, his example was ultimately followed—not in the Cibao but in the "empty" lowlands of the southeast.

Starting the modern sugar industry in the Dominican Republic is generally attributed to Cuban entrepreneur Joaquín Delgado. With the help of Rafael Martín, he converted his *ingenio*, La Esperanza, into the first steam-powered sugar plantation in 1874.⁴¹ He started by planting six Cuban *caballerías* (thirty-three acres each) four miles from the capital.

By 1879 he had planted ten caballerías. The plantation used the most modern technology of the time, but its steam power was what impressed contemporaries most. The amount of capital needed to launch this kind of enterprise was evident from its 1879 selling price of \$150,000.⁴²

After 1874 the sugar sector expanded dramatically. New ingenios sprang up everywhere, and the air was full of what Antonio Lluberes has aptly called "the sugar dream."⁴³ Between 1875 and 1882, thirty sugar haciendas were founded in the Dominican Republic, all but three in the south.⁴⁴ The center of the new sugar industry was located east of the capital and had few links with the traditional peasant sector. Established in a region with no history of sugarcane cultivation, it represented a new sector of capitalist commodity production.

The peasants who produced sugarcane initially prospered in the shadow of the sugar boom. Demand for sugar and expanding opportunities for commercialization stimulated increased production. Many peasants continued to crush sugarcane on small ox-drawn trapiches. In 1883, just before the sugar crisis, Azua had more than three-hundred wooden or iron trapiches.⁴⁵

Some peasants attached themselves to sugar haciendas as *colonos*. Many plantation owners were eager to establish such contacts because their main concern was securing enough sugarcane to feed their expensive steam mills. Loynaz had already started a system in which producers received free land and an advance in exchange for delivering a fixed amount of cane. Especially after the sugar crisis of 1883, when the scarcity of wage labor worried planters, this system was perfected and became the basis of huge centrales.⁴⁶

In the long run, however, the modern sugar industry meant the ruin of traditional sugarcane cultivation.⁴⁷ After the sugar crisis, small-scale production was no longer remunerative, and large haciendas claimed most of the land and other means of production.⁴⁸ Some small farmers were incorporated into the sugarcane sector and stopped producing. Those who did not want to work on the ingenios were pushed westward,⁴⁹ where many started raising cattle for the Haitian market. But the small producers were not the only ones hit by plunging sugar prices during the world-market sugar crisis in 1883. The newly fostered sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic were equally affected. Loynaz had already gone under because of erroneous calculations, and now many other entrepreneurs discovered that they also had been too optimistic. Interest due remained fixed, but incomes decreased dramatically. Almost all the haciendas were in trouble. Many failed to make any new investments, and at least thirteen of them went bankrupt.⁵⁰ Some enterprises managed to avoid this fate by merging with companies that possessed sufficient capital. During this period, J. B.

Vicini made his immense fortune in sugar by cheaply buying or acquiring dominant interest in several haciendas. Other Dominican owners sold their estates to U.S. companies.

Only in the 1890s did the sugar sector regain its impetus. By that time, however, it had been modified by several factors: U.S. interests had become dominant, management was more efficient than ever, and the size of land holdings had increased considerably. Since that time, the southern part of the Dominican Republic has become completely subjugated to the interests of foreign plantation owners and the whims of the New York sugar market.⁵¹

During the sugarcane harvest, which lasted nearly half a year, many men were needed to do the heavy work of cane cutting. This intense demand for labor in the sugarcane sector had profound consequences on Dominican society. In 1884 the industry employed approximately six thousand men, five hundred of whom were foreigners.⁵² According to J. R. Abad, small peasants from all parts of the Republic flocked to the sugar ingenios in great numbers seeking employment.⁵³ The work force in sugarcane totaled seven thousand, including an estimated one thousand small producers. This figure implies that more than thirty thousand persons had become dependent on sugar production, a sizable number, considering the low population of the Dominican Republic at the time.

