

## HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHERS ON *PHAEDRUS* 229B–30A

### 1. Introduction

At *M.* 7.433 the sceptic Sextus Empiricus infers from the statement that the early Stoics did not profess themselves to be sages that ‘Cleanthes did not know whether he was a human being or a beast more complex than Typhon.’<sup>1</sup> Since in two other passages, at *M.* 7.264 and *PH* 2.22, Sextus ascribes (variations upon) this confession of ignorance to Socrates rather than Cleanthes, whom Sextus otherwise obviously presents as one of his dogmatic adversaries, it has been alleged that the reference to one of the heads of the Stoic school must simply have been a ‘wilful misreading’ on Sextus’ behalf.<sup>2</sup> As I hope to show, there are good reasons for Sextus to refer to a Stoic here, or rather even better reasons for a Stoic to have brought up this reference himself.

As has been picked up well in modern scholarship, Sextus’ inference at *M.* 7.433 (as in the other two passages) ultimately refers back to the beginning of the *Phaedrus*, at 229e–30a, which contains an image (or perhaps even self-portrait)<sup>3</sup> of Socrates.<sup>4</sup> It is my contention here that Sextus’ inference is a faint reminder of the fact that this image functioned as a kind of touchstone among the different newly established Hellenistic philosophical schools: Epicureans like Colotes rejected Socrates’ words as insincere and hence as without value; the Stoics not only took Socrates’ confession of ignorance very seriously indeed, but also extrapolated their ideal of the sage from it; and probably even Pyrrho and Timon understood Socrates’ characterisation of himself as a description of the human state of ignorance accepted and praised.

As it is my intention to reconstruct how the Hellenistic philosophers used the image of Socrates in the *Phaedrus* passage,<sup>5</sup> I will thus *not* deal with what Plato makes out of

<sup>1</sup> οὐκ ἤπίστατο Κλεάνθης εἴτε ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶν εἴτε τι θηρίον Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον. For an assessment of the fact that the Stoics did not declare themselves to be sages see Brouwer (2002).

<sup>2</sup> Annas and Barnes (2000) *ad loc.*

<sup>3</sup> That is of the historical Socrates, as suggested by Rowe (1988) 140, who describes Plato as ‘extending a genuinely Socratic idea’ here.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. Fabricius (1718), Bury (1935), Bett (2005), who all refer *ad loc.* to *Phdr.* 230a, albeit via the cross-reference of *M.* 7.264. Mutschmann (1914) is the exception here in not referring to either passage.

<sup>5</sup> The Hellenistic reception of the *Phaedrus* passage has not been well understood in the modern literature. The Epicurean usage of the passage is well known (see e.g. Einarson and de Lacy (1967), Warren (2002b)). However, the use made of it by the sceptics is dealt with in a couple of remarks only (as in Decleva Caizzi (1980a) 409, (1980b) 62, Ioppolo (1995) 103ff., Bett (2006) 301) and furthermore the Stoic usage is downplayed in Decleva Caizzi (1981) 272–3: ‘Passi come *Pyrrh. hyp.* II 22 e *Adv. math.* VII 264 [*M.* 7.433 is not mentioned here] mostrano che egli [Socrates] rimaneva nella tradizione come una figura eccezionale e non facilmente tacciabile di dogmatismo.’

it in the continuation of the dialogue.<sup>6</sup> After presenting the passage and its immediate context (section 2), I will discuss how it was rejected by the Epicureans (section 3), but otherwise put to use by the Stoics (section 4) and probably the early Pyrrhonists too (section 5).

## 2. *Phaedrus* 229b–30a

Taking a stroll outside Athens, Socrates and Phaedrus arrive in the area where Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, one of the first kings of Athens, is said to have been seized by Boreas, the North wind. There Phaedrus asks Socrates whether he is convinced that this ‘mythological account’ (μυθολόγημα, 229c) is true. Socrates answers that he rather accepts these accounts or, as he puts it at 230a, ‘believes what is commonly said about them’. He admits that it would be normal not to be convinced by this mythological account, just as the ‘sages’ as he calls them (only partly in jest, as we will see) are not convinced either. He could, as he explains at 229c, like these sages ‘play the sophist’ (σοφίζόμενος), and explain instead that the wind blew the girl off the hill.<sup>7</sup> But, Socrates continues, this constitutes a weighty task for ‘an excessively clever and industrious man who is not altogether fortunate’ (229d), for he can go on and on, having to give interpretations of the shape of the Centaurs, of the Chimaera etc.:

[TEXT 1] If someone is unconvinced by these [sc. mythological accounts] and tries to reduce each to what is likely, with some rustic wisdom, he will need a great deal of leisure.<sup>8</sup> (*Phdr.* 229e)

Usually ἄγροικος is here interpreted as ‘rude’, ‘boorish’, opposed to ‘civilised’,<sup>9</sup> mostly combined with the interpretation that Socrates rejects the sages’ wisdom altogether,<sup>10</sup> but here it can just as well be taken in its first meaning of ‘rustic’ (opposed to ἄσπετος, ‘urban’, already mentioned in 227d), as a characterisation of the wisdom that concerns the countryside – a meaning towards which the setting of the dialogue in the immediate countryside that surrounds the city of Athens should already have made us sensitive. Rustic wisdom is thus knowledge of local geography, including the knowledge of the savage monsters inhabiting the countryside, such as Centaurs, the Chimaera and others. This wisdom, Socrates explains at 229e–30a, concerns things that are ‘alien’ to him:

<sup>6</sup> E.g. using it as an illustration of the instability of the tripartite soul, to be compared with the image of the charioteer and the horses at 246a–b. Cf. e.g. Rowe (2005) 154, (2007) 139–40.

<sup>7</sup> On revealing hidden meanings as an activity of (at least some of) the sophists see Richardson (1975).

<sup>8</sup> αἷς εἰ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει.

<sup>9</sup> See the monograph on ἄγροικος by Ribbeck (1888) esp. 39–40, where he deals with ἄγροικος in relation to Socrates, although *Phdr.* 229e is missing.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. e.g. Hackforth (1952) 24, Verdenius (1955) 268.

[TEXT 2] But I have no leisure for these [mythological accounts] at all; and the reason for it, my friend, is this: I am not yet capable of, in accordance with the Delphic inscription, knowing myself; it therefore seems ridiculous to me, while I am still ignorant of this subject, that I inquire into things that are alien.<sup>11</sup>

Some commentators have interpreted this rejection of rustic wisdom as a rejection of the method of rationally interpreting myth itself. I see no reason here to think of an attack on the ‘rationalists’<sup>12</sup> or, better but still inaccurately, to accept mythological accounts only in so far as they are ‘inoffensive’.<sup>13</sup> For Socrates does not reject the reductive interpretations of things that do not concern him because they are reductive, but because they do not concern him, that is: they do not contribute to his quest for self-knowledge. The reductive method can thus be important in as far as it contributes to self-knowledge. Socrates already hinted at that at 229d by making clear that the sages’ sayings are very ‘attractive ... in other respects’, and suggests at 230a that it ought to be applied to the mythological account of Typhon:

