

1 **Varicella Zoster Virus outbreak in a long-term care unit of a tertiary care hospital in**  
2 **Northern India**

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## 12 **Summary**

13 Nosocomial outbreak of Varicella Zoster Virus (VZV) has been reported when susceptible  
14 individuals encounter a case of chicken pox or shingles. Containment of the outbreak depends on  
15 isolation of suspected cases and increasing the immunized population in these settings. Hospital  
16 Infection control team investigated a suspected VZV outbreak in a 50-bedded in-patient facility  
17 of Department of Physical medicine and rehabilitation (PMR) in a tertiary care multispecialty  
18 hospital. Epidemiological investigation included developing a case definition, line listing of  
19 cases and contact tracing. Five cases were identified amongst patients and three among  
20 healthcare workers (HCWs). A 30-year-old female patient admitted with Pott's spine complained  
21 of fever and rash all over the body and was clinically diagnosed with chicken pox on 31<sup>st</sup>  
22 December 2022. In the following week, four more cases were identified in the same ward. Serum  
23 and vesicular fluid samples were tested for VZV by PCR and all cases were diagnosed as  
24 laboratory confirmed Varicella Zoster infection. On interviewing the HCWs, primary case was  
25 identified as a housekeeping staff who was clinically diagnosed with chicken pox three weeks  
26 prior on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2022. He returned to work on the eighth day of infection (17<sup>th</sup> December  
27 2022) after apparent clinical recovery with no episodes of fever and malaise, but before the  
28 lesions had crusted over. A total of 31 HCWs were identified as contacts and tested for VZV IgG  
29 and three had no evidence of immunity. Two-dose immunization with varicella vaccine of  
30 susceptible HCWs was initiated. However, two susceptible HCWs had onset of chickenpox  
31 shortly after first dose of vaccination. All cases recovered after treatment with no reported  
32 complications. No further cases were reported after 42 days of monitoring. VZV infection is  
33 highly contagious in healthcare settings with susceptible populations. Prompt identification of

34 cases and implementation of infection prevention and control measures like patient isolation and  
35 vaccination are essential for containment of outbreaks.

## 36 **Introduction**

37 Varicella Zoster Virus (VZV) causes a highly communicable, usually self-limiting endemic  
38 infection in children commonly called chickenpox. But the infection can have a more serious  
39 clinical course in adults, immunocompromised, sick and debilitated long term care patients.(1)  
40 The virus can spread quickly when people co-exist in proximity, like schools, colleges, long-term  
41 care facilities, hospital wards, and ICUs. When patients with already weak immune system due  
42 to multiple pathologies contract the disease, treating them can be especially challenging.(2)  
43 Nosocomial outbreak of VZV have been reported when susceptible individuals encounter a case  
44 of chicken pox or shingles.(2) Susceptible individuals are patients and health care workers  
45 (HCWs) with no evidence of immunity to varicella. Evidence of immunity to varicella is defined  
46 by Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) as fulfilment of any of the following  
47 four criteria: a) documentation of two doses of varicella vaccine, b) laboratory evidence of  
48 immunity or laboratory confirmation of disease, c) diagnosis or verification of a history of  
49 varicella disease by a healthcare provider, and d) diagnosis or verification of a history of herpes  
50 zoster by a healthcare provider. (3) If the number of individuals without immunity against VZV  
51 is high, in that setting disease can spread rapidly with a secondary attack rate of 80% in  
52 community and 90% in hospital setting.(4) According to Minhas A et al., there were about 269  
53 chickenpox outbreaks accounting for 27,257 cases documented between January 2015 and May  
54 2021 in India. (5) Prevention of outbreaks can be achieved by increasing the population of  
55 immunized people in such settings and by implementing appropriate infection prevention and  
56 control measures. (6)(7) We report an outbreak of Varicella Zoster virus at Physical Medicine

57 and Rehabilitation (PMR) ward of Vardaman Mahavir Medical College and Safdarjung Hospital  
58 that started on 31<sup>st</sup> December 2022 and ended on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2023. The effective identification  
59 and control of the outbreak by the hospital infection control team curtailed the spread of  
60 infection. The objective of this outbreak report is to describe the measures implemented in  
61 controlling the spread of the infection by our hospital infection control team.

62

### 63 **Setting**

64 Vardhman Mahavir Medical College and Safdarjung Hospital is a 2800 bedded multispecialty  
65 tertiary care hospital in Delhi, India. Although the hospital is primarily an acute care facility, the  
66 Department of PMR admits patients requiring long term care and has an in-patient facility with  
67 50 beds distributed in 7 cubicles. The ward has an open layout with Nurse: Patient ratio of 1:5  
68 and Doctor: Patient ratio of 1:3. Average bed occupancy was about 60%. There are in total 30  
69 HCWs in the ward including eight doctors, thirteen nurses, four nursing orderlies and five  
70 housekeeping staff. At the time of the outbreak, seventeen patients were admitted for various  
71 rehabilitative care.

