

RECENT ADDITIONS TO NINETEENTH-CENTURY MEXICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

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The recent literature dealing with Mexico in the nineteenth century is massive. This motivated us to the task of reviewing the material published since the Third Reunion of Mexican and North American Historians at Oaxtapec in 1969. Initially over 450 titles were identified, dealing with all aspects of the period. Our original intention was to review the literature in Spanish, since that material is already becoming difficult to locate, but our attempt to treat material in only one language became unworkable. We also had planned to organize the essay conceptually rather than chronologically, but too many important studies were left out. So we have reluctantly returned to the traditionally accepted periodization of political history: independence, early republic, reform, and the *porfiriato*. Limitations of space forced the elimination of sections dealing with local, diplomatic, intellectual, and cultural history.

I

New interpretive works on the independence period are few. Nothing replaces the essential Luis Villoro, *La revolución de independencia* (México: UNAM, 1953), which has been rewritten for clarity and for the inclusion of the findings of José Miranda, Francisco López Cámara, and Jesús Reyes Heróles,* and reissued as *El proceso ideológico de la revolución de independencia* (México: UNAM, 1967). Villoro's class analysis makes better sense than the usual three-period (Hidalgo-Morelos, interlude, Iturbide) approach.

Another kind of interpretive work is by Antonio Pompa y Pompa, *Orígenes de la independencia mexicana* (Guadalajara, 1970; México: Jus, 1972). Unlike Villoro's documentary research, this is an essay in bold strokes. Mexico in the eighteenth century, according to Pompa y Pompa, was evolving a mature culture of self-realization, a *mexicanidad* that would have resulted in a secure independence of mestizo identification, when she was bombarded by the alien enlightenment

*José Miranda, *Las ideas e instituciones políticas mexicanas; primera parte: 1521–1820* (México: UNAM, 1952); Francisco López Cámara, *La génesis de la conciencia liberal en México* (México: El Colegio de México, 1954); Jesús Reyes Heróles, *El liberalismo mexicano; los orígenes* (México: UNAM, 1957); José Miranda et al., *Presencia de Rousseau* (México: UNAM, 1962).

ideas of the "Liberal Revolutionary Superstate." By that the author means a conscious, secret, and hypocritical policy of British, French, and Anglo-American statesmen to destroy the Spanish empire in order to absorb the markets and raw materials of her dependencies. They assaulted the colonies with pirates who destroyed Spain's communications with New Spain ("Independence was conquered on the high seas"), with contraband, commercial diplomats, freemasonry, and with agents of the new ideas of popular sovereignty, individual freedom, anticlericalism, constitutionalism, and national independence. This interpretation thus rejects the ultra-conservative view that Mexico ought better to have remained in the empire, and rejects the liberal view that the struggle for independence was worth the price. Here the natural independence within a home-grown culture was thwarted by foreign powers, and Mexico fell from a legal and responsible regime to a new colonial status within an illegal and irresponsible regime. Much of the interpretation is ingenious and will appeal to the conspiratorial mind; other parts need more work.

Doris M. Ladd's *The Mexican Nobility at Independence 1780–1826* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976) examines in detail the neglected experience of the titled nobility in the generation of the independence movement. She clarifies the origins, the economic predominance, and the plutocratic influence of the nobility in the colonial period. Ladd examines the social demands that frequently strained the economic resources of the nobility. There is a particularly important analysis of the initial advantages and later the encumbrances of *mayorazgo*, or entail. She also explores the grievances of the nobility by the early years of the nineteenth century. What seems open to question in her book is her attitude toward the nobility. In her study of the independence movement she seems eager to argue that they were not entirely reactionary. By emphasizing the role of such members as José María Fagoaga, she suggests that our negative views of the nobility should be revised. Yet in her conclusion she admits that some members of the elite were able to relinquish prerogatives since those older privileges no longer served their economic ends. That concept of an elite changing in order to maintain its privileged position undermines her dissent from the argument of Luís Chavez Orozco, to the effect that it was a liberal Spain against which the independence movement reacted. Still, the study is well done and an important addition to the literature of the period.

The Mexican and Anglo-American independence movements are examined in the tradition of Herbert Bolton's thesis of common New World experience by Richard Morris, Josefina Zoraida Vásquez, and Elías Trabulsa in *Las revoluciones de independencia en México y en los Estados Unidos* (3 vols., México: SepSetentas, 1976). In twelve introductory essays to as many parts, the authors compare the two independence movements and present parallel documents "to reveal up to what point common terrain exists." The areas for comparison include prerevolutionary incipient nationalism, plans for imperial reorganization antedating the independence movements, economic and fiscal complaints of the colonists, rationalization and justification for independence, constitutionalism, opposition to monarchy, federalism, church-state relations, problems of equality,

anti-imperialism, and antimilitarism. The authors maintain that the independence movements developed out of concrete grievances within colonial societies that had matured sufficiently to direct their own destinies. Further parallels include the problems of taxation in the colonies, discrimination against colonials in administration, enlightenment legalism in justification for rebellion, the nature of the problems of independence, and similar constitutional formulas. The documents are chosen with care to demonstrate the parallels, but the comparative essays are cursory.

An issue that has received some attention lately is the Real Cédula de Consolidación de Vales of 1804. New Spain was the American colony that rendered the greatest fiscal benefit to the Crown, some eight to eleven million pesos per year on the eve of the *consolidación*. The colonists, particularly Spaniards, had responded voluntarily to the financial crises of the Crown. Then in 1798 Spain issued a royal decree (in response to the defeat at the hands of the British at Cape St. Vincent in 1796), which alienated the land of the Pious Works in Spain to the benefit of the royal treasury. Although that decree did not affect New Spain, a precedent was established. The crisis of 1804, as Spain went to war with Great Britain, elicited the Real Cédula de Consolidación de Vales, which required that the Church loan all Pious Funds and the community treasuries to the Crown at three percent annual interest, guaranteed by the various taxes of the colony. Lucas Alamán later stated that the consolidation was a principal cause of the independence movement. Several authors have examined the issue, frequently setting their discussion against the comment made by Bishop Abad y Queipo to the effect that the Pious Funds in New Spain controlled 59,000,000 pesos.

Three studies of the consolidation and the subsequent impact upon the economy and social fabric of New Spain have recently appeared. Brian R. Hamnett, in "The Appropriation of Mexican Church Wealth by the Spanish Bourbon Government—The 'Consolidación de Vales Reales' 1805–1809" (*Journal of Latin American Studies* 1:2[1969]:85–113), argues that the motivation for the alienation of properties belonging to the Pious Funds and the end of their function as a mortgage bank was a response to the debt of the Spanish government. He estimates that the total amount taken from New Spain between 1805 and 1809 was between 10,500,000 and 12,750,000 pesos.

The social and economic impact of the measure upon New Spain resulted from the obligation of the Church to call in all loans. In Oaxaca and Yucatán the measures hit the pueblos hardest, where two-thirds of the *cajas de comunidad* were sequestered by the Crown. Ecclesiastical annuities were terminated. The *nuevo noveno decimal*, issued in 1806, was a further one-ninth added to the two-ninths of the one-half of the revenues from tithes to be advanced to the Crown. This additional tax was another burden, especially resented by the merchants. Hamnett also argues that the removal of ten to twelve million pesos from financial channels had a depressing effect upon the economy of New Spain. The government suffered a shrinkage of its tax base and was less able to meet its obligations; the Church was less able to support its commitments (Hidalgo and

Morelos personally suffered decreases in income that Hamnett attributes to the consolidación). Loss of institutional solvency was coupled with a crisis of confidence that created conditions for the independence movement.

Asunción Lavrin also studies the issue in "The Execution of the Law of Consolidación in New Spain, Economic Aims and Results" (*HAHR* 53:1[1973]:27–49). Her position is that whereas the Pious Funds, charities, and civil corporations did suffer, the Church as a whole was not badly affected, even though it had been given a blow by a traditional ally. She suggests, unlike Hamnett, that merchants may have gained from the entire process and that most rural landholders retained their land. The consolidación, she thinks, contributed to the decapitalization of New Spain (she accepts the figure of eleven million pesos for the amount collected) but was not as destructive to the economy as the war of independence.

Romeo Flores Caballero also studies the consolidación in *La contrarrevolución en la independencia* (México: Colegio de México, 1969). He follows a series of documents published in the *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* to calculate the total value of the consolidación at 12,080,291.70 pesos, a figure compatible with the estimates of Hamnett and Lavrin. According to the author, Church wealth was less than fifty million pesos, more in capital and promissory notes than real estate. Every sector of the economy of New Spain was utilizing the capital of the Church. Flores Caballero points to the adverse impact upon the economy of calling in the majority of outstanding loans at a given time; many agricultural enterprises were abandoned, and land values dropped to one-half. In this context he builds upon the work of Michael Costeloe (*Church Wealth in Mexico, A Study of the "Juzgado de Capellanías" in the Archbishopric of Mexico, 1800–1856* [London: Cambridge University Press, 1967]) and applies the insights relating to the *juzgado de capellanías* to the issue of consolidación. Flores Caballero notes in this clear case of conflict between the needs of the metropolis and the interests of the colony that the success of the former in the short run led to the groundswell of opposition to the Crown in a class that might have been expected to remain loyal. The Creoles viewed the flow of money to Spain with disgust and even the *peninsulares* doubted Spain's ability to resolve her problems. This gives some economic substance to the overworked concept of Creole opposition to the Crown because of political discrimination.

There is little of value in the new crop of biographic literature of the principal independence insurgents. Roberto Carrillo Díaz's *Presencia del padre Hidalgo* (México: Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1973) is principally a study of Hidalgo's intellectual preparation for his role as insurgent leader. Hidalgo is placed in his time and circumstance by Felipe Servin in *Próceres de la independencia de América* (México: SEP, 1968). Pablo G. Macías' *Hidalgo, reformador y maestro* (México: UNAM, 1969) is a reedition of the 1959 examination of Hidalgo before the insurrection as a man, teacher, and rector. A chapter is given to the Hidalgo inheritance. Nevertheless, Luis Castillo Ledón's *Hidalgo, la vida del héroe* (2 vols., México: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1948, 1949) is still the most complete and best in quality.

On Morelos nothing has replaced Alfonso Teja Zabre's *Vida de Morelos*

(México: Andres Botas, 1916) and Ignacio Hermesdorf's *Morelos, hombre fundamental de México* (México: Grijalba, 1958). The best edition of Teja Zabre is now the 1959 version updated by María del Carmen Velázquez. Nevertheless, students of Morelos will now need to consult the serious new study by Ernesto Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos, su vida revolucionaria a través de sus escritos* (México: UNAM, 1965). The 350 pages of important documents, many newly discovered in the AGN and AGI, and the 150-page biography are well balanced and insightful, avoiding the abject idolatry of other new literature. For example, Lemoine does not denigrate Félix María Calleja and Ignacio López Rayón in order to create a grander Morelos, as have so many biographers, including Baltasar Dromundo. Dromundo's *José María Morelos* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1970) exemplifies the eulogistic literature. Largely assembled from previous accounts, it does seem to contain the proof that Morelos was never a mule-driver and that he was not a mulatto or *zambo* (but rather a mestizo, for whatever value that might be). Jesús Romero Flores' *Biografía de Morelos* (México: 1970) can be missed.

Nothing exciting has newly appeared on Iturbide. His court is described by Manuel Romero de Terreros in "Don Agustín de Iturbide, emperador de México y su corte" (*Memorias de la Academia Mexicana de la Historia* 23:3[1969]: 225–87) and the narration of his arrest and execution appears in Juan Fidel Zorrilla's *Los últimos días de Iturbide* (México: Manuel Porrúa, 1969). Romero's purpose is to persuade Mexicans to venerate the "real" hero of the independence. Zorrilla describes the legislature of Tamaulipas that decreed the outlawing of Iturbide, the persons involved with the decree, the arrest and the execution, the last messages and letters of Iturbide, and contemporary judgements of him. Iturbide comes off well. Nevertheless, the best work remains that of William Spence Robertson, *Iturbide of Mexico* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968).

Biographic literature on the secondary insurgents is better. José María Miguel y Vergés' *Diccionario de insurgentes* (México: Porrúa, 1969) is a major contribution, a collection of biographic sketches of hundreds of insurgents and contemporaries of the movement, including printed references and documents for each entry. Other new insurgent biographies are Luis Pérez Verdía's *Prisciliano Sánchez* (Guadalajara: Gobierno de Jalisco, 1969); two biographies of José María Mercado by Adalberto Navarro Hidalgo, *Un tapatía en la revolución de independencia de México*, (Guadalajara, 1970) and Juan López, *José María Mercado, insurgente tapatío* (Guadalajara: Ediciones del Ayuntamiento, 1973); Joaquín Fernández de Córdoba's "Juan José Martínez de Lejarza y Alday" (*Historia Mexicana* 24:3[No. 95, 1975]:321–55), a revisionary article on the Michoacán patriot and insurgent in which many errors from earlier biographies are corrected in scholarly fashion; Ernesto Zertuche's "Juan Ignacio Ramón, general nuevoleonés de la insurgencia" (*Humanitas* 12[1971]:255–75), based on new documents and the older work of Castillo Ledón; José García Pimentel's *Leona Vicario, una mujer por entero* (México: SEP, 1968), at least the fourth biography of this fascinating insurgency propagandist and wife of Andrés Quintana Roo; the well edited selection of revolutionary propaganda, the *Escritos políticos de José María Cos y Pérez* by Ernesto Lemoine Villicaña (México: UNAM, 1967); and the Manuel Mejía Ziniga

et al. *La Independencia de México* (México: Editorial del Magisterio, 1969), a collection of five biographic sketches by as many authors of "El Pípila," Mariano Jiménez, Manuel Villalongín, Mariano Abasolo, and Hermenegildo Galeano.

