

# THE PERIPHERAL STATE DEBATE: State Capitalist and Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America\*

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In 1975 the Trilateral Commission published Crozier, Huntington, and Wantanuki's *Crisis of Democracy*, which questioned the compatibility of stable capitalist development and traditional democratic freedoms in the advanced capitalist nations, a theme echoed in Lindblom (1977), Lindberg et al. (1975), Nisbet (1975), and Huntington (1981). Living in capitalist societies whose recent experience is strikingly nondemocratic, Latin American scholars have felt most urgently the need to assess critically this contradiction and its implications for general political tendencies within the process of capitalist development. In the 1970s, directly in response to events in the major industrialized Latin American nations (especially Brazil, Argentina, and Chile), theoretical and empirical research has reformulated the terrain of debate regarding the relationship of political, economic, and social relations in peripheral capitalist nations. This new vocabulary and new set of hypotheses about state structure and state intervention suggest explanations for the nondemocratic political structure and the increasingly expansive and intensive role of the state in the process of capital accumulation in Latin America.<sup>1</sup>

Two major conceptual frameworks have characterized the work of scholars analyzing the state in Latin America. The first can be termed the state capitalist perspective and the second the bureaucratic-authoritarian perspective. Neither position is *sui generis*. Each is grounded in a general understanding that imperialism and dependency have both conditioned and placed limits upon the process of economic development and political relations in Latin America. They both aim toward a rigorous and systematic specification of the relationship between national political

\*I am indebted to Gary Gereffi and Ira Katznelson for their helpful suggestions and to anonymous reviewers and editors for insightful comments that substantially improved this essay.

regimes, class coalitions, and state policy at a particular historical conjuncture (Collier 1979).

While the two frameworks are distinct, they are not incompatible. Indeed, they share several concerns. Both theories attempt to depict state structure and state policy as it is linked to a crisis deriving from the exhaustion of an import substitution model of industrialization. Each theory is concerned with understanding the internal dynamics and contradictions of the state. Both perspectives share a focus on foreign capital as one, but not the sole, determinant of economic growth and industrialization. The literature on each theory characterizes the national bourgeoisie as relatively weak and links the expansion of the state to this weakness. Finally, both theories view this form of the state as a transitional stage, although neither is particularly clear on the question of long-term tendencies.

The two theories differ in terms of specific emphases. For example, the bureaucratic-authoritarian model identifies the importance of populism as a historical antecedent to the formation of this type of state. This element is either neglected or considered irrelevant in the state capitalism literature. Second, the bureaucratic-authoritarian model is especially concerned with examining modes of interest representation and social control politics (especially repression) and links these to conflicting class interests. The state capitalism model analyzes state policy in a more narrowly defined economic sense, focusing particularly on the growth of state involvement in direct production. The bureaucratic-authoritarian model defines the emergence of a set of autonomous "state interests" as conjunctural and unstable, requiring a rapprochement with the national bourgeoisie. In the state capitalist perspective, identification of the "state bourgeoisie" and the antagonistic interests of this group with fractions of national and foreign capital is of major importance. Given these distinct, albeit not contradictory, foci, one may justify separating the two in a survey that attempts to review the numerous recent theoretical and empirical studies of the Latin American state.

#### STATE CAPITALISM

In the current era, a striking characteristic of peripheral capitalist societies with relatively extensive industrial development is the breadth and intensity of state interventions. A commonly accepted precept of state analysis is confinement of the state to a set of objective determinations that it cannot transcend because it must reproduce capitalist social relations (Altwater 1973; Mueller and Neussuess 1975; Reyna 1977). In addition, given that the total social capital is divided into national capitals, the state collaborates with other states to establish the conditions for accumulation on a world scale (Jessop 1977, 363). Numerous contribu-

tors to the state capitalism literature emphasize the dual role of the state as both regulator and controller of capital investment (Baer, Kerstenet-sky, and Villela 1973; Baer, Newfarmer, and Trebat 1976; Fitzgerald 1976a, 1977, 1978; Quijano 1972; Faucher 1980; Pérez 1980; Evans 1977). The unique thrust of the state capitalist perspective has been the emphasis on how this dual role of the peripheral capitalist state has established an objective basis for the state to emerge as an autonomous class actor, formulating and enacting a plan of accumulation that will restructure industrial production and the infrastructure for circulation, rationalize investment, and stabilize political and economic conditions.

This perspective argues that a conjuncture of processes specific to capital accumulation in the periphery leads to the emergence of an autonomous set of state interests vis-à-vis national and international capital and “dominated” classes within the nation. The three specific concerns of the theoretical and empirical literature addressing this issue may be characterized as: specification of the historical processes in peripheral capitalism that established the objective basis for the origins of state capitalism; analysis of the state as a class actor and identification of the class interests of state personnel; and conceptualization of the limits of state intervention and the contradictions inherent in specific modes of state intervention.

### *Historical Origins of State Capitalism*

The term *state capitalism* is not of recent origin, having its roots in the political writings of Engels (1962) and Lenin (1960a, 1960b, 1960c). In reference to the Soviet Union, the term has been echoed in the work of Bettelheim (1976), Cliff (1974), James (1969), and Mattick (1969). It has also been used to describe contemporary advanced capitalist nations. The works under review are most closely linked with this usage (Jessop 1977). Three recent critiques of the state capitalism concept and some of its practitioners are available in Dupuy and Truchil (1979), Pérez (1980), and Fox (1980).

Briefly, Dupuy and Truchil conclude that the concept of state capitalism—whether applied to peripheral capitalist, advanced capitalist, or socialist nations—is inappropriate because the conditions that it designates as characteristic of the “form of capitalism” can be explained within the existing conceptual framework of class analysis.<sup>2</sup> Pérez (1980) argues that the existing studies have inadequately conceptualized the term and that they have not presented the class content of the state. He notes that they have confused different modes of state intervention. Pérez attempts to conceptualize “state capitalism” as “a transitional form taken by capital in peripheral societies in response to the possible manifestation of the weakness which characterizes the national form of the peripheral state,

aiming to secure capital reproduction by means of apparent nationalistic reorientation of the accumulation process which prevents such a manifestation" (1980, 66). Fox (1980) begins with the general question of state autonomy, but while he offers some brief reflections on the work of bureaucratic-authoritarian theorists such as O'Donnell, Stepan, and Schmitter, the body of the paper is less directly concerned with interest representation and political policy than with economic policy and the state's relations with domestic and foreign capital. Here Fox focuses on the work of Fitzgerald, Cardoso, and Evans, although other authors are represented. Fox phrases the central issue as one of discovering a "*discontinuous* qualitative change." He notes three separable responses to the position that state capitalism presents a new mode of capital accumulation: first, it is nothing new (Dupuy and Truchil 1979); second, it has developed, but only where revolutionary nationalism has occurred (Pfeifer 1979); and third, it may develop, but it is not yet mature (Fitzgerald 1979).

Although suggestive, these three critical reviews are neither comprehensive nor systematic. Dupuy and Truchil restrict their discussion to several articles that are not sufficiently representative of the perspective to merit elimination of the other theoretical and empirical studies using this concept. Pérez's critique, while elegant and cogent, does some disservice to the complexity of the model, and his reconstruction of the concept provides little direction for empirical analysis. Fox offers a rephrasing of the central issue and an accurate summary of several authors, but little more. In general, the concept of state capitalism has remained poorly specified, one that has been used for its rhetorical impact. Fitzgerald holds that three distinct preconditions are required for the emergence of state capitalism: ownership by the state of production sectors that generate surplus; sufficient state financing; and centralizing planning (coordination) of the corporate economy (1977, 70). This description addresses state structure, but only vaguely so and with little sense of historical process. Sorj (1983) adopts an "ideal type" definition of state capitalism: "State intervention in peripheral economies can have a variety of social contents. The limiting situation, which is by no means typical, is that in which public sector accumulation implies a confrontation with, and the partial or total elimination of, the private sector. It is only in this case that we can properly speak about state capitalism" (1983). Here the classical definition of capital accumulation seems to have been transformed and the complexity of class relations drastically simplified.

