banking sector. Yet in France, the ability of large French banks and peak associations to "speak with (nearly) one voice" (196), as well as national sentiments and threats of foreign takeovers, supported already friendly relations between French officials and bankers. Unfortunately, the authors show how this cooperation between politicians and industry led France to underperform in terms of strengthening its bank reforms.

The case studies are fascinating illustrations of the way that bank reform was managed (or not) and the way that politics shaped or stalled financial recovery. For people interested in financial crises or the revolving door between politicians, the financial sector, and regulation in wealthy countries, this is a remarkable book. However, one factor that very obviously played a key role in the case studies, but less so in the theory, is the role of time. Indeed, the sequencing or starting and stalling of reforms led me to think of earlier literature on partial reforms (see Joel S. Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," *World Politics* 50(2), 1998); and Timothy Frye, *Building States and Markets after Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, 2010). According to the partial-reforms literature, people win and lose at various stages over time during reform implementation. Those who win early are therefore incentivized to block later reforms that may interfere with their winnings. A related issue is also the role that credible commitment might play. Early winners might announce at the start of any reforms that they support substantial bank reforms, which take time to implement. When the industry is divided, it can be harder for some members to believe that the industry's commitment to later reforms is credible. Credible commitment issues may then lead to important actors not backing earlier reforms, even though they may subsequently benefit from them. Therefore, it may not be the case that divided groups have problems organizing as a consequence of collective action but that they have commitment issues. I would have liked the authors to engage a bit more with the differences between collective action and commitment in their review of alternative explanations, especially because evidence of both collective action and commitment at work can be found in the case studies. This is especially important because the measure of a divided or unified financial sector is derived not from observed behavior but rather from "long standing institutional features of interest representation" (44–46).

Finally, I would like to see the theory tested on a larger sample of countries. In chapter 3, the authors mention commitments made at the Group of 20 (G20), in which the five countries examined in the case studies participated. Operationalizing the authors' key variables, *interest group lobbying* and *venue shifting*, for a larger and more diverse group of countries is challenging, and it is therefore understandable that this is missing in this book. Future research, however, may want to tackle this. A larger sample of countries may offer not only greater evidence in support of the authors' theory but also additional conditioning variables, especially for the poorer countries in the G20. Furthermore, because the G20 includes member states with a history of financial crises—Argentina and Brazil, for example—it might also be fruitful to ask whether venue shifting works mainly as a political-calming strategy, as the authors show with their case studies, and whether it can operate as a market-calming strategy as well. It is possible to imagine ways in which the delegation of policy decision making to technocrats changes the flow of information to market participants. It would therefore be interesting empirically to analyze whether markets rewarded or punished delegation. Did markets view venue shifting, when it occurred, as a costly signal of reform success?

Overall, this is a fascinating book and an especially readable one. It is interesting and full of important details and draws on excellent primary and secondary research.

Redefining Ceasefires: Wartime Order and Statebuilding in Syria. By Marika Sosnowski. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. 220p. $110.00 cloth.
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— Kevin Mazur, *King's College London*
kevin.mazur@kcl.ac.uk

This passionately argued book is an important contribution to policy debates on how ceasefires alter the course of civil wars. It also lays out an agenda to extend the micro-level research program on violence to conflict termination and postconflict situations. Drawing her primary empirical material from the civil war that followed the 2011 Syrian uprising, Marika Sosnowski argues that ceasefires may stop active fighting but hardly pause, much less end, the struggle among involved parties to gain control of resources and construct political order. Many policy makers view ceasefires as an unalloyed good that facilitates formal negotiations; however, incumbent state actors, rebels, and their international allies can use ceasefires strategically in ways that strengthen their positions but undermine formal settlements—in effect, using ostensibly neutral, well-meaning international institutions in service of their particular aims. To explicate these mechanisms, Sosnowski borrows the concept of "wartime order" from the rebel governance literature: whereas extant work on ceasefires takes the simple presence or absence of active fighting as the measure of ceasefires' success, the wartime order lens brings into view patterns of political domination at the local level, allowing scholars to see how governance varies over time and space within a single conflict.

