

about how that labor must be disciplined. Part III includes, first, extended reflections about the emotional labor of fieldwork in what Morris terms “intimate ethnography,” and, second, summary thoughts on the analytical utility of attending to the everyday as an arena of habitability, of finding one’s way to “having enough.”

Many of the topics covered in Morris’s ethnography of everyday habitability will be quite familiar to students of the ground-level postsocialist experience since the early 1990s, especially in rural and/or working-class settings: do-it-yourself projects, moonlighting, gendered drinking rituals, the importance of sociability and friendship, contested arenas of personhood, and others. Indeed, one of Izluchino’s residents sums up the distance traveled since the 1990s succinctly: “Nothing has changed, yet everything has changed” (59). This paradox, skillfully and vividly captured in the ethnographic portraits of working-class Izluchino, is backed up by Morris’s (quite proper) insistence that his interlocutors are not somehow caught in the past of the 1980s or 1990s but, rather, responding creatively to shifting, ongoing challenges in the present. Nevertheless, one wonders whether more analytical weight might have been accorded to the change aspect of the book’s overall continuity-and-change portrait. Major Putin-era themes in the social science of Russia—the return of a centralized and bureaucratized state, petro-economics, nationalism—receive only passing mention and seem to have little substantive impact on the flow of life in Izluchino. They appear, rather, as yet more changes of a generic sort, their precise contours less relevant than the bare fact of yet more change, yet more uncertainty, yet more obstacles to habitability. Are the details of these social, economic, and political trends in Russia as peripheral to the ways in which residents of this former monoton town experience and navigate everyday life in the 2000s as they appear to be in the text? If so, this is a striking and highly significant research finding that bears more emphasis than it is given.

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The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism, 2000–15. Ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. xix, 424 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. \$110.00, hard cover. doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.188

This edited volume addresses the highly important issue of contemporary Russian nationalism. The rise of Russian nationalism under Vladimir Putin has attracted a lot of scholarly and media attention, and even more so following the 2014 Ukraine Crisis. Among the numerous books and articles on similar topics, this volume stands out for its specific focus on the “new” imperialist to ethnic turn of contemporary Russian nationalism, and for its list of contributors, which consists of some of the most prominent scholars of Russian nationalism in both academic and policy circles from six different countries. One common problem of many edited volumes is the difficulty in putting together a coherent theme with multiple authors with different research backgrounds. But the diversity of perspectives in this volume constitutes a major strength. Russian nationalism, as a complicated and multifaceted phenomenon, deserves and needs to be studied from a multiplicity of angles, which is what this book offers. Much of the empirical analysis in this book is based on two major nationwide surveys conducted by Romir in May 2013 and in November 2014 following the events in Ukraine, although the contributors also draw upon a large amount of other primary and secondary sources.

Organizationally, this volume is divided into two parts, focusing on society-level and state-level Russian nationalism, respectively. Even though the title of the volume rightly accentuates the “new” aspects of contemporary Russian nationalism, the authors are well-aware of the historical roots of this nationalism. The first several chapters make it abundantly clear that today’s Russian nationalism is a product of historical vicissitudes as well as more recent developments, such as the Soviet collapse and the subsequent mass influx of non-Russian migrants. The chapter by Emil Pain, for example, shows compellingly that Russia’s authoritarian and imperial legacies have far-reaching influence on Russian national identity even after the Soviet collapse and emergence of a post-Soviet anti-imperial nationalism. The chapters by Alexander Verkhovsky and Anastasia Mitrofanova examine ethnic Russian nationalism from racial and religious perspectives, respectively. Race and religion are two commonly employed criteria by ethnic nationalists everywhere to justify the exclusion of those deemed not to belong. Interestingly, both chapters find that despite the recent ethnic resurgence, strictly racial and religious definitions of Russian national identity do not seem to appeal to the majority of Russians, which implicitly attests to the strength of the imperial legacy. This, of course, does not mean sentiments of ethnic exclusion are not rampant today, as shown by the chapter by Natalya Kosmarskaya and Igor Savin that studies Muscovites’ attitudes toward immigrants. The resilience of the imperial mindset is further supported by the chapter by Mikhail A. Alexeev, which shows that even ethnic minorities in Russia tend to support further territorial expansion, although Slavic and non-Slavic minorities prefer different types of expansion.