It is possible to delineate within the literature five separate historical circumstances as precursors of this type of regime: first, a weak national bourgeoisie; second, a crisis in the accumulation process linked to the exhaustion of an import substitution model; third, the penetration of

the international economy and the strength of foreign capital; fourth, contradictions inherent in the state; and fifth, intensified interimperialist rivalries. No single author offers a comprehensive treatment of all these themes that would define their explanatory power or causal ordering. Nevertheless, in concert they may provide the basis for a formal theory and may merit consideration for their heuristic power in the process of formulating such a theory.

*The Weak Bourgeoisie*

There is almost universal agreement in the state capitalist literature regarding the low levels of investment by domestic capital in peripheral nations. It is asserted that this failure to invest requires the state to adopt an entrepreneurial role to promote industrial development.<sup>3</sup> This view is echoed in Petras (1977), Sorj (1976), Torpik (1979), Fitzgerald (1979), Munck (1979), Faucher (1980), Pérez (1980), Bennett and Sharpe (1979c), Ferner (1981), and Chattopadhyay (1970). Sorj (1976) and Pérez (1980) also specify the weakness of "popular" classes as an essential element leading to the state capitalist regime.

On the face of it, the terms "national capital" and "popular classes" do little in directing our understanding toward the complex differentiation of class relations and class positions to which they supposedly refer. An analysis of the state's role in the process of capital accumulation must be based upon a careful mapping of class structure that allows specification of the structural and organizational capacities of class positions, as well as the immediate and historical interests of class positions (Wright 1979). Without this mapping, the deeper meaning of the "weakness" assertion is left vague, as are the historical processes leading to it and the consequences that flow from it. The weakness assertion seems to be based upon an assumption about the systemic function of capital, that is, that capital invests in new production and if it does not, then it is weak. By defining domestic capital as a homogeneous block, although a weak one, these authors have been able to bypass the problem of investigating exactly what it is that the native bourgeoisie has been doing. Moreover, the processes leading to increasing state intervention are subsequently avoided. Not only has capital been caricatured on the historical stage, but urban labor and rural labor do not even make it to the wings. What remains is fine drama: the state steps in to keep the plot moving, but has little to do with the dynamics of capital accumulation and class struggle.

*Accumulation Crisis*

The accumulation crisis theme couches the explanation of state capitalism in a historical process that characterizes peripheral capitalist nations as having relatively extensive, if disarticulated, industrialization, which is under the control of native capital. The origins of state capitalism are thus linked to the more general theory of accumulation crises (Wright 1975) by adapting this perspective to the specific structural conditions characterizing peripheral nations. Most studies focus on contradictions in the sphere of production (Castells 1975; Faucher 1980; Baer, Kerstenetsky, and Villela 1973; Baer, Newfarmer, and Trebat 1976; Munck 1979). Furtado, however, takes the opposite emphasis: "Brazil is engendering a new type of capitalism, heavily dependent upon the appropriation and utilization of profits to generate a certain type of consumption expenditure. This can only be obtained through decisive action on the part of the state. . . ." (1973, 127). Dillon Soares (1977) takes a particularly statist view of this crisis, noting generally the difference in policy between import substitution countries and agricultural export countries. He views state intervention for the purpose of restructuring the economy as a result of industry-biased policies in the past. Szentes reduces the concept of crisis to one of factor imperfections in markets, defining state capitalism as an attempt "to eliminate the factors hindering the rapid development of the productive forces" (1976, 312).

As in the weak capital thesis, the class content of these crises and the processes by which crises become realized in state structure and policy remain unspecified and unexamined. Underlying this position is a fundamentally structuralist logic, based upon an implicit notion of "market saturation" in particular industrial sectors. The crisis does not arise in the realm of class relations, but in the size of the domestic market. The role of the state, then, is to act independently of market forces in ways that meet the general needs of capital.<sup>4</sup> The state, however, is also an arena of class struggle, and its capacity to enact specific policies can only be understood through a historical analysis that attends to those struggles as they both transform the state and are mediated by the structure of the state.<sup>5</sup> If crises of accumulation become reduced to the status of crises of industrialization, then careful analysis of class organization and class struggles underlying the "crisis" can be ignored.<sup>6</sup>

*Foreign Capital*

This element of the argument is perhaps the strongest direct link with the dependency tradition, emphasizing the deformation of the accumulation process resulting from the penetration of foreign capital in the domestic economy. Castells (1975) links this new type of state to the

"internationalization of the domestic market" as does Faucher (1980), who notes generally that state capitalism is "caused by the industrialization of production and the concurrent opening of borders" and later by "a reaction against the internationalization of production." Petras likewise views the "high political and social 'costs' of foreign induced economic expansion" as one antecedent condition leading to state capitalism (1977). Munck (1979) points to the role of state corporations in direct production as complementary to the needs of foreign capital in Brazil.

Fernández and Ocampo (1975) present perhaps the most "orthodox" Marxist interpretation of what they term *state capitalism*. Drawing on Marx and Lenin (1960a, 1960b, 1960c), they view this phenomenon as merely an extension of the necessity for state intervention to overcome the central contradiction of forces and relations of production, a problem that arises in all nations. They cite its potential in imperialist, socialist, social-imperialist, and "backward" nations. In the latter context, Fernández and Ocampo state that the consolidation of state capitalism is a "necessity" for the development of imperialism and a consequence of its economic policy toward Latin America. State capitalism thus results from oppression and subjection. Latin American nations therefore are reduced to a passive status in which they are shaped and manipulated by external forces.

This particular theme within the state capitalism perspective most forcefully expresses what has come to be termed the *instrumentalist* view of the state. In essence, the state has been reduced to the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," but in this case it is a monolithic foreign bourgeoisie. This position has difficulty in accounting for state interventions that clearly contradict the interests of foreign capital. Such interventions typically are associated with numerous protectionist policies that block foreign investment, restrict its autonomy, compel collaborative arrangements, or similar measures. While it is possible to assert that these policies actually complement the interests of foreign capital, this issue is not examined within the instrumentalist view. More importantly, foreign capital remains a homogeneous mass. Few empirical studies provide analysis of the differentiated structure of foreign capital interests, organization, or policies. Those that provide such analysis fall less within the state capitalism literature per se than in the multinational corporation literature (Evans 1979; Newfarmer 1980; Gereffi 1983; Gereffi and Evans 1981; Bennett and Sharpe 1979a, 1979b). Thus neither the relationship of foreign capital presence in a nation vis-à-vis the increasing control of the state over direct production nor the extension of state regulation over investment and markets is examined.<sup>7</sup>

*Contradictions Inherent in the State*

In essence, the state capitalism perspective rests upon the interpretation that state intervention fulfills two functions in the process of capital accumulation. First, the state is viewed as a set of institutional structures that “support” this process. Second, the state may assume the role of “controller” of accumulation. It is precisely the transformation from the former to the latter function that lies at the crux of the state capitalism model, a qualitative change in the relationship between state and economy and between state and classes that is embodied in the form of direct state investment in production and the emergence of state corporations. Various authors specify this new role for the state in peripheral capitalism as constituting a distinctive attribute of underdevelopment and industrialization beyond the import substitution model (Baer, Kerstenet-sky, and Villela 1973; Baer, Newfarmer, and Trebat 1976; Quijano 1972; Pérez 1980; Fitzgerald 1977, 1978; Sachs 1964; Faucher 1980; Evans 1977).