[TEXT 3] So then, saying goodbye to these things, and believing what is commonly thought about them, I inquire, as I was saying just now, not into these things, but into myself, to see whether I am actually a beast more complex and more violent than Typhon or a more cultivated and simpler living being, sharing some divine and ἄτυφος portion by nature.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike the other savage monsters Typhon apparently can be connected with self-knowledge. As for the Greeks Typhon is a (source of) wind, the point can also be formulated in these reductive terms: whereas Socrates was dismissive of the mythological account of the death of Oreithyia explained as caused by Boreas the North wind, the reductive account of Typhon apparently contributes to self-knowledge.<sup>15</sup>

As TEXT 3 shows, Socrates’ inquiry into himself oscillates between two alternatives, in which ‘complex’ is contrasted with ‘more simple’, and ‘more violent’ with ‘more cultivated’. Two further noticeable features are the word-play upon the root ‘τυφ-’ and ‘divine portion’ (θεία μοῖρα). ‘Violent’ (ἐπιτεθυμμένον) is derived from ἐπιτύφω,

<sup>11</sup> ἔμοι δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστί σχολή· τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, ὦ φίλε, τούτου τόδε. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἑμαυτὸν· γελοῖον δὲ μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἐτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν.

<sup>12</sup> de Vries (1969) 51, Rowe (1988) 139.

<sup>13</sup> Hackforth (1952) 26.

<sup>14</sup> ὅθεν δὴ, χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νῦν διή εἶλεγον. σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ’ ἑμαυτὸν, εἴτε τι θηρίον τυγχάνω Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῶον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον.

<sup>15</sup> On Typhon as a source of destructive winds see Hes. *Th.* 869–80, esp. 869–72.

‘to puff up’.<sup>16</sup> ἄτυφος is impossible to translate, but means ‘lacking τῦφος’, where τῦφος means vanity or pride, but also delusion or craziness.<sup>17</sup> In this context of playing with words a relation with Typhon is most likely: just as ‘puffed up’ can be associated with Typhon as a source of wind, so ἄτυφος, especially in connection with ‘divine’ in ‘divine portion’ (on which more directly below), can be associated with Typhon as the many-headed monster, who challenged the rule of Zeus: having been chased by Typhon Zeus finally managed to conquer the monster with the help of his fiery thunderbolts, thus single-handedly establishing his world order, proving himself worthy of it.<sup>18</sup> The meanings of ἄτυφος therefore include ‘free from vanity’, ‘free from delusion’ or – from a ‘reductive’ point of view – ‘divine’. The other feature, ‘divine portion’, has been explained by commentators on Plato in various ways.<sup>19</sup> Some take it as something outside human nature, that is divine assistance or grace,<sup>20</sup> others as something inside human nature, where a distinction can be made between those who distinguish the divine part from human nature,<sup>21</sup> and those who identify the two.<sup>22</sup> This is not the place to decide which of these interpretations is the correct reading of Plato. It is, however, important to be aware of the different possibilities.

In the *Phaedrus* passage Socrates thus presents himself,<sup>23</sup> or is at least said to present himself, as searching for self-knowledge. He does not claim to possess it, and tries to find it by means of a method of reduction: by comparing himself to Typhon he asks himself whether he is more complex, more violent, more vain or more deluded than this beast, or whether he is more simple and cultivated, possessing something divine or sharing in the divine.

<sup>16</sup> The term is hence clearly difficult to translate. Apart from my simple, and admittedly rather bland ‘violent’, in which I follow Rowe (1988), translations include ‘burning with pride or passion’ in Thompson (1868), ‘furious’ in Fowler (1914), ‘puffed up with pride’ in Hackforth (1952), Griswold (1986) and Ferrari (1987), ‘fierce’ in de Vries (1969), ‘fumante d’orgueil’ in Brisson (1989) and Moreschini and Vicaire (1998), ‘pervasa di brame’ in Reale (1998), ‘aufgebläht’ in Ritter (1922), ‘aufgeblasen’ in Heitsch (1993).

<sup>17</sup> See e.g. LSJ s.v.; de Vries (1969) 52; Rowe (1988) 140–1.

<sup>18</sup> Early accounts are in e.g. Hes. *Th.* 853–8, Aesch. *Pr.* 358–61. The monster is also referred to as Typhoeus: Typhon at *Th.* 306 and *Pr.* 354, and Typhoeus at *Th.* 820–80 and *Pr.* 370 (cf. *Hymn to Apollo*: Typhon at 306 and 352, Typhoeus at 367). The variations upon his name are of no significance: see West (1966) 252. For the interpretation of Zeus beating Typhon all by himself (unlike the previous battle against the Titans, which the gods won together) and thereby proving himself worthy of his rule see Most (2006) xxxiii.

<sup>19</sup> See the literature mentioned in the next three notes and cf. also des Places (1949) 149–62, Canto-Sperber (1993) 315 n. 338.

<sup>20</sup> Festugière (1932) 102 n. 3 ‘assistance divine’, Shorey (1933) 199 ‘grace of God’, followed by Bluck (1961) 435–6 ‘a divine allocation or dispensation’. Hackforth (1952) 24 suggests as much by translating ‘whom heaven has blessed’.

<sup>21</sup> Souilhé (1930) 25 ‘Elle est l’expression d’une sorte de surnature qui se greffe sur la nature humaine.’

<sup>22</sup> Berry (1940) 51 ‘The sense of *moira* is perhaps best taken here as “part” or “share”’, Greene (1944) 420 ‘Θεία μοῖρα is associated or identified with φύσις.’

<sup>23</sup> Presumably a trait of the historical Socrates: see (apart from well-known passages in Plato, such as *Ap.* 21b, 21d, 23b, *Symp.* 216d, *Th.* 150c) e.g. Arist. *Soph. El.* 183b6–8 (fr. 20 Giannantoni).

## 3. Epicureans

Explicit evidence that the *Phaedrus* passage was discussed in the early Hellenistic period comes from the Epicurean Colotes, a contemporary of Zeno and Cleanthes, and his book entitled *On the point that it is impossible to live according to the doctrines of the other philosophers*.<sup>24</sup> Colotes' treatise is lost, but from Plutarch's reply, entitled *Against Colotes*, we can reconstruct that it contained several attacks against Socrates.

At *Adv. Col.* 1118f–9c Colotes argues that the quest for self-knowledge leads to the 'collapse of life' (1119a τοῦ βίου σύγχυσις), saying 'These are the enormities in the *Phaedrus* that bring our affairs into disorder' (1119b ἐκείνα δ' ἦν τὰ ἐν Φαίδρῳ δεινὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων), after which the latter part of TEXT 3 (εἶτε Τυφῶνος ... μετέχον) is quoted. Plutarch replies that he cannot see how asking questions like 'What am I?' can lead to the collapse of life, and continues with a counter-attack upon Colotes' 'master' Epicurus (fr. 558 Usener), in which he explicitly refers to Typhon, playing upon its different connotations: 'He [Socrates] cleared life from madness and τύφος, and from burdensome and excessive illusions about oneself and arrogance. For this is what Typhon signifies.'<sup>25</sup>

A little earlier on in the treatise, at 1118c, Plutarch had already presented Colotes' argument against Socrates' quest for self-knowledge itself and his claim (made 'with youthful insolence' (νεανιευόμενος), as Colotes characterised it) that he knew nothing himself. (As both the claim and the quest occur in TEXT 2 and TEXT 3 respectively, Colotes may yet again have been referring to the *Phaedrus* passage here.)<sup>26</sup> This argument, more than the earlier one, reveals why Epicureans like Colotes rejected the *Phaedrus* passage and the (self?-)portrait of Socrates in it. For Colotes, quoted by Plutarch at 1117d, Socrates' words or arguments were 'dishonest' (ἀλαζών): 'What you said to people in your conversations was one thing, but what you actually did was something else.'<sup>27</sup> As is well known, for Epicureans Socrates' dishonesty consisted in claiming not to know anything, whereas in fact he did know a few things, and hence – even more importantly from the Epicurean perspective – not sharing this hidden knowledge with people he should have treated as his friends, thereby making life impossible, that is, making the Epicurean ideal of living together with friends impossible.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>24</sup> The title Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἐστιν is in Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1107e.