72 The study was approved by institutional ethics committee (IEC/VMMC/SJH/Project/2022-  
73 11/CC-316) and hospital administration.

### 74 **Outbreak Report**

75 A 30-year-old female patient diagnosed with Pott's spine with paraplegia admitted on 6<sup>th</sup>  
76 December 2022 presented with complaints of fever and a pustular rash all over the body on 31<sup>st</sup>  
77 December 2022. A clinical diagnosis of varicella zoster virus (VZV) infection was made after  
78 dermatology opinion and the patient was immediately isolated. This was identified as the index

79 case. On 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2023, three more patients complained of similar symptoms and were  
80 diagnosed with VZV clinically. All patients were cohorted in an isolation ward with adequate  
81 ventilation and sunlight as no negative pressure room was available in the facility. Treatment  
82 with acyclovir was also initiated.

83 The hospital infection control (HIC) team was informed of the suspected outbreak on 2<sup>nd</sup> January  
84 2023 and the team visited the PMR ward. Vesicular fluid and scab material samples were  
85 collected in viral transport medium from all four patients. The vesicular lesions were unroofed  
86 and the base of the lesion was vigorously swabbed using a flocced nylon swab to collect  
87 epithelial cells and vesicular fluid. Samples were sent to Virology Lab, Department of  
88 Microbiology at AIIMS, New Delhi for detection of VZV DNA by PCR . Swabs are processed  
89 immediately once received in the virology laboratory. They were rotated several times against  
90 the VTM tube walls to ensure maximal transfer of material into the fluid, and the swabs were  
91 discarded. The tubes were then centrifuged for 5 minutes at 3,000 rpm. DNA was extracted using  
92 the QIAmp DNA extraction kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) following manufacturer's  
93 instructions. The processed samples were stored in -80°C freezer until testing was performed.  
94 VZV DNA was detected by real time PCR using the Fast Track Diagnostics (Siemens  
95 Healthineers, Fast Track Diagnostics Luxembourg) kit. This kit is a multiplex PCR kit which  
96 simultaneously detects herpes simplex virus 1(HSV-1), herpes simplex virus 2 (HSV-2), and  
97 VZV. All samples tested positive for VZV DNA and an outbreak of nosocomial varicella zoster  
98 was confirmed.

99 HIC team consisting of microbiologist and infection control nurses (ICNs) instructed the HCWs  
100 regarding contact and airborne precautions to be taken during care for these patients. These  
101 included strict compliance to hand hygiene, PPE including gloves, gown and N95 mask,

102 dedicated patient care equipment and a separate washroom for the isolated cohort. Only one  
103 caregiver was allowed to stay with each patient after determining a history of past infection with  
104 chickenpox. New admissions to the ward were restricted and any patient requiring admission was  
105 placed in a separate in-patient facility.

106 HIC conducted extensive interviews of the staff in the ward to identify the probable source.  
107 Detailed history was taken from nurses and doctors who were involved with direct patient care as  
108 well as from patient attendants. Other staff like nursing orderlies, housekeeping staff and security  
109 guards not involved in direct patient care were also asked about any recent history of fever and  
110 rash. It was found that one of the housekeeping staff was diagnosed clinically with VZV  
111 infection on 9<sup>th</sup> December 2022. He returned to work on the eighth day of infection (17<sup>th</sup>  
112 December) after apparent clinical improvement with no episodes of fever and malaise but before  
113 the lesions had crusted over. He was identified as the likely primary case.

114 On 5<sup>th</sup> January one more patient showed symptoms of VZV, and samples were sent for PCR  
115 which came positive. To identify HCWs who were immune to varicella zoster, serum samples  
116 were collected from all HCWs for VZV IgG titers. History of chickenpox and VZV  
117 immunization was also elicited. Eighteen out of 30 HCWs gave a history of chickenpox and only  
118 one had taken VZV vaccine. Three HCWs had low VZV titers and were identified as persons  
119 with no evidence of immunity. These individuals were provided the first dose of VZV vaccine on  
120 8<sup>th</sup> January, 0.5 ml s.c injection of live attenuated vaccine of Oka strain (VARIVAX®, Merck,  
121 USA). They were also reassigned to care for unexposed patients and asked not to interact with  
122 positive patients and their caregivers. Only immune HCWs were assigned to take care of infected  
123 patients. All HCWs were asked to self-monitor for any symptoms of chickenpox and report  
124 immediately to HIC if infection is suspected.

