This chapter drills into the parish records of Little and Great Clacton to reveal new information about the Selles family, accused of witchcraft as tensions around child-rearing and illegitimacy reached a peak in a second village. It shows how parish records are vital to an understanding of the life circumstances of ordinary villagers and how much a name, a relatuonship or a life event can tell us about the processes of witch accusation.

Chapter 3 is the first of four chapters drawing on the original empirical data. It interrogates the issue of participation in CoP proceedings to argue that the CoP has failed to facilitate participation of the subject of proceedings, thereby undermining procedural justice and access to justice. Despite the rhetorical value placed on participation, the chapter shows that participation in CoP proceedings has not yet effectively been secured. An important distinction is drawn between direct and indirect participation, which is then used throughout the book to make a number of further arguments for reimagining the CoP. In addition, the chapter shows that the subject of CoP proceedings still rarely directly participates in them, despite some attempts at improvements. The chapter argues that direct participation is the ideal approach to ensure that procedural justice is secured, also briefly considering the ways that direct participation might be achieved in other types of case that do not reach a hearing. The second section of the chapter explores the reasons for limited participation, rejecting each of them as a sufficient justification for the current failure to secure participation. Finally, the chapter concludes with a number of recommendations for improving participation.

Australian indigenous peoples are among the world’s most incarcerated populations. The nineteenth century origins of this fact lie in Australian legal histories, of the interaction of indigenous peoples and British criminal law introduced in the course of colonisation. This chapter considers first the assertion of criminal jurisdiction in law and statute in the early nineteenth century, paying attention to some significant differences between the colonies. Second, we look at some elements of criminal trial, including the treatment of Aboriginal evidence and the role of interpreters. Third, the chapter examines the importance of the criminal justice system’s putative concern with victimisation and the justice due to victims. Finally we consider some evidence about the system-wide impacts of the assertion of criminal jurisdiction over indigenous peoples, including patterns of prosecution and punishment. Understanding these legal histories makes clear how the legal system’s professed principles of justice and fairness compounded discrimination and disadvantage.

Mismanagement of property was always a threat to family survival and patrimonial continuity. Law provided a process by which an imprudent manager could be deemed unfit, even insane (furiosus), and placed under guardianship. While prudence was a quality too slippery to define, it was also generally expected, such that the "prudent man" was a standard of behavior. Here too, things were not simple and conflicts arose, as the sharing economy of the household was under strain by the demands or actions of someone others thought insane.

Chapters 4 and 5 explore how various subject positions (or what Foucault describes as enunciative modalities) influenced how knowledge was produced within the archive, from which perspective records were constructed and, ultimately, what was to be archived. In Chapter 4, ‘Contesting the Archive’, I focus on the witnesses, who played a far more significant role in constructing the archive than scholars normally credit. Whilst this shows how legal actors constrained what witnesses could record within the archive, it also demonstrates how witnesses were able to contest these parameters both in terms of which crimes would be recorded, but also how the law was to account for violence. This contestation also destabilised many of the objects and subjects that the legal discourse tried to produce, such as what constituted a victim or perpetrator.

This brings these findings together and considers what this tells us about the role of archives in international criminal justice and international politics. This reveals a complex picture where the principles and strategies that underpinned knowledge production within the ICTR’s archive shifted over time, from a form of restorative justice to a more strictly retributive model. This also meant a shift from more far-reaching records of violence produced under the witnesses’ influence to a more legalistic record of violence. Over time, the archive, then, less closely reflected the needs and priorities of those affected by the genocide and arguably also produced a more conservative vision of the international community. The chapter also examines the extent to which these dynamics are an inevitable part of international criminal justice,. as a liberal tool of international governance, in part by examining the ICC. This argues that whilst there is little to suggest international criminal justice must necessarily act with such a reductionist view of its function, that these issues continue to underpin current practices of international courts.

While third states and international organisations often co-sign peace agreements in the capacity of witnesses or guarantors, little is understood of the legal consequences flowing from these roles. The chapter aims to fill this gap. First, it highlights that the mere designation of witness or guarantor leads to few consequences. Second, it analyses how specific third-party rights and obligations are established and conceptualised under VCLT rules, extended by analogy to intra-state peace agreements. Third, it provides a brief illustration of common third-party rights and obligations in peace agreements. Finally, it examines whether the involvement of third parties can internationalise an intra-state peace agreement, i.e. render it to be governed by international law. Bringing together views from the literature, jurisprudence and the preceding analysis on the structure of third-party rights and obligations, the chapter concludes that such rights and obligations can be internationalised, in a manner that can only extend to the agreement as a whole when inseparable from the rest of the agreement.

While third states and international organisations often co-sign peace agreements in the capacity of witnesses or guarantors, little is understood of the legal consequences flowing from these roles. The chapter aims to fill this gap. First, it highlights that the mere designation of witness or guarantor leads to few consequences. Second, it analyses how specific third-party rights and obligations are established and conceptualised under VCLT rules, extended by analogy to intra-state peace agreements. Third, it provides a brief illustration of common third-party rights and obligations in peace agreements. Finally, it examines whether the involvement of third parties can internationalise an intra-state peace agreement, i.e. render it to be governed by international law. Bringing together views from the literature, jurisprudence and the preceding analysis on the structure of third-party rights and obligations, the chapter concludes that such rights and obligations can be internationalised, in a manner that can only extend to the agreement as a whole when inseparable from the rest of the agreement.

The procedural regime of the International Criminal Court is largely a hybrid of two systems, the adversarial approach of the English common law and the inquisitorial approach of the Napoleonic code and other European legislations of the Romano-Germanic tradition. The trial procedure is not specified in detail in the Statute or in the Rules, and a large degree of latitude to the judges in this respect. The trial is to take place at the seat of the Court, in The Hague, unless otherwise decided. In absentia trial is explicitly prohibited although the accused may be absent for part of the proceedings in certain circumstances. Subject to exceptions, the trial is public. Detailed procedural guarantees for the defence are set out, including a robust provision on the presumption of innocence. When the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence, the Trial Chamber may allow a ‘no case to answer’ motion. Special rules apply if the defendant chooses to plead guilty. Regulation 55 allows the judges to reformulate the charges while the trial is underway. When the trial is completed, the Trial Chamber may issue a decision convicting the accused if it is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsequent stages require the Trial Chamber to fix the sentence and then rule on reparations for victims. There is an unqualified right of appeal from the final verdict as well as appeals with permission of the Trial Chamber of decisions issued in the course of the trial, for example on matters of procedure and evidence.

This chapter deals with documents recording a variety of inter-personal dealings that reveal that transactional ambit of the protagonists, including sale and purchase, loans, gifts, and payment of blood-money. Structured as recognizably pan-Islamic documentary forms and sealed by the Islamic judge (qazi), these documents offer an opportunity for learning further details about the social life of the protagonists, especially the women among them, and their relations with their social equals or subordinates. This leads to a discussion about the percolation of Islamic legal forms and procedures in this pre-dominantly non-Muslim context. The documents in the collection are connected to models provided by Persian-language formularies known as munshats, showing how standardization amd popularization of legal forms may have been achieved through such non-religious manuals that formed training materials for Indo-Persian scribes, or munshis.

When the total or partial non-observance of the international norms relating to the right to a fair trial, established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned, is of such gravity as to give the deprivation of liberty an arbitrary character (category III);1