One other category of new literature of the independence period might be mentioned—that concerning the intervention or participation of foreigners. José R. Guzmán has been the most prolific contributor: "La correspondencia de don Luis de Onís sobre la expedición de Javier Mina" (*Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* 9:3–4[1968]:509–44) demonstrates the indifference of the US government toward the remonstrances of the Spanish agent in Washington; "La misión de José Herrera en Estados Unidos" (*Boletín del AGN* 10:1–2[1969]:253–88) is an account and the supporting documents of the agent sent by Morelos to seek military and financial aid for the insurgent cause in Mexico; "John Galvin en la guerra de independencia de México" (*Boletín del AGN* 10:3–4[1969]:557–87) documents the gunrunning activities of the Mexican insurgents by an English adventurer operating from ports in the United States; "Actividades corsarias en el Golfo de México" (*Boletín del AGN* 11:3–4[1970]:355–452) further demonstrates the activity of Luis de Onís as he informed Spanish officials of the filibustering and piratical operations being perpetuated against New Spain and the real depredations of such acts; "Adventureros, corsarios e insurgentes en el Golfo de México" (*Boletín del AGN* 12:1–2[1971]:175–236) documents more closely the involvement of the government of the United States in filibustering activity of the period; and "Extranjeros en la guerra de independencia" (*Boletín Bibliográfico de la Secretaría de Hacienda* 492[1973]). These are well-documented articles from newly found materials; we can await Guzmán's book with enthusiasm. Also Ernesto de la Torre Villar traces the career of a revolutionary diplomat in the United States and elsewhere in "Un patriota jalisciense, Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala, diplomático mexicano" (*Humanitas* 14[1973]:534–92), and Vidal Covián Martínez writes of *Don José Bernardo Maximiliano Gutiérrez de Lara* (Ciudad Victoria: Siglo XX, 1967) as Hidalgo's agent to the United States, insurgent in Texas, and first governor of Tamaulipas. Carlos López Urrutia relates the arrival of Lord Cochrane to the port of Acapulco in *La escuadra chilena en México, 1822; Los corsarios chilenos y argentinos en los mares del norte* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1971).

Anna Macías' *Génesis del gobierno constitucional en México, 1808–1820* (México: SepSetentas, 1973) is an extension of her articles, "Los autores de la constitución de Apatzingán" (*Historia Mexicana* 20:4[No. 80, 1971]:522–21) and "Como fue publicada la constitución de Apatzingán" (*Historia Mexicana* 19:1[No. 73, 1969]:11–22). The book traces the endeavors during the independence period to establish constitutional government. She analyzes the proposals of Melchor de Talamantes and Jacobo de Villaurrutia to the Viceroy José Iturrigaray in 1808 for a National Congress, José Mariano Michelena's conspiracy in Valladolid for a revolutionary government, the Junta de Zitácuaro of Ignacio López Rayón, the Congress of Chilpancingo, and the Constitution of Apatzingán. The author claims that Mexico's later political instability cannot be understood by the military history of the independence period, but rather in part, by "Mexico's tenacious struggle to obtain her own government and to prove to herself and others her

right and capacity to govern herself." The struggle was not Mexico's but that of specific individuals and classes. The attempts to constitutionalize government apparently had no influence on later constitutional history. The author maintains that Iturbide's imperial government was based upon the Constitution of Cádiz of 1812 and that that of 1824 was a copy of the Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, she tells us that neither the Congress of 1813 nor the Constitution of 1814 even influenced the course of the insurgency. They did not attract Creole support to the insurrection nor succeed in obtaining the desired foreign aid.

The importance of this work apparently resides in some observations about the use and abuse of power in Mexico. All attempts to form a constitutional government during the independence period failed because the men with sufficient power to override the limitations and divisions of power inherent in constitutionalism regularly opposed the measures that threatened their own power. The antagonisms between Rayón and Morelos appear in this book as personal and ambitious: Rayón used his Junta de Zitácuaro and Morelos used his Congress of Chilpancingo to establish bases of monopolistic power. According to the author, the Constitution of Apatzingán was created to establish a government to replace the discredited despotism of Rayón and Morelos. Similarly, the plan of Talamantes for a supreme legislature, Hidalgo's refusal to share power, Rayón's attempt to control all authority during the insurrection and for the following years, Morelos' suggestion of a lifetime executive, and the all-powerful Congress in the Constitution of Apatzingán all sustain the author's important observation, which can be projected for all later national history, that attempts to limit and divide power simply have not worked. The other reason for this failure, which can also be applied to later Mexican history, is that individuals always emerged to resist the monopolization of power. Allende and Aldama stripped Hidalgo of his supreme authority; Liceaga and Burdusco opposed the dictatorial power of Rayón; Rayón and the Congress of Chilpancingo threatened the one-man rule of Morelos; Cos and Terán turned upon the assumed total power of Congress. And so a study about the attempts to institutionalize government ultimately explains the obstacles to that institutionalization.

Another work about Apatzingán is the first essay in the book by Miguel González Avelar, *La constitución de Apatzingán y otros estudios* (México: SepSetentas, 1973). The "other studies" principally treat education and science in the twentieth century. The first essay compares interestingly with the work by Macías. While she seeks the historicity of the attempts to constitutionalize power, González Avelar attempts to give historicity to that constitution. He refuses to accept the edict of generations of historians and jurists that the Constitution of Apatzingán only registered the political theories of a few men at a given historic moment. He believes that the document represented the will of the Mexican people to design their own destiny and was the origin of Mexican popular sovereignty. He cites arguments of individuals with whom he does not agree, but it seems to us that theirs are better than his, and that Anna Macías' view is also superior.

In yet another book about *El federalismo mexicano* (México: SepSetentas,

1975), José Gamas Torruco traces the origins and development of federalism in its theoretical, political, and economic aspects to the present. Unlike the authors (Lanz Duret, Rabasa, etc., including the authors above, Morris, Vásquez, and Trabulse) who claim that federalism was imported from the United States, Gamas Torruco follows Nettie Lee Benson, Carpizo, and Reyes Heróles that federalism was necessary and within the constitutional tradition of Cádiz, Anáhuac, and Apatzingán. The idea was born in the Cortés of Cádiz and its author was Ramos Arispe; it obeyed the necessity of the provinces to avoid further centralistic oppression by establishing its own political institutions. Viceroy Apodaca swore allegiance to the Constitution of Cádiz in May 1820; provincial deputations were rapidly established, antedating Mexican independence, and the Treaty of Córdoba left them functioning. Although Iturbide overrode them in an excess of centralism, sixteen provincial deputations between February and April of 1823 accepted the plan of Casa Mata, withdrawing recognition from the empire of Iturbide. They were thus autonomous states, governing themselves. Before and during the Constitutional Convention of 1823–24 several states declared their independence and adopted or were writing political constitutions. Others declared that their only relationship with Mexico was as federated states. In this way the author refutes Fray Sevando's famous argument that whereas federalism in the United States united divided political units, in Mexico it divided a united state. The separation had been motivated and accomplished, according to the author, by excessive centralism, and the reunion of 1824 was only made possible by federalism. The argument is not new, but well stated in this, yet another treatise aimed at the excessive centralism still found in modern Mexico. It is much superior to Jorge Sayeg Helú's *El nacimiento de la república federal mexicana* (México: SepSetentas, 1974), which is marred on every page by poor historical judgement and organized around a fuzzy concept of "social liberalism."

II

Javier Ocampo's *Las ideas de un día* (México: Colegio de México, 1969) is an analysis of the ideas within Mexican society that emerged in response to the independence of Mexico in 1821. The "day" of the ideas covers the period of the Soberana Junta Provisional Gubernativa, from 12 September 1821 to 25 February 1822. The author studies the persons and groups who presented ideas, as well as the circumstances, interests, pressures, and the real conditions of the new nation. He finds an explosion of joy, optimism and hope for the future of a prosperous and powerful nation as manifested in ceremonies of oaths to the new order, popular festivities, sermons, and odes to the hero Iturbide. The thesis is that the optimism of the nation upon the first news of independence fell to deep pessimism within two months, and that the plunge was due to the unreality of the utopian ideas in the face of traditional Mexico, as well as the lack of swift official action in response to revolutionary demands for transformation.

The slowness of the junta in reforming society may have exasperated contemporary revolutionaries, but Luis Villoro (*La revolución de independencia*) finds significant change: the peninsulares lost their directional monopoly of the

Creoles; the Spanish functionaries and the Spanish expeditionary forces abandoned New Spain; the Spanish commercial class lost their privileged position with the break in relations with Cádiz and with the junta's decree of free trade; their influence on government was replaced by the high clergy and Creole aristocracy (albeit not by the insurgents); citizenship replaced loyalty of subjects; caste discrimination and the privilege of holding public office were legally broken; the monopolistic restrictions on industry, mining, and commerce were disestablished; the *alcabala* was reduced. Even Villoro, however, agrees that only "one faction of the counterrevolutionary party supplanted another."

The original optimism that Ocampo discovered was expressed in terms of the three guarantees of the Plan de Iguala: religion, the independent monarchy and union—widely interpreted as peace, freedom, and progress. Writers turned their hands to postulating an ideal nation, proposing projects of public works, political systems, economic development, administrative reorganization, popular education, and national defense. They dwelled on the ideas of independence, popular sovereignty, and individual freedom. They debated the relative contributions of Hidalgo and Iturbide, already with political and social overtones. Divisions began to form between traditionalists and liberals who issued commentaries that served as programs of action for later political groups.

Both the utopian ideas and the governmental action were unrealistic, according to Ocampo. In a chapter study on the 325 sessions of the Soberana Junta Provisional Gubernativa, the author concludes that the ideas and energies of the government were "few and inoperative" and did not approach the urgency for profound and rapid changes necessary to meet the utopian demands for transformation. Official action bogged down in bureaucratic business, concern for order, financial needs, and respect for tradition. Thus the enthusiasm and optimism turned to pessimism and disillusion within two months of September 1821. Ocampo's book is a grand display of documentary research and a laudable model of intellectual history for other investigators interested in the mood and hopes of a people at a given moment. The concepts and methods used here could be repeated in parallel studies for Mexico at numerous other points.

The new literature on the ideological figures of the early republic is thin. *Miguel Ramos Arispe, consumidor de la independencia de México* (México: SEP, 1969), a biography by Oscar Flores Tapia, emphasizes the role of Ramos Arispe as the advanced liberal, leader of the opposition to Iturbide, major architect of the Constitution of 1824, and advocate of federalism. This piece is sound and short, but has no new information. The 1974 reedition of Vito Alessio Robles' *El pensamiento del padre Mier* (México: Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1974) is an enlarged version of his 1944 edition (from 91 pages to 144) of the biography and selected writings of Teresa de Mier. The best piece on Teresa de Mier, however, remains Edmundo O'Gorman's *José Servando Teresa de Mier y Guerra, escritos y memorias* (México: UNAM, 1941). Nothing significant has been added on José María Luis Mora since Charles Hale's study (*Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968]) and Arturo Arnaiz y Freg's "El Dr. José María Luis Mora, 1794–1850" (*Memorias de la Academia Mexicana de la Historia* 25:4[1966]:405–525). Jesús Reyes Heróles studies Mariano Otero

and organizes his writings in *Obras de Mariano Otero* (2 vols., México: Porrúa, 1967). Lorenzo de Zavala had previously been most thoroughly and neutrally studied by Raymond Step, *Lorenzo de Zavala, profeta del liberalismo mexicano* (México: Porrúa, 1952). Now Zavala is rehandled by María de la Luz Parceró, *Lorenzo de Zavala, fuente y origen de la reforma liberal en México* (México: INAH, 1969), as a man, an historian, a subject of contemporary opinion, an heir of enlightenment thought, and a liberal; the charge of treason is gone. Apparently nothing has been recently added to the literature on Lucas Alamán. The best study remains that of José C. Valadés, the only work on Alamán that utilizes the family archives, published in 1938. Nevertheless, the student will want to see Tarcisio García's "Alamán ilustrado" in *Memorias del primer coloquio mexicano de historia de la ciencia* (2 vols., México: Sociedad Mexicana de Historia de la Ciencia y la Tecnología, 1964) for Alamán's role in advocating science and technology for Mexican economic development. On Carlos María Bustamante the best work is still Edmundo O'Gorman's 1932 essay, now returned to in a thoughtful piece by Juan Antonio Ortega y Medina, "El historiador don Carlos María Bustamante ante la conciencia histórica mexicana" in *Estudios de tema mexicano* (México: Setentas, 1973).

The consolidación is but one part of Flores Caballero's work, *La contrarrevolución en la independencia*, which is a monographic study of the participation and influence of the Spanish population in New Spain and Mexico upon political developments from 1804 to 1838. The only discernible thesis is that Spaniards in the social body influenced many other issues. The narrative handling of the period is probably not the best way to treat the subject, but the judgements made throughout render the work important. The author estimates that the influence of the Spaniards was great in the viceregal administration, the Church, courts, military, commerce and industry, but minor in education, mining, and agriculture. The great wealth of the colony was primarily in the Creole-oriented agricultural sector. In his discussion of the Creole-Peninsular rivalry, the Creoles were merely awaiting the opportunity to overthrow the Spanish administration—a nationalist point frequently made by Mexican authors without presenting satisfactory evidence or distinguishing which Creoles.

According to the author, the Spanish residents in New Spain were not only responsible for the arrest of Viceroy Iturrigaray, but also for the replacement of all the remaining viceroys. The Spanish oligarchy also opposed the Constitution of 1812 and the Córtes, and celebrated the reestablishment of Ferdinand's absolutism in 1814. The first wave of Spanish migrants from the colony occurred at that time; they took some twelve million pesos with them, which Calleja attempted to stop. After throwing their weight in favor of independence in 1820 because of the liberalism in Spain, the migrants supported Iturbide until the Soberana Junta limited the amount of money that they could take from the country; support was withdrawn from Iturbide when in February 1822 news arrived that the Spanish court disapproved the Treaty of Córdoba.

The remainder of the study examines the increasing attack upon the Spanish residents by the Creoles, the populace, and the liberals. Coveting bureaucratic and military positions, the Creoles argued that the guarantee of "union"

undermined the guarantee of "independence." Thus commenced the second great exodus of Spaniards with their capital, which Iturbide tried to stem. Spanish loyalty, particularly that of military officers, was suspect, and minor plots and uprisings heightened anti-Spanish sentiments. Laws from the state legislatures registered the popular sentiment against Spaniards in public offices until a law in May of 1827 expelled them from all official employment. Many Spaniards left Mexico after the laws of expulsion in December 1827 and March 1829, although the first law exempted so many categories that few were threatened. The author could count but 772 Spaniards expelled by the first law; the second excluded fewer categories, but particular bills exempted over 2,700 individuals.

Rumors of Spanish attempts to reconquer Mexico placed pressure upon the government to enforce the law, but President Vicente Guerrero was too busy in 1829, in part with the real Spanish invasion (designed and led, incidentally, by expelled Spaniards from Mexico). President Anastasio Bustamante and his minister Lucas Alamán protected Spaniards in Mexico in 1830–32; indeed, some Spaniards returned. Valentín Gómez Farias was more interested in liberal reforms in 1833 and 1834 than in enforcing the expulsion of the Spaniards, while Santa Anna in 1835 was allied to the conservatives who did not want to expel the Spaniards. Finally in 1836 Spain recognized Mexican independence, which ended the whole matter.