The crucial historical argument pertaining to this conception of the state in the periphery rests with the differences in the transition to industrial capitalism between core and periphery due to the export-oriented structure of the latter’s economy. The role of the state, then, is characteristic of a specific stage in the accumulation process, but one identified by the structure of industrial production and the orientation of markets, not by class relations.

The theme of contradictions inherent in the state tends to operate at a rather high level of abstraction. Fundamentally, it provides a listing of dependent capitalism’s characteristics and asserts that these become focused in transformations of state structure and necessitate massive direct state intervention to restructure industrial production. In reviewing various sources, it is difficult to reconstruct the specific interclass relations, the historical transformation of these relations, and the process by which they lead to specific transformations in state structure and state policy within the complexity of national and international contexts. Classes tend to be discussed in the broadest of terms, such as national bourgeoisie, foreign capital, popular classes, while the concrete historical and immediate interests and capacities of these classes remain obscure.

*The State Bourgeoisie*

The most direct specification of a class position, indeed, one unique to the state capitalist perspective, is that of the state bourgeoisie. It is in discussing this class position that state capitalist writers make their most original and controversial contribution. Here they directly address the question of state interests qua state interests within capitalism. A num-



ber of authors have noted the existence of a "state bourgeoisie" prior to the formulation of the state capitalist perspective. González Casanova used a general grouping of state personnel under the rubric of public sector bourgeoisie and viewed them as a progressive force (1970). This evaluation is also present in C. E. Martins's discussion of an "emancipationalist" alliance in Brazil under direction of the state bourgeoisie (1977).<sup>8</sup> Caio Prado (1966) aggregated all those whose reproduction was directly dependent upon the state budget under the term *bureaucratic bourgeoisie*, a usage that was reflected in Ribeiro (1971) when he identified a "contractist bourgeoisie" within the state sector. Similarly, Quijano views the fundamental characteristic of state capitalism as the emergence of a "unity" of capital and the state in the same institutional apparatus to form "a capitalist economy wherein the generation, realization and accumulation of surplus-value is carried out mainly or totally under the management and direct control of the state" (1972).

The fundamental point at issue here is the ownership and control over capital investment or, as Pérez phrases it, "the class content of state capitalism" (1980) and the autonomy of the state. Focusing on Brazil, Cardoso views the state bourgeoisie as the "directors" of state corporations who have developed autonomous interests and take steps to enact a plan of accumulation that corresponds to those interests (1973, 1975). Evans's view concurs, but emphasizes the state bourgeoisie, "men who fill the state apparatus," as the hegemonic bloc within the ruling class that directs a "restructuring of the elite" (1977, 59). In his forthcoming study of Peru, Ferner states: "Because of the particular, transitional moment which gave rise to the 1968 coup, the state's ability to appropriate and dispose of resources in its own interests became a significant factor in the Peruvian process and elements of the state bureaucracy came to constitute important political forces in their own right" (forthcoming). Similarly, Baer, Newfarmer, and Trebat posit this leading position within the ruling class as a potential basis for state capitalism: "In this view, the technocrats and public managers form an 'independent state' relatively free from the influence of private sector interests, and allocate resources in a way that expands their own power and wealth" (1976, 84–85).

Sorj offers a rather greater definitional rigor and conceptual sophistication than other writers using the concept of state bourgeoisie. "In short, the usage of state bourgeoisie needs to be restricted to the limiting situation referred to above in which public sector accumulation involves the partial or total elimination of private capitalist accumulation. Under state capitalist regimes thus defined, it is proper to speak of the ruling group as a state bourgeoisie so long as it is understood that the absence of the juridical relations of private property at the level of state enterprises means that the interests and behavior of a state bourgeoisie are different from those of a private capitalist class" (1981). His analysis of

Peru during 1968–80 exemplifies the utility of this concept as a heuristic tool for reconstructing specific struggles, class alliances, and their outcome in the transformation of state structure and state policy. What Sorj emphasizes is the fact that the state bourgeoisie is not simply a new fraction of national capital, but a class position whose relationship to other classes and to the means of production in Peruvian society is complexly defined by economic as well as political and ideological relations that cannot be derived from those of private capital.

A central issue here is the correspondence between the interests of a state bourgeoisie and those of national and international capital, characterized by Evans (1977, 1979) as a “tri-pe” relationship,<sup>9</sup> or the antagonism of these interests as state sector managers acquire their own interests and act to consolidate a “national plan of accumulation” that is at odds with the logic of international accumulation (Sorj 1976). While most of the state capitalism writers essentially eliminate the national bourgeoisie as an important factor, Evans (1979) attempts to detail their material bases for struggle, particularly their linkages to the state and their comparative advantage over foreign and state capital in particular sectors of the economy. He notes the advantages resulting from their more intimate knowledge of the political and economic landscape in their own society, also reflecting an internal organizational capacity that is based on high levels of social integration. Evans uses this more detailed class mapping to investigate the process of class struggle and class alliance formation among local capital, the state, and foreign capital in Brazil.

At the other extreme, Arruda (1979) disputes both the view of the state bourgeoisie as a fraction of national capital and the need to analyze carefully the capacities of all class positions in a particular situation, derivations of the dependency perspective that link Evans (1977, 1979) with Cardoso (1975), Furtado (1973), and Dowbor (1977, 1978). Arruda sees instead a world bourgeoisie with national subsystems. The state bourgeoisie is therefore reduced simply to the status of a nationalist faction of this world bourgeoisie. “In contrast, I conceive the state bourgeoisie, or more precisely, the hegemonic faction of the state bourgeoisie, as a fraction of the ‘Brazilian’ internationalized bourgeoisie” (1979). Not only is class struggle—indeed labor itself—written off, but the progressive internationalization of each moment in the reproductive circuit of capital has become confused with the real substance of classes as they are defined in relation to each other.

### *Limits of State Capitalism*

In almost every instance, the emergence of state capitalism is viewed as a “transitional” stage, one associated with the structural contradictions

typifying dependent industrialization and the exhaustion of a phase of capital accumulation. Massive entry of the state into the production process, however, is interpreted as violating some of the fundamental requisites of the capitalist state for mystification of the class structure; it politicizes the state, even in the face of a bureaucratic or technocratic ideology on the part of state managers of public enterprises (Pérez 1980). This very act of state intervention to shore up and stabilize accumulation produces new contradictions linked to the resulting consolidation of “popular forces” and of native dominant classes, according to Sorj (1976). By directly controlling the production process and planning the economy, Munck (1980) asserts, the state comes to embody the contradictions of capital accumulation.

Fitzgerald expresses this tendency succinctly: “In other words, the economic nature of state capitalism may be logically expected to weaken its independent political base, and thus reduce the relative autonomy required for the restructuring of capital” (1979, 38). This view locates the structural limits on state intervention within the state itself. In an earlier work on Peru, however, Fitzgerald (1976b) finds structural limits residing in the duality of the peripheral capitalist economy. This duality, which exists essentially between a modern capital-intensive industrial sector and simple commodity production at the household level in both urban and rural areas, leads to narrow markets, unequal regional development, internal migration, and stagnant food supply. He doubts the capacity of the state to enact a new plan of accumulation, given its technocratic tendency to focus only on restructuring the large capitalist and state enterprises, while a policy of reallocating resources and transforming the “traditional” sector is viewed as politically unfeasible because it attacks the interests of the middle classes and domestic bourgeoisie.

