

and left-liberal critics on the one hand, and earlier supporters of Henry Wallace on the other, are striking. The "new conservative" critics of détente (Senator Henry Jackson, *Commentary*, and others) have their counterparts (indeed, some of the same people, such as Irving Kristol, were active then and still are) in the "Vital Center" of anti-Soviet liberals of the early Cold War years.

WILLIAM TAUBMAN
Amherst College

THE SECRET WAR FOR THE OCEAN DEPTHS: SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY FOR MASTERY OF THE SEAS. By *Thomas S. Burns*. New York: Rawson Associates, 1978. xiv, 334 pp. \$12.95.

This book will satisfy completely neither the scholar nor the specialist on ocean science or maritime warfare. Despite some redeeming features, especially for the "hobbyist" on naval matters, *The Secret War for the Ocean Depths* must be classed as popular literature and not as a serious study of the "Soviet-American Rivalry for Mastery of the Seas."

There are a few insights in the book and some interesting discussion of the powerful personalities and the political and bureaucratic obstacles associated with the U.S.-Soviet underseas competition, but these insights are almost exclusively into the American side of the competition. Thomas Burns, who has some inside knowledge of U.S. underseas development, contributes by way of breezy narrative without documentation. The expert in these matters will find nothing new, but the uninitiated might enjoy the account of Western developments.

The treatment of Soviet naval matters is even less rigorous, although at times it makes for interesting reading. Again, there are no footnotes. Assertions such as "the Russians are not a peace-loving people" and "they have supported only rulers that have led them into battle" do little to engender confidence in the author's objectivity or scholarship. Also, while many of the assertions about Soviet naval development and priorities are not far off the mark, the bulk of the treatment of the Soviet navy is anecdotal in character.

There is a wide literature on the U.S.-Soviet naval competition. Anyone seeking to understand the nature of this competition would be best advised to consult the well-known books already available in both Russian and English. Only if one wishes to emphasize the problem of U.S. decision making in naval matters is he likely to be much informed by what Mr. Burns has to say.

STEVE F. KIME
National War College

SOVIET AVIATION AND AIR POWER: A HISTORICAL VIEW. Edited by *Robin Higham* and *Jacob W. Kipp*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. London: Brassey's, 1978. xii, 328 pp. Illus. \$25.00.

Scholars interested in the development and contemporary nature of Soviet air power have recently been treated to a spate of book-length studies on the topic. The present volume is a valuable addition to that literature. For the specialist it offers much helpful analysis; for other interested Soviet area scholars it provides sound insights into what has become an especially high-priority Soviet effort.

Professor Higham's introductory essay sets a cautionary tone. He argues against treating Soviet air power with anything but cautious respect—either in terms of organization or equipment. The USSR has only rarely been out of step with world aviation trends, and to denigrate Soviet hardware as unsophisticated and therefore inferior is a substantial error.

The eleven essays that follow investigate the evolution of Soviet air power from its feeble prerevolutionary origins through the perilous years of World War II to its present position of impressive strength, vitality, and leadership. In addition to treating the growth of the Soviet air services historically, a number of essays are devoted to topical subjects. These include the development of the naval air arm, civil aviation, the strategic air force, civil defense, lessons of World War II, strategic missile forces, cosmic research, and patterns of Soviet aircraft development.

The longest and in many ways most impressive work is John T. Greenwood's essay, which is devoted to the role of the air forces in the Great Patriotic War. Writing about a period of Soviet aviation history which has received more attention than any other—both in the West and in the USSR—Greenwood manages to present a great deal that is new and compelling. He describes, in an easily understandable narrative, the evolution of Soviet fighter forces from their early crushing defeat to final overwhelming victory. He painstakingly analyzes the elaboration of Soviet war-time strategy and (most refreshingly) tactics, pointing out that serious technical and tactical weaknesses continued to plague Soviet air forces throughout the war. Greenwood's essay makes it clear how decisive sheer numbers were in defeating "gold-plated" equipment and airmen with superior training. He provides a well-balanced picture derived from both Soviet and German sources.

Unlike most of the more technical works on the Soviet air forces, these essays do a good job of linking politics and leaders to both technical and organizational development. This is particularly well done in Kenneth Whiting's concluding essay dealing with the postwar period. Unlike some "softer" histories, this volume has a firm technical side as well.

In spite of its strong positive qualities, however, the book is certainly not without its problems. If the purpose of the entire effort was to provide historical depth and perspective to the phenomenon of Soviet air power, the essays covering the pre-World War II era are disappointing, since they are little more than good summaries, whose authors appear not to have taken full advantage of the available Soviet sources and generally fail to provide either important new data or fresh analytic insights. But the summaries do provoke a fundamental question: How could today's modern and formidable Soviet air forces have emerged from such weak and unfavorable beginnings? The essays that follow do a highly creditable job of providing answers.

The book also contains a few factual errors. For example, Greenwood places the city of Kursk in the Ukraine and credits Rudolph Rossler's mythical "contacts in the German High Command" with supplying vital information for the Soviet Stavka. But these and other errors that are less glaring do not detract significantly from the importance of this book. The absence of source notes is a more fundamental fault.

Whatever its weaknesses, this is a good and important book which displays balance and crispness and offers carefully drawn conclusions. Annotated bibliographies provide discerning evaluations of much of the most important literature. The extraordinary wealth of photographs is a welcome bonus.

ROBERT W. CLAWSON
Kent State University

SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY. By *Thomas B. Larson*. New York and Toronto: W. W. Norton and George J. McLeod, 1978. xii, 308 pp. \$13.95.

Thomas Larson, a veteran State Department official and the author of two previous books on the USSR, has written an excellent study of the complex relationships between Moscow and Washington. *Soviet-American Rivalry* is not merely an examination of bilateral relations between the two superpowers, but a sophisticated inves-