Neither a conclusion nor a summary gathers the judgements into a general statement on the influence of the Spanish residents. This is unfortunate and could easily have been remedied. The author seems to conclude that not many Spaniards really left Mexico and that the outward flow of money was not as serious to the Mexican economy as earlier historians have thought. Although Flores Caballero does not quantify the economic effects, several political questions become clearer than before the attitudes and activities of the Spaniards were studied as a class. For a summary statement see Romeo Flores Caballero, "Neocolonialismo, nacionalismo y expulsión de los españoles" (*Diálogos* 5:2[No. 26, 1969]:5–7).

Useful in relation to Flores Caballero's work is Harold D. Sims' "Las clases económicas y la dicotomía criollo-peninsular en Durango, 1827" (*Historia Mexicana* 20:4[No. 80, 1971]:539–62). This is a good study of the social structure in a single state. Unlike Flores Caballero, Sims argues that in Durango the mercantile competition between Creoles and Peninsulars was probably at the root of the proexpulsionist movement. Clearly Sims delineates the objective basis for the prejudice against and eventually the expulsion of the Spaniards from Durango.

In addition to these studies, both of which reflect the influence of the expulsions upon the political and economic instability of the new nation, three new economic studies also speak to the instability of the early republic. Romeo Flores Caballero's recent publication of introductory notes and documents under the title of *Protección y libre cambio: el debate entre 1821 y 1836* (México: Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, 1971) traces the fate of the doctrine of free trade in the first years after independence. Against the background of Bourbon doctrines of *libre cambio*, the erosion of the power of the mercantile monopolies, the

dislocative effect of the Napoleonic Wars, and the concomitant stimulation to local industry, the liberal doctrine of free trade—in the period after independence—seemed to have an appeal. Ironically such was not the case. Flores Caballero finds that provisions reducing maritime tariffs to merely 25 percent and alcabalas to 8 percent—implemented by the provisional junta in 1821—were the most liberal tariffs in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Iturbide's empire quickly reversed the earlier provision and initiated the trend of upward revaluation of tariffs, a trend that continued throughout the early republic. Lucas Alamán introduced the argument in favor of the protection of infant industries in his *Memoria de relaciones de 1823*. The impact of these increases on commerce was immediate and adverse. In 1821 the value of taxable commerce was 17.2 million pesos, whereas in 1823 it fell to 6.2 million. Of course Flores Caballero does not establish a causal link, only an association. Documents in the study reflect the free trade arguments of Tadeo Ortiz de Ayala but even the Vicente Guerrero government with artisan support moved away from that position. Pressure from the textile industrialists in Puebla and Querétaro added to the desire of the pauperized government to doom the doctrine of free trade. The establishment of the Banco de Avío in 1830 clearly cast the republic on the side of protectionism. The volume is useful in order to understand the highly selective application of the doctrines of liberalism, even in the case of the liberals, but is best used in juxtaposition to two others for a fiscal-economic explanation of political instability.

Both of them are by Jan Bazant. In *Historia de la deuda exterior de México, 1823–1946* (México: Colegio de México, 1968) the background is set against which the political history of the early republic is best studied. The new government of Mexico negotiated a loan in 1823 from B. A. Goldschmidt and Company and a subsequent loan from Barclay, Herring, Richardson and Company in 1824 at highly disadvantageous terms (Bazant is less upset by the terms of the loan than many of his readers). Mexico received, after bankers' deductions and fees, 42.34 percent of the nominal value of the first loan, and 76.12 percent of the second, each valued nominally at 16,000,000 pesos. Mexico thereby incurred debt at onerous terms and became trapped in another downward spiral from which there was no escape until the porfiriato.

The government might have been expected to tax the nation in order to service the debt. As Flores Caballero demonstrates, however, by increasing tax rates the government—at least in terms of tariffs—found that revenues diminished. Bazant's work suggests a complementary relationship. Since the government had to pay the interest and since attempts to tax in an age of *caudillos* meant rebellion, the governments of the early republic could not meet their obligations. On the other hand if the government failed to service the foreign debt, intervention threatened. All of Mexico's wars of the early republic had, to some degree, the issue of unpaid debt in the background. That was an insoluble dilemma. Bazant's study of the foreign debt creates an adequate explanation of the economics of political instability. The chaotic state of finances throughout the remainder of the century, tempered only by Díaz's rapidly rising foreign

debt and solvency, is handled in the remainder of Bazant's section on the nineteenth century.

The third book that reflects upon political instability in the early republic is also by Bazant. The first chapter of *Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico* (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1971) exposes another corollary for that period. A penurious government, juxtaposed to a wealthy Church, made the Church the inevitable target of finance ministers, liberal or conservative. Yet whenever those ministers tried to use Church wealth, they provoked opposition that was sometimes able to overthrow the government. Information leading to the same argument is laid out in Michael Costeloe's *Church Wealth in Mexico*.

The phenomenon of *caudillismo* and *caciquismo* has recently received considerable study. Moisés González Navarro, in *La Confederación Nacional Campesina* (México: Costa Amic, 1968), argues that a difference exists between caudillos and caciques in their mentality (caudillos—urban; caciques—rural), the scope of their projection (national/regional), their attitudes toward society (social change/status quo), the content of their goals (program/factional aggrandizement), and their transitional status (from charismatic to legal domination/from charismatic to traditional domination). González Navarro applies these characteristics to Mexico's revolutionary figures (caudillos—Madero, Carranza, Obregón; caciques—Villa, Zapata, etc.). Now Fernando Díaz Díaz revives the process in *Caudillos y caciques* (México: Colegio de México, 1972) for the early republic. Accepting some of the categories of González Navarro, Díaz Díaz adds others from Max Weber, which he applies to both prototypes, caudillos and caciques. The domination of a determined social group by political opportunism, charisma, economic advantage, etc.; the continuance of such domination by patronage, exclusion, or co-option of potential rivals; the erection of a "banner" or party; use of such domination for personal gain—these and other norms are common to both caudillos and caciques, according to Díaz Díaz. Not utilized are the factors that François Chevalier, in *Caudillos et Caciques en Amérique. Contribution à l'étude des Liens personnels. Extrait de Mélangers offerts à Marcel Bataillon par les Hispanistes Français* (Bordeaux: Férét et Fils, n.d.), used to explain the appearance of those prototypes—the power vacuum, the absence of recognized institutions, force, etc.

This ongoing discussion has not been without interest, but Díaz Díaz contributes nothing to our theoretical and sociological understanding. After applying all his criteria to the case studies of Antonio López de Santa Anna and Juan Álvarez, the only major difference he establishes is that the former maintained a national scope and the latter a regional scope. (His assertion that Santa Anna had an urban mentality and Álvarez a rural mentality is never developed as a convincing argument). Nevertheless, this single difference satisfies him that Santa Anna was a caudillo and Álvarez a cacique.

The distinction Díaz Díaz makes between caciques and caudillos is ephemeral and runs counter to Mexican historical uses of the terms. Díaz Díaz claims that historical usage implies that caudillos are "good" and caciques "bad." This

is inexact. Historical usage in Mexico has it that both caciques and caudillos dominated regions, more or less completely, by means of personal and factional power and for a significant period of time. Some had national interests and others not. Some added political titles to their domination. All of them had sufficient control to defy law and national policy in their regions and differed only in the size of their sway: caciques dominated smaller areas, a pueblo or group of pueblos, and caudillos dominated a number of caciques. Both prototypes emerged from the same social milieu and caciques acquired caudillo power when they subordinated other caciques to their will. This is the sense of nineteenth-century historical works and documents against which the categories of Díaz Díaz are unimportant innovations.

Díaz's study, nevertheless, is important for other reasons. He does demonstrate the charisma of the two figures whom he handles, and identifies their "clientele" and source of economic power. He presents evidence that neither had a meaningful social program nor a consistent (Santa Anna) or well-defined (Álvarez) political ideology. In every step of the careers of both men the primary motive was, according to the author, personal aggrandizement. Although Díaz Díaz denies that he is writing biography, the work is one of the best among those on Santa Anna and the best of few on Juan Álvarez. (Mention should be made here of one of the finest state histories to appear in recent years, *Historia del estado de guerrero* [México: Porrúa, 1968] by Moisés Ochoa Campo. Juan Álvarez dominated that state for thirty years). Finally, Díaz has handled well a large bibliography and an enormous quantity of documents, has made sagacious judgements on a score of important issues, and has maintained an impeccable posture of neutrality, unusual for studies of that period.

Moisés González Navarro's "Venganza del Sur" (*Historia Mexicana* 21:4 [No. 84, 1972]:677–92) serves as a counterpoise to Díaz Díaz's appraisal of Álvarez as a self-aggrandizing cacique who became a rich *hacendado* while the southern villagers gained nothing. González Navarro offers considerable evidence that Juan Álvarez was a loyal advocate of the villagers' aspiration for land. Although under Álvarez's leadership they won the insurrection of Ayutla, the reason for the villagers' failure, according to the author, was that the opposition to Santa Anna in 1854–55 was an alliance of the middle class (Juárez) and the villagers (Álvarez), and that the liberal middle-class *ley lerdo* weakened the communities by subdividing their lands, which operated in favor of the hacendados. That conclusion is widely accepted, obvious, and not new, although it should be stated more frequently in the English literature, where liberalism has reigned with less challenge. Taken in conjunction with Díaz Díaz, this article shows the need for a first-rate study of Juan Álvarez, who was apparently a far more complex figure than the literature yet indicates. It will take a mature historian to portray the social reformer, opportunistic caudillo, hacendado, and ally of the liberals, elements that were apparently combined in the "Pantera del Sur." Perhaps the most important aspect of the article is yet more evidence that the indigenous campesinos and villagers were struggling for social justice throughout the early republic, as they had during the colony and have from the reform to the

present—only pacified where during the revolution they obtained their traditional land.

If Díaz's cacique-hacendado Álvarez is balanced by González Navarro's portrait, the former's incompetent Santa Anna ("he was not a statesman, or general or administrator") is offset in José C. Valadés' *Orígenes de la república mexicana, la aurora constitucional* (México: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, 1972). Valadés had given Santa Anna a good press in *Santa Anna y la guerra de Tejas* (México: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, 1965), in which the general emerged as a true patriot rather than a failure and traitor. *Orígenes* is of much grander scope, from 1821 to 1854, including chapters on agriculture, commerce, communications, industry, mining, public finance, intellectual life, customs, urban and rural life, education, etc. This history of the early republic, written in Valadés' exacting and meticulous manner, suffers in the major explanatory interpretation of instability—the lack of political experience rather than the basic economic malaise—and in some respects is a life-and-times presentation for a restored Santa Anna.

Michael Costeloe's *La Primera República Federal de México (1824–1835)* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1975) is a treatment of political developments in the first decade after Iturbide's abortive empire. The volume is important in that it is the only modern attempt at synthesis for that neglected period. Yet the book stands as an example of an older methodology that has been abandoned by most modern historians. The volume suffers from an attempt to treat political issues in a vacuum. The categories of analysis also ignore much of the best modern work in the period. Brading, Ladd, and Macías, among others, have articulately demonstrated the barren nature of the Creole-Peninsular dichotomy. Yet Costeloe persists in that line of thought, even to the point of inverting causation and accounting for political behavior because of racial origins, as in the case of Guadalupe Victoria or Nicolás Bravo (p. 24). Frequently the categories are too formal. The evolution from (a) the Creole-Peninsular struggle to (b) the battles between the *yorkinos* and the *escoceses* and (c) the liberal-conservative struggle is too pat and flows from adopting exclusively political explanations. Or again, his treatment of Antonio López de Santa Anna is inadequate. Costeloe is certainly correct in his criticism of the man for his vanity, his inconsistencies, his greed for power, but those factors scarcely account for his persistent ability to dominate the political arena. Still the student of the period will rely upon Costeloe's study since so little else has been done.

Literature on the working classes in the nineteenth century includes Torcuato S. di Tella's "The Dangerous Classes in Early Nineteenth-Century Mexico" (*Journal of Latin American Studies* 5:1[May 1973]:79–105), which differentiates among various kinds of obligations that were incumbent upon village population. The *república*, the *cofradías*, and the tribute still existed in many areas. He estimates from his study of the *bajío* that most peons still had to work for a hacendado one week each four months. Di Tella differentiates between *jornaleros*, *labradores*, *comerciantes*, *artesanos*, and *fabricantes*. The article can well be read in conjunction with two by Jan Bazant for the subtle differences in the organization

of labor: "Peones, arrendatarios, y aparceros en México: 1851–1853" (*Historia Mexicana* 23:2[No. 90, 1973]:330–57) and "Peones, arrendatarios, y aparceros, 1868–1904" (*Historia Mexicana* 24:1[No. 93, 1974]:94–121). Di Tella's estimate that the middle and upper classes constituted 20 percent of the population is surprisingly high, apparently accounted for by the lack of an adequate definition of class. Lastly, he includes a revealing and valuable case study of the social stratification in Querétaro in 1844.

Another source on the socioeconomic conditions of the lower classes is *Indios de México y viajeros extranjeros, siglo XIX* (México: SepSetentas, 1973) by Brigitte B. de Lameiras. This is a useful study of the well- and lesser-known travel accounts primarily from the early republic. An initial section deals with such well-known accounts as Alejandro de Humboldt, Joel R. Poinsett, and John L. Stephens. Lesser-known travelers include such individuals as Eduard Mühlhelfordt, whom Lameiras compares favorably with Humboldt, and others. The great value of the work is the understanding that one gains of the *vida cotidiana* of the Indian population in the nineteenth century. Of course Lameiras is aware of the macro-pressures that abounded in the nineteenth century. She uses the texts carefully, and such descriptions as that of the daily trade between Chalco and the City of Mexico make the volume a unique source of ethno-history in the period of the early republic.

Between December 1835 and April 1836, a Russian diplomat was touring Mexico and making valuable ethnographic observations and descriptions of Mexican life and customs in every social class. His manuscripts were published as private letters (like those of Mme. Calderón de la Barca a few years later), first in a Saint Petersburg newspaper, then in book form, also in Russian. Now the travel accounts of Ferdinand Petrovich Wrangel appear in Spanish as *De Sitka a San Petersburgo a través de México* (México: SepSetentas, 1974), translated and with a prologue by Luis Pintos Mimó. Wrangel's observations about the bureaucracy, the clergy, the military, and the press are pungent and scathing; they were the causes, he believed, of Mexican backwardness. In contrast, he found the lower class gentle, generous, exploited, and "easily governable." His opinion of Santa Anna was frankly hostile: "An unscrupulous dictator, a dishonest and boastful man, lustful for money and power." This book is interesting and instructive.

