

to what an alert layman could have picked up from reliable news media during the last few years. The pieces on the other Asian Communist regimes are better as factual presentations, but worse as a group because of their diffuse subject matter. Hoang Van Chi finds that Hanoi's serious political and economic difficulties have not actually weakened Ho Chi Minh's regime either domestically or in its wartime struggles; war, in fact, has served to bolster its position.

A brief discussion and criticism follows each essay, and these convey something of the flavor of the Emory University conference that gave rise to this volume.

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THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNISM IN TURKEY. By *George S. Harris*. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967. xii, 215 pp.

George S. Harris, an official of the United States government, has provided the first book in English on communism and leftism in Turkey. The author has attempted to analyze factually the development of various socialist and Communist organizations in Turkey. He has stressed their heavy dependence on ideological nourishment and guidance from abroad, especially from the Soviet Union. In doing so, however, he has ignored the indigenous social and economic conditions which gave the Turkish left special ideological and organizational features. First, there were a few relatively small urban leftist groups made up of intellectuals and persons from the minorities, mostly in Istanbul. Second, and most important, were those groups formed throughout Anatolia in 1919–24. Third, there was the group formed in Baku by expatriates, mostly Ottoman-Turkish prisoners, and some natives of Turkestan and Azerbaijan. Harris seems to think that the first and third and some elements of the second groups coalesced somehow around 1925 and eventually fell under the leadership of Şefik Hüsnü, the head of the Istanbul group and a loyal follower of the Soviets. Actually, only the Anatolian groups displayed the features of a true movement. It was essentially an anti-imperialistic, antibureaucratic, social, and mostly a nationalist movement rooted in the conditions of Anatolia, in the cultural-religious ethos of the Turks and their drive for independent nationhood. Islam played a major mobilizing role in this movement, but in the process the religion itself was desacralized and became the subculture of the emerging national secular political feeling.

The Soviet leaders sensed the revolutionary appeal of Islam. The Muslim Bureau, organized under Stalin, and then the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku were the result partly of Soviet awareness of Islam's revolutionary potential and partly of the desire of the Turkish Communists in Baku to start a Muslim movement of liberation directed against the West. However, the Russians became increasingly suspicious of the Turks' appeal to Islamic identity, lest this be converted into Turanism or a nationalist heresy such as Sultangalievism. Atatürk, the leader of the nationalist movement, was able to contain and channel toward his own aim these leftist currents not only because of his tactical ability and intellectual prowess but also because he shared to a large extent the spirit of the Anatolian "leftist" nationalist upsurge. Eventually, intellectuals such as Şevket Aydemir, Vedat N. Tör, and several others associated with the Communist Party of Istanbul came to Atatürk's side when they had to choose between allegiance to a national government and loyalty to an international movement controlled by the Soviet-

Russian state. Consequently, I disagree with Harris's view that the review *Kadro*, published by Aydemir and his friends with some support from the government in 1932–34, was a continuation of the original Communist movement which began in 1919. *Kadro* was part of the intellectual effort to devise an ideology for economic development and industrialization outlined in the convention of the ruling Republicans in 1931. Harris states that in the post-World War II period "the dormant seeds planted by the early communist movement could again sprout. And in this revival many of the same figures and the same ideas again came to the surface" (p. 148). This is misleading. The period after World War II was marked once more by the political upsurge of the Anatolian masses, which eventually helped put an end to the elitist regime and paved the way for a more democratic and social-minded system.

Impressed by leftist slogans and ideological postures and the official images of leftism in the United States and in Turkey as well, Harris has failed to perceive the more basic and permanent issues of modernization, progress, and independent nationhood underlying the development of leftism in Turkey. Yet the book as a whole is useful to scholars interested in Soviet-Turkish relations in general and leftism in Turkey in particular. It reads easily, is well documented, and combines Turkish, Russian, and Western sources in a rather harmonious fashion. It is a good introduction to the complex and continuously growing leftist currents in Turkey.

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FINNISH NEUTRALITY: A STUDY OF FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By *Max Jakobson*. New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. 116 pp. \$5.95.

KIELITAISTELU SUOMESSA, 1917–1939. By *Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen*. Translated by *Osmo Mäkeläinen*. Porvoo and Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1968. xi, 300 pp.

The first book, written by Finland's ambassador to the United Nations, is an English edition of *Kuumalla linjalla: Suomen ulkopoliittikan ydinkysymyksiä*. The second book, written by an American historian, is a Finnish translation of a manuscript entitled "Nationality Strife in Finland, 1917–1939."

The Jakobson volume is a collection of sketches and essays, and the major theme emerging from the twelve chapters, which vary in length from two to nineteen pages, seems to be that Soviet policy toward Finland has been consistently defensive. The postwar response of Finnish political leaders, particularly Presidents Paasikivi and Kekkonen, has been a policy of neutrality, which seeks to keep Finland "outside the conflicts of interest between the great powers."

It is surprising that Jakobson fails to mention Finland's "active neutrality," a phrase frequently used to distinguish the foreign policy of President Paasikivi (1946–56) from the foreign policy of President Kekkonen (1956–). Even more surprising are the references by Jakobson to Paasikivi's "appeasement" (pp. 4, 33–34, 38, 44, 47). Should one equate appeasement with conciliation? Why, moreover, does Jakobson refrain from describing Kekkonen's foreign policy in similar terms? This omission is striking in view of the fact that Kekkonen (p. 48) was elected president of Finland "as the man best fitted to take over Paasikivi's role as guarantor of good relations with the Soviet Union."