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After the financial crisis of 2008, the European Union (‘EU’) not only increased its substantial legislation regarding financial services, but also built up a strong and unified system of financial market supervision. In particular, central surveillance authorities were created. These were given far-reaching competences with regard to substituting dysfunctional national authorities or players in the financial services sector. The three European Economic Area (‘EEA’) and European Free Trade Association (‘EFTA’) States—Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—participate in the EU's internal market through their membership of the EEA. In order to continue participating on an equal footing in the internal market for financial services and to honour their duty to maintain homogeneity, the EEA EFTA States also had to incorporate the new institutional setup regarding financial services supervision. This obligation, however, in particular relating to certain intrusive powers of the new surveillance authorities, collided with some constitutional reservations, above all of the two Nordic EEA EFTA States. This article will show how these conflicting aims could be merged into a system that on the one hand guarantees the unified overall approach needed for strengthened surveillance of the internal market for financial services, and on the other hand safeguards certain constitutional reservations of the EEA EFTA States. It also looks at how third countries that do not (fully) participate in the internal market, such as the United Kingdom and Switzerland, are likely to be treated in this context by the EU.
This chapter examines the cases situated in the UK political system. Blame games in the UK political system do not often produce much more than hot air. The reason for this surprising outcome are institutional factors that render it difficult for opponents to reach their reputational and policy goals. Ministers, who are usually only briefly in office and are not personally responsible for a controversy, constitute very strong blame shields for the government of the day since, in the absence of personal wrongdoings, they cannot be brought to resign. The ‘administration bias’, injected by forms of agencification and reinforced by the work of parliamentary committees, ensures that the ministerial blame shield is often not even checked for its resilience during a blame game because media attention and opponent attacks overwhelmingly focus on administrative actors and entities. Incumbents can thus remain rather passive during a blame game, tolerate occasional criticism from the governing majority, and develop strong incentives to leave a policy controversy unaddressed.
This article examines the history of mining in British Southeast Asia during the early twentieth century. In particular, it focuses on the histories of the Burma Corporation and the Duff Development Company, which were located in British-occupied Burma and Malaya, respectively. It argues that despite being represented as “rogue” corporate ventures in areas under “indirect” colonial rule, the contrasting fates of each company—one successful, one not—reveal how foreign-owned businesses operating in the empire became increasingly beholden to British colonial state regulations during this period, marking a shift in policy from the “company-state” model that operated in prior centuries. The histories of these two firms ultimately demonstrate the continued significance of business in the making of empire during the late colonial period, bridging the divide between the age of company rule and the turn toward state-sponsored “development” that would occur in the mid-twentieth century.
We examine epidemiological evidence for the central role of inequalities (principally economic) in driving the onset of mental disorders, physical ill health and premature mortality. We locate the search for solutions in current UK contexts, and include known and likely effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Prevention of mental disorders and adverse outcomes such as premature mortality must begin with efforts to mitigate rising poverty-inequality.
The UK is one of the epicenters of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in the world. As of April 14, there have been 93 873 confirmed patients of COVID-19 in the UK and 12 107 deaths with confirmed infection. On April 14, it was reported that COVID-19 was the cause of more than half of the deaths in London.
The present paper addresses the modeling and forecasting of the outbreak of COVID-19 in the UK. This modeling must be accomplished through a 2-part time series model to study the number of confirmed cases and deaths. The period we aimed at a forecast was 46 days from April 15 to May 30, 2020. All the computations and simulations were conducted on Matlab R2015b, and the average curves and confidence intervals were calculated based on 100 simulations of the fitted models.
According to the obtained model, we expect that the cumulative number of confirmed cases will reach 282 000 with an 80% confidence interval (242 000 to 316 500) on May 30, from 93 873 on April 14. In addition, it is expected that, over this period, the number of daily new confirmed cases will fall to the interval 1330 to 6450 with the probability of 0.80 by the point estimation around 3100. Regarding death, our model establishes that the real case fatality rate of the pandemic in the UK approaches 11% (80% confidence interval: 8%–15%). Accordingly, we forecast that the total death in the UK will rise to 35 000 (28 000–50 000 with the probability of 80%).
The drawback of this study is the shortage of observations. Also, to conduct a more exact study, it is possible to take the number of the tests into account as an explanatory variable besides time.
The algicolous and lichenicolous species Psammina filamentosa is described from the Netherlands and the UK, and is characterized by long (generally over 50 μm) and somewhat tapered conidial arms. Psammina filamentosa is compared with other Psammina specimens found in the same habitat, growing on algae or lichens on the dry side of trees and stones. Psammina filamentosa, P. inflata and P. stipitata differ in the dimensions of their conidial arms. Psammina simplex, however, may be a synonym of P. stipitata, and a DNA study is needed to determine whether it is a distinct species or developing material of P. stipitata. Psammina inflata is also reported as new for the Netherlands. A new worldwide key to the 10 species of Psammina currently known is provided, including three species described from plant material.