Migration to the sugar plantations affected the Dominican economy in two ways. First, it depopulated the western regions and occasioned their economic stagnation.⁵⁴ In 1883 in Azua (which then comprised the entire southwestern part of the country), the governor demanded an end to "the emigration of the rural population to other regions, where they hope to earn a salary as day laborers on the sugar haciendas, to the detriment of their own plots, which they completely abandon."⁵⁵ In 1886 the governor reported that the absence of any real protection for the agrarian producers and dwindling population had caused the turn toward cattle raising.⁵⁶ In 1887 depreciation of the national crops in international markets was blamed for *una miseria irresistible* in the province.⁵⁷ As a result, the hitherto flourishing province was drawn more and more toward the Haitian market. Some complained that Azua had become the "slave" of Haiti; others claimed that when the inhabitants of Azua spoke of the capital, they meant Port-au-Prince.⁵⁸ Similar trends were also occurring in the Monte Cristi region. Ultimately, the government became alarmed and tried to stop the frontier trade. Fear of losing territory to Haitian neighbors became an ongoing concern for various Dominican governments and eventually culminated in the slaughter of thirteen thousand Haitians in 1937 by order of President Rafael Trujillo.⁵⁹

Second, migration to the sugar plantations had a disastrous ef-

fect on the food supply. Food production, now in the hands of the families of sugar workers who stayed behind on the *conucos* (foodplots), fell short of the growing demand. This shortfall resulted in high food prices in the urban areas and frequent shortages of basic foodstuffs.⁶⁰ The problem became serious when wages in the sugar sector were no longer high enough to satisfy the sugar workers' basic needs. Here one finds an interesting aspect of capitalist penetration of a largely self-sustaining agrarian system. To attract labor for cane cutting, the sugar industry initially paid relatively high wages.⁶¹ As a result, thousands of men flocked to the sugar *fincas*, rapidly forming a class of wage laborers who (at least during the *zafra* season) depended completely on wage income. Thus a relatively large market for foodstuffs and consumer goods was suddenly created in a region that hitherto had provisioned only small urban populations. Just when a substantial portion of the productive population had been drawn away from the agricultural sector, the demand for foodstuffs rose enormously. The money suddenly pumped into the small Dominican economy also helps explain the tremendous rise in food prices.

In 1877 the newspapers were already complaining about speculation and unjustifiable price increases in the south.⁶² By 1884 *peones* were refusing to accept the wages offered by the planters, saying that it was impossible to live on so little pay.⁶³ Many workers returned to their villages instead.

The development of the sugar plantations exhibited a basic paradox. They were founded in semi-empty areas, as far as possible from peasant economies with dense populations and an established commercial class. Once the plantations were producing, however, all their efforts were geared toward obtaining a stable and controllable labor force.

The problem with the Dominican sugar plantations was that they made labor a commodity but could not effectively separate workers from the means of agricultural production. The unforeseen effects of this situation did not suit the planters at all. Scarce population and open land resources forced the planters to pay high wages, higher than ever because of fierce competition among the *ingenios*.⁶⁴ After the sugar crisis, they no longer were easily able to pay such wages. For some years, this situation caused an uneasy deadlock and occasional losses for the plantations. *Fincas* sometimes could not start the harvest because they did not have enough workers. When Dominican labor became too expensive a commodity, the *hacendados* sought workers in the British Caribbean colonies. Loynaz, a trendsetter in many respects, had already brought thirty-one men from one of the British isles in 1871, a group one official described contemptuously as "morenos y mal vestidos."⁶⁵ In the ensuing years, sugar entrepreneurs began to import laborers sporadically from abroad. After 1884 the system of indentured

labor became formally organized, with the complete cooperation of the authorities. From the 1890s onward, Dominican sugarcane was harvested by foreign immigrant workers.⁶⁶ In this same period, U.S. capital began to prevail in the sugar industry, which sealed the fate of the Dominican sugar sector as a typical enclave economy.

REGIONAL CONTRASTS

The economy in the northern Dominican Republic was originally based on small-scale tobacco production by peasant families. Although merchants exercised no strict control over these peasants, the tobacco trade was an important source of capital accumulation. To some extent, it accrued to expatriate merchants, but it simultaneously formed the base of a class of Dominican commercial capitalists. This class became the dominant economic force in the country in the 1870s and 1880s. Following the 1873 crisis in the tobacco world market, commercial interests realigned themselves. Many German mercantile houses withdrew to other markets; and Dominican merchants transferred part of their capital to the cocoa sector, which had been made viable by the construction of a railroad.⁶⁷ The center of economic activity shifted from the Santiago region to the eastern part of the Cibao, around Moca and San Francisco de Macoris. This trend was accompanied by extensive peasant migration. Although exact information is lacking, a class differentiation clearly occurred within the producing sector, partly reflected in patterns of migration and choice of crops.⁶⁸ Tobacco continued to be the principal crop of peasant families in the Santiago region and the western Cibao. Until the introduction of the more profitable burley tobacco in the 1960s, it was considered the "poor man's" crop. This characterization implied that peasant families maintained a certain degree of autonomy gradually lost by cocoa producers. Cocoa production initially guaranteed huge profits, but at the beginning of the twentieth century, it became increasingly associated with usurious interest rates and extensive debts.