The Moisés González Navarro et al. *Instituciones indígenas en México independiente, Memorias del Instituto Nacional Indigenista*, vol. 4 (México: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1954) is still unsurpassed for a study of the legal mechanisms unleashed against the rural population at both the national and state level. Reading the Lameiras study and the observations of Wrangel side by side with the revelations of González Navarro, one may conclude that the Indian population gained nothing by Mexican independence.

Several other episodes, personalities, and issues from the early republic are examined in the recent political literature. *La invasión española de 1829* (México: Jus, 1971) is narrated by Miguel A. Sánchez Lamego. Jaime F. Rodríguez O. explores the "Oposición a Bustamante" (*Historia Mexicana* 20:2[No. 78, 1970]:199–234). The principal opposition figures to the centralist government of Anastacio

Bustamante were Crescencio Rejón, Vicente Rocafuerte, and Andrés Quintana Roo. *Valentín Gómez Farías* (México: Cámara de Diputados, 1974) is briefly sketched by Daniel Muñoz y Pérez. Ernesto de la Torre Villar's "Dos historiadores de Durango" (*Historia Mexicana* 24:3[No. 95, 1975]:403–41) presents a beautiful pair of essays about two lucid historians. One, José Fernando Ramírez, was a conscientious public servant and acquaintance of virtually every major figure in Mexico from the 1830s until his exile in 1867. Ramírez left vivid and sad commentaries on every phase of public life, which are amply cited. According to the author, Ramírez was also an intellectual, bibliophile, collector, archivist, archeologist, and historian of the first order. Unfortunately the author did not choose to indicate his sources or to cite from which of Ramírez's works he was quoting.

Few Mexicans have studied episodes of United States history, even when intimately linked to Mexican history. Josefina Vásquez, in "El congreso de los Estados Unidos antes de la guerra del 47" (*Estremos de México* [México: Colegio de México, 1971]), selects two senators—the Whig John M. Clayton and the Democrat John C. Calhoun—to explain and document their opposition to the war with Mexico. Miguel González Avelar's *México en el umbral de la Reforma* (México: Federación Editorial Mexicana, 1971) sketches a top-down history of Mexico from 1848 to 1853, the governments of José Joaquín Herrera and Mariano Arista. Fully half of this short book of 81 pages contains pre-1848 biographical information about the two protagonists. This wholly political narrative, written completely from official documents and secondary sources, is inferior to Thomas E. Cotner's *The Military and Political Career of José Joaquín Herrera, 1792–1854* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969). Longer in scope and greatly superior in quality is Antonio Fernández del Castillo's *Los mártires de Tacubaya y otros temas* (México: Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1974). Also a short (95 pages) top-down narrative from published sources, the book is nevertheless a good history—well written with sagacious judgements.

Carlos J. Sierra and Rogelio Martínez Vera's *El papel sellado y la ley del timbre* (México: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 1972) is a history of the stamp tax and the change implicit in the law when *papel sellado* evolved to *timbre* in the fiscal system of Mexico. The volume is essentially a narrative, institutional account from the point of view of a functionary within the ministry of finance. It is nevertheless a useful source for financial history. Dorothy T. Estrada's "Las escuelas lancasterianas en la ciudad de México: 1822–1842" (*Historia Mexicana* 22:4[No. 88, 1973]:494–513) offers us more detail about a movement we have long acknowledged. Without making judgements about the quality or social justice of the education within the Lancaster Schools, Estrada describes the methods, content, prizes, and punishments of the system within the city of Mexico. By way of charts the reader is given the number of schools and pupils and the social and economic background of their families. The poverty of both pupils and professors is made evident, but no attempt is made to judge the importance of the system for society at large. The author's major source was the Archivo del ex-Ayuntamiento de México, the multivolume *Instrucción pública en general*.

Robert W. Randall's *Real del Monte. A British Mining Venture in Mexico*

(Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1972) is a study of the famous mine owned by the British Company of Adventurers from the purchase of the mine in 1824 to the failure and dissolution of the firm in 1849. Randall estimates that the mine lost 5,079,283 dollars in the period on an initial investment of 979,864 pounds. In his view, the failure of the venture was due to the distance between the home office and the mine, the lack of discretionary authority on the part of the managers, the error in trying to tap a deep Vizcaina vein, the lack of innovation to cope with unique problems, labor problems, and difficulties in supply. Randall discounts political turbulence as a cause of the failure. That conclusion parallels the finding of Stephen R. Niblo in "The United States-Mexican Claims Commission of 1868" (*New Mexico Historical Review* 50:2[1975]:101–22). In that article the author traces a major case of fraud, allegedly stemming from the failure of a mine in Durango, through the international claims courts from 1876 to 1900. In both cases international firms tended to blame their failures on Mexican instability rather than internal mismanagement.

III

In 1904 Francisco Bulnes published his diatribe against Benito Juárez, accusing him of opportunism, indecision, bad faith, conservatism, cowardliness, authoritarianism, and treason. There were at least ten answering biographies of Juárez, the most famous by Justo Sierra. Over the years since then the most complete biography has been that of Ralph Roeder, still appearing in new Spanish editions. It falls between eulogy and condemnation, but also between scholarship and popularization—without satisfying either. Now a new biography appears in Spanish from a North American author, Ivie E. Cadenhead, Jr.'s *Benito Juárez y su época* (México: El Colegio de México, 1975), which has the grace of being brief and still citing sources, two virtues lacking in Roeder. The best literature on Juárez by a Mexican is, in our opinion, José Fuentes Mares' trilogy of the 1960s, *Juárez y la intervención*, *Juárez y el imperio*, and *Juárez y la república* (México: Editorial Jus, 1962, 1962, 1965). As revisionary literature, it is critical, cynical, humorous, and entertaining. Fuentes Mares is the new Bulnes, followed by a new raft of eulogists.

The recent literature on the reform is cluttered with scores and maybe hundreds of eulogistic and idolatrous biographies and essays about Juárez, due to the centennial anniversary of his death and the officially decreed "Year of Juárez" in 1972. No one will ever read all of it, except, perhaps, some diligent future biographer, and he will be sorely disappointed. A sampling is here mentioned, with the hope that these reviewers have missed the best of it. *Juárez el rebelde* (México: Grupo Editorial México, 1970), by Carlos Adrián Escamilla Gómez, is dedicated to Mexican youth, written from less than two pages of bibliography and ending in 1867, followed by a "lessons of history" section in which "Juárez is the presence of eternal Mexico." Pedro Daniel Martínez's "La salud mental de Benito Juárez" (*Cuadernos Americanos* 31:4[1972]):55–67) is a psychological study in which Juárez emerges as "a prototype of maturity [and] an ideal, fully-developed personality." The very long *Psicología de Juárez, el complejo y el*

mito, el alma mágica by Mateo Solana y Gutiérrez (México: B. Costa Amic Editor, 1968) is reviewed in the *Handbook of Latin American Studies* as an "attempt at psycho-history which exemplifies all of the methodology's pitfalls." Rafael Avalos Ficcacci, in *Juárez, México y el mundo* (México: Productora e Importadora de Papel, 1972), has collected from annals some international reactions to Juárez. His activities in different regions of Mexico are chronicled by José Melgarejo Vivanco, *Juárez en Veracruz* (Jalapa: Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, 1972); Jorge Pedraza, *Juárez en Monterrey* (Monterrey, 1970, 1972); Fortino López R., *Juárez en Guanajuato* (Guanajuato: Gobierno del Estado, 1972); *Juárez en Jalisco* (Guadalajara: Gobierno del Estado, 1972); Jesús Rodríguez Frausto, *La huella de Juárez en Guanajuato* (Guanajuato: Universidad de Guanajuato, 1972); and perhaps the best, Jorge L. Tamayo, *Juárez en Chihuahua* (México: Libros de México, 1970).

Tamayo may be the most knowledgeable historian of Juárez in our day. An extraordinary contribution is his recently completed sixteen-volume edited compilation of Juárez documents from the Archivo Juárez in the Biblioteca Nacional de México: *Documentos, discursos y correspondencia de Benito Juárez* (México: Secretaría del Patrimonio Nacional, 1964–72). The introductory essays to each section of the documents probably constitute 8 to 10 percent of the work. The essays are useful because the documents are grouped by subject; the value of the documents, however, does not entirely emerge from the essays. The serious investigator must be placed on warning that documents that damage the stature of Juárez as the great republican have not been included. Indeed, the researcher who insists upon using the originals will discover that someone, presumably Pedro Santacilia or his descendants, already edited some of the Archivo Juárez, as the scissored documents bear witness. What percent of Juárez's correspondence remains to us cannot be known—but there is much of it. Juárez was, after all, a working politician who had to fight continuously in the political arena. That he survived almost fourteen years in the presidency, following thirty-four years in which there were more presidents than years, is a tribute to his political skills, which were sometimes ruthless, frequently extraconstitutional, and even unconstitutional. This will not be detected in the Tamayo essays. The political history of those incredibly difficult years can, nevertheless, be pieced together by these letters and documents as from no other single source. Indeed, all previous accounts of Mexican political history during the reform are now obsolete.

For the Juárez student who recoils from the monumental task of reading the full collection, Tamayo has edited it to single-volume proportions in *Epistolario de Benito Juárez* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económico, 1957, 1972). The second edition is larger and more complete but omits much that was also good in the earlier edition. These and Tamayo's *Antología de Benito Juárez*, (México: UNAM, 1972) can well replace all the biographies now in print for the depth of understanding of both the man and his times. The stony, enigmatic, and inscrutable Juárez of earlier authors, the silent, impenetrable and immutable Juárez, fades before a more realistic, developing, and complex figure who knew his country and his countrymen as no other in the nineteenth century.

Some interesting insights about the reform president appear amid the ten

essays in *Voces sobre Juárez* (México: Procurador General, 1972). The thesis of "La vigencia de Juárez en la Constitución de 1917" by Manuel Ramírez Reyes is that the Laws of the Reform of 1858–60, later incorporated into the Constitution of 1857 by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, continue to the present day by way of the Constitution of 1917 in articles 3, 5, 13, 24, and 130. That thesis is not as important as the incidental view of the lawyer-author that Juárez learned the legal profession under the law of 1824 and therefore opposed the Constitution of 1836, which would have made his professional training obsolete. The issue cannot be overly simplified, but that essentially personal and conservative stance helps to explain his opposition to Santa Anna. To be sure, it is not the author's conclusion that the famous feud between Juárez and Santa Anna, which continued with consequential results for Mexico for thirty years, arose from a lawyer's regard for his profession; but it might be as important as the author's judgement that the feud was "personalism vs. the law." Ramírez Reyes' contention that the "Revolution" of Ayutla was "popular," however, is ludicrous, as everyone knows who has read the Plan of Ayutla or who knows the very personal issues at stake between Santa Anna and Juan Álvarez—as Díaz Díaz explains in *Caudillos y caciques*.

In the same book, *Voces sobre Juárez*, in "Benito Juárez y Melchor Ocampo: dos liberalismos," Raúl Arreola Cortés refutes Justo Sierra's contention that Juárez only became a leader of liberalism after his tutorship by Melchor Ocampo in their New Orleans exile. The contention is that the men represented two kinds of liberalism, one that rejected the Spanish traditional heritage (the *purismo* of Melchor Ocampo) and the other that would modify the European import to the Mexican reality (the *moderismo* of Juárez). As governor of Oaxaca, Juárez enlisted the aid of the clergy for ends sought by liberals, while as the governor of Michoacán, Ocampo fought with the clergy. As ministers in the two-month government of Juan Álvarez, Ocampo resigned in fifteen days after describing the position of liberals and conservatives and asking, "What are these people called *moderados*?" Juárez did not resign and pushed through the decree sought by all liberals and known as Ley Juárez. Again, Ocampo would not serve President Comonfort; Juárez did, and emerged as president from his position on the Supreme Court. He then named Ocampo to his cabinet where they "marched together" toward the Laws of the Reform sought by all liberals. The two liberalisms, according to the author, implied the same ends but utilized different means. One wonders, however, had Ocampo not been shot in 1861, if he could have marched with Juárez as the latter replaced liberalism with nationalism during the French intervention and with executive centralism during the restored republic. One imagines he would have supported González Ortega in 1865 and José María Iglesias in 1876, as did Guillermo Prieto.

New works on the empire include the important historiographic essays on nine aspects of the subject by Martín Quirarte, *Historiografía sobre el imperio de Maximiliano* (México: UNAM, 1970). The Indian conservative general who died on the Hill of Bells with Maximilian finally is chronicled by Fernando Díaz Ramírez in *La vida heroica del general Thomas Mejía* (México: Editorial Jus, 1970). This is a pro-Catholic work in which the reform is seen as essentially antireli-

gious, which is bad history, and the wars of the period as fought on both sides by patriots of different views, which is good history. The thesis is that Mejía was a capable, religious soldier, loyal to the Church and to the principle of authority. The liberals come under yet another attack by José Fuentes Mares in *Miramón, el hombre* (México: Contrapuntos, 1974), which leaves only Leonardo Márquez of the "Four M's" to find a sympathetic biographer. The speeches of the French anti-imperialist legislators are collected and published by Manuel Tello in *Voces favorables a México en el cuerpo legislativo de Francia, 1862–1867* (2 vols., México: Senado de la República, 1967).

A curious idea has been abroad in the literature since the reform itself that Juárez and then Lerdo de Tejada were involved in a power struggle with congress. The contention is that the Constitutional Convention of 1856–57, in reaction to the dictatorship of Santa Anna, established a "parliamentary" system so restrictive of executive power that an executive-congressional struggle commenced and continued into the porfiriato, when the issue was settled in favor of the executive. The argument appears in Justo Sierra, Francisco Cosmes, Ricardo García Granados, Emilio Rabasa and, in our times, in Daniel Cosío Villegas (*Historia moderna de México, la república restaurada, la vida política* [México: Hermes, 1956]), and is picked up by other authors to be made an issue almost as serious as the centralist-federalist struggle of the early republic.

José María Calderón's *Génesis del presidencialismo en México* (México: El Callito, 1972) only dedicates a few pages to the reform period, but accepts the argument completely and uses it to sustain his thesis of the later executive-centralism of the twentieth century, which is his major subject. It is not surprising that his only source for the reform is Emilio Rabasa. Martín Quirarte, in *Relaciones entre Juárez y el congreso* (México: Cámara de Diputados, 1973), makes the struggle his central subject, and Juan Felipe Leal, in "El estado y el bloque en el poder en México, 1867–1914" (*Historia Mexicana* 23:4[No. 92, 1974]:700–21), also uses the argument. The conflict between congress and the presidents during the restored republic, according to Leal, existed because "Congress represented the interests of regional and local oligarchy" whose interests were speculation, contraband, and commercial monopolies that would have been adversely affected by the growth of the nation state. That conflict resulted in the loss of power of the states, the legislature, the courts, and the people.