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Redefining Ceasefires: Wartime Order and Statebuilding in Syria convincingly shows that policy makers designing ceasefires must take account of their effects at the ground level, not just at the negotiating table, and that doing so requires deep knowledge of the affected actors and localities. This is especially the case when conflict prevention organizations reassess the "formulaic approach to ceasefires" (165) that privileges formal procedures at the cost of investigating local, informal struggles that have enormous consequences for both civilians and the course of the conflict itself. This point may seem obvious in view of the total failure of ceasefires in Syria that Sosnowski details. Indeed, it raises questions about the extent to which policy makers are genuinely ignorant of local machinations enabled by ceasefires versus being resigned to using the only tool available to them. Having worked as a practitioner in a conflict prevention organization, I fully appreciate how "stopping the shooting" to get parties to talk remains a lodestar, even among analysts sufficiently immersed in the local details to foresee some ceasefires' detrimental effects. Sosnowski puts this nagging feeling front and center for policy makers, and I share the hope that it will filter into how they design and enforce ceasefires.

Another virtue of the book is that, even though it is structured around the Syrian case, it draws out generalizable insights and proposes hypotheses that can be evaluated in other contexts. One chapter provides a thorough review of legal and social-scientific treatments of ceasefires generally and then places them in the theoretical context of both the microlevel turn in civil war scholarship and anthropological and policy approaches to the same topics. Another chapter develops a typology of ceasefires, drawing on specific incidents in the Syrian case supplemented by an impressive range of global cases. The detailed study of Syria is divided into a chapter on prewar patterns of governance and three thematically focused chapters on how ceasefires affect rebel governance, citizenship and property, and state sovereignty and the actions of foreign states, respectively.

The book's main theoretical move—its focus on the local effects of ceasefires—opens to scholarly inquiry dynamics that have been previously overlooked but play a critical role in the wartime and postwar construction of political order: these dynamics include continuities with prewar forms of local governance and what parties actually do on the ground while their leaders sit at the negotiating table. To do this, Sosnowski weaves together theoretical and empirical insights from political scientists, anthropologists, and applied conflict research specialists. More than simply applying theory from an adjacent field, *Redefining Ceasefires* provides a synthesis, incorporating political scientists' broad view of the set of actors actually constructing political order and anthropologists' emphasis on links between violent actors and local populations (p. 27). This synthetic approach, although demanding in terms of the fine-grained data and local insight required to execute it, stands to massively improve scholarly understanding of how ceasefires affect wartime governance.

Any work setting as broad an agenda as the present one is bound to leave some questions unanswered. One that sticks out to me is the causal role of ceasefires. Throughout the book, Sosnowski describes ceasefires as having an effect on governance on the ground, characterizing them at one point as "the manufacturing and imposition of an embryonic type of wartime order on complex political systems" (p. 138). And although the book's focused comparisons examine local case studies before and after ceasefires, they do not explicitly use the standard tools of qualitative analysis, like counterfactuals or causal process tracing, to substantiate that causal role. One wonders whether the shifts in patterns of governance like the increased role for local notables (chapter 5) are the results of ceasefire implementation or simply of other wartime dynamics, such as battlefield victories or increased foreign support for one side. Discussion of some "near-miss" cases—situations similar to those where ceasefires occurred that for some reason did not see a formal agreement—might have provided clarity. For example, the section on the 2015 al-Waʿr ceasefire could have been paired with an incident featuring a similar military configuration elsewhere in Syria in which there was no agreement, thereby showing the causal work done by the hypothesized mechanisms, legal legitimacy and the presence of UN staff (86).

I also wonder how specific the findings are to the international context in which the Syrian conflict unfolds. The book ably describes the role of foreign states in advancing and undermining specific ceasefires within the Syrian case, but it does not explicitly theorize the role of international players. More generally, how does a multipolar world order or the geostrategic importance of the country undergoing conflict play into local wartime orders? The Syrian case offers a particularly bleak picture of ceasefires in part because the incumbent and rebels alike had a menu of foreign patrons from which to choose (and play off against one another). But cases of international mediation in the 1990s held up as successes, such as Bosnia and Northern Ireland, were subject to less competition by foreign patrons—and took place in the post–Cold War, unipolar moment. Although hardly contemporary paragons of stability and inclusion, these latter polities have been spared the depth of destruction and prolonged suffering seen in Syria and other contemporary conflicts like the one in Yemen. International actors and configurations could theoretically be integrated into the book's variable capturing the balance of power between incumbent authorities and rebels, but this variable would have to account for switching among patrons, as well as the thorny cases where the foreign patron acts independently of, and not necessarily in the

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interest of, the incumbent authority (e.g., the 2017 de-escalation zones agreement to which the Syrian regime was not a formal signatory [144]).