<sup>25</sup> τὴν δ' ἐμβρονησιάν ἐκ τοῦ βίου καὶ τὸν τύφον ἐξήλαυσε καὶ τὰς ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ ὑπερόγκους κατοήσεις καὶ μεγαλαυχίας. ταῦτα γὰρ ὁ Τυφῶν ἐστιν.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Einarson and de Lacy (1976) *ad loc.*

<sup>27</sup> καὶ ἕτερα μὲν διελέγου τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν, ἕτερα δ' ἔπραττε. On ἀλαζών see Ribbeck (1882) and MacDowell (1990).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Philodemus, *Lib. dic.* fr. 41.1–2 Olivieri and Cic. *Brut.* 292 with Riley (1980) 65–6. The things he thus did know would, of course, not have appealed to the Epicureans either, whether interpreted in a Stoic way (*infra*) or in a Platonic way (discussed by Warren (2002b) esp. 351–4).

4. *Stoics*

No explicit reference to the *Phaedrus* by the Stoics has survived. The Stoic usage of the *Phaedrus* passage is hence somewhat less easy to establish. However, a variety of the most remarkable terms in the *Phaedrus* passage reappear in the extant sources, making the conclusion inescapable that the Stoics exploited the passage. I will start with the occurrences of (variations upon) ἄτυφος in the Stoic corpus.

A Stoic definition of ἄτυφος can be found at DL 7.117 (*SVF* 3.646): the sage is ἄτυφος, as he has the same attitude towards fame (or a good reputation) as towards the absence of it.<sup>29</sup> Cleanthes *ap.* Clement, *Protr.* 6.72.2 (*SVF* 1.557) included ἄτυφος in his long list of synonyms of good. In both cases ἄτυφος is obviously used in an ethical sense. Furthermore, with regard to Zeno (ἄ)τυφος is used twice. First, Zeno's eagerness for learning is described in terms of τῦφος; according to the late third-century (BCE) historian of philosophy Hippobotus in DL 7.25 (fr. 10 Gigante) Zeno, although having made considerable progress, still allowed himself to study with Polemo, one of the earliest successors of Plato as head of the Academy,<sup>30</sup> thus being declared to possess ἀτυφία, which here surely means 'freedom from vanity'.<sup>31</sup> Secondly, at DL 7.15 (*SVF* 1.22; fr. 812 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons;<sup>32</sup> LS 3F; *FDS* 108; fr. 38 di Marco) a satirical characterisation has been preserved, composed by Timon of Phlius, Pyrrho's leading disciple and a contemporary of Zeno, in which Zeno is described in terms of τῦφος:

And I saw a greedy old Phoenician woman in her shadowy τῦφος,  
desiring everything, but her basket is gone,  
small as it was, and she got no more insight than the plunking of the four strings.<sup>33</sup>

The interpretation of the passage is notoriously difficult. It has been taken to show Zeno's 'vain attempts ... to catch philosophical fish in a net of fine mesh, a satirical representation of Stoic dialectic'.<sup>34</sup> However, as we just saw with regard to the Hippobotus passage, Zeno is not usually presented as being particularly interested in (dialectically) fighting other philosophers (if anything other philosophers fought him), he is rather presented as wanting to learn from them.<sup>35</sup> Diogenes Laertius'

<sup>29</sup> ἄτυφόν τε εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· ἴσως γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς τε τὸ ἐνδοξόν καὶ τὸ ἀδοξόν.

<sup>30</sup> For an interesting proposal as to what Zeno might have learned from Polemo see Sedley (1999) 151–2.

<sup>31</sup> See the parallel with Zeno's contemporary and rival Arcesilaus, declared 'free from [professional] vanity' by Diogenes Laertius at 4.42 (text 1A 176–9 Mette) in contrast to Timon's 'Why do you like a fool talk big (πλατύνεαι) of yourself?' (fr. 808 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons; LS 3E; fr. 34 di Marco).

<sup>32</sup> This most recent edition of Timon also gives the references to the still valuable collections by Wachsmuth (1885) and Diels (1901).

<sup>33</sup> καὶ Φοίνισσαν ἴδον λχνόγρῶν σσιερῶ ἐνὶ τῦφῳ ἰ πάντων ἰμείρουσαν· ὁ δ' ἔρρει γυργαθὸς αὐτῆς ἰ μικρὸς ἐών· νοῦν δ' εἶχεν ἐλάσσονα κινδαψοῖο.

<sup>34</sup> E.g. by Long (1978) 80. Cf. also LS 2, 15. Long followed Diels (1901) 194, whose argument is also quoted by Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (1983) 381; cf. Wachsmuth (1885) 104–6.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Pianko (1948–9) 122; Billerbeck (1987) 132; di Marco (1989) 195. In the revised version of his 1978 paper, Long (2006) 92 seems to have taken these criticisms into account.

introduction to Timon's three lines on Zeno as 'searching and precisely reasoning about everything' (ζητητικὸς καὶ περὶ πάντων ἀκριβολογούμενος) fits well here. Moreover, both expressions have Socratic connotations: 'searching' is a familiar way of Socrates describing himself (see for example Plato, *Ap.* 23b ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν); 'precise reasoning' is a quality that Timon elsewhere uses with respect to Socrates in another of his characterisations again preserved by Diogenes Laertius, at 2.19 (fr. 799 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons; fr. 25 di Marco), in which he describes Socrates as 'having presented precise arguments' (ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφίνας).<sup>36</sup> Timon's lines are therefore more appropriately interpreted as if Zeno desired to know about 'everything' (τὰ πάντα), but that his searching had little result: starting out from his 'shadowy confusion' (σκιερὸς τύφος), his collecting did not bring much: not only did the basket go missing in the process,<sup>37</sup> it also did not 'bring insight' (νοῦν ἔχειν). Interestingly, 'bringing insight' is one of the Stoic ways of describing the state of wisdom.<sup>38</sup> If his searching brought Zeno anything, Timon continues, then it is no more insight than (σ)κινδαψός. The Stoics are attested to have used this term as a sound without significance,<sup>39</sup> but it was also used as the name of an instrument with four strings.<sup>40</sup> These two meanings probably go back to the onomatopoeic rendering of the sound of the instrument, and thus presumably also with regard to the Stoics both meanings should be taken into account.<sup>41</sup> Both expressions 'to have insight' and 'the plunking of the strings' are related to order: the former can be related to the 'order of things' (κόσμος; cf. τὰ πάντα)<sup>42</sup> and the latter to an order of a musical kind. Thus when Timon ascribes to the Phoenician old woman not so much insight, but rather the sound of the plunking of strings, he could well be taken to say that she did not get insight into the order of things, but only produced, at best, some meaningless harmony by the plunking of strings. If this is a correct interpretation of Timon's characterisation

<sup>36</sup> Only two commentators discuss Diogenes Laertius' introductory words, although disappointingly: as qualities that will be illustrated in Timon's persiflage (Billerbeck (1987) 132–3) or as insufficient to interpret them (Gannon (1987) 603).