Laurens Perry's "El modelo liberal y la política práctica en la República Restaurada" (*Historia Mexicana* 23:4[No. 92, 1974]:649–99) modifies the argument. A "parliamentary" party did exist in congress (Zamacona, Mata, Montes, etc.) as Frank Knapp pointed out in "Parliamentary Government and the Mexican Constitution of 1857, A Forgotten Phase of Mexican Political History" (*HAHR* 33[1953]:65–87), but the major power struggle in the restored republic was between the liberal president and the caudillo governors who had been the victors of the republican resistance to the second empire. Frequently the congressmen were appointees of the caudillo governors precisely because governors could control elections through the *jefes políticos*. Such congressmen voted to protect regionalism, which implied a monopoly of opportunity for elite factions in every part of the nation. That, in turn, spawned local civil wars that threatened the

general peace. It became the mutual interest of both the local caudillo governors and the national president to support each other. Juárez commenced a campaign, not to ensure republicanism in the states but to ally caudillos to his personal party, and sought not to destroy caudillismo per se but to replace independent caudillos with party loyalists. This, not the conflict between congress and the presidents, caused loss of power to the states, the legislature, courts, and people, because local monopolistic elites in support of factional governors allied with the president against their local rivals for the political continuity that secured their elitism and assured the presidential continuity for Benito Juárez until his death.

Juárez had strong opposition in the fourth, fifth, and sixth congresses, not principally because congress as a whole was jealous of its prerogatives, but because it was a hotbed of representation of local regimes that were being overridden by executive centralism in tandem with caudillo governors. Even at that, however, from 1867 to his death in 1872, Juárez controlled a growing majority of party loyalists in congress, selected by party governors. Congress repeatedly gave him extraordinary powers in finance and war, authorized his setting aside the individual constitutional guarantees, and sanctioned his use of federal troops in state politics. This was the political reality that emerges so clearly from Tamayo's selection of documents and not from his essays.

An excellent essay to come from the "Year of Juárez" is that of Luis González, "Era de Juárez" in *La economía mexicana en la época de Juárez* (México: Secretaria de Industria y Comercio, 1972). This is the introductory essay to a good book that includes some of Mexico's outstanding historians (Enrique Florescano, Romeo Flores Caballero, Jan Bazant, etc.). The scope of this very human essay—alternately humorous, nostalgic, informative, and bitter—is the whole of Mexican society from 1850 to 1876. It describes Mexico in 1850, identifies the conservative and liberal world views, narrates the Three Years' War and the Maximilian empire, and analyzes the restored republic. The Three Years' War, according to González, was an international struggle in which "the North Americans became the god-fathers of the liberals and some European monarchs acted as god-mothers to the conservatives." Maximilian emerges kindly, inept, and too liberal for his supporters. Mexico in the restored republic needed peace, according to González, "a peace for which Juárez sacrificed some of his warmest collaborators, and some of the goals of the liberal order." It is good to see this argument in Spanish, although it is not worked out.

Liberalism had nothing more to offer as a theory of economic development than making private investments safe and profitable. Luis González notes that for all the liberal efforts the economy did not improve, "among other causes because it was believed that the Reform ought to start with the spirit, and end in the enjoyment of riches, mother of happiness." On the disentanglement of Church wealth, González concedes that it did not lead to grand changes in land tenure, but did "in some measure fortify the middle class, who supported the liberal leaders, and it did debilitate the clergy, the majority sector of the conservatives." On land tenure, González notes that nothing was done to abate the growth of latifundia, and the process of breaking up the communal lands was fraught with abuses to the loss of the "little fishes." Indeed, the lower classes gained nothing

from the reform but token triumphs. "All in all," says the author, "the life of the poor was hardly modified, and not always in his own benefit." González is not certain why that was so: "Whether because occupied in other more urgent problems the liberal leaders dedicated little time to the submerged majority; whether because a liberal regime has nothing to offer the underdogs; whether because of the traditional structure of Mexican society . . . the important thing to understand is the good intentions that prevailed, or almost."

González proposes that the liberal revolution sought to change economic, political, social, and cultural patterns. The reform was a minor success in economics, politics, and society; it was a major success in letters and arts. When Juárez died, in 1872, however, "Mexico had not found a way out of traditional agriculture, cottage industry, insecure commerce, peonage, sweatshops, crime, fraud, epidemics, elites, *latifundia*, social antagonisms, political discord, autocracy, the abuse of authority, banditry, *caciquismo*, *caudillismo* and other corrupting vices that grew side by side with a good literature." A bitter diatribe against the abject failure of the liberal reform would have been unseemly for this publication; perhaps the homely and always good-natured pen of Luis González was the best approach. If someone wishes to present in translation a series of essays to cover all the periods of Mexican history, this one should be considered for the reform.

In the same volume is Enrique Florescano and María del Rosario Lanza-gorta's "Política economía, antecedentes y consecuencias" (pp. 57–102). After a thoughtful essay on the colony, they set their discussion of the reform against two important observations about the early republic. They argue that its two most notable characteristics were the increasing importance of the rural areas and the growth of regional economies. The men of the reform accepted an ideology that worked against both of those tendencies. They supported industry but were not able to bring about its growth. In a study that draws upon the work of Dominico Sindico for Nuevo León (*Ensayo sobre problemas agrícolas en Nuevo León, 1820–1906* [cuadernos de trabajo del Departamento de Investigaciones Históricas, INAH, 1975]), they observe that the growth of a textile industry in the North had a highly disadvantageous impact upon the textile industry in Tlaxcala, Puebla, and Veracruz. The article also discusses the importance of Matías Romero and the railroad issue. In the view of Florescano and Lanzagorta the beneficiaries of the liberal reform were the latifundistas who shared in the corporate land and the merchants and commercial interests who benefited from the return to importance of the City of Mexico.

Romeo Flores Caballero's "Etapas del desarrollo industrial" in the same volume (pp. 103–25) reviews early projects of an industrial nature such as Proyecto Godoy of 1827, the Banco de Avío, and the 1842 Dirección General de la Industria Nacional. Indeed the momentum was emerging in favor of state-sponsored projects of development. Since Flores Caballero follows the work of Francisco Calderón and Francisco López Cámara and agrees that the level of industry remained static in Mexico from 1854 to 1876, he only concentrates upon counting those factories, discussing the lack of direction in industrial policy of the government, and citing individual lamentations of the situation—Matías Ro-

mero is a case in point. Flores Caballero does demonstrate that liberal thinking on the subject of free trade was not consistent. Some liberals like Francisco Zarco called for an implementation of free trade, whereas other liberals like Manuel Payno suggested a realistic compromise with the existing tariffs. Flores Caballero, true to the spirit of the "Year of Juárez," nonetheless concludes that Juárez laid the base for future industrial development, a position that he does not substantiate.

For a descriptive, secondary account of the various legal changes governing foreign trade in the reform period, see Inés Herrera Canales' "Comercio exterior," also in *La economía mexicana en la época de Juárez* (pp. 128–158). She also concludes that little change took place in the composition of trade in the reform period. From 1821 to 1872, Mexico remained an exporter of primary products and an importer of manufactured goods; luxury goods were the chief article of importation. Tariffs taxed those who consumed European products but also reduced possible funds for investment. Not until 1872 did the battle over free trade begin to move in the direction of the free-traders, and even then not for long. An unhealthy cycle continued in which taxation on luxury goods provided the governmental revenues of the era. That financial dependency must have contributed to the liberal deaf-ear to the workers and peasants in the reform period.

Romeo Flores Caballero's article "Comercio interior" (pp. 160–85) is a similar summary of internal trade in the period. The most interesting section is the treatment of the Juárez government's road building policy and the suppression of *peaje*. When Flores Caballero's article is juxtaposed to John Gresham Chapman's *La construcción del ferrocarril mexicano, 1837–1880* (México: SepSetentas, 1975), one finds the kind of project to which the liberal reform most ably addressed itself: governmental intervention in the economy for the development of infrastructure.

Jan Bazant's *Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico* is a major study of the alienation of Church lands by the men of the reform. Bazant disagrees that the reform marked the change from feudal to capitalistic agriculture in Mexico. He denies that the Church-owned land was typical of autarchic, inward-looking agriculture. He views the economic functioning of the haciendas as quite similar whether they were owned by the Church or by laymen. It is not certain that purchases of urbanized property set off a cycle of capital accumulation. Since many buyers of the Church property were merchants, their capital was buried in the land they bought. The economic impact may have therefore been negative. "In general the buyers did not become industrialists," and in the textile industry Mexican owners in several cases sold their factories to Frenchmen in order to purchase the estates. Thus a dependency model emerges in this instance. Bazant, too, sees the origins of the porfiriato in the reform: "the Mexican Reform facilitated the penetration of industrial capitalism and thus led to the growth of the economy during the Díaz era." The buyers of the Church lands adapted themselves to the life style and social attitudes of the landed elite rather than imposing commercial attitudes upon rural areas. The reform in practice made a parody of the liberal ideals of creating a large base of small landowners.

Other notable aspects of Bazant's study include the idea that perhaps Church wealth was universally overestimated, especially by liberals. Bazant disagrees with José María Luis Mora's frequently quoted estimate of the total value of Church wealth at 180,000,000 pesos in 1832 and criticizes Mora's methodology on several grounds. Mora capitalized income flows, in the case of tithes, dues, alms, etc. Since those funds were not the product of capital, they scarcely represented income on capital. Moreover, Bazant charges that Mora failed to take into account the losses in capital the Church had suffered since 1804. Finally, Bazant faults Mora for including in his calculation the value of Church buildings, jewels, works of art, etc. After adjusting to these objections Bazant argues that the appropriate figure of productive Church wealth was roughly 50,000,000 pesos, although the value of unproductive assets doubled that figure.

Robert J. Knowlton's *Church Property and the Mexican Reform, 1856–1910* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976) is best read in conjunction with Bazant's study. Whereas Bazant examines the economic aspects of the alienation of Church land at considerable depth in a limited number of states, Knowlton looks at the political-judicial aspects of the reform at the national level. As such the two volumes complement each other. Interestingly, both authors have a negative view of the impact of the land seizures. Both share the perspective that the reform created a windfall for the landowning elite rather than establishing the base for a nation of small farmers. Knowlton's volume certainly does trace the vicissitudes of the land laws. The political and legal aspects of that reform are now far clearer. Perhaps the single most obvious gap in Knowlton's volume is the lack of any attempt to identify the recipients of the alienated Church lands. An estimation of that would have left the reader more satisfied. Still, it is unfair to fault an author for not having written a different book. The two volumes are indeed important literature for the period.

The fatal flaw in the liberal program was the agrarian problem. As Florescano and Lanzagorta state in their article, the liberal view toward "principles of political and individual liberty were only applicable to the society that they represented, not to the world of Indians." T. G. Powell's excellent study *El liberalismo y el campesinado en el centro de México* (México: SepSetentas, 1974) develops the point at length. His thesis is that "Mexican liberals demonstrated little understanding of the peasant and that by means of pursuing a policy that disorganized the traditional life of the Indian communities, accentuated the alienation and misery of the group that was the ethnic majority in the country." Powell substantiates his case by studying numerous villages in the center of Mexico. He stresses the continuous effort by merchants and governmental functionaries to control local communities. Powell develops a number of good case studies. In one he is able to demonstrate that it cost between ten to twenty days labor to bury a child. Rather than become involved in a theoretical study of the European roots of the phenomenon, Powell views liberalism as the manifestation of self-interest in the commercial and landowning classes. Some individuals, he concedes, empathized with the peasantry: Juan Álvarez, Ignacio Ramírez, Blas Balcárcel, José María Castillo Velasco, Ponciano Arriaga, and Isidro Olvera.

Not only were those individuals in the liberal minority, their position did not prevail.

Most liberals in power not only ignored the plight of the poor, they even aggravated their problems. Liberals assumed that if patterns of fee-simple land tenure came to the countryside, progress would follow. Some of the liberal propensity to alienate corporate lands might have been based upon something more immediate than theoretical exposition. Powell documents the fact that such famous reformers as Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, José María Iglesias, Francisco M. Olaguíbel, José María del Río, Juan A. de la Fuente, Manuel Payno, Ignacio Mejía, and Benito Juárez purchased alienated lands. In Powell's view the mixture of self-interest and class ideology made the peasants of Mexico worse off in 1867 than they were in 1855.

In an excellent article, "La política de desamortización en las comunidades indígenas, 1856–1872" (*Historia Mexicana* 21:4[No. 84, 1972]:615–52), Donald J. Frazier argues for continuity with regard to the land policy of the restored republic and the porfiriato. Frazier adduces massive evidence to show that liberal thinking opposed the custom that villages should control land in their traditional manner. He takes issue with PRI theorist Jesús Reyes Heróles that the liberal policy on land tenure failed. Frazier does not view the deterioration of the villages' position as peripheral, but rather as central to the liberal thrust in the reform period. Nothing went wrong, in Frazier's view, with the agrarian policy: in fact the liberals succeeded magnificently in bringing the institution of private property to the land, a success that reflected their espoused beliefs.

One of the most important new books on the agrarian problem is Jan Bazant's *Cinco haciendas mexicanas*, subtitled *tres siglos de vida rural en San Luis Potosí, 1600–1910* (México: El Colegio de México, 1975). Bazant traces the economic and social development of five haciendas in the state of San Luis Potosí from their foundation in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to their expropriation and distribution in the twentieth century. The major emphasis is the nineteenth century, based upon financial records of the haciendas, judicial records, and a variety of local history sources. Exceptionally important is the continuous span of records for particular haciendas and the checks available to compare developments for generalities, uniqueness, and exceptions.

The history of these five haciendas, and another half dozen mentioned by Bazant, exemplify many of the things we know about hacienda life and organization and a good many other things we did not know. The foundation of the haciendas under study emerges from the history of the pacification, Christianization, and silver exploitation of the region. One continuous theme is the connection between landownership and political office; another, from the beginning to the end of hacienda life, is the conflict between hacendados and Indian villages, between the various religious orders and, once the orders became proprietors, between the orders and the villages. Another theme is the alternation between the expansion and concentration of holdings through marriage and purchase (Bazant mentions a case of *composición* in the early eighteenth century following expansion by encroachment) and the division of holdings among heirs. Examples are given of Indian towns losing land to haciendas, but also of towns

and even *poblados* of peons winning land from haciendas. We see a hacendado, producing wine in the late colony, win his case in court. Since one of the haciendas was owned for a century and a half by Jesuits, we become witness to its expropriation in 1767 and its secularization. None is owned by the Church prior to the nineteenth-century reform. We note that even in the nineteenth century the proprietors were Spaniards—not only Creoles, but even new Peninsulars, who sometimes suffered loss of juridical powers in the early republic to civil authorities but who assumed some civil authority even in the late nineteenth century. We see peasant rebellions, a hacendado who raised a peon army during the war with the United States, an attempt at land reform in the 1820s, another in the 1890s. We see an adherent to the Maximilian empire lose his holdings to the Republicans after 1867, one forced loan during the Mexican-American War, another larger loan levied by the Republicans during the Three Years' War. A sharp rise in the cost of corn in 1876 coupled with the proprietor's attempt to drive peons from his hacienda helps explain how Porfirio Díaz raised an army that year. As Bazant's narrative approaches 1910, we see the coming of the railroad in the 1880s, with its repercussions on crop production and price structure; we watch the price of corn rise three and four hundred percent during the porfiriato while wages remained the same as those of 1852.