Petras (1977) also indicates that state capitalism is necessarily a transitional stage expressing contradictions between the nationalist appearance of the process and its objective content of rationalizing the accumulation process within the national state in accordance with the logic of internationalization. Yet, as Pérez (1980) notes, this interpretation does not offer an explanation of the transitional character of state capitalism. Pérez suggests that stabilizing the strong tendencies of state capitalism to centralize organization would lead eventually to a fragmentation of capital within the state, much as it is fragmented in civil society. Second, he notes that the role of the capitalist state as a mediator of class struggles requires that the state not be totally identified with capital. If it is, then the “hegemonic” function of the state and its mediation through the symbolic representation of general interests will be undermined (Pérez 1980, 64).

The transition argument expresses two versions of the Marxist

concept of contradictions that are generally available elsewhere. The first notes the state's role as a national state, representing the collective interests of a society that is simultaneously characterized by deep antagonisms among classes. The second refers to the necessity for the capitalist state to reproduce those unequal distributions of power and social relations of control over investment, work processes, and labor that constitute the basis for the state's own survival as a capitalist state. The state capitalist perspective holds that emergence of the state as a class actor will clarify the nature of the capitalist state as a focal point of domination and undermine its capacity to mediate class antagonisms inherent in capitalism.

But the question of transformations in state structure and state policy linked both to broad-scale political mobilizations and to crises in the process of capital accumulation has been addressed elsewhere. The concern with understanding authoritarian repressive regimes has been particularly strong among writers concerned with state regimes in the Southern Cone and Mexico, and to their work I shall now turn.

#### BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM

If one were to identify a paradigmatic exemplar in the bureaucratic-authoritarian perspective, it would be Guillermo O'Donnell's *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (1973) wherein the hyphenated concept was coined to indicate its derivation from two related traditions of state theory, corporatism and authoritarianism, and from the work of two scholars, Apter (1965, 1969, 1971) and Linz (1970).<sup>10</sup> The empirical referents were the political regimes that emerged in Brazil in 1964 and Argentina in 1966 (O'Donnell 1973, 95). O'Donnell argued that authoritarian regimes were not vestigial features of traditional societies, but a structural outcome of those very processes identified by modernization theory as leading to democratic political structures. He observed that the expansion of market relations, political participation, and industrialization together resulted in a state structure and in state policies that were not democratic, redistributive, or humanitarian. Because his primary concern was to reveal the mystification of modernization theories regarding political economy, O'Donnell did not propose a fully developed theory of the state generally or the peripheral capitalist state specifically.

The historical scenario depicted by O'Donnell may be summarized as follows. A highly mobilized, but fragmented, populist movement—one linked to the deterioration of an industrialized, but structurally poorly integrated, capitalist economy—confronted a state that was unable to satisfy conflicting demands in a highly pluralistic population. The emergence of a class of technocrats and bureaucrats in industry, government, and the military who subscribed to an ideology of stability

and rapid growth of the economy—that is, “rational” social planning and social control—became the catalyst for a “class coalition” among the petty bourgeoisie, state personnel, military, and most affluent sectors. The populist alliance of working class organizations was in disarray, but political mobilization was still great, the economy was caught in a squeeze of high inflation, unemployment was high, and no access existed to the capital required for industrialization beyond import substitution. Facing these circumstances, this new coalition perceived the demands of various working class groups as “serious threats to the survival of existing social arrangements—particularly the class structure, the power distribution and the international alignments of the countries” (O’Donnell 1973, 72). The coalition defined the situation as one requiring tough constraints (repression and exclusion) on the rest of the population,<sup>11</sup> if they were to enact a plan of industrial growth that would move beyond the limits of import substitution. They acted to establish a political regime whose central structural rationale is the elimination of all forms of autonomous working-class organization and the restructuring of industrial production in accordance with the conditions established by international capital to secure investment (the “deepening” defined in O’Donnell’s 1978a analysis). Three central factors serve as foci for this theory. They are the crisis of industrialization, the fragmentation and consolidation of class alliances, and the role of the state in reproducing class domination and supporting economic development, each of which will be considered in turn.

### *Crisis of Industrialization*

Two separate factors are incorporated in the “exhaustion of industrialization” thesis. The first is a characterization of industrial structure and development. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is said to develop in those peripheral nations where an import substitution model of industrialization resulted in an industrial structure lacking vertical integration. Although not explicitly grounded in orthodox Marxist theories of accumulation and crises (surveyed in Wright 1975), the thesis rests on a clear sense of historical “stages” of economic development linked by moments of transition when noneconomic forces express class interests, class organization, and class alliances. The second factor relates to the linkage of the national and international economy and the interests and capacities of domestic and foreign capital. This element most directly links the bureaucratic-authoritarian model to the dependency perspective that at its core asserts that the economic structure and history of Latin American nations are conditioned by other nations’ economies, although internal political and economic relations mediate these effects.

One virtue of O’Donnell’s original model was that state interven-

tion and state structure were neither reduced to the status of a function of distributional struggles (typical of neo-Ricardian works like Gough 1975 or Boddy and Crotty 1974) nor limited to a function of structurally defined economic contradictions (the tendency of the rate of profit to fall), which would necessitate the intervention of the state. O'Donnell appeared to be laying the foundation for a truly historical analysis that attended to transformative class struggles within specific economic and political contexts that mediated those struggles. But a number of attempts to extend and critique the bureaucratic-authoritarian model have focused upon one element, the crisis of industrialization, in isolation from its original role as part of a complex historical argument.

These industrialization critiques commonly approach O'Donnell's model either by arguing that a relatively advanced industrial development in a nation-state—such as that characterizing Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay—is found elsewhere in Latin America, but without the emergence of the particular attributes assigned to the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (Collier 1979) or by critiquing O'Donnell's assertion (1978a) that the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime necessarily embarks on a process of “deepening” industrial structure (Kaufman 1979; Hirschman 1979; Serra 1979). Especially influenced by Gerschenkron (1962), Kaufman locates the policy alternatives of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state within the structural limitations imposed by the process of transition. Serra argues that the internal coherence and process of policy implementation of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state in Brazil is itself unique and that assumptions of the model cannot be generalized to other authoritarian regimes without revision. Hirschman displays an ambivalent sympathy for O'Donnell's model but hopes that the economically deterministic emphasis can be reformulated to account for political factors (both endogamous and exogamous, such as the fear generated by the Cuban revolution) in the origins of authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Serra (1979) and Kaufman (1979) conclude that the industrialization crisis thesis neither explains the particular form of authoritarian regimes that emerge to resolve such crises nor adequately documents the existence of the crisis itself in the manner and at the time that O'Donnell asserts.

Kurth takes seriously the essential conception that a phase of industrialization and the articulation of national and international capitalist development place different constraints and opportunities on the process of class struggle in each nation. He asserts that transformations in political structure and policy must be analyzed within a model that conceptualizes this process in order to specify “those historical conjunctures when politics takes command” (Kurth 1979, 362). Here the industrialization thesis is generalized to encompass a historical conception of the timing of industrialization and the sectoral focus of industrialization

in both European and Latin American societies. Kurth attempts to ascertain whether there is a pattern of political structures associated with this generalized view of industrialization and the structural constraints that are imposed upon the range of possible political forms. His general conclusion is that a historical analysis seems to confirm the existence of a pattern, thus placing the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime within a more general model linking industrial structure, international economy, and political structure.