The UK, and England in particular, has suffered egregiously poor outcomes in managing the Covid-19 pandemic. This short perspective points to the explanation in terms of both current British politics and the public health policy inheritance. Boris Johnson's Premiership was born in an opportunistic assertion of British exceptionalism, and Johnson's initial, fate-tempting reaction to the novel Coronavirus set the UK on the wrong path. Furthermore, the gradual erosion of professionalism in (especially health) policy-making over almost four decades, and the hollowing-out of the health protection infrastructure, both facilitated and accentuated a toxic approach to managing Covid-19.
Chapter 4 examines the bubble in railway shares which occurred in the UK in the mid-1840s. Railway share prices more than doubled between 1843 and the autumn of 1845. In addition, there was a promotion boom with hundreds of new railways being authorised by Parliament. By the autumn of 1845, 562 new railway schemes had been submitted to Parliament. Following several major newspaper editorials regarding this folly, the bubble came to an end. The chapter then moves on to discuss the causes of the bubble. The incorporation of hundreds of railway companies by Parliament resulted in an increase in marketability. In terms of money and credit, interest rates were at an historical low and part-paid shares leveraged the buying of shares. The railway bubble witnessed the democratisation of speculation, with many middle-class individuals buying shares for the first time. The spark which set the bubble fire alight was the Railway Act. This Act signalled that railways had the potential to be very remunerative investments. It also created the Railway Board, which was a means of coordinating applications to build railways so that a national rail network was constructed. The chapter concludes by examining the consequences of the bubble, arguing that the bubble was a deeply inefficient way to create a national rail network, and much too wasteful to be considered useful.
Chapter 10 examines the housing bubble which occurred in Ireland, Spain, the UK and the United States in the 2000s. House prices in many parts of these countries more than doubled in the years leading up to 2007. They then crashed with terrible consequences for the global financial system, which imploded in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy. The chapter then discusses how the bubble triangle explains this episode. Financial alchemy meant that mortgage finance could be provided to a wider range of people, thus making the family home much more marketable and an object of speculation. The spark which ignited the subprime bubble was a policy decision taken in the late 1990s that attempted to use loose mortgage lending standards as a substitute for government-provided social housing. The chapter concludes by examining the economic, social and political consequences of the bubble. The housing bubble of the 2000s is a perfect example of an economically and socially destructive bubble, despite extraordinary measures taken by governments and central bankers to save the system. The chapter concludes by drawing a line from the housing bubble and its collapse to the rise of populism.
Chapter 6 examines the bubble that occurred in the UK bicycle company shares in the 1890s. The modern bicycle emerged in the late 1880s after a series of revolutionary technological innovations, ranging from the pneumatic tyre to weldless steel tubes. Between 1895 and 1897, nearly 700 cycle companies were floated on the stock exchange, many of which were promoted by very questionable characters. An index of cycle shares appreciated 258 per cent in the first five months of 1896. The index remained high until the early months of 1897. By the end of 1898, the index was 71 per cent below its peak. The chapter then moves on to explore how the bubble triangle and the spark provided by the new technology explains the British bicycle mania. Marketability was high because so many cycle companies had floated their shares on the stock market and these shares had very low denominations. Monetary conditions were as loose as they ever had been up to that point and returns on traditional assets were very low. Speculation was rampant, but the presence of corners limited speculation in the opposite direction. The chapter concludes by arguing that the bicycle mania is a good example of a useful bubble.
UK clinical guidelines recommend treatment of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in adults by suitably qualified clinical teams. However, young people with ADHD attempting the transition from children's to adults’ services experience considerable difficulties in accessing care.
To map the mental health services in the UK for adults who have ADHD and compare the reports of key stakeholders (people with ADHD and their carers, health workers, service commissioners).
A survey about the existence and extent of service provision for adults with ADHD was distributed online and via national organisations (e.g. Royal College of Psychiatrists, the ADHD Foundation). Freedom of information requests were sent to commissioners. Descriptive analysis was used to compare reports from the different stakeholders.
A total of 294 unique services were identified by 2686 respondents. Of these, 44 (15%) were dedicated adult ADHD services and 99 (34%) were generic adult mental health services. Only 12 dedicated services (27%) provided the full range of treatments recommended by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. Only half of the dedicated services (55%) and a minority of other services (7%) were reported by all stakeholder groups (P < 0.001, Fisher's exact test).
There is geographical variation in the provision of NHS services for adults with ADHD across the UK, as well as limited availability of treatments in the available services. Differences between stakeholder reports raise questions about equitable access. With increasing numbers of young people with ADHD graduating from children's services, developing evidence-based accessible models of care for adults with ADHD remains an urgent policy and commissioning priority.