Two continuous and surprising trends that emerge from Bazant's descriptions are the constant rate of profits and the continual rise in sale prices of estates through three centuries, even in the nineteenth century, irrespective of political considerations. Sale prices rather uniformly represented purchase price plus new investments, and profits rather uniformly ran about 10 percent of sale price. Apparently the decisive factor here was not inflation in the price of unimproved land, or an increased rate of return to agricultural investment, but rather increased income from rural property which was reflected, in turn, in higher property values. The hacendados under study continually invested in irrigation works, buildings, and constructions for diversification of production, even during the early decades of independence when such investment has been thought not to have occurred. Bazant finds, contrary to common belief, that these haciendas were doing well on the eve of independence, did not lose value in the wars of independence, made profits throughout the period of national stress between 1822 and 1856, and were not guilty of Francisco Bulnes' famous accusation of refusing to invest in or to utilize modern methods of production.

Another important theme that arises from *Cinco haciendas* is the diversification of investments among hacendados, who were primarily businessmen, not rural aristocrats. Some hacendados were military men, some politicians, but business came first for most of them. They were active in commerce and mining and rural industry (e.g., *piloncillo* and *mezcal*); they diversified crops; dealt in silver; mastered animal husbandry; experimented in cotton, sugar, and wine; and invested in urban property—sometimes extensively. The hacendados frequently lived in the capital city of San Luis Potosí, utilizing administrators and overseers, but not to the neglect of their properties. Successful proprietors owned more than one hacienda and managed them closely from city offices as integral parts of their business interests.

One of the most important and disturbing aspects of *Cinco haciendas* is the verification of the abysmal conditions of peonage. Here and in Bazant's two articles ("Peones, arrendatarios y aparceros en México"), the differences between *peones permanentes* (or *acomodados, acasillados*), *peones eventuales* (*temporales, alquilados, jornaleros*) and *arrendatarios* (renters and share croppers) are explained in social and economic terms relative to standard of living, security, and responsibilities. Debt peonage was apparently not widely practiced in San Luis Potosí, if these haciendas were typical. This study makes clear that hacendados tried to keep the debts of workers low, tried various methods of collection, and drove off insolvent workers who had no means of payment. Bazant finds for the late nineteenth century, as Gibson found for the late colony in the Valley of Mexico, that fewer than 30 percent of peons owed debts to the hacienda. Nevertheless, if many of our concepts of nineteenth-century rural Mexico need modification, certainly the revolutionary claim that life was precarious, degrading, and miserable for the greatest part of hacienda peasantry is borne out by *Cinco haciendas*. Lastly, the application of nineteenth-century liberalism held no promise for the peasantry: the case of Hacienda las Bocas shows how the proprietor reorganized the labor force in his own interests within laws promulgated by Benito Juárez in 1871 and adopted by the state of San Luis Potosí, a reorganization greatly prejudicial to the peons.

Precursores de la revolución agraria en México, las obras de Wistano Luis Orozco y Andrés Molina Enríquez (México: SepSetentas, 1975), by James L. Hamon and Stephen R. Niblo, is a study of the level of understanding of the agrarian problem on the eve of the revolution. The chapter that deals with Orozco suggests that his legal study contained a key to explaining the secular alienation of land in the restored republic and the porfiriato. Orozco believed that the *terrenos baldíos* legislation was twisted in 1863 and became the great device for alienating Indian village lands.

The volume also proposes an analysis of the reformer Molina Enríquez based upon his views of race and class (the two unfortunately merge in his thinking), the evils of the hacienda, the role of agrarian reform, and the role of nationalism. The argument is that Orozco had the best understanding of the nature and origin of the latifundia system, and that Molina Enríquez's analysis best provided a solution. His work, however, was so confusing that it had little impact upon his contemporaries. Looking for other figures interested in the agrarian problem, the authors are forced to conclude that many of the contributions of Orozco and Molina Enríquez were lost upon subsequent analysts. A final section of the book suggests that the level of creative thinking with regard to the agrarian problem has not changed a great deal from the late porfiriato to our own day. If the liberal alienation of Church lands did not, as Bazant demonstrates, create numerous new farms but rather added to the land of the haciendas, and if, as Hamon and Niblo argue, the *terrenos baldíos* legislation became a legal mechanism enabling those with access to the law to despoil villages of their traditional lands, then it is understandable why peasant rebellion multiplied.

Moisés González Navarro, in his excellent study of Yucatán *Raza y tierra*,

la guerra de castas y el henequén (México: Colegio de México, 1970) and also in his *Historia moderna de México, el porfiriato, vida social* (México: Editorial Hermes, 1957), breaks considerable ground by placing rural rebellion within the context of changes in land tenure. Rebellions in the period were clearly more numerous than was formerly conceded.

Jean Meyer's *Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias, 1821–1910* (México: SepSetentas, 1973) is a deeply moving collection of information dealing with peasant rebellion. Meyer's work documents the number of uprisings against the condition of life in the campo. He parades before us the words of bourgeois politicians who were profoundly against the patterns of lord and peasant relationships that had emerged in the countryside; but abstract statements in favor of freedom did little when confined to the courts, the press, or the congress. Peasants who time and again arose against latifundistas and politicians with little chance of winning testify to the depths of desperation experienced. Although there are some organizational problems in the book, it stands as a monument to the misery in rural Mexico during the nineteenth century.

John H. Coatsworth's *El impacto económico de los ferrocarriles en el porfiriato* (2 vols., México: SepSetentas, 1976) is an example of the "new economic history." Coatsworth tries to use a quantified methodology in order to answer questions relating to the economic impact of railroad building in Mexico: What was the quantitative impact of the railroad construction on the GNP of Mexico? What importance did the foreign ownership of railroad companies have for the economy? What impact did the railroads have on the distribution of wealth in the country? In addition, Coatsworth addresses himself to a series of secondary issues: the impact of proposed or real construction projects on land disputes, and the amount of social savings generated by the railroad construction in Mexico. Coatsworth is always aware of methodological problems and relates his work to such "new economic historians" as Albert Fishlow, Robert Fogel, and Douglas North.

Coatsworth argues that the direct social savings generated by the railroads were not significant for passenger traffic but were indeed for the movement of freight. Social savings on freight by 1910 reached a level between 10.8 and 11.5 percent of the GNP in Mexico, more than twice the social savings generated by the railroad building in the United States, Britain, or Russia. Coatsworth considers it "ironic" that the vast majority of that freight consisted of primary products being exported. Moreover his study shows that the linkages were vis-à-vis the United States and Europe. He estimates that the total flow of resources in 1910 alone reached more than 60 million pesos. His argument is that the strongest social impact of railroad building was the pressure that concomitant speculation applied to the villages. In a section that he summarizes in "Railroads, Landholding and Agrarian Protest in the Early Porfiriato" (*HAHR* 54 [1974]:48–71), Coatsworth identifies fifty-four incidents of land conflict in the period between 1877 and 1884. In the majority of these cases he is able to demonstrate that speculation over railroad rights of way sparked the conflict. He may overstate the case, but there is little doubt that he perceives a positive association.

In terms of the distribution of the social savings implied by the construction of the railroads, Coatsworth points out that the foreigners benefited magnificently from the construction of the railroads and that a national—as contrasted to regional—elite emerged during the porfiriato. Indeed his ultimate conclusion is that the economic impact of railroad construction was to place Mexico squarely within the “contradictory process of modern capitalist dependent underdevelopment.” Coatsworth’s works are important in that they quantify that which other historians of the porfiriato have been approaching with nonquantitative tools. His work is also of didactic importance in that it serves as a good introduction to a new methodology emerging within economic history that should not be summarily dismissed by historians. In addition, Coatsworth escapes the most obvious ideological myopia from which a number of his colleagues in the “new economic history” suffer.

Additional studies of the rural response to the alienation of land abound. Two are surprisingly similar. John M. Hart’s *Los anarquistas mexicanos, 1860–1900* (México: SepSetentas, 1974) has skillfully uncovered numerous cases of artisan and rural rebellion during the restored republic and the porfiriato. He has admirably worked to acquaint the reader with the ideas and aspirations of workers in rebellion. A major issue with Hart’s work is that he has chosen to call that rebellion anarchism. By including virtually all mutualist, co-operativist, anti-industrial, antilatifundista and antiauthoritarian activity, Hart has defined the concept of anarchism in the broadest possible way.

The work of Gastón García Cantú is similar except that he calls opposition to the social-economic-political order of the nineteenth century socialism. *El socialismo en México, siglo xix* (México: Ediciones Era, 1969) desperately needed an editor to add a sense of organization to the important research. Nevertheless, García Cantú, Meyer, and Hart together make it impossible to deny that the population was continuous in its opposition to changes in land tenure patterns.

An article by María Galaviz de Capdevielle, “Descripción y pacificación de la Sierra Gorda” (*Estudios de Historia Novohispana* 4[1971]:113–49), is a study of rebellion in the region known as the Sierra Gorda in Hidalgo, Querétaro, and Guanajuato. Galaviz de Capdevielle works out a useful map of the region, but more importantly she studies the rebellions of the Indian groups known as the Jonacas, the Pames, and the Ximpeces—Otomi-speaking groups. Her study deals with the initial attempt to reduce the native population in the sixteenth century and the continuing campaigns and rebellions caused by raiding parties to force the population to work on haciendas. A major rebellion in 1703 was later followed by another, when the native population saw a chance to improve its lot during the independence movement. The study stresses the role of the rebellions for twenty years, first against the government of Benito Juárez and later Maximilian. The issues in these rebellions were always the defense of the lands of the communities and the misery of life.

The Plan de Rio Verde in 1849 associated with Eleuterio Quiroz was a clear statement of the goals of the community: the call was for the dissolution of the army and its replacement by a national guard; clerical reforms; electoral

reforms; and above all the redistribution of land in the region. The area seems to be a microcosm of the agrarian problem of mid-century at large. Liberals blamed the outbreak of the rebellion on the lack of private property in the area. In their view a distribution of land in small parcels would ameliorate the situation. More practically the liberal President José Joaquín Herrera established three military colonies in the area in order to suppress future rebellions. The military territory thus formed was terminated only in 1875. This regional study is another case work of the results of the alienation of community land.

Thus from the direction of national politics, or based upon accounts of local hacienda and case studies, or from the fragmentary records left by campesinos in rebellion, the student of nineteenth-century Mexico finds that the land and Indian policies of the professional, commercial, and legal community—those whom we call the “liberals”—constituted a conscious attack upon rural Mexico. That assault commenced before the reform, was legalized by the reform, and only became generalized during the porfiriato. The pattern of rapidly growing haciendas, the alienation of village lands, the commercialization of peasant-landlord and peasant-urban relations, and the concomitant peasant rebellions is probably more applicable in some regions than others, even though the generalization at this point seems to hold for most parts of the country. Clearly we must stop speaking of a thwarting of the reform program during the porfiriato as though dictatorship caused good intentions to go awry. We are dealing here with a historic process—the destruction of the peasant class—that has taken place in almost all modernizing societies—capitalist, socialist, or fascist—and which in Mexico during the nineteenth century became the major source of the social dislocation that stood behind the twentieth-century revolution.

In what appears to be rapidly emerging as the major “exception” in Mexican history, the case of Oaxaca gives us a problem in generalizing about latifundia. The reader will recall that in the colonial literature William B. Taylor’s *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972) emerged as an exception to the classic work of Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule. A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico 1519–1810* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), in that the pattern of the hacienda in the Valley of Mexico did not seem to apply in Oaxaca.

Similarly, Charles R. Berry’s “The Fiction and Fact of the Reform: The Case of the Central District of Oaxaca 1856–1867” (*The Americas* 25[1970]:227–90) appears to suggest a major difference from the norm of the period of the *reforma*. Berry uses notarial records to estimate the property of the Church in the period from 1856 to 1867. He finds that the Church was already weak before the Ley Lerdo was applied to its property. Whereas the Church did own major amounts of urban property (72.5 percent of the houses in the city of Oaxaca), fully 79 per cent of its rural property was already disentailed. He was able to identify 224 of the 509 purchasers of property: professional men, women, and politicians formed the majority of the buyers of the land in question. In conclusion, he finds that a pattern of speculation on ex-Church property did not emerge (because of the lack of capital existent in the region?). He demonstrates that the majority of

Church land was urban rather than rural, that the Indian villages in Oaxaca willingly sold their property, and that in that section of Mexico the reform succeeded in political, social, and economic terms.

Perhaps the key that enables us to fit the work of Taylor and Berry into an overall understanding of the socioeconomic history of Mexico emerges from the excellent study by Brian R. Hamnett, *Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico 1750–1821* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971). Hamnett studies the relationship between the Consulado de México and the largest industry in Oaxaca, the cochineal trade. It appears that cochineal was the second largest export item in the colonial period and in nineteenth-century Mexico. A series of devices were used to place the Indians of Oaxaca in a position of having to collect a given amount of the dye each year. This, rather than extensive agriculture, clearly emerges as the principal economic activity in Oaxaca. It may follow that, since the main object of concern was dye, not landownership, and since the Church was closely integrated into the network of relationships among the Consulado de México, the Alcaldes Mayores, the merchant-aviadores, and the fiadores, studying economic power exclusively in terms of landownership may be a false issue. It would be important to carry Hamnett's work forward into the nineteenth century in order to understand the principal economic activity of the Oaxaca region. Only then could we accurately understand the degree of socio-economic compulsion there.

