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The revolution in federal procurement, 1980–present
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2018
Abstract
This paper examines revolutionary changes in the federal procurement regime that have taken place over roughly the past thirty-five years. The procurement process has long been formalized, but contractors were dispersed across the country and tended to furnish tangible goods in singular and discrete transactions. As a result of technology, global competition and security threats, ideological shifts, and fiscal changes, procurement spending exploded after 9/11 and today the regime forms “information communities” in which private companies exert both political and economic influence and supply staffing and information to the federal government within a continuous and seamless relationship where lines demarcating responsibilities and personnel are blurred.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2018 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press
Footnotes
Previous versions of the paper were presented to the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association and Southern Political Science Association. I would like to thank Jeff Grynaviski, Trey Marchbanks, Brian Kelleher Richter, Henrik Schatzinger, and Doug Schuler for their helpful comments.
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