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Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Ken Kollman ,
John H. Miller  and
Scott E. Page
Ken Kollman
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
John H. Miller
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University
Scott E. Page
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
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Abstract

We develop a model of two-party spatial elections that departs from the standard model in three respects: parties' information about voters' preferences is limited to polls; parties can be either office-seeking or ideological; and parties are not perfect optimizers, that is, they are modelled as boundedly rational adaptive actors. We employ computer search algorithms to model the adaptive behavior of parties and show that three distinct search algorithms lead to similar results. Our findings suggest that convergence in spatial voting models is robust to variations in the intelligence of parties. We also find that an adaptive party in a complex issue space may not be able to defeat a well-positioned incumbent.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 86 , Issue 4 , December 1992 , pp. 929 - 937
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1992

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