An interesting question is emerging in relation to our understanding of the haciendas: How long could a given proprietor maintain ownership of a hacienda? The evidence, upon first reading, seems to be contradictory. Charles H. Harris III, in *A Mexican Family Empire; The Latifundio of the Sanchez Navarros, 1765–1867* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1974), suggests that in the case of that family the tenure was quite long. Such a pattern would also hold for the Rincón Gallardo and other well-known latifundista families. Similarly the study by David A. Brading, "La estructura de la producción agrícola en el Bajío de 1700–1850" (*Historia Mexicana* 23:2[No. 90, 1973]:197–237), finds that there was a remarkable degree of stability in landownership. He suggests that the bajío was an exception to the general pattern of rapid turnover of estates because of the lack of a tradition of village lands and a lack of differentiation between the peones of the pueblos and those of the towns. Brading argues that the pattern established for the bajío in the Bourbon period changed little until the 1880s.

Bazant, in *Cinco haciendas*, suggests a rather different pattern, because in the haciendas that he studied there seemed to be a change of ownership every generation. But Brading, in *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico 1763–1810* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), demonstrates that fortunes made in commerce, mining, and manufacturing were frequently invested in the land; this suggests a pattern in which Spaniards came to the New World and made their fortune, then their children went broke on haciendas and ownership passed on to new commercial figures. Of course the pattern is subject to enormous variation from region to region. Enrique Florescano, in his excellent study, *Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México (1708–1810)* (México: El Colegio de México, 1969), demonstrates that for the Chalco area agriculture was highly market

oriented, lucrative, and in every sense a capitalistic venture. Nonetheless, the suggestion that in many less market-oriented haciendas the Creole owners may have overseen the dismantling of the fortunes previously acquired by commercially successful Peninsulars is a point of contention in the Creole-Peninsular antagonism. Were Peninsulars on an up escalator less by privilege than by commerce, while Creoles were on a down escalator less by discrimination than by hacienda? More business studies will perhaps shed light on this.

IV

In 1970 and 1972 the last two volumes of the ten-volume study of *Historia moderna de México*, commenced by Daniel Cosío Villegas in 1950, emerged from the press. The accomplishment—the documented history of Mexico from 1867 to 1910—is colossal and laudable for its completeness and its readable style, in spite of the absence of a developed body of monographic literature on the period. Here in the final two volumes, *El porfiriato, la vida política interior* (2 vols., México: Hermes), Cosío emerges as the grand historian, much more to be admired than in his early works. The limited criticism we had of his “República restaurada” (essay in *Investigaciones contemporáneas sobre historia de México* [México: UNAM, 1971]) and applicable to his *La Noria* and *La constitución de 1857 y sus críticos* melts away in these volumes.

Cosío Villegas’ grand thesis is that the governments of Juárez and Lerdo promoted constitutionalism and that those of Díaz and González sacrificed it. That is the rationale for the dividing line of 1876 between his volumes on the restored republic and the porfiriato. As a reflection of that thesis Cosío wastes no sympathy in his early writing on the opposition during the restored republic. In the volumes on the porfiriato, where constitutionalism was sacrificed, the liberal opposition, if not the radical opposition, is treated sympathetically. It is strange for a history so closely written from newspapers, including many opposition newspapers, to hold this thesis, inasmuch as the military opposition to Juárez and Lerdo was to a large degree the outcome of the frustrations of constitutional liberals to the abuse of power. Surely Díaz would never have become president if many constitutional liberals had not turned to the caudillos to redress the abuse of power which contravened their basic convictions. For the same reasons Cosío is more sympathetic to the earlier presidents than to Díaz for the need to obtain order for economic and fiscal development of the nation.

Cosío is still wrong on much factual information, but his sensitivity to change within the porfiriato, to variation among places, to a certain finesse in governance, and his admiration for Díaz as a politician, administrator, and nationalist in the latter volumes, which could not have been expected by a reader of the earlier ones, will surprise students who hold a concept of relentless oppression during the porfiriato. Cosío apparently starts with that concept, perhaps as a result of his personal concern—demonstrated by his journalistic career—with monolithic abuse of power in contemporary Mexico. The best review of the ten volumes is that of Charles A. Hale, “The Liberal Impulse: Daniel Cosío Villegas and the *Historia moderna de México*” (*HAHR* 54:3[1974]:478–98).

The posthumous Spanish publication in 1973 of another Mexican historical study by the English-speaking author, Ralph Roeder, was a surprise to these reviewers. *Hacia el México moderno: Porfirio Díaz* (2 vols., México: Fondo de Cultura Económico, 1973) is much like his *Juárez and His Times*. It is a man-and-times study, written almost entirely from newspaper accounts in which long excerpts are strung together with good narrative and frequent editorialization, but without citations or bibliography. The single great difference between Roeder's two works is that Juárez emerges as a grand hero and Díaz as a hypocrite and tyrant. A second-string villain, but more important to Cosío Villegas than to Roeder as the cause of the basic failure of the porfiriato, is the limitation of applied liberalism. In Cosío's account, Díaz overrode the laissez-faire dictum of the neutral state in economic matters and sacrificed political republicanism. As a result political growth was stunted, freedom was sacrificed, and no one was forced to attend to a decent distribution of the real wealth created. Roeder presents a Díaz who understood and sympathized with the social problems but continually sacrificed them to the needs for peace in order for the economic miracle to take care of the social problem in the long run. Neither author believes that a laissez-faire liberal model was viable in the first place. They do not even suggest that individual freedom to accumulate unlimited property will result in exploitation and alienation of other people. Rather, they romantically believe that the political freedoms of liberalism will ensure that the state will be obliged to solve the resultant economic and social problems.

These Porfirian studies by Cosío Villegas and Roeder demonstrate the danger of overreliance upon newspapers as historical sources. Cosío Villegas, by using a large array of sources, does not fall into the error of his earlier works, as does Roeder here, of making small issues large simply because the press did. Two examples will suffice: Roeder makes the Magdalena Bay issue and the Creelman interview into major causes of Díaz's fall; but the diplomatic archives helped Cosío conclude, in his *La vida política exterior*, that there was no substance to the issue, and his use of the *Colección General Porfirio Díaz* enabled him to note that working politicians did not consider Díaz's statements to Creelman as particularly significant in the political turmoil of 1910.

José C. Valadés published *El porfirismo, el nacimiento* in 1941 in one volume, and *El porfirismo, el crecimiento* in two volumes in 1944. Valadés, we thought, would turn to *La caída* or *El envejecimiento y muerte*. Instead, in 1971 Valadés published *Breve historia del porfirismo* (México: Editores Mexicanos Unidos), a restatement and summary of the whole period, 1876–1911. Sketchy and disjointed, the work lacks the scholarly apparatus of his earlier contributions. It has, however, other qualities. Unlike Cosío Villegas' work, the social and economic elements are not separated from the political, nor are they as well woven together as in Roeder's version. Valadés includes ample social and economic detail in pages of isolated statements but provides no significant theory or interpretation. Descriptive passages tell us that in the early porfiriato industry and agriculture were in disarray, commerce weak, and credit absent. Then came the banks and the foreigners. Short chapters treat poverty, the cost of living, inflation, working hours, insecurity, banditry, the *leva*, natural disasters, gambling,

alcoholism, official corruption, fiscal disarray, contraband—everything is lightly touched upon. There is more sureness in chapters on the growth of the hacienda through dispossession of peasants' land, the governmental policies that caused those injustices, the resultant rebellions and the official repression of them. The strength of the work, however, is the author's description of the spirit of the regime of Porfirio Díaz.

This book does not proceed from evidence to conclusion, nor is it a theoretical study. There is instead a mixture of detail and spirit, not a narrative but a transfusion of sentiment—a knowing that while life was running on with good intentions and solid virtues, everything was going amiss; that an aura of wrongheadedness was carrying the system astray. Gone is the dichotomy of bureaucrats versus military, the interpretive structure in *Nacimiento*. The mechanical interpretation has given way to an organic and mystical presentation, the linear to the spatial. This is an impressionistic painting of an age. Díaz knew men but not human community. He knew how to administer but not to govern. He was a politician, not a statesman. The idea that Díaz did not concern himself with a successor is belied here. In this treatment he is overwhelmed with that preoccupation: Limantour, Reyes, Corral—each was chosen and trained and rejected, Corral too late. Corral was more sinister, more tyrannical, more cruel, more ignorant than Díaz. Under challenge is not Díaz's failure to prepare a successor, but his very right in a republic to do so. Valadés concludes with a comparison of Juárez and Díaz: neither believed that Mexico could sustain a democracy; both were austere in domestic life; both believed in the principle of authority. "Juárez founded the nation; Díaz, the state." Juárez invented the system of government, Díaz turned it into a regime.

Fortunately some of the secondary personalities in the porfiriato are now beginning to receive attention. The new biography of *Matías Romero, 1837–1898* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1973) by Harry Bernstein is a case in point. The study is meticulous and detailed and makes use of the massive correspondence Romero left. His career in diplomacy and the treasury and his writings make Romero a significant figure of the era. Another biography is Jesús Luna's *La carrera pública de don Ramón Corral* (México: SepSetentas, 1975). Luna examines Corral's background in Sonora, his involvement in the Indian campaigns, and his subsequent career in the nation's capital. Using new documentation, Luna amplifies, but does not substantially change, our view of the unsavory career of Ramón Corral.

From the narrative to the theoretical works on porfirismo, Juan Felipe Leal's "El estado y el bloque en el poder" (*Historia Mexicana* 23:4[No. 92, 1974]: 700–21) is a theoretical essay about the shifting nature of the elite governing class from 1867 to 1914, the period the author calls the liberal-oligarchy. He finds a basic contradiction between the liberal juridical-political institutions and the local economic-political oligarchy. The local and regional oligarchs undermined laissez-faire economics but supported the liberal nation state because they needed protection, law and order. According to Leal, after 1880 the foreign imperialists were admitted to the power block, negating further need for domestic republicanism, which was replaced by executive dictatorship. The liberal-

oligarchic state, although formally independent, was economically, technologically, diplomatically, politically, and militarily dependent upon the metropolitan capitalist states, particularly the United States. Free enterprise, first undermined by regional oligarchs, was replaced by monopolistic, imperialistic capitalism.

After 1890 the Mexican industrial bourgeoisie related to commerce, banking, and the new export agriculture were admitted to the power block. Receiving facilities and stimulation from the regime, they became active in the transformation sector and commerce, largely not competing with foreigners who dominated mining, industry, and public services. Two groups of national bourgeoisie then developed in the late porfiriato, the hacendado-banker-industrialists from the provinces (exemplified by the Madero and Terrazas families) and the *científicos*. Both became diversified in banking, industry, and land, but only the *científicos* were included in the power block. Because the regional out-groups wanted power, they demanded a return to the Constitution of 1857 and the dissolution of the dictatorship. After the credit crisis of 1907, when the *científicos* monopolized credit, the regional group withdrew support from the regime and campaigned against Díaz in 1910. The elites thus divided and the popular groups were able to make themselves heard.

Another elite study, of shorter span but considerably greater depth of detail for the identification of the ties between economic and political power in the late porfiriato, is José Luis Ceceña Gamez's "La penetración extranjera y los grupos de poder económico en el México porfirista, 1870–1910" (*Problemas del desarrollo* 1[1969]:49–88). The author first presents a list of the largest 170 *sociedades anónimas* in Mexico in 1910–11. He estimates that the total capital of those companies was 1,650 million pesos, and then demonstrates the composition of investment by origin of the capital—United States, Britain, France, and Mexico. Foreign capital, he finds, controlled 130 of the 170 corporations, a figure equal to 63.2 percent of the total, which sufficed to control 77 percent of the total capital of the 170 firms (44 percent was controlled by U.S. capitalists). Of the foreign capital involved, 46.9 percent was in railroads, electricity, and other activities classified as infrastructure; 22.9 percent was in banking; and commercial activities took 18.9 percent. Certainly the role of foreign capital in the Mexican economy was overwhelming.

Then Ceceña Gamez studies the ties between the government functionaries of the period—the nascent Mexican bourgeoisie—and the foreign investors. The link that has long been suspected becomes explicit: numerous Mexican functionaries of the porfiriato were working in closest harmony with foreign investors for personal profit. Pablo Macedo, for example, a member of the científico group and president of the national congress in 1907 and 1910, was vice-president of the Banco Nacional de México (French capital), counselor for the Mexican Light and Power Company (English-Canadian control), counselor of the U.S. Pan American Company, counselor of the U.S.-controlled Pan American Railway Company, director of the Caja de Préstamos OI y FA, vice-president of the Banco de Fomento (British, Mexican, French capital), director of the Fundidora de F.A. de Monterrey, director of the manufacturing company El Buen Tono (French capital), director of the Light and Power Company of Pachuca, etc.

Ceceña also identifies the economic interests of Enrique C. Creel, minister of foreign relations; General Manuel González Cosío, minister of war; Guillermo de Landa y Escandón, governor of the Distrito Federal; Roberto Núñez, subsecretary of hacienda; Rosendo Pineda, subsecretary of relaciones exteriores; Senator Sebastián Camacho; Pablo Escandón, governor of Morelos; Joaquín D. Casasús, president of congress in 1895 and 1903 and científico; Pablo Martínez del Rio, president of congress in 1901 and 1905; Gabriel Mancera, president of congress in 1904 and 1906; Col. Porfirio Díaz, son of the dictator; Julio I. Limantour, brother of the minister of finance; and Rodolfo Reyes, son of General Bernardo Reyes. In short, Ceceña demonstrates the link between politics and economics in the case of numerous members of the Porfirian government. The work is an important beginning in establishing the economic interests of the period. Subsequently José Luis Ceceña published *México en la órbita imperial* (México: Ediciones El Caballito, 1970) and carried his work on economic dependency into the twentieth century.

Ceceña's work is much more sophisticated than that of Salvador Rodríguez y Rodríguez, whose *Evolución del capitalismo en México, de la Reforma a 1910* (México: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, 1969) is overly general and without recourse to the best work in the area. Chapters on the English model of development, the expansion of capitalism, and the development of capitalism in Mexico are generations late in the level of analysis and investigation. It does not merit consultation.

Another oligarchic study is that of Mark Wasserman, "Oligarquía e intereses extranjeros en Chihuahua durante el porfiriato" (*Historia Mexicana* 22:2[No. 87, 1973]:279–319). He studies the economic structure of the state and concludes that the revolution in Chihuahua was a function of the intense popular hatred against the Terrazas-Creel family. The Terrazas-Creel group exercised an absolute control over the nonmining sectors of the economy, which was the fruit of their political control of the state. The oligarchy in Chihuahua granted favors only to itself and to well established foreigners. The nascent middle class was excluded in economic fact: there was no way to gain land without political influence. By identifying the property of the Terrazas-Creel groups, Wasserman supports the frequently reiterated generalizations about the monolithic property ownership of Porfirian politicians in Chihuahua.

