Objective: The purpose of this study was to compare adolescent students with and without concussion on a battery of academic, neurocognitive, and socioemotional measures and assess the aftereffects of concussion across domains of functioning. Methods: Twenty-four adolescents (ages 13–17) reporting postconcussion symptoms were compared to 24 controls matched for age and gender across a battery of tests and surveys. Results: After correcting for multiple comparisons, there were no significant differences on any neuropsychological measures. Similarly, there were no significant group differences on academic measures of vocabulary, word recognition, or reading comprehension. Self-reported concussion symptoms were much greater for students with concussion, as were self-reports of anxiety, depression, and somatization symptoms. Parents also rated those with concussion as having greater depression and somatization symptoms, but not to a degree that survived Bonferroni correction. Lastly, those with concussion reported a significantly greater number of school problems and academic concerns. Conclusions: Results indicated that adolescents who reported postconcussion symptoms do not perform differently from peers on most neurocognitive and academic tasks, yet they showed considerably more worry, somatization, academic concerns, and feelings of inadequacy than matched controls. The findings suggest that interventions to address psychological and academic stress may be indicated for adolescents symptomatic from concussion.

No argument from the Arabic philosophical tradition has received more scholarly attention than Avicenna's ‘flying man’ thought experiment, in which a human is created out of thin air and is able to grasp his existence without grasping that he has a body. This paper offers a new interpretation of the version of this thought experiment found at the end of the first chapter of Avicenna's treatment of soul in the Healing. We argue that it needs to be understood in light of an epistemological theory set out elsewhere by Avicenna, which allows that all the constitutive properties of an essence will be clear to someone who understands and considers that essence. On our reading, this theory is put to work in the ‘flying man’: because the flying man would grasp that his own essence has existence without grasping that he has a body, connection to body cannot be constitutive of the essence.

Self-awareness is often impaired after acquired brain injury (ABI) and this hampers rehabilitation, in general: unrealistic reports by patients about their functioning and poor motivation and compliance with treatment. We evaluated a self-awareness treatment that was part of a treatment protocol on executive dysfunction (Spikman, Boelen, Lamberts, Brouwer, & Fasotti, 2010). A total of 63 patients were included, aged 17–70, suffering non-progressive ABI, and minimum time post-onset of 3 months. Self-awareness was measured by comparing the patient's Dysexecutive Questionnaire (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996) score with that of an independent other. As emotion recognition is associated with self-awareness and influences the effect of rehabilitation treatment, we assessed this function using the Facial Expressions of Emotion-Stimuli and Tests (Young, Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002). Results showed that patients in the experimental treatment group (n = 29) had better self-awareness after training than control patients (n = 34). Moreover, our results confirmed that the level of self-awareness before treatment was related to emotion recognition. Hence, self-awareness can improve after neuropsychological treatment fostering self-monitoring. Since neuropsychological treatment involves social learning, impairments in social cognition should be taken into account before starting and during treatment.

Perceived cognitive difficulties and cognitive impairment are important determinants of employment in people with multiple sclerosis (pwMS). However, it is not clear how they are related to adverse work outcomes and whether the relationship is influenced by depressive symptoms. Thus, this study examined perceived and actual general cognitive and prospective memory function, and cognitive appraisal accuracy, in relation to adverse work outcomes. The possible mediating and/or moderating role of depression was also examined. A cross-sectional community-based sample of 111 participants (33 males, 78 females) completed the Multiple Sclerosis Work Difficulties Questionnaire (MSWDQ), Beck Depression Inventory – Fast Screen (BDI-FS), and questions related to their current or past employment. They then underwent cognitive testing using the Screening Examination for Cognitive Impairment, Auditory Consonant Trigrams test, Zoo Map Test, and Cambridge Prospective Memory Test. Perceived general cognitive and prospective memory difficulties in the workplace and performance on the respective cognitive tests were found to predict unemployment and reduced work hours since MS diagnosis due to MS. Depression was also related to reduced work hours, but it did not explain the relationship between perceived cognitive difficulties and the work outcomes. Nor was it related to cognitive test performance. The results highlight a need to address the perceptions of cognitive difficulties together with cognitive impairment and levels of depression in vocational rehabilitation programs in pwMS. (JINS, 2015, 21, 156–168)

