occupies roughly one-third of the volume.) Following the background information, there is a list—complete, to my knowledge—of all Orthodox bodies in the United States and Canada including information on their organizational history, hierarchy, and membership. It is precisely this information which has so far been unavailable in one place to researchers. The chapter notes are testimony to the exhausting combination of research, telephone calls, and personal visits required to assemble it. In addition to the jurisdictional sketches, the feature of the work which will make its reputation is the thorough, meticulous bibliography of works in English on the various churches. Typical of Piepkorn's (or perhaps Tietjan's?) care is the entry "Ware, Timothy ([Father] Kallistos)." It is most unfortunate, however, that the chapter bibliographies do not include all works cited in the notes and also that there is no general bibliography. Consequently, the reader who remembers part of a citation had also better remember where he saw it, or it is lost. This must be corrected in later editions.

Profiles In Belief has imperfections rather than serious defects; by their relative insignificance, they are themselves evidence of the quality of the work. Membership figures are reported without reservation, although Orthodox churches normally count their membership in baptized, rather than active, members. (The figures claimed by splinter groups sometimes strain credulity.) Piepkorn reports (p. 78) that in 1968 the American Finnish Orthodox Mission withdrew from episcopal oversight—an ecclesiological impossibility. The "Holy Orthodox Church in America (Eastern Catholic and Apostolic)," listed as an Orthodox church (pp. 75–76), should be under the heading "Churches Deriving Their Orders From Eastern Orthodox . . . Sources," because its orthodoxy is accepted by no one outside the group. Piepkorn's suspicion should have been aroused when the information on the group was supplied by the "widow of the late Archbishop" (p. 87, note 29)!

Some errors of minor factual matters are inevitable in a work of this scope, and some have simply changed since Piepkorn's death. The Byelorussian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, for example, no longer uniformly uses Church Slavonic in the liturgy but has introduced Belorussian (p. 74). Bishops are properly referred to by their first names, for example, Archbishop Anthony rather than "Archbishop Bashir." (All bishops are monks and monks have no family name.) The Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, whether by decree or simple fact, is no longer in communion with any of the other Orthodox bodies in this country (p. 66), although most of these groups recognize it as an Orthodox body.

The reader of *Profiles In Belief* will not be dazzled by Piepkorn's (or Tietjan's) erudition, but will be deeply impressed by their dogged and thorough work. In the foreword to the volume, Martin Marty predicts—correctly, I think—that the book will soon be known simply as "Piepkorn," since it will be the standard reference in the field.

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, 1939–1949. By *Dennis J. Dunn*. East European Monographs, 30. Boulder, Colo.: *East European Quarterly*, 1977. viii, 267 pp. $17.00. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.

Although the author of this book centers his interest on 1939–49, he provides several introductory chapters beginning with the *filioque* dispute of 1054 and takes much of Eastern Europe into account. As an Orthodox empire, Russia had to fight Teutonic Knights, Swedes, Poland-Lithuania, and the Fourth Crusade. But despite the domination of Russia by the Mongols for over two hundred years, the latter allowed the

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Orthodox church to continue, and the Russians unified and grew strong. Europe, rent by Protestant heresies, split into numerous states. Russia forced back Poland and Sweden and dominated Eastern Europe. Together with Catholic Austria and Lutheran Prussia it partitioned Poland and rode roughshod over the Catholics and the Uniates of Poland. Paul and Alexander I had no definite religious policy, but Nicholas I and his three successors suppressed the Uniates and kept Polish Catholicism in fetters.

Communist interest in religion was slight until Lenin, who, as a convinced atheist, was against all religions and insisted that the workers' party should be antireligious. He believed, however, that the government should be neutral to religion. Stalin cared little about religion, especially Russia's few Catholics, and was eager to build Soviet industry, agriculture, and military power, because he saw Nazi Germany as a threat to the USSR. He skillfully made a deal with Hitler whereby the USSR gained eastern Poland and the three lower Baltic states. While the Catholics lost church lands and schools, the more aggressive Uniates were treated more severely. The treaty of 1939 lasted almost two years until, in spite of Stalin's efforts to buy time, Hitler invaded the USSR.

When the Germans invaded the USSR in June 1941, Stalin was taken aback and did little about religious matters. The Orthodox church, however, hastened to urge its followers to fight the invaders as their forefathers had done. Metropolitan Sergii and his followers joined the government in the cause, donating large sums to buy tanks and planes to fight the foe, whose atrocities they sternly condemned. Orthodox bishops of occupied areas who supported the Germans met bitter condemnation from the church. The Kremlin soon ceased propaganda against the Russian church and granted it highly significant favors. Finally, in September 1943, Stalin received Metropolitan Sergii and Metropolitan Nikolai in the Kremlin and gave consent for a Sobor, or Council, to elect a patriarch of Moscow. A few days later a Sobor of nineteen bishops met and elected Sergii as the second patriarch of Moscow since Peter the Great. The Russian church was permitted to open theological seminaries and to publish a church periodical. The Politburo made moderate gestures to the Catholics: it praised the Vatican for condemning Nazi atrocities and freed several Catholic priests who were under arrest, some of whom later functioned as chaplains with Polish troops of the Polish regime in London. The Politburo also stressed freedom of religion in the USSR and did numerous small favors for Father Leopold Braun, a Catholic priest in Moscow, who declared that there was no antireligious persecution in Soviet Russia and urged the Vatican and the Kremlin to combine against the common enemy.