Robert Sandels, in "Silvestre Terrazas and the Old Regime in Chihuahua" (*The Americas* 28[1971]:191–205), studies the cousin of Luis Terrazas, the newspaperman Silvestre. In an interesting case study of the deterioration of the Porfirian coalition, Sandels demonstrates that Silvestre Terrazas was an arch-enemy of the Terrazas-Creel coalition that dominated the state. From his position as editor of *El Correo de Chihuahua* he became a witness to the torture of the suspects in the Banco del Minero robbery of 1908. The study demonstrates the inability of the Porfirian party to hold an individual's loyalty even when his personal and class background might have assured his support of the regime. This kind of intellectual defection has frequently been associated with the origin of a revolution.

Labor organization slowly emerged out of mutualist and co-operative

experience and reached something of a plateau in the restored republic with the Gran Círculo de Obreros and the Sociedad Artística-Industrial; it was then broken by the Porfirian machine in the decade of the 1880s. Nevertheless, the Porfirian repression could not erase the objective reality of poverty and the declining standard of living. Thus the rebellions associated with the foci of industry in the period never quite disappeared. Such strikes and massacres as Cananea and Río Blanco stand as evidence of official repression of workers' manifestations of their discontent. Recent literature on the lower classes in the porfiriato are indicative of continued interest in their fate.

The first part of José Calixto Rangel Contla's *La pequeña burguesía en la sociedad mexicana, 1895–1960* (México: UNAM, 1972) sets out some ideas for Porfirian society. The study uses the criteria of independent workers as the group included in the lower middle class. Although the book is based almost solely upon census data and sociological meditation, there is value in the work if only because of the topic.

A more important study, this one on industrial labor, is *El proletariado industrial en México, 1850–1930* by Jorge Basurto (México: UNAM, 1975). The section dealing with the nineteenth century starts from the perspective that the early struggles between the liberals and conservatives were confined to an elite that cared little for the interests of the working classes. Basurto views the liberal resurgence as evidence of the growth of a middle class and recognizes that their laissez-faire, laissez-passer ideology worked for the benefit of the elite. In his view the laws of the reform not only facilitated the accumulation of capital but also brought a ferocious pressure to bear on any form of labor association, such as the *gremios*. Following the lead of López Aparicio's classic history of Mexican labor, Basurto views the attitudes of such liberals as Juárez as profoundly against the interests of workers and peasants in Mexico. The introduction of advanced technology, the enclosure movement associated with the terrenos baldíos legislation, and finally the conversion of workers into a labor-selling proletariat formed the basis of the porfiriato before don Porfirio came to power. Nevertheless, all of the liberal effort to copy the image of the great powers could not help the country escape the reality that the form of capitalism that grew in the period was backward and dependent.

That which Hart calls anarchism and García Cantú calls socialism might better be recognized in the main as what Alfonso López Aparicio calls "a vague and confused ideology in the minds of the imitators of the labor movement in Mexico." López Aparicio's important *El movimiento obrero en México, antecedentes, desarrollo, y tendencias* (México: Editorial Jus, 1952) still stands as a major work.

Rodney Anderson's *Outcasts in Their Own Land: Mexican Industrial Workers, 1906–1911* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976) is probably the best single volume on Mexican labor history of the period. Anderson uses a multiplicity of sources to trace the industrial history of the working class on the eve of the Mexican revolution. The volume contains a wealth of detailed information about the struggles, failures, and frustrations experienced by Mexican workers during the porfiriato. Perhaps the most notable aspect of Anderson's study is his attempt to identify the ideological basis of the workers' movements. In direct

rebuttal to John Hart he denies the tie between European socialist and anarchist doctrines and the workers' movements during the porfiriato. He also disagrees with James Cockcroft's belief that the PLM played a major formative role in the labor activity of the period. Anderson's attitude is that workers reacted against specific conditions: against falling real wages, against mistreatment, against oppression by foreigners, against the squeeze on artisans and workers in smaller factories hit by competition from the larger mills. Their reaction identified the liberal cause—incorrectly—with a general quest for social justice and used growing belief in nationalism as a banner under which the specific grievances were mustered. He correctly identifies Díaz as being far more connected with those events than had been formerly realized. Twentieth-century authors may have been in error reading their ideology back into these events. In any case, Anderson has made an important addition to the literature of the porfiriato.

Also concerned with industrial labor, Moisés González Navarro's *Las huelgas textiles en el porfiriato* (Puebla: Editorial José M. Cajica, Jr., 1970) studies some of the most important of the 250-odd strikes in the porfiriato that have left a record for posterity. González Navarro takes the theme of the article in *El hijo del trabajo* written by José María González, which ended with the famous line "De rodillas, miserables!" and turns it into his thesis. In González Navarro's view, that phrase accurately conveys the Porfirian attitude toward labor. His position, that the official regime was wholly involved in labor repression, is supported by documents recently uncovered in the Colección General Porfirio Díaz in the cases of the repression of the workers at Río Blanco and Cananea, and the massacre of the people of Tomochic who did not want to cut timber on lands recently awarded to Limantour. The works of González Navarro, Jorge Basurto, and Rodney Anderson combine to create a massive onslaught against pro-Díaz revisionism that seems to be prevalent in some new Porfirian studies.

Friedrich Katz's article "Labor Conditions on Haciendas in Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends and Tendencies" (*HAHR* 54:1[February, 1974]:1-47), examines the topic from the point of view of the organization of labor in each region of the country. He argues that the main sources of information are: contemporary journalists' reports, parliamentary accounts, local history, and foreign diplomatic papers. He was particularly impressed by a report written by a German diplomat, Karl Kaerger, *Landwirtschaft und Kolonisation im Spanischen Südamerika* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1901-1902). The insights that Katz found in Kaerger's work make it seem even more important to have a modern translation and analysis of the multi-volume Jozefe manuscript, which also deals with haciendas in the nineteenth century.

Katz demonstrates that no single generalization on the standard of living of rural workers holds for all regions and workers in Mexico. Indeed, he points out that similar causes can lead to different effects in different regions. In brief, he argues that conditions in the South and the North were affected strongly by increased incorporation of those regions into the world economy. Yet conditions deteriorated more rapidly in the South than in the North. In the center of Mexico subsistence agriculture led to deterioration of real wages for hacienda workers. The workers who were most rebellious in the North were relatively

well-to-do by the standards of the era. Katz's article is logical and suggestive. He recognizes that the material and sources on this vital topic are disappointing, yet he adds a clarity of thought to the recent literature.

R. Th. J. Buve has also contributed to the growing literature on the topic, in his "Protesta de obreros y campesinos durante el porfiriato: unas consideraciones sobre el desarrollo e interrelaciones en el este de México Central" (*Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos* 13 [1972]:1–20). After a well-grounded review of recent literature, Buve finds a number of individuals who had been active during the labor disputes of the late porfiriato in the state of Tlaxcala. He demonstrates that several of the local labor leaders in that area had contact with and were influenced by the PLM organizers. Inadvertently seconding Cockcroft's thesis, Buve demonstrates that the PLM had established a far larger grass-roots organization than had been formerly recognized. Also remarkable was the success of the Porfirian military machine in opposing the Maderista factions in comparison with their failure to route the PLM guerrillas. Still in Tlaxcala, as elsewhere, the Maderistas eventually absorbed the PLM under the banners of nationalism and mass appeal. That of course led to much of the "confusion and ideological disorientation" on the part of the revolutionary workers. Also see Richard Ulric Miller, "American Railroad Unions and the National Railways of Mexico: An Exercise in Nineteenth-Century Manifest Destiny" (*Labor History* 15:2[1974]:239–60), for a study of the relationships between unions in the United States and Mexico.

Clifton B. Kroeber's "La cuestion del Nazas hasta 1913" (*Historia Mexicana* 22:3[No. 79, 1971]:428–56) is a study of the water policy of the Río Nazas in Durango and Coahuila, particularly as the British company Agrícola del Tlahualilo dealt with Oligario Molina when he was secretary of fomento. Kroeber argues, not convincingly, that Oligario Molina favored small agriculture and that his ministry served as a force for modernization in the period. His conclusion is in striking contradiction to Molina's activity as Porfirian governor of Yucatán where he was in close collaboration with the International Harvester Company in turning the peninsula into an extension of the company—a collaboration in which the company aided Molina in monopolizing land and henequin production in return for lowering prices. Perhaps a study of the ties of the Compañía Agrícola de Tlahualilo to national politics would cause Kroeber to modify his thesis.

In a recent study, "Los rurales: producto de una necesidad social" (*Historia Mexicana* 22:1[No. 85, 1972]:34–51), Paul J. Vanderwood argues that the *rurales* were the natural response to banditry and the socioeconomic conditions of the day. He introduces evidence to show that at times *rurales* resisted the will of local authorities; in some cases *rurales* were not turned over to factory owners to wreak vengeance upon their workers; and instances arose in which they were restrained from enforcing the will of the railroad owners upon their workers. Vanderwood seems to think that these examples of lack of coercion justify a revision of the revolutionary view of the *rurales* as a brutal arm of the Porfirian dictatorship. The ability to demonstrate that the *rurales* were sometimes restrained, or merely became pawns in the struggles between various factions of

the elite, scarcely allows one to conclude that their overall impact was something other than repressive. In addition, Vanderwood believes that the *rurales* created a positive condition of peace in the countryside and that such tranquility created a favorable climate that attracted foreign investment. If one agrees that foreign investment in Latin America leads to economic development, then Vanderwood's conclusion follows. If, on the other hand, one views that impact as detrimental to a healthy growth for the region, then one can scarcely applaud the peace-making efforts of the *rurales*.

An important study for an understanding of the intellectual origins of the Mexican revolution and the dissolution of the porfiriato is Arnaldo Córdoba's *La ideología de la Revolución Mexicana, la formación del nuevo régimen* (México: Editorial Era, 1970). Córdoba's study of the ideology of the Porfirian system deemphasizes the personal virtues of Díaz in order to concentrate on the implications of peace, order, progress, prosperity, and stability. Science had the double function of demonstrating reality and also of conciliating differences of opinion. Unity and discipline in the Porfirian view were the key to progress. Positivism was the elaboration of the concepts of order and progress. The new ideology of privilege was based upon an application of social Darwinism. Liberty for the powerful came to replace the ideal of the French Revolution of equality before the law. Emilio Rabasa stated the científico position when he observed that liberals tended to "confuse zoological equality with social equality." In his view the differences made the Indian population inept subjects for literacy campaigns: "An Indian who knows how to read and write has gained nothing by it; he will gain if he reads and writes; but instead of using those skills, he will abandon them." This attitude on the part of the científico apologists for the porfiriato has usually led historians to identify positivism in Mexico with racism.

It is, therefore, quite surprising to find a contradiction to the assertion that there was a racist ingredient in Porfirian ideology. William D. Raat, in "Los intelectuales, el positivismo, y la cuestión indígena" (*Historia Mexicana* 20:3[No. 79, 1971]:412–27), announces that his study of the thought of Limantour, Bulnes, and Sierra shows that racism was not endemic to científico thought. His article is an attempt to introduce a revisionism more favorable to the positivists, but needs more documentation to be convincing.

Another part of Porfirian thought is reflected in attitudes about education. Following Leopoldo Zea's seminal *Del liberalismo a la revolución en la educación mexicana* (México: Biblioteca del Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1956), Francisco Larroyo's *Historia comparada de la educación de México* (México: Porrúa, 1967), the sections on education in *Historia moderna de México*, and the volume on *la vida social*, came Josefina Vásquez's magnificent *Nacionalismo y educación en México* (México: Colegio de México, 1970). The author commences with a theoretical-historical discussion of the relationship between education and nationalism in which she maintains that every nation uses the teaching of history as a force to develop national unity, to sustain the philosophy underlying the institutions, and to create civic pride and citizenship. She then undertakes the enormous task of tracing three themes in Mexican history from independence to 1960—the educational legislation and programs

of instruction developed by each generation of Mexicans, in which party struggle for educational monopolies looms larger than most of us have usually supposed; the evolution of Mexican historical textbooks, as the historians of each generation shouldered the task of forming Mexican youth; and the correlation between the interpretation of the historical textbooks and the national policies of the respective national government. The analysis at each step is superb and of importance to our understanding of Mexican intellectual history as well as social and even political history.

Alejandro Martínez Jiménez, in "La educación elemental en el porfiriato" (*Historia Mexicana* 22:4[No. 88, 1973]:514–52), addresses himself to education in the porfiriato. He starts with an essay on Mexican education from independence to the porfiriato, with statistics on the number of schools, students, and literacy for given years. The author demonstrates that the centralization of finances during the porfiriato, particularly the discontinuance of the alcabala, left the local authorities without money for education. Thus the later declarations of Joaquín Baranda and Justo Sierra for a national, democratic, and rural educational system were more theoretical than real, particularly as the educational demands ran parallel to the impoverishment of the countryside, the extension of peonage, and the loss of nationality to foreign dependence. The essay on Baranda is a contribution inasmuch as little has been known about his long tenure (1882–1901) as minister of justice and instruction, whereas the section on Justo Sierra is simply well-done, if not new. The author submits that the real importance of educational theory during the porfiriato was the continual demand among intellectuals for the creation of a national system of mass education capable of transforming the country. Finally the author offers a statistical analysis of education during the porfiriato, which leads to the conclusion that the penetration of capital in regional capital cities reanimated local budgets for education and produced a middle-class, urban literate group that further separated the cities from the countryside and augmented class differences.

The importance of an attempt to review some of the recent literature dealing with nineteenth-century Mexico ultimately relates to one's estimation of the value and importance of history. In an age when the profession is in obvious trouble, we think it important to reject an antiquarian approach to the subject. For our own part, we still find E. H. Carr's definition of history as a reciprocal relationship between the present and the past to be most useful.

The most transcendent topic that we find in the period under consideration is the acute integration of Mexico into the global economy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Dependent capitalism can most clearly be dated from the porfiriato. Few aspects of life remained unaffected. The ability of the political elite to dominate their society increased markedly. Díaz's desire for dominance was no different from that of earlier political figures. Only the rewards of dependent capitalism allowed him to achieve that which earlier politicians had found impossible. The deterioration of the living standards of the great masses of the Mexican people also closely parallels the contemporary experience of a dependent economy in Mexico.

Class analysis is also receiving much well-deserved attention in the current literature. This, too, may be motivated by the persistent and growing class differentiation in our own time in Latin America. The historical roots of legal, political, social, and economic repression deserve close scrutiny by those who are committed to fight against these phenomena. Historians frequently observe supposedly practical men entering into a program of reform that has already proved barren. Only a clear understanding of the origins of the profound inequity in Latin America can provide the analysis to create the possibility of meaningful change.



Ramona con Mantilla, handpainted lithograph by Antonio Berni (Argentina). From a private collection.