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, when foreign capital tried to foster capitalist agricultural enterprises in the Cibao, they generally failed. I suggest two basic reasons for this failure. First of all, the vital class of small agricultural producers with free access to land were disinclined to leave their rural dwellings to work as wage laborers in the enterprises. Although wage labor existed in the region, workers were not separated from the means of production. For instance, they worked in infrastructural projects,⁶⁹ but such work remained a complement to agriculture, which continued to be the basis of their livelihood. Second, and probably more important, was the resistance of the Cibao commercial classes. Urban merchants acclaimed

every initiative of progress, but their support depended on the share they got of it. Foreign capitalist plantations typically maintained direct contact with their home countries, where they sold their products, and they tried assiduously to monopolize the commercialization of their products. This approach was unacceptable to the Cibao merchants, and consequently, commercial interests in the Cibao actively resisted any attempts to circumvent their services during the modernization of agriculture.⁷⁰

In the south, the situation was clearly different. Only a relatively small peasant sector existed there, forming a subordinate branch of the economy as a whole. More significant was the near absence of a native commercial class. In the south, the dominant class (and until the 1870s, the governing class) was the group of large landholders who lived off their land. Exporting cattle and wood were purely extractive economic activities, carried out by semiservile labor. Although land was hardly commercialized before the sugar industry arrived, a certain monopolization was evident. Peasant groups were confined to their communal lands (*terrenos comunales*), and their titles to this land were subsequently proved challengeable.⁷¹ The modern sugar industry quickly turned to the "empty" areas of El Seybo, where thousands of dollars were invested in machinery, housing, and other capital goods. This new sector transformed San Pedro de Macorís from an insignificant fishing hamlet into a bustling city. Laborers from all over the Caribbean arrived, with or without contracts. The transformation was so rapid that one alarmed official in San Pedro de Macorís complained: "Thousands of workers live on the six sugar fincas located in the vicinity of the city. They come to town on certain days of the week, and the police are unable to maintain law and order, as is required by moral decency."⁷²

Other negative social and economic effects of the focus on export agriculture became apparent to foreign observers as well as to the national government. In 1911 a British diplomat remarked that "the attention bestowed on cocoa has, at least in the Cibao, arrested the developments of other products," and that the "small farmers, who formerly grew crops for the consumption of their families, are frequently neglecting everything for cocoa, and purchasing articles of food, which they themselves could very well raise."⁷³

In the urban centers of the Dominican Republic, food prices soared sky high from the 1890s onward. Crops that had been abundant for centuries were virtually disappearing. The governors of Azua and Santiago wrote worried letters to President Heureaux about the demoralization and apathy of the rural population in their districts. In 1895 the governor of Puerto Plata complained: "The continuous demand for laborers by the railroad enterprise has caused great masses of the popu-

lation of this district to migrate. This has caused such demoralization and unrest in the rural villages that drunkenness, vagrancy, gambling, theft, and fighting increase every day."⁷⁴ Everywhere, groups of men were seen walking along the roads, looking for work. Expatriate plantations had been encouraged along the Dominican coast that produced sugar and some coffee in the south and cocoa and bananas in the north. Everyone was talking about *el progreso* and civilization, but no one really had any idea what these concepts entailed. Railways and steam locomotives were obvious heralds of a new age. But did the roaming wage workers and expatriate control also go along with it? Huge sugar plantations with modern steam machinery were signs of progress, but what about the expropriation of small landholding peasant families and the shortage of basic foodstuffs?⁷⁵

The Santo Domingo elite began to realize that in encouraging the sugar industry, they had welcomed a Trojan horse and that the undesirable consequences were irreversible. In July 1884, the influential *Eco de la Opinión* devoted its lead article "Crisis" to the punishment for lack of foresight: "No de un solo cultivo viven los pueblos."⁷⁶ A delegate to the Congreso Nacional analyzed the situation as follows:

It is certain that the government of the Republic and many others believe that the sugar ingenios will enrich the country. I do not think so. The sugarcane ingenios enrich their owners and those who can utilize the hacendados' capital. I do not share the illusion that the ingenios will make the country any richer. . . . The progress apparently fostered by the ingenios is fictitious. San Pedro de Macorís has shown the strongest example of what I now say. And what has happened in San Pedro de Macorís will repeat itself in every part of the country where sugar ingenios exist. The first time I visited this capital, I saw in the surrounding countryside many conucos that provided means of subsistence. But when the fincas came, showers of gold were expected and there was public elation. Today all the people who possessed a conuco have sold their land and transformed themselves into peones of the plantation owners. This has caused a scarcity of foodstuffs in Macorís that will also occur in Azua.⁷⁷

Modernization was not to be a painless process, and it brought changes and insecurity to the entire population. But the most anxious were the traditional elite in the Dominican Republic, who feared the consequences of a process they could not control. In the stronger colonial states of the Caribbean, governments had forced the incorporation of segments of their populations into wage-labor by means of strict vagrancy laws and workbook systems.⁷⁸ But Dominican authorities were hardly able to influence the course of events. Often they had to obey the power of capital, a superior force in a weak state.⁷⁹ This imbalance also led to an ambivalent attitude toward the increasing withdrawal of labor from the agricultural sector. Agricultural work was viewed as the axis around which society revolved. Although infrastructural work was applauded, its wage labor was associated with vagrancy and idleness.

The groups of men traveling through the countryside, drinking and waiting for work in the *ventorillas* (the roadside shops), were objects of disgust and fear.

CONCLUSIONS

As has been shown, two agrarian systems evolved in the Dominican Republic at the end of the nineteenth century. In the north, the production by peasant families—first of tobacco and later of cocoa—constituted the basic pattern, giving rise to a commercial class that dominated import-export commerce. The south became the center of large-scale sugarcane plantations that controlled the production, processing, and commercialization of their product. The implications of these export agricultural systems extended far beyond the regions of production itself. The transition to producing cocoa brought about two kinds of differentiation: social differentiation in withdrawing capital and land from the tobacco sector, thereby relegating the tobacco producers to the periphery of the Cibao economy; and geographical differentiation in shifting the center of the Cibao from the region around Santiago to the eastern triangle of La Vega–Moca–San Francisco de Macorís.

Large-scale cultivation of sugarcane in the south held even wider implications. In the first place, it ended peasant production of sugarcane around Azua and Bani, depriving the peasantry of capital and labor. Second, large-scale cultivation monopolized land resources in the southern parts of the Republic, causing a food shortage. In the long run, it also limited Dominican producers' access to land. Finally, the emergence of capitalist export agriculture in the eastern parts of the country led to the marginalization and ultimately the underdevelopment of the western region. Drained of its labor and deprived of government support and capital, the western region could do nothing but turn to the Haitian market as its sole recourse.

The consequences of this regionally differentiated development for twentieth-century Dominican history have been complex. In the present context, it is possible only to suggest some hypotheses about these effects. No doubt U.S. sugar interests in the southern Dominican Republic played an important role in the decision to send U.S. marines in 1916.⁸⁰ Under the military government, the sugar enterprises were able to expand their properties on an unprecedented scale. The resulting dislocation of rural society in the southern part of the Republic eventually led to resentment and protest by small landholders as well as the rural elite. In the drier Barahona region, a fierce struggle over scarce water resources ensued between the Dominican elite and the aggressive Barahona company.⁸¹ In the eastern part, the dislocation

gave rise to the guerrilla war of the *gavilleros*, which counted on widespread support from the rural population.⁸²

Reactions clearly differed in the Cibao, where agricultural transformation had occurred within existing social structures. The region experienced no extensive investment of foreign capital and little of the social and economic dislocations so evident in the south. As a result, U.S. occupation was initially met by a fairly reserved and pragmatic response. Only when the military government started to interfere with the economy of the Cibao by introducing a tax on land did a substantive anti-U.S. movement come into being.

Regional contrasts may also be helpful in analyzing the Trujillo dictatorship (1930–1961). I would suggest that the president's initial support came from the urban middle classes, but above all from the frustrated and sometimes desperate population of the southern countryside: smallholders and laborers, but also larger landowners who saw their position threatened by expanding U.S. enterprises.⁸³

It is significant, however, that although Trujillo was politically dominant, he never succeeded in establishing a decisive hold over the northern economy. The clearest example was his abortive attempt to establish a tobacco monopoly in 1934. The economic strength of the Santiago elite (and possibly its European contacts) forestalled too much interference from even as powerful a dictator as Trujillo. Such observations suggest that the different forms of agricultural transformation occurring in the late nineteenth century offer a crucial starting point for analyzing the history of the Dominican Republic in the twentieth century.