This article argues that the politics and governance of migrants’ rights needs to be reframed. In particular, the terms “welfare chauvinism”, and deservingness should be replaced. Using a qualitative transnational case study of policymakers in Poland and the UK, we develop an alternative approach. In fine-grained and small-scale interpretive analysis, we tease out four distinct “rationales of belonging” that mark out the terms and practices of social membership, as well as relative positions of privilege and subordination. These rationales of belonging are: temporal-territorial, ethno-cultural, labourist, and welfareist. Importantly, these rationales are knitted together by different framings of the transnational contexts, within which the politics and governance of migration and social protection are given meaning. The rationales of belonging do not exist in isolation, but, in each country, they qualify each other in ways that imply different politics and governance of migrants’ rights. Taken together, these rationales of belonging generate transnational projects of social exclusion, as well as justifications for migrant inclusion stratified by class, gender and ethnicity.
The nineteenth-century growth of the London Stock Exchange and the development of the market for stocks and shares are familiar topics of study. This article provides an alternative perspective on them by decentering the London Stock Exchange and focusing instead on the activities of “outside stockbrokers”—those who operated outside the Stock Exchange and its rules. Often regarded as peripheral, these brokers were in fact instrumental in promoting investment and speculation to a mass market. The article examines their innovative methods, and seeks to explain why they were so successful, despite persistent—and sometimes justifiable—accusations of fraud. It suggests how perspectives from the history of consumer society provide fresh insights into the market for financial products. And it underlines the importance of looking outside formal markets by arguing that focusing on “fringe” markets can help scholars to rethink boundaries, relations, and practices in the history of capitalism.
Each of these chapters contains a case study of a couple from the relevant country. Each includes a description of the everyday life of the couple with respect to the division of housework and childcare, a recounting of the history of their relationship and how it became equal, a discussion of how they balance paid work and family, and an analysis of the factors that facilitate their equality. Those factors include their conviction in gender equality, their rejection of essentialist beliefs, their familism, and their socialization in their families of origin. By showing how and why they undo gender, these couples provide lessons on how equality at home can be achieved.
While policy attention is understandably diverted to COVID-19, the end of the UK's post-Brexit ‘transition period’ remains 31 December 2020. All forms of future EU−UK relationship are worse for health than EU membership, but analysis of the negotiating texts shows some forms are better than others. The likely outcomes involve major negative effects for NHS staffing, funding for health and social care, and capital financing for the NHS; and for UK global leadership and influence. We expect minor negative effects for cross border healthcare (except in Northern Ireland); research collaboration; and data sharing, such as the Early Warning and Response System for health threats. Despite political narratives, the legal texts show that the UK seeks de facto continuity in selected key areas for pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and equipment [including personal protective equipment (PPE)], especially clinical trials, pharmacovigilance, and batch-testing. The UK will be excluded from economies of scale of EU membership, e.g. joint procurement programmes as used recently for PPE. Above all, there is a major risk of reaching an agreement with significant adverse effects for health, without meaningful oversight by or input from the UK Parliament, or other health policy stakeholders.
This article examines the 2019 European Parliament election in the UK. The main beneficiaries were the newly formed Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats, both of which ran on clear Brexit platforms, while the Conservatives and Labour struggled to attract support. But the Brexit focus of the campaign – and the victory of parties with clear positions on these issues – belied the extent to which the election conformed to the expectations of second-order contest theory, with low turnout, declining support for the governing (Conservative) party, a surge in support for new and small parties, and scant discussion of European Union-level issues. While the vote shows realignment in the UK continues and can tell us much about the shifting politics of Brexit, we should be cautious inferring much from the victory of the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats given the second-order nature of the contest.
The conclusion revisits the book’s three principal themes: language, the Anglosphere and Syria. First, it maps out the significant theoretical implications for understanding the way in which language, discourse and policy intertwine across the transnational political space of the Anglosphere. Second, it notes that military intervention in Syria has once again served to reinforce the ties that bind together the old Anglosphere coalition. Third, it reflects on the scale of the crisis in Syria, as well as the prospects for the country and its people going forward.
This chapter explores the underpinnings, development and impact of an ‘old Anglosphere coalition’. First, the chapter considers the nature of a coalition of the English-speaking countries at two levels: the Anglosphere, and its core USA–UK–Australia alliance. Second, the chapter explores the Anglosphere’s various underpinnings, linking nuanced but overlapping identities to shared language, cultural commonalities and intertwined histories, including racialised narratives and an enduring proclivity for expeditionary warfare. Here, the drivers of the Anglosphere are considered in full, despite the limitations of mainstream norms in the study of Politics, International Relations, and their subdisciplines. Third, the chapter considers the recent and contemporary implications of this alliance, setting the ground for the subsequent analysis of Anglosphere foreign policy in Syria.
The Introduction asks three questions: (i) Why study Syria? (ii) Why focus on the foreign policies of the USA, UK and Australia? And, (iii) Why analyse language? First, the case is made for the study of Syria as the principal crisis on the planet today. Second, the case is made for the study of three of the world’s leading interventionist states, intimately connected through a sense of shared values, culture and identity, which propels them into repeated patterns of coalition warfare. Third, the case is made that policy responses and possibilities are contingent upon their discursive architectural foundations. Finally, the Introduction maps out the structure and arguments of the book.