

have been equally hostile. Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian nationalists brand Piłsudski's schemes as an attempt to reassert Polish hegemony over the ethnically non-Polish lands which had formerly belonged to the *Rzeczpospolita*. In Poland recently, a talented young historian, Józef Lewandowski, in a couple of studies devoted to Piłsudskiite federalism, concludes that the federalist ideology, for all its democratic phrases, was merely a smoke screen to cover up the fact that the Polish "feudal" landowning class was maintaining its politico-economic supremacy throughout the territories involved. On the other hand, Piłsudski's political rivals, the National Democrats, saw his eastern program as the result of sinister influences, Jewish and freemasonic, on a still leftist-minded politician.

For Dziewanowski, federalism illustrates Piłsudski's statesmanship, vision, and genuinely democratic sympathies. While not neglecting Polish *raison d'état*, the Polish leader sought to integrate this with the wider interests of the whole area. He was, in fact, a pioneer in working for a supranational order in Eastern Europe, and, like many pioneers, for being ahead of his time he paid the penalty of failure. Unenlightened chauvinism on the part of borderland nationalists and Polish rightists alike was responsible for the defeat of federalism. Both Poland and the small nations to the East were later to suffer for this narrowness of view; as a result of their consequent weakness vis-à-vis the two big neighbors, Russia and Germany, they were gobbled up by them in the course of time. Dziewanowski develops this thesis with cogency, and on the basis of a wide array of printed sources as well as of archives available in the Piłsudski Institute in New York. In successive chapters he presents a detailed account of Piłsudski's efforts first to bring about a Polish-Lithuanian federation, which however always bogged down over the question of Wilno, and then to back an independent Ukraine under the leadership of Petlura.

The author is aware of many of Piłsudski's shortcomings and critical of his policies in some respects. Yet he draws an overidealized picture. Indeed it remains unclear if Piłsudski really had any clear-cut federalist policy beyond the romantic notions he imbibed as a member of the prewar Polish Socialist Party. In any case, a revival of the "Jagiellonian idea" appears anachronistic in view of the almost unanimous rejection of federation by the non-Polish—and predominantly peasant—peoples of the borderlands, except when their politicians were driven into a tight corner. The illiberal attitude of the local Polish community is not brought out sufficiently; this attitude did not augur well for federalism's success. Nonetheless, Dziewanowski is correct in arguing that Piłsudski was not a crude imperialist, as he has frequently been presented in Western historical writing. The book, although by no means the last word on the subject, represents a valuable contribution to a continuing debate.

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BOHEMIA: JAHRBUCH DES COLLEGIUM CAROLINUM, vol. 8. Munich: Verlag Robert Lerche, 1967. 485 pp. DM 45.

As often in the remarkable series of *Bohemia*, the problems of Czech and German play a very important role. This is true of the introduction, "Change and Tradition in the German and Czech View of History," by the editor, Professor Karl Bosl. He is, in a way, rather optimistic: the catastrophic events that led first to Czechoslovakia's temporary destruction and then, largely as a consequence, to the expulsion of the vast majority of the Sudeten German population, have by now made it pos-

sible to gain a clearer historical understanding of the two ethnic groups that had lived together so long and fought each other often. With this tragic basis "an objective approach and common traditions have moved into the foreground." The issue of German and Czech is presented in several other contributions of significance. An article by Peter Burian, "Documents Concerning the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans," deals with the publication by a commission appointed and financed by the German Federal Ministry for the Expellees. It included the postwar German expulsion from large territories such as present-day Poland (including the former German provinces east of the Oder and the Neisse), Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and, next in numbers to the now Polish lands, the Germans of the original territories of Bohemia and Moravia. Burian's article concentrates on the last group. The reports presented contain many of the sad and painful events and experiences that arose from this mass expulsion, but the author also gives a fairly objective evaluation of the documents. While it is impossible to neglect those hard and sad aspects which, in the collection, appear almost alone in the foreground, Burian rightly criticizes the fact that most of those whose reports are used were "not able to see the connection between the German policy of the time prior to 1945 and the Czech actions of which they became the victims."