The second aspect of the industrialization thesis is most succinctly presented in Kaufman's argument that "the effective mobilization of foreign and public investment required the implementation of a number of new, highly controversial extractive powers and investment capabilities which had been steadily eroded by populist pressures and inflation. . . . New *private* capital (both foreign and domestic) required, above all, greater stability and predictability" (1977, 201–2). Hirschman (1979), however, seems to argue that it is precisely the importance of foreign capital in the preauthoritarian period that led to the rapid emergence of general popular demands for redistribution and delegitimation of entrepreneurial activity. Kaufman (1977) also asserts that the exhaustion of the import substitution model and of export booms led to inflation, depression, labor unrest, and the need for capital, especially foreign capital and state investment, to sustain new economic growth. Concurring with O'Donnell (1978a), Kaufman notes that lack of stability and security in the domestic economy under populist regimes encouraged a specific class coalition to seize control of the state apparatus to repress popular demands and create a favorable investment climate.

The essential issue here seems to be the strength of domestic capital vis-à-vis foreign capital. Cotler's contribution (1979) to this issue seems to diverge from the implicit conception of a weak national bourgeoisie common to other studies in this literature. He contrasts Southern Cone nations, which provide the empirical referent for the model, with other Latin American nations on the basis of control over the export economy. He argues that in nations where bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes emerged, export production was controlled by national capital, while in other nations, export enclaves controlled by foreign capital were the primary mode of integrating the national economy in the world system. Thus the regimes of Mexico and Peru are cited as examples of a differing pattern of control over industrial production and differing political structures.

Reyna (1977), while uncritically accepting the exhaustion of the import substitution thesis, seeks to explain the relative stability of popular political activity and the capacity of the Mexican state to mediate foreign investment after World War II by the early institutionalization of an authoritarian political structure prior to the crisis of industrialization.

With authoritarian institutions already well established, the state was able to mediate the potentially conflicting interests of national and foreign capital. But in the Southern Cone, Reyna notes, the state has had to forge an alliance with foreign capital that has led to a severe deterioration in the political and economic welfare of the population. Here, however, the authoritarian institutions to implement that policy were being created in the context of the crisis, not prior to it.<sup>12</sup> Weinert (1977), addressing Mexico, complements this thesis by detailing the flexibility of state policy regarding foreign-capital investment, as opposed to the free market policies characterizing bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.

To briefly recapitulate, the bureaucratic-authoritarian theory proposes that authoritarian regimes in Latin America comprise distinct types that express unique conjunctures of class alliances, coercive and co-optive state policies, and stages of industrialization. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is thus distinguished from other authoritarian regimes, such as oligarchic, populist, and fascist regimes. The internationalizing of accumulation processes within specific nations produces deep contradictions that make necessary an increasingly active state. As Oszlak observes: "State intervention in new areas of the economy and society were determined by the weakness of private initiative, the lack of investment opportunities, the absence of incentives and means of investment, the tendency to concentration and centralization of capital as a result of the increasingly extended control of foreign monopolies over the sectors or branches of highest income or the growing mobilization of popular classes facilitated by their better organization and capacity for political expression" (Oszlak 1977, 47).

Lechner focuses primarily on the subordination to the process of international accumulation characteristic of dependent capitalism. Drawing on the work of Gramsci, he uses a distinction between domination and hegemony to analyze the crisis of the state emerging in the disintegration of any semblance of unity in these two factors. "In Latin America, the state is primordially domination; it lacks this something more that is hegemony and which—in Hegelian terms—has its truth" (1977, 23). To translate, national capital is able to mystify its domination and defuse the tendencies of antagonistic class interests to become expressed in conflict because it can manipulate ideological and political institutions through appeals to some general interest. Given the domination of international capital in Latin America, the process of capital accumulation cannot express "a general interest." This conclusion is also found in Sorj (1976), who notes that the purer authoritarianism is, the less able it is to achieve corporatist domination. Thus, the new authoritarianism in Latin American nations with high levels of industrial development and somewhat stable traditions of democratic institutions "came in reaction to two events: internally, the sharpening of class con-



flict, that destabilized the structure of domination, without being able to create a new order. Externally, the internationalization of capital, that transformed the process of accumulation and activated a reordering of local economies" (Sorj 1976). Lechner and Sorj therefore link the structural conditions of economic crisis preceding the emergence of the new authoritarian regimes not simply to an exhaustion of a line of accumulation within the nation but to a new extension of the internationalization process. In this way, they echo the arguments of Christian Palloix's *L'Internationalisation du capital* (1975).

It is essential to remember that the economic thesis of the bureaucratic-authoritarian approach is not a thesis about the process of capital accumulation, even though that term is frequently used. It is a thesis about stages of industrialization, markets, and the investment capacity of national capital. Capital accumulation, on the other hand, refers to the expansion of capitalist social relations through the transformation of surplus value to new constant and variable capital (wage labor). On its own terms, however, it is less a theory about market saturation than one about barriers to industrialization posed by insufficient capital, constraints on technology, and market imperfections. Similarly, the assumed weakness of native capital is derived from its failure to invest capital in new productive industries, particularly in the sector of capital goods and consumer durable goods. Failure to invest, however, is a very narrow definition of class strength, partly because it does not consider the alternative opportunities for investment by native capital.

### *Populism, Class Struggle, and Modes of Inclusion or Exclusion*

The second historical factor leading to the emergence of authoritarian regimes of this type is identified as massive popular mobilizations and the formation of specific class alliances. Two separate issues may be distinguished: first, the disintegration of the populist alliance despite continued high mobilization and demand making directed at the government; and second, consolidation of an alliance between specific class positions that support a policy of repression and exclusion toward "popular" classes. These factors most strictly test the bureaucratic-authoritarian theory for its capacity to map the terrain of class relations and class struggles leading to the emergence of an authoritarian state.

O'Donnell identifies neither the industrial structure nor its phase, but the "extended political activation of the popular sector" (1978a, 6) and the reaction of other classes to it as the essential precondition of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. While numerous authors in this tradition have separated out the industrialization crisis thesis, O'Donnell begins with the question of class relations and class struggle (1978a). He then attempts to understand how "these processes are linked with nu-

merous manifestations of economic crisis" (1978, 6–7). The determining factor is the level of organization and struggle among the popular classes, with variations in this factor being associated with different levels of class solidarity that arise among dominant class fractions.<sup>13</sup>

In a critical test of three theories' power to explain authoritarianism, Palmer (1977) uses Banks's *Cross-Polity Time-Series Data* (1971). He compares cultural corporatist explanations (Newton 1970; Silvert 1963; Wiarda 1973), dependency theory (Frank 1969; Cockcroft, Frank, and Johnson 1972; Sunkel 1972) and bureaucratic-authoritarian theory and derives from them contrasting hypotheses for the rise of authoritarian regimes in the same set of countries. Looking at rank-order correlations between authoritarian regimes and variables specified by each theory (colonial penetration, modes of dependence, and social mobilization, respectively), Palmer concludes that only the colonial penetration thesis (cultural corporatist theory) is supported. This comparative study is complemented by a subsequent case study of Peru that addresses in greater depth the historical mechanisms linking the rise of authoritarianism with a culturally received corporatist structure of social organization.

Malloy (1977) provides what is substantially a test of whether popular mobilization is a sufficient condition for the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. He examines Bolivia, where mass mobilization occurred, although lacking horizontal industrialization and characterized by what he calls a weak state apparatus. Malloy concludes that Bolivia's lack of a technocratic or bureaucratic cadre in business, government, and the military, its low levels of industrialization, and its low levels of commercialized social relations all combined with an "overly intense" mobilization and fragmentation of class forces, which precluded a new class alliance and blocked the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state.