<sup>37</sup> di Marco (1989) 198 on fr. 38 suggested reading ἔρρηι as the imperfect tense of ῥέω, 'to flow over', rather than the present tense of ἔρρω, 'to perish'. However, Trapp (1991) 470 rightly pointed out that 'to flow over' is an unlikely meaning of ῥέω.

<sup>38</sup> See e.g. Stob. 2.102.20 (*SVF* 3.563) πάντα τε εὖ ποιεῖ ὁ νοῦν ἔχων; Stob. 2.66.9 (*SVF* 3.717); Plut. *Comm. not.* 1068d (*SVF* 3.672<sup>3</sup>); Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1053e (*SVF* 3.701). The point is also noted by Gannon (1987) 611.

<sup>39</sup> See esp. Galen, *De diff. puls.* 8.662 K (*SVF* 2.149; *FDS* 510) ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βλίτυρι, φασί, καὶ τὸ σκινδαψὸς ἄσημα παντελῶς ἔστι. Further (late and also non-Stoic) examples are mentioned by Hülser in *FDS* 509 (to which can be added Hermias, *In Phdr.* 218.3, translated as 'XY' by Bernard (1997) 372).

<sup>40</sup> LSJ refers to Athenaeus 4.183a–e, who quotes three comic poets, Matron, Theopompus of Colophon and Anaxilas.

<sup>41</sup> See Gannon (1987) 611, Hülser in *FDS* 509.

<sup>42</sup> See e.g. Aetius 1.7.23 (*SVF* 1.157) Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς νοῦν κόσμον πύρινον (sc. θεὸν ἀπεφίνατο); DL 7.138 (*SVF* 2.634; LS 470) τὸν δὴ κόσμον οἰκείσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ προνοίας.

of Zeno, Timon's usage of τῦφος, although presented in a satirical manner, could even have found approval of some kind from Zeno, who did not consider himself a sage, and therefore must have considered himself to be in a state of ignorance.<sup>43</sup> With regard to ἄτῦφος the conclusion must be that it was used by the Stoics in the ethical sense as an aspect of the good, that it was used with regard to Zeno to declare him 'free from (professional) vanity', and that τῦφος was used to characterise his state of ignorance.

However, it might be objected that these four occurrences of τῦφος in the Stoic corpus, rather than pointing us already to the *Phaedrus* passage, go back to the Stoics' more immediate predecessors such as Stilpo and the Cynics.<sup>44</sup> Stilpo was the subject of one of the parodies upon lines in Homer (sc. *Il.* 11.582 and *Od.* 2.783) by Crates the Cynic (preserved at DL 2.118; fr. 67 Giannantoni): 'And I saw Stilpo, suffering great pains | in Megara, where they say the beds of Typhoeus are.' As there is no mythological connection between Typhon/Typhoeus and Megara, whereas Stilpo was from Megara, an allusion to τῦφος is more than likely.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, there is something to be said for this story of Stilpo as referring to Socrates' dilemma at *Phdr.* 230a, if the anecdote preserved at DL 2.119 (fr. 11 Giannantoni) is given any weight: on drawing a crowd, Stilpo is said to have responded to the remark 'Stilpo, they stare at you as if you are a beast (θηρόιον)' with the phrase 'Not at all, but as if I am a genuine human being.' With regard to the Cynics and their predecessor Antisthenes there is quite a bit of evidence that shows that they made τῦφος into a topos.<sup>46</sup> For Antisthenes the goal in life is ἀτυφία (Clem. *Strom.* 2.21.130; fr. 111 Giannantoni), where τῦφος is guiding the masses (Stob. 3.593.15; fr. 289 Giannantoni). Furthermore, in the anecdotes preserved by Diogenes Laertius at 6.7 (fr. 27 Giannantoni) Antisthenes declared Plato to be 'puffed up' (τετυφωμένον), calling him a 'showy horse' (ἵππος λαμπρυντής), and expressed surprise at the fact that Plato, when ill, simply vomited bile rather than τῦφος. With regard to Diogenes the Cynic an anecdote concerning an exchange with Plato survived in two versions (DL 6.26; fr. 55 Giannantoni): in one version Plato responds to Diogenes, who trampling upon Plato's carpets says 'I trample upon Plato's vainglory', with 'How much τῦφος do you show, by appearing not to be puffed up (τετυφώσθαι)'; in the other version Diogenes would have said: 'I trample upon Plato's τῦφος',

<sup>43</sup> On the Stoics as followers of Socrates see the classic article by Long (1988) 150–71 (reprinted with a 'Postscript 1995' in his (1996) 1–34), although if the interpretation of the Stoics' use of Socrates' *confessio ignorantiae* offered here is correct, the contrast between the dogmatic Zeno following the Xenophontic Socrates and the sceptical Arcesilaus following the Platonic Socrates is too sharply drawn there.

<sup>44</sup> On Crates as Zeno's first 'Socratic' teacher to be followed by Stilpo see e.g. DL 7.2 (SVF 1.1), DL 2.114 (not in SVF), cf. Numenius *ap.* Eus. *PE* 14.5.11 (SVF 1.11; fr. 25 des Places).

<sup>45</sup> See e.g. Dudley (1937) 57, Marcovich (1999) *ad loc.*

<sup>46</sup> See further Norden (1892) 311–12, Dudley (1937) 56 ('almost a technical term'), Goulet-Cazé (1986) 17 n. 2, and esp. Decleva Caizzi (1980b).



which drew Plato's response thus: 'With another kind of τῦφος.' For Crates the Cynic, besides the parody on Stilpo already mentioned, there are two more pieces of direct evidence that he used τῦφος: in the so-called Pera fragment (preserved in DL 6.85; fr. 70 Giannantoni) he described Pera, his ideal community, as surrounded by τῦφος; in another composition Crates stated that wealth may lead to τῦφος (DL 6.86; fr. 74 Giannantoni). Finally, Monimus of Syracuse, a pupil of Diogenes the Cynic and a companion of Crates, said according to Sextus, *M.* 8.5 (fr. 2 Giannantoni) that "everything is τῦφος", which is thinking of things that are not, as if they are',<sup>47</sup> and according to Menander in his play *The groom ap.* DL 6.83 (fr. 1 Giannantoni; fr. 193 Kassel/Austin) that 'all that is being undertaken is τῦφος', where it is used to explain that Monimus 'did not speak a word to match the saying "know thyself"'.<sup>48</sup> What we see here is thus a clear interest in τῦφος, as well as some hints that may point in the direction of the *Phaedrus*: Socrates' dilemma in the anecdote on Stilpo, Diogenes' use of the word-play 'puffed up', and Monimus being linked (however pejoratively) with the Delphic saying.

