

Constituent Assembly in 1918, has now spent more than fifty years in emigration, which he has filled with untiring political and publicistic activity. His prolific writings have undoubtedly influenced public opinion here and abroad, especially during his long association with *Time* magazine. He has also given us several historical books, two of which are memoirs. The present volume is also memoiristic, though only marginally autobiographical. What the author by his own admission offers us here is a *mélange* of *petite histoire* and various observations and comments about men and events. He makes no pretense of writing an objective, scholarly history. However, this should not deter the potential reader—provided, of course, he has the time and patience to plow through the miscellaneous factual bits and pieces, little stories, and marginal observations which to him may mean nothing or even seem trivial, but for which historians and biographers are likely to be very grateful. For instance, in emphasizing that since his early years he has always identified himself as a Russian Jew, Vishniak repeatedly discusses the question of his relationship to the Russian and the Jewish nationalities, and in the process conveys in a most convincing way why he never could or would divorce the Jewishness from the Russianness within himself. No formal history can provide us with the same depth of understanding and feeling for events as a volume written by one who has experienced them and knows how to convey his experience intelligibly and interestingly. In addition, the author's style and prose are smooth and lively. Nobody will regret having embarked upon the reading of this attractively published volume.

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FRUNZE: THE SOVIET CLAUSEWITZ, 1885–1925. By *Walter Darnell Jacobs*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. xii, 231 pp. 30.60 Dutch guilders, paper.

Professor Jacobs tries, with some success, to right the balance between the relative neglect of Western scholarship in analyzing Frunze's role in formulating a military doctrine for the Red Army and the "overkill" of the subject in the Soviet Union. Western scholarship, however, has not ignored Frunze quite as much as Jacobs implies in his preface. D. Fedotoff White, a quarter of a century ago, devoted a good part of his *Growth of the Red Army* to Frunze, and John Erickson, a decade ago, dealt extensively with Frunze's role in the formulation of military doctrine (*The Soviet High Command*).

Jacobs, after a brief biographical sketch of Frunze (sixteen pages), gets down to the main business of his book—Frunze as the creator of the "unified military doctrine," that is, a proletarian military doctrine. He was opposed vehemently by Trotsky, and much of the book is devoted to the debate that ensued. In Jacobs's opinion Frunze won, and when he replaced Trotsky as commissar of war in 1925, he was able to impose his doctrine upon the Red Army. His other contributions to Soviet military theory, such as the role of technology, regular versus militia troops, and the erosion of the line separating the front and rear in modern wars, are also analyzed, but much more briefly. The two Frunze articles in the appendixes, strangely enough, do not stress the "unified military doctrine" but rather Frunze's advocacy of "the militarization in time of peace of the entire civil apparatus" (p. 171).

The attempt to show how Frunze's military doctrine has influenced Soviet military thought right to the present seems overdone. Even Jacobs admits that in the Finnish War, at Khalkin-Gol, and in the early stages of World War II the Red Army was not a "maneuver army" as envisioned in Frunze's doctrine. And certainly Stalin's military doctrine between 1945 and 1953 was not Frunzean. Although Professor Jacobs accomplishes the task he set for himself, in doing so he neglects the political and economic environment of the 1920s that had so much to do with the defeat of Trotsky and the victory of Frunze. Incidentally, to have well over fifty typographical errors in such a short book is inexcusable.

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STALIN UND DER AUFSTIEG HITLERS: DIE DEUTSCHLAND-POLITIK DER SOWJETUNION UND DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN INTERNATIONALE, 1929–1934. By *Thomas Weingartner*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970. xii, 302 pp. DM 38.

In an interesting and provocative thesis the author traces the tortuous and complex relationship between the Comintern, the top leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of Germany between 1929 and 1934. Using unpublished documents from the political archives of the German foreign office and the federal archives as well as a multitude of published documents on British, German, and Soviet foreign policy and relevant documents on the Communist International, Weingartner attempts to show how specific interests of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) were coordinated with those general interests of the Comintern and ultimately of the Soviet Union. The author makes adequate use of a wealth of primary and secondary source materials to enlighten the layman concerning the complexities of Franco-German, Soviet-German, and Franco-Soviet diplomatic and economic relations during the period of the Depression and its accompanying social upheavals within Germany. He succeeds quite well in relating the attitudes and policies of the top Soviet leaders toward the pre-Nazi German governments of Brüning, Papen, and Schleicher. One obtains the impression that during the period 1929–33 the Soviet Union and the Comintern were more interested in getting on with the German leadership than in furthering the cause of Communist revolution within Germany. What the Soviet leadership wished, as expressed in the Comintern policy, was a friendly "bourgeois" Germany with no ties to any anti-Soviet bloc.

Weingartner points out adequately the shortsighted policy of the Comintern and the KPD toward the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which, though anti-National Socialist, was nevertheless viewed by the German and Soviet Communist leadership as a greater enemy of communism than the Nazi Party. Both the Comintern and the KPD placed too much emphasis on interpreting the activities of their rivals and enemies—the SPD and the NSDAP—in terms of classic Marxist-Leninist ideology. Both failed to see that the NSDAP was the greater of the two "evils" and that once in power it would destroy both the KPD and the SPD. The author points out succinctly that the KPD's "olive branch" to the SPD after January 1933 was offered too late. But once the National Socialists had legitimately come to power, the CPSU sought to revise its foreign policy and to seek better relations with its Baltic neighbors and France. At the same time the Soviets did not fail to continue a fruitless dialogue with Nazi Germany.