Both the Palmer (1977) and Malloy (1977) studies substantially transform the fundamental historical perspective of the original theory in order to force it into a comparative format. Palmer's approach is straightforwardly positivist. He extracts one element from a theory that presents a complex causal argument, then rejects the theory when this "variable" does not appear to be statistically significant. Although Malloy does not reduce the theory into a multivariate format wherein specific variables may be held constant, he does translate the historical explanation into a causal model that asks whether any one factor (for example, mass mobilization) is a necessary and sufficient precondition. Although the bureaucratic-authoritarian model does offer a causal explanation, each of these studies has confused the epistemological assumptions inherent in that theory and thereby invalidated their comparative project.

This importance of historical sequence in establishing authoritarian institutions (*vis-à-vis* industrial phases and popular mobilization) is

also noted in Kaufman (1977). He stresses the importance of political authoritarianism being consolidated before the onset of the difficult industrialization phases as the key to understanding Mexico's ability to avoid a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. O'Donnell agrees, describing Mexico as an instance where "political and economic exclusion may be achieved before tackling the economic deepening" (1978a, 28). Demobilization of the working class via exclusionary corporatist institutions prior to this phase is the central issue. Yet Kaufman's focus on labor seems to be restricted to only a small portion of that population—the unionized sector—while the mechanisms for dealing with the mass of the rural and urban working-class population remain unclear.

Susan Eckstein, also focusing on Mexico, begins with an effort to describe the "dual functions" of the state—accumulation and legitimation—but with greater emphasis on the autonomy of the state (1977a, 1977b). Using anecdotal material, she details the modes of corporatist integration of the urban poor's organizations by the Mexican state. This analysis is complemented by Montes de Oca's 1977 study of the Mexican state and the peasantry. Montes de Oca notes two goals of state policy: first, it must block the union of industrial workers with peasants; and second, it must garner peasant support of the state. But in doing so, the state is limited by the necessity of restricting its policies to those that reproduce capitalist social relations, that is, private property. The state policy that resulted gave the bulk of financial and infrastructural support to large private agrarian properties rather than to the *ejidos* (peasant organizations), but gave peasants access to land for subsistence production.

In essence, the bureaucratic-authoritarian perspective treats the fragmentation, defeat, and ultimate repression of working-class "popular" movements in a mechanistic and even fatalistic manner. It poses a simple correlation between the prior level of mobilization and conflict and the subsequent level and length of repression. The reason for this correlation is given as the need for the state to prove to foreign capital that it is in control and can provide a stable, secure environment for investment (O'Donnell 1978a). If authoritarian institutions are established prior to the accumulation crisis, then the need for repressive or exclusionary policies is reduced. But even if the road taken is different, the outcome remains the same. Is it essential, however, that the bureaucratic-authoritarian perspective simply accept the defeat of popular mobilizations? Recent studies of massive defeats of working-class organization and struggle in England (Edward P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*) and in the United States (Lawrence Goodwyn's *The Democratic Promise*) reveal not only the vitality and potential of these movements that failed, but help in understanding the degree to which received culture and those spaces for inquiry and organization that re-

main are owed to these movements' profound successes. If there is a failure within the bureaucratic-authoritarian perspective, it rests in the abstracting of working-class struggles, the writing of history from the viewpoint of capital, and the acceptance of capital's own rationale for how it and the capitalist state have acted.

*State Structure and State Policy: Contradictions and Tensions*

The third theme in the bureaucratic-authoritarian perspective concerns the period after it has been established. To review briefly the central components of its structure, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state is characterized by leadership drawn from large-scale formal organizations in business, the military, and state institutions that embody a bureaucratic-technical ideology expressed in subsequent state policies of political and economic exclusion of the "popular" sector; it is linked to a transitional phase of capital accumulation that initiates a "deepening" of industrialization. The assumption is that domestic capital was incapable of this task and that although it and other sectors of the population seeking stability supported the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, the fundamental logic of this regime compels it in its earliest stages to forge an alliance with international capital. This alliance is conditional upon the state's demonstrated capacity to repress popular forces as well as the interests of domestic capital, thus ensuring economic stability and political security for foreign capital. The degree to which the state can accomplish this task, O'Donnell asserts, is directly associated with levels of foreign investment.

In order to sustain successfully the "call for foreign capital," the state must demonstrate both its independence from domestic class interests that contradict the logic of international accumulation and the capacity to repress those interests, including national capital. A contradiction exists, however, between an unlimited internationalization of the economy and the political reality of maintaining what amounts to a "garrison state." Consequently, the state eventually must allow the national bourgeoisie into the coalition, but on the state's terms. The "instrumentalist" view of the state has been turned on its head (Miliband 1969; Jessop 1977; Andersen, Friedland, and Wright 1976). The state must "actively tutor" the bourgeoisie (O'Donnell 1978a, 22) or in Reyna's terms, "the Bourgeoisie is the son of the state" (1977). At this juncture, the bureaucratic-authoritarian model begins to conceptualize the state much as state capitalism does, but perhaps with a greater sensitivity to the contradictions arising as the state enters into control of direct production.

This contradiction is most directly realized in the confrontation of an international circuit of capital reproduction and capital accumulation

within a specific society. As O'Donnell observes, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state "must reserve for itself and for the national bourgeoisie hunting grounds forbidden to the direct access of international capital; and it has to be itself more entrepreneurial in directly productive activities" (1978a, 22). Thus the bureaucratic-authoritarian state must operate as a national state that represents the interests of both the national bourgeoisie and of all classes (at least in rhetoric), while making sure to reproduce the openness, security, and stability required by international capital for investment.

Oszlak asserts that there is a structural association among a particular system of state institutions, the predominant form of production, world market linkages, and the resulting social fabric of the nation (1977, 46). The results of internationalization within specific nations produces deep contradictions that make necessary an increasingly active state. O'Donnell (1977, 1979) has begun to analyze more deeply the role of the state in capitalist society, first in terms of its dual character as a set of coercive and inclusive social relations and then in terms of the necessary mediations of state and society that are embodied in the principles of citizenship, nation, and masses (*pueblo*). An appreciation of the state's need to reproduce both domination and consensus has led O'Donnell to reformulate his understanding of the contradictions operating within the bureaucratic-authoritarian state and to perceive new possibilities for the emergence of democratic political relations.<sup>14</sup> The primary objective of maintaining security and stability via exclusion and repression in order to attract foreign capital must be countered by a rapprochement with certain fractions of the national bourgeoisie. Thus, the state cannot create absolute autonomy for itself. The "decompression" in Brazil and the "crumbling" of the state's repressive capacities in Brazil and Argentina are viewed by O'Donnell as evidence of the inherent instability of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. It is impossible in the long run for the state to maintain autonomy from class interests and class struggles. Briefly stated, the state is necessarily an arena of class struggles, but the very structure of state institutions and the content of state interventions mediate these struggles.

This issue again raises the question of "interest representation" or inclusionary versus exclusionary authoritarianism. In her study of the Mexican regime, Purcell essentially adopts the O'Donnell model of authoritarian regimes, arguing that Brazil since 1964 is an example of such an exclusionary authoritarian regime whereas the Mexican regime is an example of the inclusionary, essentially nonrepressive type of political authoritarianism (1975, 8). The inclusion-exclusion division is also noted in O'Donnell (1973) and is reiterated in Collier and Collier (1977), Stepan (1978), and Kaufman (1977). When considering the dynamic tendencies of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, however, these alternative

structural relations of class interests and state policy are now used to express the fundamental contradiction of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. To survive as a national state, a regime must mediate social relations within its boundaries and legitimate national interests. To sustain the alliance with international capital, the state must allow the economy to be open to restructuring in accordance with the logic of international accumulation. Repression and exclusion, the shortest route to achieving this logic, will generate in the long run sufficient social conflict to undermine that alliance.