On the basis of this evidence it can be argued that the Stoics' interest in τῦφος was simply taken over from their immediate teachers. However, there is evidence that suggests that the Stoics went beyond Stilpo and the Cynics and indeed must have returned to the more specific formulations of the *Phaedrus* passage itself.<sup>49</sup> In one of the two horns of Socrates' dilemma in TEXT 3, that is 'a more cultivated and simpler living being', both 'cultivated' and 'simple' can be traced back in our Stoic sources. Both terms are relatively infrequent, and thus make it probable that the Stoics took it from the *Phaedrus* passage. 'Simple' recurs as a characterisation of the sage and can be found in Stobaeus 2.108.11 (*SVF* 3.630).<sup>50</sup> The term is easily explained within the framework of Stoic theory: the simplicity (or non-complexity) of the sage is that the sage has got a rational nature, free from alien elements.<sup>51</sup> 'Cultivated' is also used with regard to the sage, that is to say it can be derived *e contrario* from Stobaeus 2.104.3–4 (*SVF* 3.677), where 'uncultivated' is used with regard to the inferior person. However, there is more in this passage in Stobaeus, at 103.24–104.5, that really ought to make us think of the beginning of the *Phaedrus*. The passage is therefore worth quoting here in full:

<sup>47</sup> τῦφον ... τὰ πάντα, ὅπερ οἰησὶς ἐστι τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὡς ὄντων.

<sup>48</sup> ῥῆμά τι ἰ ἐφθέγγεατ' οὐδὲν ἐμπερές, μὰ τὸν Δία, ἢ τῷ γνώθι σαυτόν.

<sup>49</sup> Wholly in line with the anecdotal tradition according to which Zeno's interest in Cynicism is explained out of an interest in Socrates (see DL 7.2–3; *SVF* 1.2), and with Philodemus' remark at *Stoic.* 13.3–4 Dorandi (not in *SVF*) that the Stoics wanted to call themselves Socratics at first.

<sup>50</sup> τὸν δὲ σπουδαῖον ... ἀπλοῦν.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. DL 7.98 (*SVF* 3.102), where knowledge is described as a simple good. In physiological terms the soul (or rather its leading part) of the sage differs from the soul of the inferior person in that the latter consists of fire and air, whereas the former freed itself from the air and consists of (a special kind of?) fire only: see Brouwer (2007) 305–11.

They also say that every inferior person is rustic. For rusticity is inexperience of the practices and laws in a city, of which every inferior person is guilty. He is also wild, being hostile to a lifestyle which is in accord with the law, bestial, and a harmful human being. And he is uncultivated and tyrannical, inclined to do despotic acts, and even to cruel, violent, and lawless acts when he is given the opportunities.<sup>52</sup>

‘Uncultivated’ is preceded by ‘bestial’ at 2.104.3 and followed by ‘violent’ at 2.104.5, clearly reminiscent of ‘the beast more complex and violent than Typhon’.<sup>53</sup> ‘Rustic’ at the beginning of the section, and explained by Stobaeus as ‘not having the experience of the customs and laws of the city’ can be contrasted with ἀστείος, ‘urban’ as a characterisation of the city, discussed in the preceding section at 2.103.12–17, one of the most elaborate passages on the Stoic city we still possess.<sup>54</sup> This pair of opposites again reminds of the beginning of the *Phaedrus*.<sup>55</sup>

It may be objected that in these passages the Stoics’ use of ‘simple’ and ‘cultivated’ is rather different from the use Socrates made of the adjectives in TEXT 3: whereas the Stoics applied them to the sage, Socrates applied these – in the comparative – to a human being. From a Stoic point of view this objection can be readily rebutted, precisely because of the usage of the comparative. The Stoics, especially in this kind of context, that is the contrast between the sage and the non-sage or inferior person, use the comparative in a special, ‘paradoxical’, way. Rejecting the commonsensical reading of a comparative expressing ‘more of the same’ as in ‘amongst all sweet objects one sweet object can be sweeter than the others’, they offer their ‘paradoxical’ reading of the comparative as an expression of approximation that in the end has nothing to do with the basic quality from which the comparative is derived. The most prominent Socratic example can be found in Plato’s *Ap.* 23b, in which Socrates finds himself wiser than all other human beings, but not at all truly wise; the best-known Stoic example is surely with regard to someone who makes progress towards the good: someone who makes progress, becomes a better person, but is in no way a truly good or virtuous person.<sup>56</sup> In the same manner ‘more cultivated’ and ‘more simple’ can be taken as approximations of ‘cultivated’ and ‘simple’, which as such can only be said

<sup>52</sup> (103.24) φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἄγροικον εἶναι πάντα φαῦλον· τὴν (25) γὰρ ἀγροικίαν ἀπειρίαν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἔθῶν καὶ (104.1) νόμων· ἢ πάντα φαῦλον ἔνοχον ὑπάρχειν. εἶναι δὲ καὶ (2) ἄγριον, ἐναντιωτικὸν ὄντα τῇ κατὰ νόμον διεξαγωγῇ καὶ (3) θηριώδη καὶ βλαπτικὸν ἄνθρωπον. τὸν δ’ αὐτὸν τοῦτον (4) καὶ ἀνήμερον ὑπάρχειν καὶ τυραννικόν, οὕτως δια- (5) κείμενον ὥστε δεσποτικά ποιεῖν. ἔτι δὲ ὡμὰ καὶ βίαια καὶ παρὰ νόμα καιρῶν ἐπιλαβόμενον.

<sup>53</sup> ‘Tyrannical’ can also be linked with Typhon: cf. Dio, *Or.* 1.67, with Dudley (1937) 57.

<sup>54</sup> See Schofield (1999) 131–5. For the Stoic usage of ἀστείος predominantly attested in relation to the law pervading the world see Schofield (1999) 136–41. On the opposition between ἀγροικός and ἀστείος with regard to the Stoics see further Ribbeck (1888) 46–7.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Cicero, who – following the early Stoics? – also uses this contrast at the beginning of his (Stoicised) *Leg.* 1, with explicit reference (at 3) to the beginning of the *Phaedrus*. See e.g. Dyck (2004) 20–2.

<sup>56</sup> See e.g. Plut. *Comm. not.* 1063a (*SVF* 3.539); cf. in the form of the paradox ‘all mistakes are equal’, DL 7.120 (*SVF* 1.224), Cic. *Par. St.* 20–6 (referred to at *SVF* 1.224).

of the sage. So for the Stoics Socrates' ignorance about whether he is being either a beast or a human being, at the same time offers a clue as to what self-knowledge should amount to. Socrates' confession of ignorance thus interpreted contains both an analysis of his present condition as an inferior person as well as a suggestion as to how this condition might be overcome or perhaps better what it would entail, i.e. being simple and cultivated.

