

IGNATIEV AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BULGARIAN EX-ARCHATE, 1864–1872: A STUDY IN PERSONAL DIPLOMACY. By *Thomas A. Meininger*. Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1970. xii, 251 pp. \$3.50.

Drawing on the literature and published documents, this monograph carefully traces Nikolai Ignatiev's role in the complicated political and religious quarrels leading to the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the schism of 1872. The author makes several important points. Ignatiev's policy in this question was distinctly personal, his diplomacy active and indefatigable. His principal aim was always to break up the Ottoman Empire and promote Russian interests and power, but next in importance for him was the unity of the Orthodox Church. Though always sympathetic to the Bulgarians, Ignatiev constantly tried to satisfy them within the framework of Orthodox unity. Only when defeated by events and the force of Balkan nationalism did he come to champion Bulgarians over Greeks.

Unfortunately there are defects in this generally useful book. For reasons of economy it was not given the usual editorial attention, and is marred by many awkward phrases and ill-chosen or inaccurately used words. The author's claim that Ignatiev had a pivotal, dynamic role in forming the Exarchate seems to me unsubstantiated. The story is much more one of Ignatiev's defeats, Pyrrhic victories, and accommodation to forces he could not control. Finally, Meininger's favorable view of Ignatiev verges at times on naïveté. He credits Ignatiev with remarkable prescience in foreseeing that internecine Balkan wars would result from the revolutions Ignatiev was promoting. Others might regard this as proof of criminal recklessness. He denies that Ignatiev's Pan-Slav plans really represented a dangerous Russian nationalism, insisting that Ignatiev viewed them as a defense against Germany, that Russia's leading position in the Slavic world was natural, and that Ignatiev wanted other Slavic peoples to gain as well as the Russians. Every Pan-German made the same argument, *mutatis mutandis*, for a German-dominated *Mittleuropa*. Moreover, in wanting to break up Austria-Hungary, Ignatiev chose the best way to make the German threat a deadly reality. Certainly Ignatiev's assumptions should be presented fairly—but also without burking the illusions and hubris they contained.

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THE TROUBLED ALLIANCE: GERMAN-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS, 1914 TO 1917. By *Gerard E. Silberstein*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970. xiii, 366 pp. \$12.50.

The title of this study is somewhat misleading. It implies a general account of the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary from 1914 to 1917. Actually, it deals only with one particular aspect of their relations—their diplomatic efforts to secure the adherence of the Balkan states and Turkey to the Central alliance in World War I.

Since it was the Austro-Serb conflict that precipitated the war, Serbia was literally the first Allied nation. Montenegro associated herself with Serbia from the beginning of the war, but the other Balkan states and Turkey were not drawn in until later. In the diplomatic duel for their allegiance that developed