

SCHOLARS' GUIDE TO WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR RUSSIAN/SOVIET STUDIES. By *Steven A. Grant*. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977. xii, 404 pp. \$19.95, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

Although I would like to avoid the reviewer's sin of labeling a book "indispensable," I am forced to rank this as one that all serious researchers in Russian and Soviet fields should know about, that most of them should use, and that many will want to own personally, especially (but not only) if their work is concentrated on the recent period. The aim of the compiler was to cover all of the relevant resources in the immediate Washington, D.C. area as of 1976. The book describes not only libraries and archives, but also other sorts of collections and data banks, as well as a host of public and private organizations, including cultural associations and publications. The groups and institutions treated number several hundred.

The project was sponsored by the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies and by its parent organization, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Sergius Yakobson served as consultant and Zdenek V. David—librarian of the Wilson Center and general editor of the projected series of which this volume is the first—served as the editor of this book.

Steven Grant has done his work admirably. He has included names of a great many knowledgeable individuals, together with their telephone numbers, and he has given lengthy and highly informative treatment to large and complex organizations such as the Library of Congress, the National Archives and Records Service, and the Department of Commerce. The arrangement of the material makes it easy to use. There are several kinds of indexes. Except for the often ambiguous resort to the slash for punctuation, the style is clear and direct. Mr. Grant and his sponsors and assistants have done us all a most valuable service. It would be interesting to know how many copies are bought by the Soviet embassy!

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SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE. By *Daniel Yergin*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. xii, 526 pp. \$15.00.

Daniel Yergin's effectively written book covers the years between the Yalta Conference and the Berlin blockade which marked the end of the wartime alliance. Of all the Cold War studies that abound, *Shattered Peace* is probably the most thoroughly researched. The impressive bibliography contains dozens of interviews and unpublished private papers, many of which provide new and enlightening information. Although his is a revisionist interpretation, Yergin maintains an appropriate distance from other revisionist writings which alternately blame America's economic imperialism, multilateralism, and an alleged anti-Soviet purpose for the first atomic bombs. By contrast, Yergin's culprit—and I believe rightly so—is America's fearful suspicion of Soviet intentions which, in the postwar years, produced a mirror image, that is, a negative interpretation of all Russian actions regardless of what their real purposes were.

According to Yergin, the Soviet Union can be seen as a revolutionary state which denies the possibility of coexistence and aims at world mastery—the Riga axiom—or as a traditional Great Power that operates within the international system without any intention of overthrowing it—the Yalta axiom. The two labels have the advantage of facilitating presentation and of satisfying the reader who wants uncomplicated answers. At the same time, however, they not only oversimplify complex issues but

actually obfuscate the fact that the two axioms are by no means mutually exclusive. The Soviet Union was and continues to be a world revolutionary state which always unambiguously denied the possibility of ideological coexistence. Simultaneously, it behaves like a traditional Great Power within the international system, which—as the Kremlin sees it—is gradually disintegrating. By treating the two axioms as irreconcilable opposites, *Shattered Peace* follows the national tradition which steadfastly refuses to see American-Soviet relations as a continuum that can be successfully managed only by an ever-sensitive diplomacy supported by adequate and *unquestionably* committable force. Yergin could have strengthened his interpretation by stressing the sterility of the Yalta-Riga dispute. He also might have clarified the necessity for Roosevelt's Yalta axiom at a time when Russia had to be kept in the war and America's latent anticommunism consequently had to be shelved.

In the light of the ongoing "détente versus containment" debate, *Shattered Peace* gains significance. It will be profitably read by the younger generation which faces similar dilemmas and has not yet absorbed the lessons of the past.

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THE GIANTS: RUSSIA AND AMERICA. By *Richard J. Barnet*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977. 191 pp. \$8.95.

In his previous writing, Richard Barnet presented a revisionist view of Cold War American foreign policy; according to Barnet, the United States has engaged in "a form of permanent war." The reasons are to be found not in the external environment, including the "Soviet threat" so often cited by Cold War statesmen and orthodox historians, but rather in the nature of American institutions. Peace requires a fundamental change in American policy, and that in turn depends on a drastic restructuring of American society. Conspicuously absent from most of Barnet's earlier books has been the Soviet Union. That omission has been corrected in *The Giants*, a book which focuses on détente—what it is, how it developed, and where it is going. *The Giants* does not so much take the United States off the hook as put the Soviets on it. Barnet's thesis is that the United States and the USSR are two of a kind.

The Giants should interest even those who "discovered" the Soviet Union somewhat earlier than Barnet did. The analysis of Kissinger's thinking is instructive, informed as it is by interviews with Kissinger's top Soviet specialists. Barnet's critical approach is particularly suited to analyzing the arms race where, more than anywhere else, the nightmares of the hawks are exaggerated. And the chapter on the politics of trade is an intelligent treatment of the pitfalls as well as of the potential of "linking" American political and economic policies.

But despite its accomplishments, *The Giants* is seriously flawed. The book shows signs of being a rush job. The argument is developed in a haphazard fashion. The author has apparently interviewed a variety of American and Soviet officials, but, for the most part, he does not identify them. He cites secret episodes and confidential exchanges, implying that he has had access to classified sources, but, in the manner of the "National Security managers," whom his past work severely condemns, he will not acknowledge his sources. (The book does not have a single footnote.)

But the main problem is substantive. The notion of Soviet-American similarity (a kind of negative convergence) is valid in part (and too often ignored), but Barnet takes it too far. "Rival elites" may govern the two societies, but how different they are! Each elite may have a devil image of the other, but American leaders like Roosevelt and Cordell Hull managed to misplace theirs during World War II, while Stalin never set aside his morbid suspicions of the United States.