The apposite 'divine and ἄτυφος portion' can also be understood on these two levels of imperfection and perfection, as imperfect reason possessed by all full-grown human beings on the one hand and as perfect reason acquired by the sage on the other. 'Portion' (μοῖρα) was used by the Stoics, notably by Chrysippus, as we know from Diogenianus (*ap. Eus. PE* 6.8.9; *SVF* 2.914) in his critique of Chrysippus' contention that the different names given to fate, such as Μοῖραι, support the doctrine that everything is fated: 'The name of the Μοῖραι derives from their function of apportioning and distributing some lot to each of us',<sup>57</sup> thus relating μοῖρα to the verb μείρομαι, 'to receive as one's portion'. As everything is determined by fate and we all have a share in it, μοῖρα is thus one's personal fate that is a portion of the fate of the whole.<sup>58</sup> Since, according to the Stoics, the fate of the whole is just another expression for the reason pervading the cosmos,<sup>59</sup> μοῖρα as individual fate must be just another expression for one's personal portion of the reason of the cosmos. 'Sharing' (μετέχον) and 'by nature' (φύσει) fit well too. 'Sharing' might be read as sharing alongside other μοῖραι which together constitute divine cosmic reason, and nature in 'by nature' might be read as human nature, in which our portion of divine reason can be developed by our rational capacity. The problem discussed in section 2 whether θεῖα μοῖρα should be interpreted transcendentally as divine grace or immanently as a (divine) portion in us would thus have been decided by the Stoics in favour of the immanent reading.

What is more, Socrates even offers a method of how to achieve this good state, that is by applying the reductive method from TEXT 1. As is well known the Stoics were interested in the method of 'reducing' mythological accounts, that is – in standard Stoic terminology – of reading myth allegorically.<sup>60</sup> In contrast to all these other strange creatures inhabiting the countryside mentioned at *Phdr.* 229d–e and for which he has no leisure, Socrates *does* have time to mention Typhon in his inquiry of himself, which suggests that it *does* make sense 'to reduce' this monster. Besides the

<sup>57</sup> ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Μοῖρας ὀνομάσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μεμερίσθαι καὶ κατανεμεμήσθαι τινα [sc. τὴν εἰμαρμένην] ἡμῶν ἐκάστω. Cf. Stob. 1.79.11–12 (*SVF* 2.913; LS 55M) Μοῖρας δὲ καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὰς διαμερισμοῦ.

<sup>58</sup> Like μοῖρα 'fate' (εἰμαρμένη) is presumably also related to μείρομαι (see e.g. LSJ s.v. μείρομαι. Gundel (1912) 2623–4, Greene (1944) 402). The Stoics also seem to relate fate to εἶρω, 'to connect', as in DL 7.149 (*SVF* 2.915) ἔστι δ' εἰμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη.

<sup>59</sup> See e.g. Chrysippus in *On definitions* [or *On seasons?*, the text is uncertain] 2 and in the books *On fate* and elsewhere according to Stob. 1.79.5–6 (*SVF* 2.913; LS 55M) εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος; Stob. 1.133.3–5 (Arius Didymus fr. 20; *SVF* 1.87) διὰ ταύτης [sc. matter] δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντός λόγον, ὃν ἔνιοι εἰμαρμένην καλοῦσιν; DL 7.149 (*SVF* 2.915).

<sup>60</sup> On allegorical interpretation in early Stoicism see e.g. Steinmetz (1986) 18–30, Boys-Stones (2001) 31–43.

interpretation of Typhon as a source of wind (see above n. 15) there are various other and more meaningful ways to allegorise upon Typhon. As the Stoics identified Zeus with cosmic reason,<sup>61</sup> his battle with Typhon may well be understood as a metaphor for reason prevailing over unreason,<sup>62</sup> and hence of (the possibility of) overcoming ignorance. Another possible manner in which the mythological account of Typhon can be ‘reduced’ is in connection with Python, the monster that had to be beaten by Apollo before he was able to found his sanctuary at Delphi, to the extent that ‘before the fifth century some Greeks, if not all, called Apollo’s opponent Typhon’ and that ‘the names Typhon and Python are in fact variants of a single name.’<sup>63</sup> Interpreting Socrates’ inquiry into himself ‘in accordance with the Delphic inscription’ (or as put in Plato, *Ap.* 23c ‘in the service to the god’, διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν) as a search for self-knowledge, the Stoics may have thought that Socrates allegorically brought up the suggestion that finding self-knowledge is to repeat what Apollo did.<sup>64</sup> Like Apollo beating Typhon, we should beat Typhon or ignorance or badness. This reductive interpretation of Typhon/Python has an interesting implication concerning our relation to the gods: whereas in the search for self-knowledge one is a servant to Apollo only, by finding self-knowledge or developing one’s divine portion in the world one becomes equal to the god or even divine oneself. This victory could thus have been the true *apotheosis* (or better *entheosis*, as we discover the divine in ourselves, cf. for example DL 7.119 (*SVF* 3.606) ἔχειν γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἰοῦναι θεόν) of the Stoics’ project.<sup>65</sup>

To sum up: apart from τῦφος, which can well be regarded as a common theme among the Cynics, not only the string of adjectives which occur in Stobaeus, such as ‘rustic’, ‘urban’, ‘bestial’, ‘violent’, ‘urban’, ‘simple’ and ‘(un)cultivated’, but also their application of the reductive method ought to lead to the conclusion that the Stoics must have drawn from the beginning of the *Phaedrus*, allowing them to read in TEXT 3 not only their ideal of wisdom, but also a diagnosis of the *condition humaine* and a way to overcome it.

<sup>61</sup> See e.g. Chrysippus, *On the gods* 1 according to Philod. *Piet.* col. 4.12–18 Henrichs (*SVF* 2.1076) ἀλλ[ὰ μὴν] καὶ (i.e. the Stoics earlier than Chrysippus, cf. Obbink (2002) 200 n. 40) Χρόσιππος τὸ πᾶν ἐπὶ Διὶ ἀνάγκων ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ θεῶν Δία φη[σὶν εἶναι τὸν] ἅπαντα διοικοῦντα λόγον; DL 7.88 (*SVF* 3.4; LS 63C) ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, κατηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι.

<sup>62</sup> Typhon has been characterised as ‘*acosmia* incarnate’ by Clay (2003) 26; cf. Blaise (1992) 362, 363 ‘un anti-Zeus parfait’, ‘une menace pour l’organisation du cosmos’.

<sup>63</sup> Fontenrose (1959) 77–93 at 91; cf. 95, 252. The parallel between Typhon and Python was noted by e.g. Weniger (1870) 28, Gruppe (1906) 102, 812 (followed by Höfer (1902–9) col. 3398) and West (2007) 257–8.

<sup>64</sup> On the Stoic end as self-knowledge see e.g. Cic. *Fin.* 3.73 (*SVF* 3.282), *Leg.* 1.58–62 (not in *SVF*); Julian, *Or.* 6.6 185d–6a (not in *SVF*) ὅτι δὲ τὸ Γνώθι σαυτὸν κεφάλαιον τίθενται [sc. the Stoics] φιλοσοφίας. Cf. Wilkins (1917) 66, Gerson (1990) 144.