Generally objective also is the report of Margareta Reindl-Mommsen, "The Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia After 1945." After the difficult times immediately following the war there was some improvement in the situation of the remaining Germans; from 1953 there were again three Germans—two Communists and one "Nonpartisan"—representing the German minority in the National Assembly, a fact which can hardly be considered as very effective. The total number of Germans in Czechoslovakia, after the expulsion of about three million, was around 1947 somewhere between 200,000 and 240,000—some twelve years later only 140,000 to 160,000. Even so the German minority was larger than the Polish and Ukrainian minorities (only the Hungarians were more numerous), yet the Germans did not have their own school system as the other minorities did, supposedly because the Germans were too scattered, a doubtful claim in view of the relatively large numbers of Germans in the region around Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary). Other cultural institutions (a state-owned traveling German theater) and a few papers (none a daily) are hardly strong enough to counteract a slow but steady loss of the German ethnic consciousness by the Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia.

Two other articles are devoted to related issues: Oswald von Kostrba-Skalitsky's "Czech Commentaries on Problems of Transfer and the Facts of Transfer" and Professor Friedrich Prinz's "Ideological Aspects of Expulsion." Both attack, among others, President Beneš as the culprit mainly responsible for the expulsion. It is indeed true that Beneš was very active in the political decisions that led to the expulsion, and it is just as true that the expulsion, which would have been defensible if it had been a limited action based, for example, on membership in the (Nazi) Sudetendeutsche Partei, was a doubtful action in its policy of generalization. However, Professor Prinz's claim that Beneš (e.g., p. 282) had always been a violent nationalist and had planned such a policy from early times is simply not true. This is historically obvious and beyond that quite clear to people—for example, this reviewer—who have had the opportunity through most of the thirties to know Czechoslovakia's long-time foreign minister and president personally. It was in fact the bitter experience which Beneš had to undergo before and during the events of Munich and during his exile that made the resolve for the mass expulsion grow in his mind.

The yearbook also contains some valuable treatments of scientific and cultural problems, among them one of Professor Ernst Schwarz's always brilliant contributions, this one devoted to the movements of the Bavarians (through Bohemia) in the sixth century. Of special interest perhaps are two articles (originally lectures presented in Munich) by Otto von Habsburg, who reasonably enough is devoting much thought to historical and political problems rather than claiming thrones that have ceased to exist. The former archduke and crown prince has, not for the first time, shown his thorough knowledge of the European history during the last hundred years, beginning, in this case, with the War of 1866. But he also goes rather far in using the doubtful mechanism of historical "ifs," and with it the claims of nearly definite developments—in this case that the tragic developments of Central Europe were the direct consequence of Königgrätz. Many critical judgments can be expressed about Bismarck, but it is hardly possible to think, in relation to this phase, of a German development without a measure of nationalism; and a Central European empire which would have combined in one huge structure the elements and traditions of the Habsburg Empire with the very different tendencies of national German unification is hardly imaginable. It is also doubtful when Bismarck in this connection is made responsible for the destruction of the balance of power—which supposedly had existed in Europe just down to 1866. This, at least, is an exaggeration. If the balance of power, to whatever extent it had existed, was weakened by Bismarck, it was not done in 1866. Even so, it is worth while to read the ideas of a thoughtful man whose personal fate was to an unusual degree directed by the history of the relation between "little" Germany and the Habsburg Empire.

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THE ASSASSINATION OF HEYDRICH. By *Jan G. Wiener*. New York: Grossman Publishers, 1969. vi, 177 pp. \$6.95.

This monograph by Jan Wiener deals with one of the most dramatic events in modern Czechoslovak history—the assassination of SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, Acting Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, and head of the German security police, by Czech parachutists in May 1942. The author approaches the complex subject from a subjective viewpoint. His aim is not to analyze the event but simply to tell a patently moving story.

The most interesting aspect of the assassination is the reason for the decision of the exile Czechoslovak authorities in London to initiate an attempt on Heydrich's life. German historiography, in the main, assumes that its own prejudiced view of the success of the Heydrich plan to pacify the Czechs in 1941–42 is generally accepted as the reason for the assassination. However, this oversimplified explanation of the London decision shows little understanding of the reign of terror in the Protectorate under Heydrich. It is a matter of regret that the author has not attempted a really close and serious study of this, and other, relevant issues of one of the most discussed episodes of World War II.

The author depends primarily on such standard accounts as those by Čestmír Amort, *Heydrichiáda* (Prague, 1964), Miroslav Ivanov, *Nejen černé uniformy* (Prague, 1964), and Dušan Hamšík and Jiří Pražák, *Bomba pro Heydricha* (Prague, 1963). In his first four chapters he offers some background on the German occupation and the Czech Resistance to explain the events that led up to the assassi-