Very few empirically validated interventions for improving metacognitive skills (i.e., self-awareness and self-regulation) and functional outcomes have been reported. This single-case experimental study presents JM, a 36-year-old man with a very severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) who demonstrated long-term awareness deficits. Treatment at four years post-injury involved a metacognitive contextual intervention based on a conceptualization of neuro-cognitive, psychological, and socio-environmental factors contributing to his awareness deficits. The 16-week intervention targeted error awareness and self-correction in two real life settings: (a) cooking at home; and (b) volunteer work. Outcome measures included behavioral observation of error behavior and standardized awareness measures. Relative to baseline performance in the cooking setting, JM demonstrated a 44% reduction in error frequency and increased self-correction. Although no spontaneous generalization was evident in the volunteer work setting, specific training in this environment led to a 39% decrease in errors. JM later gained paid employment and received brief metacognitive training in his work environment. JM's global self-knowledge of deficits assessed by self-report was unchanged after the program. Overall, the study provides preliminary support for a metacognitive contextual approach to improve error awareness and functional outcome in real life settings. (JINS, 2006, 12, 54–63.)

Researchers have begun to explore animals' capacities for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. This exploration could extend the study of animal self-awareness and establish the relationship of self-awareness to other-awareness. It could sharpen descriptions of metacognition in the human literature and suggest the earliest roots of metacognition in human development. We summarize research on uncertainty monitoring by humans, monkeys, and a dolphin within perceptual and metamemory tasks. We extend phylogenetically the search for metacognitive capacities by considering studies that have tested less cognitively sophisticated species. By using the same uncertainty-monitoring paradigms across species, it should be possible to map the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition and illuminate the emergence of mind. We provide a unifying formal description of animals' performances and examine the optimality of their decisional strategies. Finally, we interpret animals' and humans' nearly identical performances psychologically. Low-level, stimulus-based accounts cannot explain the phenomena. The results suggest granting animals a higher-level decision-making process that involves criterion setting using controlled cognitive processes. This conclusion raises the difficult question of animal consciousness. The results show that animals have functional features of or parallels to human conscious cognition. Remaining questions are whether animals also have the phenomenal features that are the feeling/knowing states of human conscious cognition, and whether the present paradigms can be extended to demonstrate that they do. Thus, the comparative study of metacognition potentially grounds the systematic study of animal consciousness.

Poor awareness of deficit is common after brain injury. Recent literature has examined various tools for measurement of this phenomenon; the most widely used being self–other rating scales. Although self–other scale measures have face validity, their criterion-related validity has not been adequately demonstrated, and there is little information as to whether and how they relate to other neuropsychological measures. The present study compared measurement of awareness by the Dysexecutive (DEX) Questionnaire self–other rating scale with the Self-Awareness of Deficits Interview (SADI), a semistructured interview measure. Evaluation of awareness by these measures was compared to tests of executive functioning and IQ. Results indicated significant, albeit marginal relationships between the two measures, and better correlation of the SADI with measures of frontal lobe functioning. The SADI also predicted injury severity. (JINS, 2003, 9, 450–458.)

Darwin, Sex and Status argues that a human sociobiology that mistakes evolutionary theory for theories of psychology and culture is wrong, as are psychologies that could never have evolved or social sciences that posit impossible psychologies. Status develops theories of human self-awareness, cognition, and cultural capacity that are compatible with evolutionary theory. Recurring themes include: the importance of sexual selection in human evolution; our species' preoccupation with self-esteem and relative standing; the individual as an active strategist, regularly revising culturally provided information; and awareness as an impressionmanagement device. Culture is a somewhat structured information pool that itself evolves, often in ways that reduce the genetic fitness of its participants.

Ethologists and comparative psychologists have found that the social behavior, discrimination learning, and especially the communicative behavior of many animals are sufficiently versatile to call into question the customary denial that animals have mental experiences comparable to our own. Many of their behavior patterns suggest that animals have mental images of objects, events, or relationships remote from the immediate stimulus situation, as well as self-awareness and intentions concerning future actions. Our behavioristic Zeitgeist has inhibited investigation of such possibilities, but reopening these long-neglected questions requires no departure from the materialistic approach to biological and behavioral science. The basic question at issue involves a comparison of those aspects of human and nonhuman brain function that sometimes lead to what we call mental experiences, at least in our own species. It seems more feasible to devise objectively verifiable tests for the existence of these general categories of mental experiences than for that of many others. While many other kinds of evidence could well be used (with appropriate caution and all possible controls) to weigh the likelihood that animals sometimes know what they are doing, the experimental use of communicative behavior seems especially promising, because the latter could serve a function analogous to human language, which provides our best evidence about the mental experiences of our fellow men.