<sup>65</sup> The Stoic sage as a divine man is further attested in Chrysippus’ *On gods* 1 according to Philod. *Piet.* col. 6.14–16 Henrichs; Stob. 2.68.3 (*SVF* 3.604); Sextus, *M.* 7.423 (not in *SVF*); Epiphanius, *De fide* 9.41 p. 508.25–8 Holl-Dummer (*SVF* 1.538).

5. *Pyrrhonists*

In contrast with the Stoics there is no such piece of evidence that shows that Pyrrho and Timon drew directly from the *Phaedrus*. However, Pyrrho and Timon not only took up the topos of τῦφος, as we will see, but also other terminological similarities between the extant evidence and the *Phaedrus* passage indicate that they too may have gone beyond the Cynic topos, which makes it at least likely that like the Stoics Pyrrho and Timon were also inspired by the image of Socrates in the *Phaedrus*.

τῦφος appears in two passages with regard to Pyrrho. In the first of these, one of Timon's *Silloi* preserved in the long and hostile account on Pyrrho by the historian Aristocles of Messene (*ap. Eus. PE* 14.18.19; fr. 58 Decleva Caizzi; fr. 783 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons; LS 2B; fr. 9 di Marco), Pyrrho is favourably described as ἄτυφος in contrast with 'the empty hosts of people weighed down on this side and on that | with affections, opinion and haphazard law-making'.<sup>66</sup> According to the second passage, the endnote to Aristocles' account of Pyrrho (*ap. Eus. PE* 14.18.27; fr. 23 Decleva Caizzi), Pyrrho called himself ἄτυφος. As with the Stoics it may be thought that Pyrrho's use of τῦφος goes back to the Cynics here, more specifically through Anaxarchus, Pyrrho's teacher, whom Sextus associated with Monimus the Cynic (see n. 48).<sup>67</sup> Aristocles already suggested as much, describing Pyrrho as 'wrapping himself up in that τῦφος' i.e. taking over Anaxarchus' teachings.<sup>68</sup>

However, there are a couple of indications that Pyrrho and Timon went beyond the Cynic topos.<sup>69</sup> 'To inquire' (σχοπῶ) in TEXT 3 is obviously a pivotal Pyrrhonist (or sceptical for that matter) term, as e.g. Sextus, at *PH* 1.2–3, makes clear, describing the Pyrrhonists as 'inquiring' and 'searching' (ζητεῖν, yet another Socratic term).

<sup>66</sup> ἄτυφον ... λαὸν ἔθνεα κούφα, βαρυνόμεν' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα | ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νομοσθήκης.

<sup>67</sup> At *M.* 7.88 (LS 1D; fr. 16 DK; Monimus, fr. 2 Giannantoni; Antigonos, fr. 64B Dorandi). See further Zeller and Nestle (1920) 1190 and esp. Ioppolo (1980) 506 against Long (1978) 76 (= (2006) 84), who attributes the Cynic traits in Pyrrho's characterisation primarily to Timon. For a judicious treatment of Anaxarchus' philosophical stance see Warren (2002a) 73–85.

<sup>68</sup> For this reading of Aristocles *ap. Eus. PE* 14.18.27 there are several good arguments for following des Places (1987) *ad loc.*, Léger (1997) 174–7 and Brunschwig (1999a) 242 n. 40 against Decleva Caizzi (1981) 179–80, Dorandi (1999) 45 n. 18, Chiesara (2001) 133–4: the first part (ὁ μὲν οὖν Πύρρων Ἀναξάρχου τιδὸς ἐγένετο μαθητῆς, ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἦν ζωγράφος, οὐδ' οὕτως εὐτυχῆς, ἔπειτα τοῖς Δημοκρίτου βιβλίοις ἐντυχῶν χρηστὸν μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε εὗρεν οὔτε ἔγραψεν, κακῶς δὲ πάντα εἶπε καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους) deals with Anaxarchus (rather than already with Pyrrho), the second part (αὐτὸς δ' ὕστερον τοῦτον τὸν τῦφον περιβαλλόμενος καὶ καλῶν ἄτυφον ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἐν γραφῇ κατέλιπεν) with Pyrrho. Not only does the αὐτὸς δ' mark a contrast with the earlier part of the sentence, but also the description in the first part fits in well with the little we otherwise know of Anaxarchus: as Pyrrho's teacher see further DL 9.61 (fr. A2 DK; fr. 1 Dorandi); on his Democritean background see DL 9.58 (fr. A1 DK; fr. 1 Dorandi), Clem. *Strom.* 1.64.4 (not in DK; fr. 1A Dorandi); on his speaking badly see e.g. Athen. 548b (fr. A9 DK; fr. 8 Dorandi); and for his writings see notably Clem. *Strom.* 1.36.1/Stob. 3.686.15–7.5 (fr. B1 DK; fr. 65A/B Dorandi). Finally, this reading removes the apparent inconsistency in 27 with regard to Pyrrho writing and not writing.

<sup>69</sup> If Menander's sentence quoted above in n. 48 is in any way related to Monimus' views, it may well have been he who – via Anaxarchus – drew Pyrrho's attention to the *Phaedrus*.

The Pyrrhonists offered a meaning rather different from the Stoics' 'striving (for self-knowledge)' discussed in the previous section, a meaning elegantly conveyed by Hankinson's paraphrase as 'pottering around, comparing and contrasting things'.<sup>70</sup> A good example of what this 'pottering around' may result in can be found in (again) TEXT 3, that is in not taking up a position ('whether I am a beast or something else' or 'whether I am worse than Typhon or ἄτυφος'). Timon seems to have described this attitude in his (lost) book *Python*,<sup>71</sup> which was to offer a clear account of Pyrrho's 'personality' (διάθεσις).<sup>72</sup> As the book also contained an explanation of the notion of the Democritean expression 'no more [this than that]' (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον) as 'not to determine anything and not to take up any other position besides' (used to make the point that for the sceptics Democritus' 'no more' did not go far enough, as it implied taking up a position after all),<sup>73</sup> it seems reasonable to apply this explanation to Pyrrho's personality.

A further indication that the early Pyrrhonists went back to the *Phaedrus* passage is their lack of interest in the reductive method described in TEXT 1. In marked contrast with the Stoics, this lack of interest was unconditional (but then the Stoics needed it to go beyond the state of ignorance, as we have seen), as again a passage from Timon's *Python* (and the *Silloi*)<sup>74</sup> preserved at DL 9.65 (fr. 78 (= 48) Diels; fr. 60 Decleva Caizzi; fr. 822 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons; LS 2C; fr. 48 di Marco) makes clear. Timon offers us a couple of lines on Pyrrho, in which he compares 'sophists' unfavourably with Pyrrho: 'You did not concern yourself with discovering what winds I pass over Greece, and from and to what these pass.'<sup>75</sup> Socrates in TEXT 1 springs to mind here, who – distinguishing himself from the people who, playing the sophist, are 'excessively clever', 'with some rustic wisdom' – neither wishes to occupy himself with which winds pass over Greece, such as Boreas, nor with how they can be explained (as opposed to traditional accounts of Typhon as the source of winds), as it is an activity

<sup>70</sup> Hankinson (1998) 299 (cf. 13).