What is striking about the first part of the book, therefore, is the finding that imperial and Soviet legacies seem to be far-reaching despite the “new” ethnocentric shift. This important finding explains why a coherent and distinctive Russian national identity remains elusive despite the regime’s efforts, to which the second part turns. Building on his previous acclaimed works on patronal politics in Russia, Henry Hale explains the heightened role of nationalism during Putin’s third term through the lens of evolving machine politics in Russia, which forced Putin to seek out a new basis of support following the 2011 domestic political crisis. Similarly, the chapter by Helge Blakkisrud notes the ethnic shift under Putin’s third term in response to domestic and international challenges even as the regime distanced itself from more extreme versions of ethnic nationalism. Meanwhile, Marlene Laruelle brings attention to the content of contemporary Russian nationalism by examining the ambiguous and ambivalent relationship between Russian and European identities, which is reflected by some intriguing parallels between strands of ethnic Russian nationalism and right-wing nationalism in Europe. Next, Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz explore the crucial role of the Russian media in the regime’s nation-building project, which strives to strike a balance between maintaining multi-ethnic cohesion and catering to growing ethnic nationalist sentiments, with the latter gradually gaining ground during Putin’s third term. Finally, Peter Rutland examines the impact of Russian nationalism on the country’s developmental trajectory as “modernizers” and “nationalists” continue to debate over the desirability of a uniquely-Russian economic model, with the 2014 Ukraine Crisis appearing to push Russia further away from embracing western market institutions. The second part of the book thus echoes the first in noting the ethnic shift under Putin’s third term as the imperial vs. ethnic tension continues into the uncertain future. What is clear is that, “imperial” or “ethnic,” contemporary Russian nationalism is ever far-removed from the liberal and civil ideal, which is now under increasing challenge within the west itself.

Russian nationalism is an inherently messy topic. As many contributors acknowledge, the imperial/ethnic dichotomy of Russian nationalism does not capture all the

nuances of its full spectrum. Not all the “imperialists” are the same, and the “ethno-centrists” are far from a homogeneous group. But this conceptual distinction does provide a useful analytical tool in highlighting the tangible shift that had taken place in contemporary Russian nationalism from 2000 to 2015. Russia’s imperial and Soviet pasts continue to cast a long shadow, while new challenges lead to forms of ethnic backlashes not entirely unlike what has been going on in the west. The Putin regime’s efforts to occupy a dominant middle ground have achieved mixed success. On the one hand, it has created a narrative that has more coherence and intelligibility than was the case in the first post-communist decade; on the other hand, there remain fundamental tensions within the narrative, which certainly does not enjoy anything close to a national consensus. This volume has brought together a set of complementary, thought-provoking essays that offer a wide range of theoretical and empirical insights into the evolution of, and the fundamental tensions within, contemporary Russian nationalism. As such, this book should be on the reading list of everyone who is interested in Russian nationalism and in the trajectories of Russian and post-communist politics writ large.

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The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia. By Ora John Reuter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

xiii, 316 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. Maps. \$99.99, hard cover. doi: 10.1017/slr.2018.189

This book seeks to explain why United Russia emerged as a dominant party in the 2000s, while earlier attempts in the 1990s to create such a party failed. The essence of Reuter’s argument is that a dominant party emerges when both the leader and regional elites perceive it to be in their interests to commit to such a party. When regional elites commit, the leader gains greater capacity to run the country because those elites deliver both electoral and administrative resources as well as committing to support the party. In exchange, elites gain greater certainty over access to spoils and career prospects. The development of the dominant party is thereby seen as a result of the actions of both leader and elites, not simply of the unilateral action of the central authorities. Reuter also argues that the emergence of such a party comes about only when there is an approximate balance between the resources held by the leader and those controlled by the elites. If the leader is very strong relative to the elites, he has no incentive to bind himself by committing to a party in order to get cooperation from the regional elites. If the elites are very strong relative to the leader, they have no incentive to bind themselves to the restrictions stemming from party membership. Neither side is confident about the commitment of the other, but the party is seen as the means of guaranteeing the commitments on both sides. Based on a rich comparative and theoretical literature, Reuter tests this argument in both Russia and a range of other authoritarian polities.

This is a well-constructed argument, resting on a sophisticated theoretical apparatus and wide field experience (including interviews) in Russia. Its basic thesis, that the party emerges when both leader and elites see they have something to gain from it, is both logical and demonstrated through the analysis. All subsequent study of United Russia will need to take this book into account. In doing so, however, there are a number of aspects of the argument that require greater explication. One is the way in which the comparative resource base of leader and elites is discussed. Despite