The terminology of this perspective is replete with these bonded yet contradictory relationships and tendencies embodied in the origins, structure, and dynamics of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. The independence of the state is only an illusion characteristic of a historical conjuncture in which a hegemonic class alliance is being forged. The violence of the state therefore is contributing to the state's aura of independence and power over classes at that moment when the class character of capitalism is ideologically and politically least mystified, that is to say, when material bases and organizational expressions of class interests must be torn down in order to break ground for a new historical phase of capital accumulation. Thus O'Donnell (1978a, 26; 1978b) and Kurth (1979) foresee alternative possibilities for opening political life and liberalizing the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. First, this process may occur once the "deepening" of industrialization has occurred and an alliance among international capital, the state, and the national bourgeoisie has been created. Second, it may result from these regimes' profound failure to formulate and enact adequate accumulation or social expense policies that would start a broad process of delegitimation and internal division.

#### CONCLUSION

Four generic categories may be identified that indicate the assumptions shaping a theory of the peripheral capitalist state. Neither the state capitalist nor the bureaucratic-authoritarian theory is fairly characterized by them. Yet framing the issue in this manner may allow us to see more clearly the strengths, limits, and differences of these two theories. First, if the goal is to specify a qualitatively distinct role for the peripheral capitalist state in the process of capital accumulation, then an adequate theory must distinguish the extent, intensity, and content of state interventions. Second, if the central proposition is that this type of state emerges as an instrument to be used to further specific class interests, then an adequate theory must map class relations and class positions as well as identify the means by which class interests and capacities become translated into state structure and policy. Third, if the assertion is that

the peripheral capitalist state emerges as a structural consequence of crises in the process of capital accumulation, then it must conceptualize systematically such crises in relation to state structure and policy. Fourth, if the theory proposes that the state is autonomous with respect to class struggles or that it has become a class actor, then the relationship between the state and other classes must be conceptualized and the historical tendencies in those relationships indicated.

As attempts to test these theories by using a comparative methodology have demonstrated, the effort to develop each of these concepts results in the schematic glossing of important divisions in class structure, specification of class relations, and the process of class struggle. The focus on productive structures as a means of identifying economies obscures the complexity of social processes such as the reproduction of labor. The process of capital accumulation, which is essentially a process of class formation and class dissolution, is thus reduced to a question of industrialization. The emphasis on state interventions has tended to reduce the capacity of the models to analyze the state as "an arena of class struggle." Finally, the utility of these perspectives must rest not on their capacity to identify a type of state as a "fact," but on their provision of a conceptual framework that orients and poses questions for the historical analysis of specific societies.

The current burgeoning of state analysis in all the social sciences is not accidental. Nor is the concern over traditional democratic freedoms simply academic. The expansion and intensification of state interventions in "civil society" is neither an aberration nor an insignificant phenomenon. State capitalism and bureaucratic-authoritarian perspectives represent two limited, but perceptive, attempts to account for the historical antecedents and tendencies of this process. If the two accounts are not comprehensive, they are nevertheless the foundation upon which to construct an analysis of the capitalist state in the periphery.

These new directions of theory and research may be generally understood as an extension and clarification of several traditions of economic and political analysis that have been grouped under the rubrics of dependency, corporatism, and authoritarianism. They have also emerged as a critique of modernization theory, which postulated an association of advanced industrialization with democracy and egalitarian values (Lipset 1959; Coleman 1960; Cutright 1963),<sup>15</sup> with a critique available to the English-speaking audience in Cardoso and Faletto (1979), O'Donnell (1973), and Schmitter (1971).

While the last decade has witnessed a burgeoning literature on the relationship between the state and society in advanced capitalist nations (surveyed elsewhere in Jessop 1977; Gold, Lo, and Wright 1975; Andersen, Friedland, and Wright 1976), the horizons of that territory have been relatively uninformed by a contemporaneous body of theoretic-

cal and empirical studies on the peripheral capitalist state (Alavi 1973; Boron 1979; Sorj 1977; Ziemann and Lanzendorfer 1977). This situation may be due partly to an assumption that a distinct set of hypotheses and concepts is appropriate to peripheral nations because of their position in the world system. The timing of industrial development, the role of foreign capital, the structure of agrarian production, the distribution of economic resources and political power, and the structure of capital and commodity circulation have all been cited as grounds for the consignment of developments within the periphery to a distinct category.

More recently, however, numerous structural parallels have emerged that may suggest the inappropriateness of this division and the larger relevance of studies attending to the political economy of peripheral societies. First, the long-assumed incompatibility between "dependency" and industrial growth has been questioned (Amin 1976; Warren 1976; Cardoso 1972, 1973; Evans 1977; Gereffi and Evans 1979), although the meaning of these developments is still held to be distinct from that in the core (Emmanuel 1974; McMichael, Petras, and Rhodes 1974). Second, current economic tendencies in advanced capitalist nations suggest that the limits of a particular pattern of capital accumulation may have been reached, heralded by the decay of traditional industries and calls for a new "reindustrialization." Third, the increasing internationalization of the production process itself is beginning to "disarticulate" the industrial structure and financial structures within each nation, whether core or periphery. Fourth, transformation in both the size of the state (percentage of the labor force, expenditures as a percentage of the GNP, and so on) and the structure of state interventions (especially in direct production) have reduced the dissimilarity of advanced capitalist and peripheral states. Fifth, state organization of interest-group representation in the core is increasingly corporatist, albeit characterized by a well-documented historical base (Schmitter 1974). Sixth, the collapse of traditional alliances supporting democratic-socialist ideals in Europe and the Democratic party in the United States and the rise of neofascist and racist movements, as well as regional, religious, and ethnic political movements, all testify to the increasing mobilization *and* fragmentation of working-class institutions. Finally, polls and electoral participation document the increasing delegitimation of the state. Although schematically presented, these features of the current historical period collectively suggest that we may do well to reassess the degree to which studies of capitalist economic and political relations in Latin America may inform our understanding of general tendencies within late capitalism. Instead of being residual and underdeveloped, the periphery may represent the cutting edge of the future.



