

the Jewish workers), and Odessa, and an appraisal of Zubatov's program. The author is favorable to Zubatov and his labor program, comparing him in approach and intent to Stolypin. Zubatov emphasized the limited value of repression and the need for measures to improve the material, educational, and moral status of the lower classes if the tsarist government was to retain their loyalty. Pospelovsky believes that if nonpolitical trade unions had been established throughout Russia as Zubatov recommended, social forces would have been released which would have strengthened the monarchy and forestalled revolution.

The *Zubatovshchina* failed because of a lack of understanding and support by Pleve and Witte, the withdrawal of the liberal academicians after initial cooperation, the unrelenting opposition of the Moscow industrialists, and the anti-Judaic policies of the government. The overall picture of Zubatov is of a loyal, intelligent, and enlightened bureaucrat striving to modernize and strengthen the autocracy in the face of ignorant and almost universal opposition from the government and society.

The contradictions within the *Zubatovshchina* are never clearly delineated. The Russian chauvinism and anti-Semitism of the worker Fedor Slepov and the Grand Duke Sergei, Zubatov's most influential protector, were incompatible with efforts to seek the support of Russia's Jews. Moreover, the release of social forces would inevitably have led to escalating demands for constitutional liberties, destroying Zubatov's utopian vision of a pure monarchy.

Pospelovsky rarely touches ground to evaluate the impact on the factory workers of the Zubatov ideology and the labor unions. Almost totally ignored are a rich-memoir literature on the Moscow movement, the legal press, and correspondent accounts in the émigré socialist periodicals. Neither Slepov's memoirs and writings nor D. N. Liubimov's memoirs are cited. The Social Democrats are rarely mentioned, although Zubatov's program was aimed at undermining their influence, causing Martov and Lenin to spend considerable time combating the *Zubatovshchina*.

Various points remain unproved, including the assertion that the idea of government-guided trade unions was adopted from the French example under Napoleon III. Many errors exist: Zubatov was born in 1864 not 1866; Meer Kogan was not known as Volin; Pleve received a deputation of workers on April 7, 1903, not in 1902; employers did become members of the Moscow Zubatov societies in their latter stages. The book is in need of thorough editing. It lacks cohesion and logical progression. There is sloppiness in documentation, and the footnotes are on occasion confusing, incomplete, or inaccurate.

In summary, Pospelovsky's book, although of limited value, adds to our knowledge and re-evaluation of tsarist labor policy. It will have served its purpose if it reawakens interest within the Soviet academic community.

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BURZHUAZIJA I TSARIZM V PEROVI RUSSKOI REVOLIUTSII. By E. D. Chermensky. 2nd revised edition. Moscow: "Mysl'," 1970 [1939 under title: *Burzhuziia i tsarizm v revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg.*]. 448 pp.

Professor Chermensky analyzes the policies and actions of all "bourgeois" elements, from Sviatopolk-Mirsky's "springtime" ministry to the dissolution of the Second

Duma. His material, drawn largely from the Central State Historical Archives of the USSR, consists primarily of minutes of meetings, conferences, and congresses (much of it highly enlightening) of bodies of the "ruling circles," of representatives of commercial and industrial organizations, and of the Octobrist and Kadet parties, with brief treatment of the rightists, populists, and Marxists. He does this from a strictly Leninist position. The ultimate, familiar conclusion is that these elements were counterrevolutionary or followed the dangerous counsels of counterrevolutionary—particularly liberal—forces. Hence Chermensky's aim is to present the Kadets—the embodiment of the parliamentary effort—as a negative and weak force which could not prevent the inevitable march toward the Bolshevik Revolution.

Hardly deviating from Lenin's analyses of 1906–8, Chermensky holds that the Kadets "crashed" because they were too "rotten" to take over power and could not solve Russia's problems by parliamentary methods. The latter is yet to be proved. But the Kadets were interested primarily in parliamentary reform, not class struggle, as the way to power. Power would come with the success of the parliamentary system, and its promoters would have their due position in it. For the Kadets it was not a question of striving for control à la Marx but of creating social stability through parliamentary government. The Leninist view holds that the liberals interfered with historical development—the proletarian revolution—by refusing to take power and by leading the masses with them. In this connection it was relatively easy to portray the Kadet defense of the weak parliamentary structure as a betrayal of the popular cause and fear of revolution—to the point of cooperating with the regime. The Leninist argument focuses on the Kadets as the key element in a class struggle. Lenin identified them directly with business management, the classical capitalists; he considered their "democratic" intellectuals petty bourgeois. And both shrank before a peasant and worker revolution. It is demonstrable that as a political element the Kadets thought chiefly in terms of the freest possible political action. In this sense they promoted economic freedom, simply did not believe in the efficacy of a controlled, socialist economy, and abhorred the prospect of a "proletarian" or any other kind of dictatorship. This had been the broad "anti-Jacobin" position since the 1870s at least.

The loose structure of the "bourgeois" parties and their organizational weakness in the localities are presented as evidence of their lack of support in the period concerned. These circumstances more or less characterized all Russian parties after 1905–7, including the Social Democrats, who were in a sad state of disarray from both internal dissension and official repression by the summer of 1907. These circumstances also lend themselves to the presentation of partisan or splinter attitudes as representative of entire parties or political currents.

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A SOLDIER'S NOTE-BOOK, 1914–1918. By *General A. A. Brusilov [Brusilov]*. West Point Military Library. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971 [London, 1930]. xi, 340 pp. \$13.00.

Churchill said that war is too important to leave to the generals. But General Brusilov views the Russian political leaders as no better, because a sensible military regime under Alexander III was followed by the "bewildering shilly-shallying"