NOTES

1. For example, see *Tropical Development, 1880–1913*, edited by W. A. Lewis (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970); and E. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), chap. 11.
2. For instance, see M. L. Moreau Saint-Méry, *Descripción de la parte española de Santo Domingo* (1796; reprint, Ciudad Trujillo: Editora Montalvo, 1944), 98.
3. The first German merchant ships appeared on the northern coast in 1835. From 1845 on, the two Hamburg mercantile houses of Linck & Jones and Decastro & Petroltd established a regular trading connection with the island. See W. Kresse, *Die Fahrgebiete der Hamburger Handelsflotte, 1824–1888* (Hamburg: Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte, 1972), 165.
4. For instance, J. R. Abad, *La República Dominicana: reseña general geográfico-estadística* (1888; reprint, Santo Domingo: Banco Central de la República Dominicana, 1973), 297 and passim.
5. In 1849, French diplomat V. Place wrote: "The [tobacco] wrapper from Santo Domingo looks more pleasant and rich than any other and offers a perfect elasticity and good resistance." Cited in J. Boin and J. Serulle Ramia, *El proceso de desarrollo del capitalismo en la República Dominicana*, vol. 1, 1844–1875 (Santo Domingo: Ediciones Gramil, 1979), 194.
6. On the German penetration into the Caribbean from St. Thomas, see E. Wiskemann, *Hamburg und die Welthandelspolitik von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Hamburg:

- Friedrichsen, 1929), 117 and passim. Also, J. de J. Domínguez, *Economía y política en la República Dominicana, años 1844–1861* (Santo Domingo: Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo [UASD], 1977), 82–83.
7. Boin and Serulle Ramia, *Proceso de desarrollo*, 80–108.
 8. Domínguez, *Economía y política*, 60.
 9. The commercial class of Santiago remained utterly dependent on the credit of the foreign mercantile houses, which were established in Puerto Plata: “With only a few exceptions, commerce in Santiago cannot maintain itself without the help of Puerto Plata. The merchant of the interior cannot move without its assistance.” *El Liberal* 1, no. 10 (14 Nov. 1878).
 10. *Eco del Pueblo* 3, no. 111 (18 May 1884).
 11. H. Hoetink, *El pueblo dominicano, 1850–1900: apuntes para su sociología histórica* (Santiago de los Caballeros: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1971), 91.
 12. The construction of this railroad started in 1881 under the direction of Scottish entrepreneur Allen Howard Crosby. After many delays and intrigues, it reached La Vega in 1887.
 13. P. F. Bonó, “Apuntes sobre las clases trabajadoras dominicanas,” an essay written in 1881, in *Papeles de Pedro F. Bonó*, edited by E. Rodríguez Demorizi (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, 1964), 194.
 14. These prices are mentioned in Boin and Serulle Ramia, *Proceso de desarrollo*, 196; *El Porvenir* 1, no. 25 (6 July 1872); and *El Mensajero* 7, no. 13 (28 Aug. 1887).
 15. See the report on the situation in the Dominican Republic in the Dutch tobacco journal *De Tabakspiant* 10, no. 505 (9 Jan. 1883). During this period, the Dominican newspapers were filled with similar complaints. Producers who could afford not to sell their tobacco often refused to sell it. At the end of the harvest season in 1891, one paper reported that the “remaining tobacco is in the hands of the better-off cultivators, who prefer to store it rather than give away, as is commonly said, what has cost them so much work to harvest.” See “Sobre el tabaco,” *Eco del Pueblo* 10, no. 300 (19 Sept. 1891) (emphasis in original).
 16. “Hundreds, thousands of women make a living in a hard way, but at least eat and live, thanks to the preparation of the tobacco before it is packed,” said Diputado Andrew in the Congreso Nacional, 14 June 1889, cited in *Gaceta Oficial* 16, no. 797 (30 Nov. 1889).
 17. *Eco del Pueblo* 3, no. 125 (24 Aug. 1884).
 18. *Eco del Pueblo* 1, no. 35 (3 Dec. 1882).
 19. *Eco del Pueblo* 6, no. 225 (1 May 1888).
 20. “El Tabaco,” *Eco del Pueblo* 11, no. 318 (24 July 1892).
 21. The Dominican government opened negotiations with the Dutch but apparently to no avail. See “Memoria del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores” for 1889, printed in the *Gaceta Oficial* 17, no. 813 (22 Mar. 1890). In 1891 the Dominican consul in Hamburg reported that the “experiment with the Dutch markets did not have any results, and the imported loads have been reexported to this city to be sold.” See “Comercio de Hamburgo,” *Gaceta Oficial* 18, no. 902 (5 Dec. 1891).
 22. For a clear appraisal of this active role, see *Eco del Pueblo* 11, no. 315 (4 June 1892).
 23. For instance, “Comisionado especial de Agricultura, Samaná, 3 junio 1876,” *Gaceta de Santo Domingo* 3, no. 126 (16 June 1876).
 24. “Corresponsal de La Vega,” *Voz de Santiago* 1, no. 12 (13 June 1880).
 25. *Eco de la Opinión*, no. 400 (14 May 1887).
 26. *El Orden* 2, no. 50 (11 Oct. 1888).
 27. R. Ciferri, *Informe general sobre la industria cacotera de Santo Domingo* (Santo Domingo: Imprenta García, 1930), 127.
 28. “Memoria que el Gobernador Civil y Militar de Samaná presenta al Ciudadano Ministro de Interior y Policía,” *Gaceta Oficial* 15, no. 728 (4 Aug. 1888). Later the whole complex was bought by the Swiss company Surchard, which exported the cocoa directly to its own chocolate factory in Switzerland. See *Gaceta Oficial* 18, no. 856 (17 Jan. 1891).
 29. Ciferri, *Informe general*.
 30. Moreau Saint-Méry, *Descripción de la parte española*, 100–108.

