

society." Giddens strives to bring out the common and divergent points of this analysis and critique, particularly the conception of the evolution of human society and an interpretation of the social differentiation which this evolution entails. The comparative discussion is organized around the questions of rationality in history, interplay of ideology and social infrastructure, and interaction of man and society.

Like Marx, Weber admits the significance of class conflicts in history but rejects the interpretation of its development as a rational scheme involving "ultimate ends." Durkheim recognizes a definite overall pattern in the "stages" of the development of society, but he rejects the significance of "revolutionary dynamism" and stresses instead the decisive role of cumulative change. From these diverging positions, "idea-systems" and the interplay of ideology and social life appear to Marx as uniquely determined by the economic infrastructure, to Weber as "irrational" in terms of connections between, say, the pre-existing social order and the innovations of "charismatic" leaderships, and to Durkheim as determined by an infrastructural set different from the one suggested by Marx. At this point the book's comparative approach loses substantially in momentum as the views involved grow increasingly divergent. But the discussion picks up again in interest as attention is drawn toward a critique of modern society.

Marx's concept of "alienation" and Durkheim's "anomie" are presented as the key elements of their respective analyses of the "crisis" of society and of the modes of solving it. For Marx, the answer lies in the *dissolution* of the division of labor which capitalism entails; contrariwise, for Durkheim, the answer lies in the moral *integration* of the worker in the society's collective endeavors. Durkheim suggests that the worker's "dehumanization" (i.e., his "anomic" position) arises from his lack of understanding of the "organic solidarity" which binds him to society's productive efforts. Once such "moral awareness" is instilled, the problem disappears. In contrast to both Marx and Durkheim, Weber stresses that what determines alienation is the institutional context in which bureaucratic specialization develops—whether under capitalism or socialism, the fragmentation of the soul is unavoidable, the "Faustian universal man" is irremediably condemned, and the "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart" are bound to replace him.

The complex ramifications of these interesting comparisons are unfortunately treated too summarily in the last third of the book. The first two-thirds, devoted to separate studies of the three authors considered, labors strenuously over a terrain already well plowed.

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HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN NON-MARXIAN SOCIAL-ECONOMIC
THOUGHT. By *Boris Ischboldin*. New Delhi: New Book Society of India,
1971. 328 pp. \$7.00.

Before presenting their own viewpoints, Soviet economic historians must attack four groups of enemies: Russian "bourgeois" economic historians, Menshevik writers, "deviationists" of all stripes, and Soviet scholars who, inadvertently or not, offer "incorrect" and ideologically "distorted" explanations. Apparently these enemies share in the "cosmopolitan" belief that much of Russian economic thought was acquired from abroad through "borrowing and importation." This contention is dismissed as a "slandorous fabrication" by A. I. Pashkov, editor of an official *Istoriia*

russskoi ekonomicheskoi mysli published in the late 1950s under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to whom this is an insult to the “mighty creative powers of the Russian people.” Once such preliminaries are disposed of, Soviet historians can stress dutifully the “originality” of Russian contributions which only by accident parallel some of the well-known mercantilist, physiocratic, and classical economic theses of the West.

Professor Ischboldin, who emigrated from Russia long ago, strives in this book to offer a “synthesis” of the opposing views of those who stress the primacy of the exogenous or of the endogenous influences on Russian thought. According to him, Russian economic thought “reflected a rather peculiar non-Western social environment,” and because of this went “beyond a mere imitation of the Western train of ideas.” On the other hand, since Russia went through various historical “phases” similar to those of the West, a certain parallelism did develop in Eastern and Western trends of economic thought. Having established this quite sensible framework, Ischboldin goes on to present in twenty-one brief chapters what he calls the evolution of the “non-Marxian socioeconomic thought” from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the twentieth century. An apparent believer in the French saying “On n’est jamais aussi bien servi que par soi-même,” Ischboldin tops his book with a chapter devoted to himself and to his own “School of Economic Synthesis.”

The volume is conceived somewhat along the lines of Heilbroner’s well-known *The Worldly Philosophers*, but unfortunately lacks the polish or depth of its model. Short biographies of writers succeed one another—from Ivan Peresvetov to Boris Ischboldin—with a too careful attention to trivia and a painful dearth of insight and analysis. I may disagree with Pashkov; but there is, alas, more to gain from the perusal of his biased volumes than from the study of the “unbiased” effort of Ischboldin.

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SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS: FROM EXTENSIVE TO INTENSIVE GROWTH UNDER CENTRAL PLANNING IN THE USSR, EASTERN EUROPE, AND YUGOSLAVIA. By *J. Wilczynski*. New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1972. xvii, 350 pp. \$17.50.

At first glance this is a most welcome book for the “general reader,” a kind of non-technical vade mecum of the principal static and dynamic features of “socialist” economics, the perplexing diversities of the economic reforms of the sixties in the eight countries, and the problems of their relations with one another and with the “capitalist” world. In addition, the author boldly offers projections of their growth, individually, to the year 2000. Alas, this ambitious task does not come off well; on balance, the general reader may have been done a disservice. It may be instructive to ask why.

To begin with, the work aims to be at once a treatise on broad historical trends affecting the Communist economies and a kind of statistical compendium for the eight countries. Unfortunately the generalizations are not always supported, hence too often they fail to be convincing. The statistical data are very conveniently