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Behavioural Economics and the Autonomous Consumer

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2017

Annette Nordhausen Scholes
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Abstract

This chapter takes as its starting point the ‘information approach’ which is the basis of current EU consumer protection legislation. It argues that the findings of behavioural economics suggest that the ‘information approach’ does not in practice achieve the protection of the consumer which it is trying to achieve. Insights and techniques gained from behavioural economics can be used as the basis for more effective consumer protection legislation, while at the same time respecting the principle of consumer autonomy which is the fundamental (though sometimes unstated) principle of EU internal market law.

Type
Research Article
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 14 , 2012 , pp. 297 - 324
Copyright
Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 2012

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References

1 EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007–2013, COM (2007) 99 final, www.ec.europa.eu/consumers/overview/cons_policy/doc/EN_99.pdf.

2 Such as the Doorstep Selling Directive: Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises, OJ L372 of 31 December 1985, 31; Timeshare Rights Directive: Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the right to use immovable property on a timeshare basis, OJ L280 of 29 October 1994, 83—now replaced by Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts, OJ L33 of 3 February 2009, 10; the Distance Selling Directive: Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, OJ L144 of 4 June 1997, 19; or the E-commerce Directive: Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L178 of 17 July 2000, 1.

3 See Consumer Market Scoreboard, www.ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/ dashboard_en.htm; Eurobarometer Studies, www.ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/facts_ eurobar_en.htm.

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17 Ie jurisdiction, arbitration, competition or employment.

18 The first mention is in the Single European Act 1986, becoming more explicit with almost every Treaty revision to an inclusion into the aims of the Community/Union.

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20 In excluding this from its scope of application in Art 4(2).

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40 Dir 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011, [2011] OJ L304/64.

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83 Klick and Mitchell, ‘Government Regulation of Irrationality’ (n 57).

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