These gestures did not mollify the papacy, for Pope Pius XII had been fiercely hostile to communism before he became pope. Also, late in January 1942, the Vatican agreed to full diplomatic relations with Japan, which was running amuck in China. This infuriated Britain and the United States and reduced the pope's influence with American Catholics. Further, when the war turned sharply against Hitler, the Vatican called for a negotiated peace, probably to save Germany from destruction. Patriarch Alexii of Moscow, elected in January 1945 after the death of Sergii, used his installation to call on all heads of Orthodox churches to join in crushing the Hitler regime.

Professor Dunn has given his study unusual breadth and depth by drawing freely on Vatican archives as well as on the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and presidential memorandums from the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. He has used many publications of the Communist Party of the USSR and great quantities of books and periodicals on his subject. The bibliography is the most impressive aspect of this small book.

The author has not, however, achieved his objective, for his discussion of the subject lacks the objectivity required by his task. He has not appraised his sources with due care, so that this book is largely a massive indictment of Soviet treatment —which he terms "persecution"—of the Catholic church and the Uniates of Eastern

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Europe, without an analysis of the grounds the Soviet authorities might have had for deportations or executions. Although Dunn admits mistakes of the Vatican in siding with the Germans and in signing an agreement with Japan in 1942, the severity of his indictment of the Soviets by far tips the scales in favor of the papacy. His book ends in 1949, when NATO and the Marshall Plan had apparently halted the Soviet tide, and when the papacy had taken a strong stand against communism. A strong admixture of impartiality would have greatly improved the study.

Another weakness of the book is the extraordinary number of textual errors: misspellings, incorrect use of words, and a multitude of typographical mistakes have impaired the potential merit of this work. A strong editor's hand could have greatly improved it.

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JEWISH SCHOOLS UNDER CZARISM AND COMMUNISM: A STRUGGLE FOR CULTURAL IDENTITY. By *Zvi Halevy*. Foreword by *George Z. F. Bereday*. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1976. vi, 298 pp. $14.50.

The title of this book is imprecise: it deals only tangentially with wider questions of Jewish education in imperial Russia, while treating in detail the fate of the Soviet state-supported, Yiddish-language, secular school system. The prerevolutionary government-supported Russian-Jewish school system is completely ignored (although subsequently its resources were used to establish Soviet Yiddish schools). Likewise, Halevy's survey of the traditional systems of the (elementary) *cheder* and the (advanced) *yeshiva* lightly touches on, but does not resolve, the question of the allegedly degenerate state of these institutions in the imperial period (although they would continue to educate most male Jews until the mid 1920s).

There were virtually no non-Russian-language, Jewish secular schools in Russia prior to 1917, but Halevy shows how the preliminary organization was already present in the cultural activities of Jewish Socialists and Zionists. Both traditional and Hebrew secular schools were eliminated by post-October party decisions, leaving a state-run Yiddish school system which faithfully followed the dictum, "national in form, socialist in content." The curriculum was *Judenrein* except for language, and even then it tendentiously neglected Yiddish writers who also wrote in Hebrew (such as C. N. Bialik), who resided outside the USSR, or who wrote before 1917. The major exception was the classic Yiddish triad of Y. L. Peretz, Sholom Aleichem, and Mendele Mocher Sforim. Here, however, the emphasis was upon a didactic attack on traditional Judaism, with even the good-natured Sholom Aleichem being converted into a critic of traditional Jewish manners and mores.

Professor Halevy attempts to explain the creation of the Yiddish school system in the 1920s, the reason for its subsequent elimination, and the way this was accomplished. He is most successful in discussing the latter question, arguing that the schools declined, not because of assimilation, which made them unnecessary, but because of governmental policy. Questions of motivation are less clearly resolved. Yiddish schools were allegedly encouraged—indeed, a policy of "Yiddishization" was adopted for the Jews—in line with Stalin's efforts to win over nationalist intellectuals by promoting "Ukrainianization" and "White Russification." Presumably the Jews were to be "Yiddishized," lest they become carriers of Russian nationalism. Would it not have been more practical to "Ukrainianize" (or "White Russify") them, especially since, as Halevy points out, tensions developed between the various national school systems? According to Halevy, another motive for creating a Yiddish school system was the threat of Jewish nationalistic and religious movements, and he believes the system came under attack when these movements declined in the 1930s. Yet, at the same time, he lists individuals and the entire staffs of institutes who were

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