sistence hunting in Alaska. However, while I can recommend it as a summary and guide to existing literature, I feel it is like a bowhead whale carcass without the meat. (Mark Nuttall, Department of Human Sciences, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH.)

OUT IN THE COLD: THE LEGACY OF CANA-DA'S INUIT RELOCATION EXPERIMENT IN THE HIGH ARCTIC. Alan Marcus. 1992. København: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. 117 p, soft cover. \$10.00 (US).

The story of development in Canada's Arctic has been told many times and from many different perspectives, and the various factors that have constrained it are by now wellknown. This study, which deals with certain momentous events in the lives of a relatively small number of Inuit, exemplifies all these factors as if in a microcosm. I found it a first-rate piece of work.

To anyone with but a passing interest in recent Arctic history, the momentous events are themselves well known. They concern the setting up of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, now the northern most civilian communities in Canada, in 1953–1955, by relocating Inuit from more southerly (in some instances, very much more southerly) communities. The reasons for the Canadian government sponsoring this relocation have also been fairly well discussed. However, it is to the author's credit that, because of meticulous research, this no-nonsense report not only fleshes out the details of these events in a most compelling way, it also demonstrates, for the first time in academic writing, what a sorry affair the whole business was. The author is careful to accept that his analysis has the benefit of hindsight and the perusal of substantial archival documentation (it also profits from the recollections, looking back over nearly 40 years, of many of those involved). Yet it is clearly only such analysis that can spell out vital lessons for the future: the failings of this episode, which have led an eminent professor of law in an independent report to call upon the Canadian government to apologise publicly to the Inuit, stem precisely from the government's confused motivations, inadequate research, and preparedness to take enormous risks with people's lives. Of particular interest to anthropologists was the government's evident lack of appreciation in this context of the nature of Inuit social structure and culture. Not surprisingly, the episode is today fast becoming, in Inuit eyes, a metaphor for government inadequacies vis-à-vis the Inuit throughout this century.

What is clear from this report is that the paternalistic attitudes of government in relation to Inuit, which generally prevailed in extreme form in the 1950s, were doubleedged. Where the relocation of the Inuit to the high Arctic is concerned, the ostensible motives were the reasonably well-intentioned ones of 'dealing with' highly complex social and economic 'problems' in the northern Quebec emigrant community. Was this community in good or bad economic shape? Even the author hasn't decided (pages 22, 40, 50). Yet the extreme subservience of Inuit to government officials at this time also meant an almost total breakdown in communications between the two sides, such that the Inuit really had no idea as to what was being proposed on their behalf.

And then there were the ulterior motives.... (David Riches, Department of Social Anthropology, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, KY169AL.)

THE SOVIET ARCTIC. Pier Horensma. 1991. London and New York: Routledge. xii + 228 p, maps, hard cover. ISBN 0-415-05537-7. £45.00.

There is a long tradition in Soviet scholarship of hiding interesting books on specific subjects under the bushel of dull, general titles. Something of this tradition seems to have rubbed off on the author of this intriguing, original, and provocative book. This is a published edition of his doctoral thesis, circulated under the title of 'The northern frontier: Soviet polar policy since 1917 and its relation to the history of exploration' (University of Groningen 1988). But even the earlier title did not do justice to what tries ultimately to be a study of the role of Stalinism as an ideology and as a style of exploration, foreign policy, and historiography in the Arctic.

The book is a treasury of details of expeditions, persons, and events. But the author places Soviet polar activity firmly within the context of political goals and constraints, such as the need to define the USSR's northern frontier or to link the country's western and Pacific coasts, and closely follows the nuances of each period. He also shows a fine appreciation of the political implications of technological advances such as icebreakers, or aeroplanes ('effective occupation could be replaced by domination from the air'). At the same time, he discusses the ambivalent attitude towards foreign countries, with the delicate interplay between an admiration for their polar explorers and the insecurity of a young state supposedly beset by these same countries cast as imperialist enemies. Thus research and strategic considerations were supplemented by propaganda, in the form of history and popular literature.

The Soviet Union had scored many firsts, and Stalin saw the country's own Arctic record as an advertisement for the socialist ideology and way of life that supposedly made these achievements possible. At home, this record provided readers with a model of revolutionary heroism; abroad, it aimed to command the admiration of foreigners and to validate legal claims. To the latter end, the propaganda also looked backwards, in a nationalist vein, to very early Russian explorers. The author carries the study into the Cold War period, with a discussion in particular of the historical writings of Belov and Pinkherson. But the story seems to tail off during the 1970s and 1980s and a skimpy appendix on Gorbachev's new era (not in the original dissertation) only serves to emphasise that the book's real focus is on the Stalinist period.

The author returns repeatedly to the theme of Stalinism