

Erratum

There was a misprint in the first paragraph of Catherine Canary and Douglas Odegard's *Deductive Justification*, vol. XXVIII, no. 2, 1989. The following is the corrected version of the paragraph:

1. The Transmission Principle

The principle that epistemic justification is necessarily transmitted to all the known logical consequences of a justified belief continues to attract critical attention. That attention is not misplaced. If the Transmission Principle is valid, anyone who thinks that a given belief is justified must defend the view that every known consequence of the belief is also justified. This task can seem formidable when a belief's consequence is as esoteric as "There is no cartesian demon". On the other hand, if the principle is modified, the possibility of deductive justification is threatened. If some known consequence fails to be justified, the failure may extend to every known consequence. To reject Transmission is to insert a logical gap between the justification of a premise and the justification of the conclusion in an obviously valid argument. Once created, the gap is hard to fill, whatever the circumstances. Reflection on the Transmission Principle therefore usefully brings us face to face with the following dilemma: accept the principle and hand Cartesian scepticism a powerful weapon, or modify the principle and risk undermining deductive justification.