<sup>71</sup> The most recent collection of sources on the *Python* is still Diels (1901) 205–6.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. DL 9.67 (fr. 79 Diels; fr. 51 Decleva Caizzi) καὶ ὁ Τίμων δὲ διασαφεῖ τὴν διάθεσιν αὐτοῦ [sc. Pyrrho] ἐν οἷς πρὸς Πύθωνα διέξεισιν.

<sup>73</sup> The explanation is extant in DL 9.76 (fr. 80 Diels; fr. 54 Decleva Caizzi; LS 1G) τὸ μηδὲν ὀρίζειν, ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν. My translation of the *hapax* ἀπροσθετεῖν here follows Brunschwig (1999b) 1113 n. 1, who remarks that it 'évoque la rupture d'équilibre provoquée par l'addition d'un poids dans l'un des plateaux d'une balance'. It hangs in the balance as it were, leading in sceptical terms to 'suspension of judgment' (ἐποχή). It is usually translated, without the connotation of the balance, as 'withholding assent' (based upon Sextus, *M.* 7.225, where its opposite προστιθεσθαι is put next to συγκατατίθεσθαι, the standard term for 'to assent'; for a discussion see LS 2, 7).

<sup>74</sup> The reading of the manuscripts of Diogenes' introduction to the lines, retained by Long and Marcovich in their editions of DL, state that they can be found 'in the *Python* and the *Silloi*'. Wachsmuth and Diels amongst others assumed a lacuna here: as the *Python* seems to have been a prose work ('in a long account' according to Aristocles *ap. Eus. PE* 14.18.14 (fr. 77 Diels; fr. 52 Decleva Caizzi)) the lines would not fit in well, and could hence only be found in the *Silloi*. For a judicious treatment of the question see Ferrari (1968) 214 n. 2 and (1981) 344.

<sup>75</sup> οὐδ' ἔμελέν σοι ταῦτα μεταλλῆσαι, τίνες αὔραι ἢ Ἑλλάδ' ἔχουσι, πόθεν τε καὶ εἰς ὃ τι κύρει ἕκαστα.

that brings rustic wisdom only.<sup>76</sup> What is more, like Socrates Pyrrho accepted these mythological accounts, without the need to go beyond them, or as can be found elsewhere, to go beyond ‘normal practice’ (συνήθεια).<sup>77</sup>

A final indication of the *Phaedrus* as a source of inspiration for the early Pyrrhonists is the expression ‘on his way to Pytho’ (Πυθοῖδε), as the place to which Pyrrho was on his way when meeting Timon, so formulated by Timon in ‘a long account’ in his *Python*.<sup>78</sup> ‘To Pytho’ obviously refers to Delphi, as the place where Apollo defeated the Python (also indeed the title of Timon’s book) and founded his oracle, and has hence been taken to recall the oracle’s declaration on Socrates as the wisest amongst human beings, interpreted by Socrates as realising that he did not possess any wisdom.<sup>79</sup> The rusticity of the place where Pyrrho and Timon actually met, ‘in the vicinity of the temple of Amphiaras’,<sup>80</sup> comparable to the rusticity of the place where Socrates expressed his self-ignorance, can be added as a further theme from the beginning of the *Phaedrus*.

These topological references as well as the lack of interest in the reductive method, which leads to accepting accounts on offer, and finally the pottering around and contrasting things, being worse than Typhon as well as ἄτυφος yet again suggest Hellenistic interest in the Socrates of *Phdr.* 229b–30a, this time as the embodiment of the perfect sceptic.<sup>81</sup>

## 6. Conclusion

The reconstruction of the Hellenistic usage of *Phdr.* 229b–30a can be taken one – chronological – step further. As we have seen, Stilpo and the Cynics showed a distinct interest in the notion of τῦφος, which figures so prominently in the *Phaedrus* passage. As I hope to have shown, the Stoics at any rate and probably the early Pyrrhonists, influenced by the Cynics, both exploited the notion, marking their philosophical positions by reference to the image of Socrates as depicted in the *Phaedrus* passage. For the Pyrrhonists Socrates served as the embodiment of the sceptic, with Socrates’

<sup>76</sup> Wachsmuth (1885) 148 already distinguished these two aspects. The connection with the *Phaedrus* obviously gives an extra dimension to the interpretation by Diels (1901) 197 (followed by LS 2, 10) as Pyrrho’s rejection of the physicists’ speculations on meteorology and cosmology.

<sup>77</sup> DL 9.105 (fr. 81 Diels; fr. 55 Decleva Caizzi). Cf. Decleva Caizzi (1980b) 62 ‘accepting accounts’ on offer.

<sup>78</sup> Aristocles *ap. Eus. PE* 14.18.14 (fr. 77 Diels; fr. 52 Decleva Caizzi).

<sup>79</sup> Long (1978) 74 = (2006) 80.

<sup>80</sup> The exact location is unclear, however: Wilamowitz (1881) 38 suggested Amphiaras’ oracle in Oropus in the border region of Boetia and Attica, Wachsmuth (1885) 11 n. 5 and Long (1978) 73 (= (2006) 80) suggested his shrine in Phlius, Chiesara (2001) 25 his temple in Delphi.

<sup>81</sup> It needs to be said that the Pyrrhonists’ allegiance to Socrates (cf. Cic. *Or.* 3.6 *alia genera philosophorum, qui se omnes fere Socraticos esse dicebant ... Pyrrhoneorum*) probably did not go beyond the traits as depicted in the *Phaedrus* passage. According to Timon (DL 2.19; fr. 799 Lloyd-Jones/Parsons; fr. 25 di Marco) Socrates is a ‘chatterer about laws, the wizard of Greece’ etc.

words being understood as a description of the human state of ignorance accepted and praised. For the Stoics Socrates' words contained an expression of this state of ignorance too, which they took not only as the description of the human state of imperfection, but also as containing an implicit formulation as to what striving for wisdom eventually leads to, that is being part of the divine cosmic reason, and thus how ignorance can be overcome and wisdom achieved, that is by developing one's rational capacity through the reductive method. Obviously, against the background of these interpretations of the image in the *Phaedrus* Colotes in his typically Epicurean hostile attitude towards Socrates would have been even more enraged.<sup>82</sup>

The reference Sextus made to the *Phaedrus* passage at *M.* 7.433 connecting it to Cleanthes thus backfires badly: rather than showing the inconsistency of the Stoic dogmatic position it actually deepens our understanding of it. It can thus even be assumed that, rather than simply having been cooked up by Sextus (or his underlying sceptical source, for that matter), the reference originated amongst the Stoics themselves.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> In a late piece of evidence, Them. *Or.* 32.358b Harduin (*SVF* 1.449), in which Antigonos puts Persaeus, Zeno's favourite pupil, to the test, two noticeable expressions that occurred in Colotes' attack against Socrates already discussed in section 3, τὰ κομψὰ δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ποικίλης νεανιεύματα and πάσαν ἐπεχείρησεν ἔργῳ ἐλέγξει τὴν τούτου ἀλαζονείαν (note also the use of the Socratic term ἐλέγξει here) are used against Persaeus. If Themistius' usage of these terms ultimately goes back to Colotes, we may well have a trace here of a polemic between Epicureans and Stoics relating to the *Phaedrus* passage.

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