31. For instance, see *Eco del Pueblo* 1, no. 3 (10 Aug. 1856): "There is an extraordinary consumption of sugar cane; it seems to be the poor man's bread."
32. J. Del Castillo, "El resurgimiento de la producción azucarera dominicana como sector de explotación: los límites del trapiche," *Inazúcar* 5, no. 28 (Nov.–Dec. 1980):41–50.
33. *Boletín Oficial* 3, no. 176 (8 July 1871).
34. Aggregated figures from the following issues of the *Boletín Oficial*: 3, no. 192 (28 Oct. 1871); 3, no. 193 (4 Nov. 1871); 3, no. 194 (11 Nov. 1871); and 4, no. 208 (10 Feb. 1872).
35. Compare S. Hazard, *Santo Domingo, Past and Present, with a Glance at Hayti* (1873; reprint, Santo Domingo: Ed. de Santo Domingo, 1982), 245–46; and J. J. Sánchez, *La caña en Santo Domingo* (1893; reprint, Santo Domingo: Ediciones Taller, 1976), 24–27.
36. An indication of the level of involvement in Dominican society can perhaps be found in the letter of protest against the sudden devaluation of the Dominican currency by the Santana Government in 1858. The letter was signed by thirteen merchants, many of them of Sephardic Jewish background. The letter, dated 5 May 1859 and written in Santo Domingo, can be found in the Municipal Archive in Willemstad, Curaçao in an unclassified box labeled "Santo Domingo."
37. "En la elaboración del azúcar está la salvación del país," *Gaceta de Santo Domingo* 4, no. 177 (25 June 1877); and continued in the following issues of the *Gaceta*: 4, no. 178 (1 July 1877); 4, no. 180 (16 July 1877); and 4, no. 182 (2 Aug. 1877).
38. See *El Porvenir* 1, no. 10 (23 Mar. 1872). See also the letter from C. J. Loynaz to the minister of Interior y Policía, 4 Mar. 1872, in Archivo General de la Nación, Santo Domingo (hereafter referred to as AGN), Correspondencia del Ministerio de Interior y Policía, legajo 16, 1872.
39. *El Porvenir* 1, no. 11 (30 Mar. 1872).
40. "Yesterday a man stood up who had abandoned the beaten path and fixed his attention on the agriculture of our district, and with daring energy he paved the way, perhaps not to its regeneration, but to waken it out of its agonizing sleep," *El Porvenir* 1, no. 19 (25 May 1872).
41. See Sánchez in *La caña*, 29; and H. Ortiz, "Algunas consideraciones sobre el alza del azúcar en la República Dominicana, 1875–1900," *Revista de Historia* (San José, Costa Rica) 1, no. 1 (1975):1–20.
42. *Eco de la Opinión* 1, no. 13 (20 June 1879).
43. A. R. Lluberes, "The Sugar Industry: Emergence and Development of Capitalism in the Dominican Republic, 1872–1930," M.A. thesis, George Washington University, 1982.
44. Hoetink, *El pueblo dominicano*, 22.
45. "The sugarcane plantations, which constitute our agricultural wealth, are mushrooming, to the extent that more than three hundred trapiches, made of wood or iron, are not sufficient to crush the sugarcane produced during the harvest season. These are the mills that work with animal power. There are also two steam mills. . . ." See "Gobernación civil y militar de la provincia de Azua, 21 de febrero de 1883," *Gaceta Oficial* 10, no. 455 (10 Mar. 1883). Also Del Castillo, "El resurgimiento," 47.
46. More research is needed on the organization and division of labor on these centrales, which were sometimes very large. Above all, the socioeconomic position of the colonos, the sugarcane producers, requires detailed analysis. This short quote from a letter written by an owner of a central will give an idea of the functioning of this system in the Dominican Republic: "At this time this central counts thirty eight colonos, five of whom produce on central land, thirty three on their own land. . . . In the past harvest, these colonias produced two thousand tons of sugar cane. This year the total will be seven thousand." Letter of 11 Sept. 1890 from E. Hatton to Secretaría de Estado de Fomento y Obras Públicas, AGN, Correspondencia del Ministerio de Interior y Policía, legajo 123, 1890. The Cuban case is discussed in J. Martínez-Alier, *Haciendas, Plantations, and Collective Farms: Agrarian Class Societies* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 96–125.
47. See "Memoria de gobernación civil y militar de la provincia de Azua," 10 Dec. 1887,

