

Although published in 1972, this book does not discuss the latest phase of Soviet policy which was inaugurated in 1969 with the announcement of the Brezhnev plan of collective security in Asia, when India seemed to have acquired a new importance in Soviet strategy in Asia, and which eventually led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August 1971. Despite this limitation, the volume is a valuable addition to the growing literature on Soviet-Asian relations.

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COMMUNIST PENETRATION OF THE THIRD WORLD. By *Edward Taborsky*. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1973. iii, 500 pp. \$12.50.

Professor Taborsky has made an heroic effort to cover in a single volume the current doctrines and policies of some nine Communist states vis-à-vis all the regions of the Third World, embracing a veritable plethora of activities—overt and covert. The attempt was worthwhile, and the results certainly should prove useful to many who labor in this field, even if the very scope of the undertaking has led to limitations that perhaps were inevitable under the circumstances.

In his evident desire to distill from his study a single coherent and consistent pattern of contemporary Soviet and East European ideological and policy approaches toward the Third World, presumably to give readers a clearer overview, the author has compressed the whole period from Khrushchev's ascendancy to the present day (1954–73) into an arbitrary monolithic entity. Works and statements emanating from different policy periods and from writers and spokesmen representing, in fact, conflicting schools of thought and interpretation (and enjoying, probably, the patronage of rival factions in the Soviet party leadership) are cited often rather indiscriminately, creating the impression somehow that, apart from the Maoist heresy, there has been a single, almost unaltered and unchallenged, Communist view of various Third World problems during the last two decades. The reader might well be led to believe (1) that, in this period, there had been no important changes in the general party line toward the Third World and in Moscow's tactics toward specific areas and states, (2) that there had been no well-documented "debates" between certain academicians from the various institutes and even between political leaders, and (3) that there had not been an endemic contradiction between the aspirations of local Communist parties in the Third World and Moscow's self-serving interests in supporting the military dictatorships that were suppressing all opposition elements, including the Communists.

Perhaps most puzzling is the author's persistent down-playing of pre-Khrushchevian, and especially Leninist, contributions to current Soviet doctrine concerning the Third World. Thus he speaks of "Lenin's well-nigh all-inclusive preoccupation with Europe in contrast to his rather cursory and definitely quite secondary interest in other continents. . . ." Is he referring to the same Lenin who emphasized that "the socialist revolution will not be solely or chiefly a struggle of the revolutionary proletariat in each country against their bourgeoisie—no, it will be a struggle of all colonies and . . . of all dependent countries against international imperialism" and who actually changed the *Communist Manifesto's* slogan to read "Workers of all countries *and oppressed nations, unite!*"? Similarly, the author treats such terms as "national democratic," "revolutionary democrats," and so forth,

as if they were semantic and conceptual innovations of the Khrushchevian period, whereas they were, in fact, lifted bodily from the vocabulary of the Leninist era. For some reason, he refers repeatedly to the Theses of the Comintern's Sixth Congress, as if they constituted the only noteworthy earlier source upon which Khrushchevian Third World ideology could draw. In fact, of course, the 1928 Sixth Congress, following immediately upon Moscow's Chinese fiasco, signaled a sharp revision and partial *abandonment* of the Leninist and early Stalinist policy of intimate collaboration with colonial nationalist leaders (initiated at the 1920 Second Comintern Congress)—the same policy Khrushchev was subsequently to revive.

These limitations notwithstanding, Professor Taborsky's diligent and lucid work makes a useful contribution to the field and will have to be numbered among the basic handbooks on the topic.

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THE U.S.S.R. AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by *Michael Confino* and *Shimon Shamir*. The Russian and East European Research Center and the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. A Halsted Press Book. New York and Toronto: John Wiley and Sons. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973. xxii, 441 pp.

This volume is a symposium of papers presented at an international conference held at Tel Aviv University in December 1971 and devoted to an examination of the Soviet presence in the Middle East. The purpose of the meeting, as noted on the jacket, was "to [attempt to] evaluate the extent of the Soviet deployment in the . . . [region], the interests which motivate it, the dilemmas it is facing, and its impact on local countries."

The limitations of a review make it impossible to do justice to symposia—this particular one contains twenty papers by Western and Israeli scholars—hence no attempt will be made to analyze them in individual detail. In sum, it is a remarkable exposition of the "state of the art" that should be read by all seriously interested in the subject. However, the book is significant not only for its contents but also as an illustration of the limits of our understanding of Soviet motives and objectives after almost twenty years of Moscow's active involvement in the region. Given the lack of information on the Soviet decision-making process, the vicissitudes of the Middle Eastern political setting in which the USSR must operate, and the constantly changing nature of the international environment, these limitations come as no surprise. Nevertheless, in light of the Kremlin's obvious determination in the mid and late 1960s to neutralize the Sixth Fleet and *Polaris* submarines, it is astonishing to find in papers dealing with Soviet policies and with superpower rivalry only a few scattered references to Moscow's desire to acquire air and naval bases in the Mediterranean. Yet this relatively simple fact goes a long way toward explaining Russia's exceptional preoccupation with Egypt both before and after the 1967 war. Similarly incomprehensible is the widespread attachment to the notion that Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's policies in the Middle East are intrinsically an extension of the historic southward drive of Russia's imperial governments.

On the positive side, the volume contains much that is new, thought-provoking, and enlightening. One is particularly impressed by the quality and thoroughness of the work being done at the Tel Aviv, the Hebrew, and Haifa Universities. Chap-