

Familiar trappings of orthodox Soviet historiography are especially evident in those sections of the book dealing with the twentieth century. It comes as no surprise to be told that Japan seized Manchuria in 1931 "with the tacit consent of the League of Nations and the United States" (p. 105), or that the 1945 Red Army attack on an "elite, technically well-equipped" Kwantung Army effectively defeated Japan. Nor is there much new about the omission of any reference to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, which brought down a Japanese cabinet.

Sladkovsky does, however, depart from his predecessors on matters affected by the Sino-Soviet rift. Whiffs of current polemics over territory crop up in descriptions of seventeenth-century Cossack-Manchu friction over the Amur basin. Mao Tse-tung, whom Soviet works of an earlier vintage praised as a progressive revolutionary leader, emerges as a Great Han chauvinist cultivating the "wealthy and petty bourgeoisie" (p. 137). The author even raises a Wilhelmian specter of a Sino-Japanese racialist alliance (p. 188) which surely is unprecedented in Soviet literature, if not in Soviet anxieties.

Presumably in the interest of readability, the translator has made editorial changes from the Russian edition. Notes have been trimmed by half. Although the translator states that "the text is complete," such is not the case. A revealing introduction in which Sladkovsky sets forth his objectives has been eliminated. Paragraphs have been fused, shortened, and simplified with results all too often deleterious to accuracy. The rhetoric has been toned down (for example, Manchu "aggression" has been softened to "expansion" [p. 25]; the title of chapter 3, "Imperialistic Aggression of Japan Against China," has become "Towards the Twentieth Century"). Sladkovsky could hardly approve the rendering of *razvitie* as "modernization" (p. 1), a term anathema to Marxists in the Japanese field. By removing Sladkovsky's deprecating quotation marks from "Meiji revolution" (p. 51), the translator makes him look like a follower of a group of Japanese Marxist scholars whom Moscow long ago branded as heretics.

The translation suffers from the translator's apparent lack of background in the subject. No coherent distinction is made between Japanese given names and surnames, with chaotic results in the index. General Douglas MacArthur is confused with Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II. While carrying most of Sladkovsky's mistransliterations and typographical errors into the English edition, the translator has compounded some errors (Sugita Genpaku, called "Sugita Genbiku" by Sladkovsky, becomes "Shugita Henbiku") or created new ones (such as "Emperor Mutsimoto" for Mutsuhito, Emperor Meiji). Ōtsuki Gentaku, a scholar of Dutch medicine, is identified as the name of a book. Users of the index will have difficulty locating Nakamura Hajime. He is listed as Makamura Hajima, and the pagination refers to the Russian, not the English, edition.

In future volumes of *Forum Asiatica* (of which *China and Japan* constitutes the first installment), the publisher would do well to enlist professional expertise.

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TOTAL REVOLUTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GERMANY UNDER HITLER, THE SOVIET UNION UNDER STALIN, AND CHINA UNDER MAO. By C. W. Cassinelli. *Studies in Comparative Politics*, 10. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Press, 1976. viii, 252 pp. \$19.75, cloth. \$6.25, paper.

Professor Cassinelli's work cannot be seen as a study of Germany, the Soviet Union, or China under their respective leaders. He does not provide a detailed analysis of either the revolutions by which these leaders came to power, or the functioning of these

regimes in the periods during which these leaders consolidated and then exercised their power. Rather, this work constitutes the author's attempt to define a set of ideological and psychological orientations which necessarily led these revolutionary leaders to wreak unprecedented human destruction in pursuit of their own visions of human progress.

There is a striking absence in this volume of concern for the concrete changes in the organization and functioning of the political system which followed these revolutions. Professor Cassinelli justifies this neglect of the means by which Hitler, Stalin, and Mao consolidated power by asserting that "concentration on bureaucratic aspects of revolutionary regimes is to miss the dynamics of total change. . . ." He concentrates instead on the policies and actions of these leaders which were directed toward re-making the human psyche, and which he can directly attribute to their ideological convictions or *Weltanschauung*. Only rarely are such policies placed into a political context, for the author believes that references to "politics" in these regimes are "inappropriate." What happens in these regimes, he suggests, has "little resemblance to the politics of the normal world."

This belief apparently makes it difficult, if not impossible, for Professor Cassinelli to recognize the striking similarity between these regimes and other revolutionary regimes with respect to the role of nationalism, both in fueling the fires of revolution and as a weapon in the consolidation of power and the implementation of policy. He explicitly rejects the notion that these leaders or revolutions were in any sense nationalist. He asserts that the concepts "race" and "nation" were used as a means to remold the human psyche, but that this did not constitute nationalism. Similarly, the author's abbreviated explanations of the rise of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao to power fails to recognize their sources of political support, the existence of which he denies at the outset of this volume. He concedes only that the support these leaders and regimes did receive was not based on belief in the ultimate goals of the revolution.

That this may have been true—at least in the Soviet and Chinese cases—because the ultimate goals of the revolution were ill-defined or undefined at the time of the revolution, or were changed after the revolution, are possibilities which Professor Cassinelli does not consider. Instead, he views the actions and ideological pronouncements of these leaders as reflections of a coherent, and unchanging, body of thought. Thus, he draws on pronouncements by Stalin made in 1907 and 1952, and concludes that "he was a dedicated revolutionary who unambiguously expressed a perfectly clear conception of the historically unprecedented society his labors were to bring into existence." The author's failure to deal with changes over time in the policies and practices of these leaders is clearly attributable to his view of them as possessing total power and hence total control over their respective societies. Under such conditions, perhaps, the convictions of these leaders might have remained static, and an attempt to apply concepts of politics to these regimes might be inappropriate. However, these leaders did not possess either total power or total control over their societies. The use of political references, therefore, should be a central feature of any attempt to explain the actions of the three leaders and their regimes.

But Professor Cassinelli's purpose does not seem to be to provide an accurate understanding of these particular leaders or of their particular regimes. The conclusion of this work consists of an attack on unidentified Western "ideologues," aspects of whose ideologies and orientations Professor Cassinelli apparently feels are similar to those of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, and which are, therefore, a threat to Western democracy. Thus, in the final pages, it becomes clear that this work has the character of a political polemic. Unfortunately, the prior analyses are unconvincing and the targets of attack are unclear; consequently, the argument suffers.

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