125 Despite early implementation of IPC practices and initiation of vaccination two of the nursing  
126 staff with no evidence of immunity against VZV developed the disease on 11<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> January  
127 2023. The HCWs were placed on medical leave to self-quarantine, till the lesions were  
128 completely crusted. All patients recovered from VZV infection and were eventually discharged.  
129 Infected HCWs had only mild disease and joined back work after 21 days when lesions had  
130 healed and were no longer infectious. Overall, seven cases of nosocomial VZV infection (five  
131 patients and two nurses) and no deaths were identified in the present outbreak. No new cases of  
132 VZV were identified among the staff and patients of PMR ward during the next 42 days (twice  
133 the maximum incubation period) and outbreak was declared as controlled. The epidemiological  
134 curve and evolution of VZV outbreak in PMR ward is depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2,  
135 respectively.

136

## 137 **Discussion**

138 VZV belonging to family *Herpesviridae* are enveloped virus with double stranded DNA  
139 (dsDNA). The transmission is via aerosol and direct contact. Virus from an infected individual is  
140 shed from 1 to 2 days before rash onset until all the chickenpox lesions have crusted. VZV  
141 infection presents either as chickenpox or zoster. Chickenpox is classically described as a self-  
142 limiting childhood disease. Adults and immunocompromised individuals tend to have more  
143 severe disease often needing hospitalization. Zoster or shingles occur in adults following  
144 reactivation of latent virus in the trigeminal nerve.

145 Nosocomial outbreaks involving patients and HCWs are being increasingly reported from  
146 diverse settings in India.(4)(7)(8)(9) Sharma et al reported an outbreak of VZV among ICU staff

147 of a tertiary care hospital in North India where three nurses and two resident doctors were  
148 infected.(4) A report from Rajasthan in western India reported an outbreak in transplant unit  
149 which affected fourteen HCWs.(8) Eight cases of healthcare associated chicken pox were  
150 identified within a week at an armed forces hospital in Delhi following exposure to an adult  
151 patient with extensive VZV disease.(7) Interestingly, cadaver-acquired infection in four medical  
152 students after attending an autopsy was reported by Paul et al.(9) Outbreaks are reported more  
153 commonly from ICUs, oncology or transplant units where patients are often  
154 immunocompromised. This current study reports an outbreak identified in the physical medicine  
155 and rehabilitation ward where most patients are admitted for long-term care, however they are  
156 not immunocompromised. Further, the outbreak evolved to spread from infected patients to  
157 susceptible HCWs.

158 The primary case was a housekeeping staff who had joined back work before the advised period  
159 of isolation after apparent clinical recovery. The infection subsequently spread to the patients  
160 admitted in the ward. VZV is transmitted to susceptible individuals, most commonly through  
161 direct contact with skin lesions.(10) Studies have also shown that transmission can occur when  
162 the aerosolized virus enters via the respiratory tract or mucosal surface like conjunctiva.(11)  
163 Airborne route has previously been reported as a common mode of transmission in nosocomial  
164 as well as localized community outbreaks.(12)(13) Both primary varicella infection and herpes  
165 zoster (shingles) can act as the source of infection.(10) In our study as well, infection was likely  
166 transmitted from primary case to patients via aerosols as the affected patients did not come in  
167 direct contact with the housekeeping staff. Subsequent transmission from patients to HCWs may  
168 have been either due to direct contact during patient care or via aerosols.



169 Infection control and prevention measures were undertaken promptly after the suspected  
170 outbreak was informed to the hospital infection control team. All probable cases were isolated in  
171 a cohort. The staff was re-educated about contact and airborne precautions including use of N-95  
172 masks during patient care. Sample were collected to identify the susceptible HCWs and  
173 vaccination initiated. Susceptible HCWs were reassigned to care for non-exposed patients and  
174 only immune HCWs were providing direct care for the infected patients.(14) These measures  
175 were partially successful in limiting the outbreak. Two out of three HCWs susceptible to VZV,  
176 subsequently became symptomatic after the first dose of vaccination. However, no further cases  
177 were identified amongst the admitted patients or other HCWs in the facility. Previous reports  
178 from India and other countries have similarly reported limited success in preventing the spread of  
179 occupational chickenpox outbreaks. (1)(6)(7)(8)(15) VZV is infectious in the incubation period  
180 and patients report non-specific symptoms early in the prodromal stage. This poses a challenge  
181 for infection control practitioners to identify cases early enough in the course of illness to  
182 prevent transmission to susceptible individuals in the close environment of wards and ICUs.  
183 Utpat S et al recently reported a nosocomial outbreak of VZV where nonimmune HCW  
184 contracted infection despite early patient isolation. (6) The problem is further exacerbated due to  
185 delay in procurement of vaccine in developing countries like India.