## NOTES

1. Jessop has offered a succinct and cogent summary of the criteria required for such a theory: (1) it is founded on the specific qualities of capitalism as a mode of production; (2) it attributes a central role to class struggle in the process of capital accumulation; (3) it establishes the relations between political and economic features of society without reducing one to the other or treating them as totally independent and autonomous; (4) it allows for historical and national differences in the forms and functions of the state in capitalist societies; and (5) it allows for the influence of noncapitalist classes and nonclass forces in determining the nature of the state and the exercise of state power (1977, pp. 353–54). While most of the observations and conclusions within the literature reviewed in this article are not at odds with such a project, I will argue that individually and collectively they do not begin to capture the range of these requirements. That task remains before us.
2. Dupuy and Truchil state: “The successful establishment of these state structures is attributed to the greater intensification of interimperialist rivalries and the consequent relative decline of United States hegemony” (1979, 2). This observation, however, seems to be built wholly upon the work of Petras, and as this article indicates, is in no way a conclusion that can be generalized to apply to the rest of the state capitalism studies.
3. To summarize briefly the flavor of these assertions, I include the following excerpts. Petras (1977): “State Capitalism emerges in part as a response to the unfavorable economic fortunes of private national capital. . . .” Sorj (1976): “It seems that in peripheral capitalism state capitalism arises from a vacuum left by the private bourgeoisie and socialist forces.” Torpik (1979): “Part of the impetus behind the expansion of governmental economic actions lies in the relative poverty and conservatism of the native Brazilian bourgeoisie.” Fitzgerald (1979): “Weakness of the domestic class structure, especially the national bourgeoisie . . . gives rise to state capitalism.” Munck (1979): “State intervention comes from the scarcity of capital and the inability of native capital to restructure the accumulation process.” Faucher (1980): “State intervention not only compensates for the deficiency of investment, but induces its own growth.” Pérez (1980): “A local Bourgeoisie was to be absent or not strong enough to lead this process of reorientation.” Ferner (1981) takes a less simplified notion of “weakness”: “That the state sector (of Peru) was able to go on expanding reflected not so much the economic weakness of the industrial bourgeoisie as its *political* weakness—in other words the fact that it was prevented from expressing its class interests adequately at the level of the state” (1981). A similar position is offered in Chattopadhyay’s analysis of state capitalism in India: “There the exigencies of development were so urgent that the government just could not leave the matter in the hands of individual capitalists because, first, they were ill-equipped for those investments that were essential, but least paying, particularly in the short run and secondly, they lacked, in general, funds, initiative, and experience” (1970).
4. According to one tradition of Marxist theory, “the state is an ideal collective capitalist” (Jessop 1977, 362).
5. If historic crises are reduced to the conceptual status of clogged pipes, then the state as “social engineer” is a logical consequence. But this is a view of the state that is fundamentally envisioned from the perspective of capital.
6. At the level of the argument as it is specified, the *crisis* remains vague and the processes of state interventions not clearly delineated. How is it measured? How is it differentiated? The most obvious questions look in vain for empirical substantiation in the literature. In the absence of a rigorous detailing of the content of this crisis, its status and the nexus of crisis and modes of state intervention termed state capitalism must remain a mystery.
7. Chattopadhyay (1970), while noting the necessity of the government’s intervention in the development process due to the incapacity of the native bourgeoisie to take on the task, argues that this model of state capitalism has the “progressive” aspect of allowing the country to consolidate its independence vis-à-vis imperialism. Yet, in so far as the model remains capitalist, he argues, internal class contradictions will be para-

- mount in the long run and contradictions between the bourgeoisie and foreign imperialism will become secondary, leading state capitalism to an alliance with foreign capital and transformation of the state into a "simple instrument of oppression" (1970, 19). Langdon (1977), in a rather tentatively offered series of judgments on the role of the Kenyan state, suggests that the state does play a central role in peripheral capitalist economies, especially in mediating potential class antagonisms between the domestic and foreign bourgeoisie. He further indicates that this function of the peripheral capitalist state leads to a "new and more pervasive dependency" (1977, 97) that avoids the conflict of native and foreign capital, but which necessarily shifts the locus of class struggle to the "power regions" and especially to the peasantry. The logic of this argument, however, is not carefully specified.
8. Martins (1977) attempts to differentiate the state bourgeoisie from the entrepreneurial bureaucracy, the former being associated with a strategy to act as independent capitalists with interests in extending capital accumulation, the latter referring to state sector organizations in production that act to facilitate the interests of dominant classes in the private sector whose organizational capacities have become represented in the state apparatus. Aguilar defines the state bourgeoisie in the following manner: "If one could speak of a bureaucratic or governmental bourgeoisie, it would contain the numerous current and former public functionaries who have made great fortunes through their offices (*a la sombra de sus puestos*) and who have sizable investments in farms and ranches, in urban real estate, in luxurious homes, in national and foreign banks, and in businesses of the most varied kinds, but who are fundamentally considered to be politicians. To this sector would belong well-known ex-presidents of the Republic, prominent cabinet members, directors of national institutions and state-supported companies, high military officials, governors, deputies, senators, many municipal presidents, and not a few labor leaders" (1970, 31).
  9. Evans uses this term to refer to the "triple alliance" of MNCs, the state, and local capital.
  10. Although the term "bureaucratic" is employed by O'Donnell, it is important not to confuse his project with a Weberian analysis. His concern is not with a historical expansion of rational behavior in the organization of social institutions.
  11. Bozzoli (1978), in an analysis of the South African state, attempts to deal with this "nonincorporatist" aspect of the state, albeit without any firm conclusions beyond the suggestion that "it must be explained, surely, in terms of some peculiarity in the mode of development of the incorporationist interest in South African industrialism; and in the nature of the desire [sic] hegemony of the national capitalist class as a whole" (1978, 50).
  12. Reyna gives the state greater autonomy from class manipulation than O'Donnell in viewing the state as an actor attempting to mediate interests of different constituencies, responding to and sometimes repressing those from below, and responding to those from above. To bargain with dominant classes, the state must have popular support. Reyna therefore concludes that both rural and urban social movements have forced a certain "*apertura democrática*" with some redistribution, populist rhetoric, and some political repression. Yet, the state's options will be bounded by the need to reproduce the capitalist system and extend capital accumulation (O'Connor 1973). Here Reyna seems to agree with the "capital logic" school (Jessop 1977; Altvater 1973; Mueller and Neussuess 1975) as to the inherent limits on state policy, while taking a position similar to Piven and Cloward (1971) on the relationship of state policies (reform, regulation, and repression) and popular movements, that is, "regulating the poor."
  13. Remmer and Merckx offer a close analysis of O'Donnell's work on this topic. They place strong emphasis on the "causal logic" of the BA model, asserting that "in summary, comparisons among cases of BA rule suggest that prior threat does not effectively account for variations in dominant class cohesion, the alignment of political forces, and military unity" (1982, 32). They criticize the ideal type theory or method that the BA model exemplifies. In particular, they take exception to the causal priority assigned to "threat" or "perceived levels of threat" and later policies and deactivation of opposition forces. O'Donnell responds, "My opinion is that more

- threat leads to *more efforts* from the BA state apparatus to deactivation, that is to say, the degree of deactivation is not only a function of the previous threat, but also of the organizational resources and possible alliances of the sectors against which those efforts are directed" (1982, 45). In essence, the Remmer and Merx critique calls for the consideration of other variables than prior threat and economic crisis in order to achieve a more generally applicable model. In truth, they are not in conflict over this matter and O'Donnell's reply to their article notes as much. It is precisely this historical interplay of class interests and capacities that is one of the strengths of the bureaucratic-authoritarian approach, albeit one not always utilized by those employing it.
14. Bartra concurs, noting that the roads to democratic capitalist political relations or to socialism are not closed to the subcapitalist countries with "bourgeois-despotic" political regimes (1978, 121). Bartra offers a somewhat distinct analysis of the structural origins of authoritarianism in Latin America. He asserts that the independence of the state is only an appearance that characterizes a historical conjuncture in which the "old modes of production" have not disappeared and the dominant classes do not yet have exclusive hegemony. The violence of the state is therefore a strategy of an emergent dominant class. Bartra concludes that the nondemocratic forms of political mediation are not simply deviations or accidents in the social life of underdeveloped countries but are produced as the mechanisms of transition in social formations where the clear predominance of the capitalist mode of production shelters a situation of "permanent primitive accumulation" (1978, 65). In essence, he is asserting that the bureaucratic-authoritarian state is an expression of a period of transition wherein the capitalist class must consolidate its hegemony but immediately must enter into alliances, extend primitive accumulation, and repress the working class. Kurth (1979) similarly agrees with O'Donnell (1978a) that the current tendencies will lead to more liberal political regimes, but he bases his argument more upon the capacity of this type of regime to be sustained by future export growth.
  15. Collier and Collier (1977) provide an excellent bibliography of works exemplifying this perspective. In an analysis of the Mexican regime, Purcell (1973) asserts that the authoritarian model offers greater utility and a basis for comparative analysis when contrasted with modernization models that hold that the political system will "evolve into a democratic system characterized by competitive political parties" (1973, 53).

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