

"naïve," ignorant folk of the West: we need to know the enemy. But surely this sort of writing is obsolete by two decades—despite Tyrmand's possible experiences in New York intellectual circles! After all, Nixon has gone to Moscow, and few Western rebels look to Soviet society any more for a model of the future.

Three more comments are necessary. First, Tyrmand justifies his book by asserting that he was *there*. But, who hasn't been there? For decades émigrés from there have come here, and in recent years American graduate students have routinely gone there. Second, Tyrmand denies the uses of objectivity in studying communism, yet the lessons contained in his stories can be found in any textbook on totalitarianism. Third, in his opening sentences Tyrmand confesses to error, then he commits error. But does confession excuse bad work? His book is unnecessary.

In the same measure as Tyrmand's book is unnecessary, Goldston's book is needed. His work can be simply described in one word: *rich*. Writing of the Enlightenment or modern pessimism, utopian socialism or Marxism, Russian revolutionaries or the Soviet system, Goldston presents the issues and offers his conclusions. He has written a book which, at 95 cents, should be considered for adoption in undergraduate classes. In commenting on such a rich book, each reader will have different reactions. This reader, of course, would like to offer his own lines of praise. For instance, Goldston summarizes well the failure of Marx's economic predictions and presents a good running commentary on various intellectual perceptions of "man." He calls Marxism "a theory of capitalism" and describes its use in industrializing feudal societies by means of what he calls "state capitalism." He points out that a study of communism becomes a study of Soviet history, and wonders if the Soviet state has become a new possessing class. He also presents his explanation of Stalin's diplomatic moves before the Second World War and comments on the nature of Castro's communism. Moreover, an interesting running commentary is provided on the place of the peasantry in various revolutionary calculations.

Naturally, any reviewer will also have his own objections. Did top German capitalists *really* finance Hitler's struggle for power? Were the purges of the 1930s tied in with Stalin's switch to a united front policy in 1935? Did the Berlin Wall or the Soviet presence in the Arab world contribute to Khrushchev's downfall? Does the continual use of the phrase "ruling classes" provide clarity or hide complexities? In any event, Goldston's book is to be recommended. I only regret that I did not write it.

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BONN'S EASTERN POLICY, 1964-1971: EVOLUTION AND LIMITATIONS. By *Lászlo Görgey*. Foreword by *Richard L. Walter*. International Relations Series, no. 3. Published on behalf of the Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books (Shoe String Press), 1972. xvi, 191 pp. \$8.50.

Professor Görgey (University of South Carolina) has written a solid, well-balanced study of one aspect of Europe's most difficult postwar problem, the German question. Personal experience—the author is a Hungarian refugee—and study have caused Görgey to distrust Soviet policy, which he believes is bent upon "political and military hegemony over the entire European continent" (p. 172),

but his writing lacks the polemic quality sometimes found in refugee works. The first four chapters describe well the evolution of West German foreign policy from the inflexibility of the Adenauer era through the cautious re-examination in the mid-1960s to Brandt's startling *Ostpolitik*. The next three chapters assess East European and Soviet reactions to Bonn's new policy. The final chapter analyzes *Ostpolitik* as it unfolded after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to the signing of the West German treaties with Poland and Russia.

Although Görgey praises Brandt's foreign policy initiatives for their courage and realism, he criticizes their results. First, he charges that West Germany in effect recognized Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the legality of two Germanies while gaining little in return. These results may not be satisfactory in Western eyes, but Brandt's realism was needed to alleviate tensions and thus lay the foundations for more fruitful political and economic relations between West Germany and the Soviet orbit. Second, he charges Brandt with forgetting Berlin; however, the opposite is true. This book was written before the ratification of the Warsaw and Moscow treaties, which Brandt astutely tied to the outcome of the four-power negotiations on Berlin then in progress. The author does not mention these negotiations. While a united Berlin could not be expected, Brandt did gain major concessions from Moscow, and thus from Pankow, regarding access to West Berlin, contacts between East and West Berliners, and ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

Görgey concludes with the sober realization that boundaries and basic political alliances remain unchanged and the fear that Soviet influence in Western Europe could grow if Western statesmen are lulled by the spirit of compromise implicit in *Ostpolitik*.

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REGIERUNGSPOLITIK UND ÖFFENTLICHE MEINUNG IM KAISERTUM ÖSTERREICH ANLÄSSLICH DER POLNISCHEN NOVEMBER-REVOLUTION (1830–1831). By *Gernot Seide*. Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München, vol. 38. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971. 184 pp. DM 34, paper.

The November Uprising may strike many contemporary readers as an irrelevant and insignificant subject. And yet it has attracted innumerable scholars ever since the event occurred, especially in recent years. In view of the extensive bibliography that already exists, one may legitimately inquire why still another study on the subject was necessary. Gernot Seide selected this topic for several reasons. Unlike other authors who have dealt with France, England, and Russia from a diplomatic point of view, Seide is concerned with Austria and its internal situation. His main objective is to depict the attitude of each of the various nationalities within the empire and how it differed from the official policy of the Austrian government. Although Józef Dutkiewicz had already written on Austria (*Austria wobec powstania listopadowego*, Cracow, 1933), his work was based largely on material in Polish archives and concentrated on Austrian diplomacy. Seide examines unexploited archival material in Vienna, Prague, and Budapest, as well as the contemporary press, and stresses the activities of the Czechs, Hungarians, Galicians, and others in support of the Poles.