

One great virtue of McKay's study is that he supports his arguments with extensive materials, hitherto little used, from the archives of banks and industrial firms in France and Belgium. He has also used publications of the tsarist government, as well as the contemporary technological and business press of Europe and Russia. His materials have enabled him to study the operations of some two hundred foreign firms in Russia. McKay has not covered all foreign business activity in Russia—the Americans and English are notable exclusions. He does not deal with the big subject of the foreign petroleum industry, reserving it for a future separate study. His method of presentation is to combine general problems, drawing upon all of his cases, with more detailed studies of specific firms. Thus, his early chapters discuss investment, entrepreneurship, promotion, management, technology, labor recruitment, and relations with the state, while the last chapters are devoted to studying a few big foreign enterprises.

McKay has made an original contribution. He has argued tellingly against some conventionally held interpretations. He has provided a mine of new facts, and has described clearly for the first time how the foreign entrepreneur operated in Russia during the last years of tsarism. The book is clearly written and well organized. It must take its place as an essential monograph for the study of the economic history of Russia during the first industrialization drive, 1885–1913.

WILLIAM L. BLACKWELL
New York University

PO TU STORONU BARRIKAD: IZ ISTORII BOR'BY MOSKOVSKOI BURZHUAZII S REVOLIUTSIEI. By *V. Ia. Laverychev*. Moscow: "Mysl'," 1967. 286 pp. 1.05 rubles.

RUSSKAIA BURZHUAZIIA I TSARIZM V GODY PERVOI MIROVOI VOINY (1914–1917). By *V. S. Diakin*. Leningrad: "Nauka," 1967. 363 pp. 1.70 rubles.

Laverychev concentrates on the political evolution of the small but economically powerful group of liberal Moscow magnates, led by P. P. Riabushinsky and A. I. Konovalov, who formed the core of the Progressist Party. Speaking through the newspaper *Utro Rossii*, this group, though it remained numerically small, exercised increasing influence in opposition politics during the half decade prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. In attempting to thwart the growing revolutionary labor movement and expand their own influence in state economic policy-making, the Moscow Progressists promoted the idea of a single, united bourgeois opposition party, and much of the monograph is devoted to this theme. The author credits them with an important role in organizing the Fourth Duma's Progressive Bloc and in creating the wide network of war-industry committees. The single-party idea neared fruition with the tacit 1915–16 alliance between Progressists, Left Octobrists, and Kadets, who sacrificed the most radical (and most objectionable to the Moscow capitalists) planks of their program in the name of wartime nationalism. But this liberal coalition—timid and indecisive at critical junctures—failed to make use of existing organizations to realize its goals. Most serious was its failure to organize the workers successfully through the war-industries committees.

Laverychev finds that pro-Bolshevik sympathies were strong enough among the workers to frustrate the organizational efforts of the bourgeoisie. This traditional contention may well be accurate, but Laverychev fails to support it with ade-

quate detail and documentation. He also fails to substantiate his view that the bourgeois parties were frightened to the point of tactical ineptitude by worker unrest. Nevertheless this is the first major study of the progressive Moscow capitalists and provides a new and valuable dimension in the examination of the pre-Soviet political order.

Diakin's volume, much broader in coverage, offers a more detailed and thorough analysis of Russian "bourgeois" politics during the war. He sees the attempts to organize in the summer of 1915, particularly in the Duma, as a veiled endeavor to obtain a real constitutional monarchy, but argues that the failure to accomplish this objective immediately, coupled with the stabilization of the situation at the front, induced the bourgeoisie to revert to its more traditional indifference to politics. Renewed political activism in the fall of 1916 came too late, and Diakin contends that Miliukov's famous Duma "stupidity or treason" speech revealed the bourgeois fear that by then revolution had become inevitable. In a final attempt to win control of the revolutionary movement, the liberals, disunited and timid, continued to advocate legal pressure on the government, fearing that more decisive action would unleash a revolutionary torrent from below.

Diakin's treatment of the moderate Duma fractions, the public organizations, particularly the Central and Moscow War-Industry Committees and the Union of Towns, and the regional differences among bourgeois groups is exceptionally strong. Both authors frequently cite unpublished archival sources, although Diakin's range of sources is much broader. Both of them preface their works with historiographical essays, and Diakin's is the more comprehensive. Diakin's volume remains the best study of the politics of the moderate opposition in any language in both scope and analysis.

MICHAEL F. HAMM
Centre College

DEUTSCH-SOWJETISCHE BEZIEHUNGEN BIS RAPALLO. By *Horst Günther Linke*. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970. 295 pp. DM 35.

Few aspects of modern diplomatic history have attracted as much attention as the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. The first years of that relationship, culminating in the Treaty of Rapallo and the initiation of military cooperation between the two powers, have been the subject of several books; and in the last few years German policy in Eastern Europe in the year and a half from the beginning of 1918 to the summer of 1919 has been the subject of re-examination, especially by Winfried Baumgart. With some Soviet documentary sources now also published, a general review of the whole subject is in order, and this is what Linke provides.

Using the published sources, and combining these with materials from archives in West Germany, Linke reconstructs the course of German-Soviet relations in the years 1918-22. This is a dependable summary of the evidence, carefully weighing the choices made by both sides in the broader context of the time. The interaction between foreign and domestic policy, the relations with other powers and their interests, the role of personalities—especially on the German side—are all considered. The expectation of a more congenial regime in the other of the two countries for a while led each to hold off while awaiting a possibly imminent overthrow of the other, but at the Genoa Conference the two finally came together.