These questions are a testament to the innovative nature of the book's approach to ceasefires. It effectively captures the dynamics that have prolonged the suffering of Syrians, often in the name of ending it, and lays out a program for future inquiry into the dynamics of wartime order generated through the use and abuse of ceasefires. In a geopolitical context characterized by competition among multiple world powers, the analytical lens and tools proposed in *Redefining Ceasefires* will be a vital guide for scholars and policy makers alike.

Under the Gun: Political Parties and Violence in Pakistan. By Niloufer Siddiqui. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023. 272p. $29.99 paper.
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— Adnan Naseemullah, *King's College London*
a.naseemullah@kcl.ac.uk

Electoral violence is emerging as the most exciting recent frontier in the agenda of violence and conflict studies in political science. Examining the relationship between parties and violence is therefore an urgent task for this research agenda. Niloufer Siddiqui, in her stimulating new book on the relationship between violence and political parties in contemporary Pakistan, seeks to explain varieties of violent (and nonviolent) strategies implemented by these political organizations. Siddiqui examines such variation through the structural context of political competition and the institutional and organizational characteristics of the parties themselves, which shape their capacities and incentives to deploy violence to achieve their ends. The book provides a valuable contribution to understanding party-implicated violence by elucidating what parties are able to do and what they seek to do in using violence to further their interests.

A book on party-implicated violence in Pakistan is overdue for two reasons. It is vital for understanding the country on its own terms as a complex landscape of intense political competition and everyday violence that characterizes many if not most developing countries, rather than popular stereotypes of a failed state overrun by radical Islamist violence or an autocracy under military control, in which elections are just window dressing. Studying parties is an essential enterprise precisely because Pakistani elections are deeply consequential and their outcomes not predetermined. Pakistan is also the ideal exemplar case for understanding the many different forms of party-implicated violence because of its extreme diversity of political geographies and forms of competition; this diversity yields significant but explicable variation in the relationship between parties and political violence that might be missed in country cases in which only one type—say, vote-suppressive violence by incumbents—is evident. Siddiqui's book deftly engages with this empirically and theoretically important national case in comparative perspective, providing us with an explanatory framework that not only accounts for strategies of violence among parties in Pakistan but also establishes a template to link these different strategies to analogous cases from Nigeria to the Philippines.

Why do parties pursue different strategies, with some perpetrating violence directly, whereas others outsource violence to violent groups, form alliances with elite actors with independent coercive capacities, or even refrain from violence completely? At the heart of Siddiqui's argument is a powerful explanatory typology, in which different values on two key dimensions of analysis yield four types of party-implicated violent (or nonviolent) strategies. The first dimension is the political geography within which party competition occurs. Siddiqui recognizes that Pakistan, like many other developing countries, is a country with weak capacity, which perforce means that the state does not maintain an unrivaled monopoly over the legitimate use of force over all its territory. Critically, however, she distinguishes between two very different manifestations of this weakness: conditions of "shared sovereignty"—where governance functions are formally or informally carried out by social elites—and "multiple, competing sovereigns," in which no actor can fully establish a coercive monopoly, and thus multiple actors clash with one another over resources and power. In the Pakistani context, the former refers to parts of (rural) Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)—certainly the majority of constituencies in the country—whereas the latter refers to the complex, multiethnic metropolis of Karachi, certainly the epicenter of political violence in the country. The second dimension is a party's organizational capacity: whether any particular party has "local-level presence and the ability to mobilize voters through their own party cadres" or "lack[s] that institutional presence and which must rely on external actors for voter mobilization" (38). This yields four types of partisan strategies with respect to violence: *direct* (competing sovereigns, organizationally strong), *outsourcing* (competing sovereigns, organizationally weak), *alliance* (shared sovereignty, weak), and *nonviolence* (shared sovereignty, strong). Other factors—the particular incentives for engaging in violence and the audience costs that might dissuade it, the inelasticity of the vote and the extent to which vote bases are effectively captured and whether associated violence actors are elite or street-level—augment rather than crosscut this central logic driving strategic choice.

The bulk of the book is dedicated to elaborating and evidencing this framework through a rigorous but wide-ranging multimethod examination of four exemplar cases of parties and their different strategies for violence:

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