- in *Gaceta Oficial* 14, no. 664 (14 May 1887): "Only a few small-scale *fincas* have been able to bear the costs of the sugarcane processing after the low prices and competition from the *ingenios*."
48. This theme dominates most twentieth-century research, which blames the sugar industry for the underdevelopment and dependence of the Dominican Republic. For examples, see F. Báez Evertsz, *Azúcar y dependencia en la República Dominicana* (Santo Domingo: UASD, 1978); W. Lozano, *La dominación imperialista en la República Dominicana, 1900–1930* (Santo Domingo: UASD, 1976); also Lluberes, "The Sugar Industry."
 49. J. Del Castillo, "La inmigración de braceros azucareros en la República Dominicana, 1900–1930," *Cuadernos del Cendia* 262, no. 7 (1978):6 and passim. This periodical is published by the UASD in Santo Domingo.
 50. Sánchez, *La caña*, 35.
 51. Lluberes views 1884 as the crucial year, the end of the "national phase" of the sugar industry. See "The Sugar Industry," 30 and passim.
 52. E. M. Hostos, "Falsas alarmas," in *Hostos en Santo Domingo*, edited by E. Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo: Imprenta García Sucesores, 1939), 1:159–76.
 53. Abad, *La República Dominicana*, 263.
 54. According to Sánchez, a hurricane acted as a catalyst in this process: "Emigration to the large haciendas began to empty the countryside of Azua, and the hurricane of September 6, 1883—which destroyed all the cane fields—sealed the fate of this town." Sánchez, *La caña*, 34.
 55. "Gobernación civil y militar de la provincia de Azua," 31 Dec. 1883, *Gaceta Oficial* 11, no. 501 (6 Mar. 1884).
 56. "Memoria de la gobernador civil y militar de la provincia de Azua," 1886, AGN, collection of provincial reports "Memorias, 1880–1895," of José A. Pichardo.
 57. Letter from the governor of Azua to the minister of Interior y Policía, 23 Aug. 1887, AGN, Correspondencia del Ministerio de Interior y Policía, legajo 107, expediente 1.
 58. *Eco de la Opinión*, no. 526 (12 Oct. 1889).
 59. Compare, for example, J. de Galíndez, *La era de Trujillo* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americana, 1958), 196–202. See also the novel by T. Prestol Castillo, *El masacre se pasa a pie* (Santo Domingo: Taller, 1973).
 60. U.S. Consul Astwood wrote in 1884, "The Island is hardly capable of producing for its internal consumption, especially in the regions where attention is geared toward sugar-cane." Cited in Ortiz, "El alza del azúcar," 14.
 61. Hoetink, *El pueblo dominicano*, 35.
 62. *Gaceta de Santo Domingo* 3, no. 160 (17 Feb. 1877).
 63. *Eco de la Opinión*, no. 274 (9 Oct. 1884). Also Abad, *La República Dominicana*, 267.
 64. Sánchez, *La caña*, 31.
 65. Letter from the governor of Puerto Plata to the minister of Interior y Policía, 4 May 1871, AGN, Correspondencia del Ministerio de Interior y Policía, legajo 13, 1871.
 66. See Del Castillo, "La inmigración."
 67. In general, Dominican merchants moved into selling cacao, but they also started producing cacao. In Puerto Plata, for instance, the three largest cacao farms were owned by former tobacco merchants. Some of them also tried their luck at sugarcane production.
 68. See P. Peek and G. Standing, *State Policies and Migration* (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1982), 1 and passim.
 69. It can be said that the Sánchez-Samaná railroad offered the first larger-scale opportunity to make a living outside agriculture. At the peak of activity, fifteen hundred men were working on the construction sites.
 70. In this respect, compare the aggressive attitude of the tobacco merchants toward the German mercantile houses. For example, when a good tobacco harvest was expected in 1892, it was written: "For this hope to die, it is only necessary that the gentlemen from Hamburg will send us, after they have received the first tobacco and have made a good price, one of these unanimous telegrams, while the second load is already underway, announcing a price drop, in order to obtain in this way the product that has cost so much work for nothing, thus causing the ruin of national commerce. . . ." *Eco del Pueblo* 10, no. 313 (13 Apr. 1892).