186 India has a high burden to childhood chickenpox. The age related seroprevalence rate of anti  
187 VZV antibodies is reported as 29% in the age group of 1-5 years, 51.1% in 5-10 years, 71.7% in  
188 11-15 years, 79.8% in 16-20 years, 88.1% in 21-30 years and 91.1% in 31-40 years. (15) Another  
189 report by Inbaraj, L.R. et al found that 68.22% -76.9% of adult population from 18 to 39 (25.3 ±  
190 4.3) years of age was immune to chickenpox. (17) However, lower seropositivities of 25.8% and  
191 28% were reported in recent studies among university students of health sciences (mean

192 age, 21.6 years) and nurses (mean age, 21 – 30 years), respectively. (18)(19). WHO position  
193 paper has reported that VZV seropositivity as an evidence for immunity among HCWs varies  
194 region to region, from <5% in USA, 19% in Saudi Arabia, 26% in India to as high as 50% in Sri  
195 Lanka.(20) As only a quarter of HCWs in India are immune to VZV, healthcare facilities remain  
196 vulnerable to frequent outbreaks. Further, self-reported history of past infection with chickenpox  
197 had positive predictive value of only 82.4%.(14). In the present study as well, we found 10%  
198 (n=3) of HCWs had no evidence of immunity to VZV and two of these had self-reported a past  
199 infection of chickenpox.

200 Prior to this outbreak, our institution did not have a policy defining the duration of leave for self-  
201 isolation in cases of transmissible infections among healthcare workers. The primary case was  
202 thus allowed to return to work before his lesions were fully scabbed. The outbreak resulted in a  
203 review of the institutional leave policy for HCWs infected with VZV as well as non-immune  
204 staff exposed to VZV case during the incubation period, to avoid further outbreaks. Prophylactic  
205 acyclovir has been recommended by some experts to prevent infections in immunosuppressed  
206 and pregnant contacts of VZV, where vaccine is contraindicated and can be considered in these  
207 groups. (21)

208

### 209 **Limitations**

210 Despite timely efforts to implement IPC measures to control the spread of nosocomial infection,  
211 there were certain limitations. During this current outbreak, we did not screen the patients for  
212 their antibody titres for their immune status as the test was not readily available at our hospital.

213

## 214 **Conclusion**

215 This is the first report of VZV outbreak in a rehabilitation ward in India where patients admitted  
216 for long-term care and non-immune healthcare workers were infected. It highlights challenges to  
217 infection prevention in developing countries with limited resources like lack of negative pressure  
218 isolation room, non-availability of VZV immunoglobulin etc. These outbreaks also place an  
219 additional burden and expense on the healthcare system to investigate and control. In our report,  
220 primary case (housekeeping staff) came back to work during the infectious period due to a lack  
221 of institutional leave policy for chickenpox cases. This highlights a need for a policy for  
222 evaluation of immune status at the time of joining and vaccination of susceptible individuals and  
223 defined leave policy for infected staff. This information regarding immune status of the staff  
224 should be readily available electronically, so that in the event of an outbreak relevant information  
225 can be easily accessed. This can reduce response time during an outbreak where immune  
226 healthcare workers can be assigned for care of patients with varicella infection and non-immune  
227 exposed staff can be quarantined in a timely manner.

228

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232 **Conflict of interest:** None

233 **Data availability statement:** Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were  
234 created or analyzed in this study.

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
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290 Figure 1: Epidemiological curve of VZV cases in Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation ward




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293 Figure 2: Evolution of VZV outbreak in Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation ward with  
 294 probable mode of transmission



295

296 Footnote for Figure 2: Note 1: Blue shaded area - duration of hospital stay of each patient is  
 297 indicated by date of admission and discharge. Blue shaded area with grid: Maximum incubation  
 298 period of Index case. Orange shaded area: infectious period of primary case (housekeeping staff).  
 299 Initially the probable mode of transmission was airborne as there was no direct contact of  
 300 primary case with patients and further transmission between patients and HCW was both



301 airborne and contact during patient care. Note 2: The reported incubation period is 10-21 days.  
302 the likely date of exposure of index cases to primary case , accordingly, should lie between  
303 10/12/2022-31/12/2022 depicted as grid lines. Therefore, index case was likely infected after the  
304 HCW joined back work following clinical response but before lesions had completely healed  
305 (Orange shaded area depicts when HCW was on leave)

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