71. Compare A. Albuquerque, *Títulos de terrenos comuneros de la República Dominicana* (Ciudad Trujillo: Impresora Dominicana, 1961); also Lluberes, "The Sugar Industry," 140–48.
72. "Memoria de San Pedro de Macorís," Feb. 1892, *Gaceta Oficial* 19, no. 924, 7 May 1892.
73. Cited in P. A. Bryan, "The Transformation of the Dominican Economy," Ph.D. diss., 149.
74. Letter from the governor of Puerto Plata, 12 July 1895, AGN, Correspondencia del Ministerio de Interior y Policía, legajo 154, expediente 3.
75. The following statement clearly exemplifies the ambiguity of the Dominican elite: "The poor *jornalero* who, with remarkable regularity, used to earn at his house, day to day, his daily bread and look after the necessities of his family, today walks the streets and cannot find honest work that will provide him with a piece of bread. The idleness makes him nervous, the lack of work eats away his strength." "De actualidad," *Eco de la Opinión*, no. 665 (5 Mar. 1892). For similar opinions, see Hoetink, *El pueblo dominicano*, 37.
76. *Eco de la Opinión*, no. 264 (25 July 1884).
77. Diputado Franco in Congreso Nacional, 14 June 1895, *Gaceta Oficial* 22, no. 1104 (19 Oct. 1895).
78. See C. F. S. Cardoso and H. Brignoli, *Historia económica de América Latina*, vol. 2, *Economías de exportación y desarrollo capitalista* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1979), 7–104. The Guatemalan case is well documented in D. J. McCreery, "Debt Servitude in Rural Guatemala, 1876–1936," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 63, no. 4 (Nov. 1983):735–59. On Puerto Rico, see L. W. Bergad, *Coffee and the Growth of Agrarian Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). On the ambivalence of the Dominican elite, see M. Baud, "Ideología y campesinado: el pensamiento social de José Ramón López," *Estudios Sociales* (Santo Domingo) 19, no. 64 (Apr.–June 1986):63–82.
79. An excellent example of the arrogance of foreign capital is provided by the railroad construction in the Cibao, which occurred completely outside the framework of national control. Later, a British correspondent observed that the Ministro de Guerra was obliged to obtain a loan from some local merchants before the troops could enter the train. See "The Problem of Santo Domingo," *The Times* (London), dispatch from the West Indian correspondent, 24 Jan. 1905.
80. Compare J. F. Rippy, "The Initiation of the Custom Receivership in the Dominican Republic," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 17, no. 4 (Nov. 1937):419–57.
81. M. M. Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo* (1928; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1970), 132–33. Also, V. Garrido, *En la ruta de mi vida, 1886–1966* (Santo Domingo: Editora Arte y Cine, 1970), 111–13 and 120.
82. B. J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), chaps. 5–7.
83. Until now, hard evidence has been lacking. For instance, see B. J. Calder, "Varieties of Resistance to the United States Occupation of the Dominican Republic," *SECOLAS Annals* 11 (Mar. 1980):103–19. But the attention given by the Trujillo government to negative aspects of the sugar economy is significant. See correspondence on the "Malestar en la region del Este" in the "Memorandum confidencial al Comisionado Especial del Poder Ejecutivo en el Este," written by B. Ortiz, 29 May 1935, AGN, Sección de Comercio, legajo 35.