To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This article considers the significance of geopolitical space to the configuration of the Russian Empire. The spatial possibilities for empire depend in part on what other empires have set in place or ignored. Moscow emerged as a bud of imperial power because at the start no great power was interested in its backwater location. Ambitious princes in this region had a chance to expand and learn how to govern before other powers took notice. Moscow’s leaders also had the good geographical fortune of eventually rubbing up against multiple imperial powers during their history. Their dynasty, the Rus’, had integrated Viking and Eurasian-style political practices on the way to power in Kiev. Kiev bequeathed Muscovites a distinctly imperial state religion – Byzantine-style Christianity with its linguistic tolerance, writing systems, and resplendent art. When the Mongols extended their western empire into the lands of the Rus’, the Muscovites acquired useful administrative techniques and were compelled into expansion to retain their hold as first-rank subordinates of the Chinggisid khans. The subsequent Romanov dynasty and the later communist and post-communist leaders continued the practices of expansion in Eurasian space and inclusion of unlike peoples under imperial protection and discipline. Russia’s rulers kept acquiring military, economic, and cultural skills from a series of imperial competitors – the Ottomans, Habsburgs, Prussians, British and the rest of what became known as the West – over the next centuries and into the present. At the start, distance from great powers gave Moscow time to run over smaller ones, but eventually expansion outward in multiple directions was critical to how Russians put their empires together and ruled them.
The great budgetary transformation of central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union demonstrates the critical importance of economic context, political culture, history, and institutions in the recreation of public financial management systems. Since the collapse of the USSR, countries in this region have served as fiscal laboratories that experiment with budgetary reforms. This includes countries like Hungary and Poland that joined the European Union.
In the nineteenth-century South Caucasus, hundreds of local farmers and nomads petitioned Russian authorities to allow them to become Christians. Most of them were Muslims and specifically requested to join the Armenian Apostolic Church. This article explores religious conversions to Armenian Christianity on Russia's mountainous southern border with the Ottoman Empire and Iran. It demonstrates that tsarist reforms, chiefly the peasant reform and the sedentarization of nomads, accelerated labor migration within the region, bringing many Muslims, Yazidis, and Assyrians into an Armenian environment. Local anxieties over Russian colonialism further encouraged conversions. I argue that by converting to Armenian Christianity many rural South Caucasians benefited from a change in their legal status, which came with the right to move residence, access to agricultural land, and other freedoms. Russia's Jewish communities, on the other hand, saw conversion to Armenian Christianity as a legal means to circumvent discrimination and obtain the right to live outside of the Pale of Settlement. By drawing on converts’ petitions and officials’ decisions, this article illustrates that the Russian government emerged as an ultimate arbiter of religious conversions, evaluating the sincerity of petitioners’ faith and how Armenian they had become, while preserving the empire's religious and social hierarchies.
The Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently being undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment toward the LIO's status hierarchy, rather than simply by economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semiperiphery, fueled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically, and organizationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.
Panskyite, Pd9Ag2Pb2S4, is a new mineral (IMA2020–039) discovered in the platinum-group element mineralisation of the Southern Kievey ore occurrence of the Fedorova–Pana layered intrusion, Kola Peninsula, Russia. It forms tiny anhedral grains (of 0.5 to 10 μm in size) in the interstices of rock-forming silicates, often forming tiny inclusions in base-metal sulfides (millerite, chalcopyrite, bornite and chalcocite) and complex intergrowths with other platinum group minerals (zvyagintsevite, laflammeite, vysotskite, thalhammerite, unnamed phase Pd9Ag2(Tl,Pb)2S4 and others). In plane-polarised light, panskyite is creamy white with weak bireflectance, weak pleochroism and distinct anisotropy with brown to grey rotation tints; it exhibits no internal reflections. Reflectance values for panskyite in air (R1, R2 in %) are: 43.8, 44.1 at 470 nm; 44.4, 44.7 at 546 nm; 45.6, 45.8 at 589 nm; and 47.2, 47.2 at 650 nm. Twelve electron-microprobe analyses of panskyite gave an average composition: Pd 55.61, Ag 12.36, Pb 23.50, Fe 0.21, Ni 0.24 and S 7.17 total 99.09 wt.%, corresponding to the formula (Pd9.05Fe0.07Ni0.07)Σ9.19Ag1.98Pb1.96S3.87 based on 17 atoms; the average of nine analyses on the synthetic analogue is: Pd 57.02, Ag 14.17, Pb 21.81 and S 7.44, total 100.44 wt.%, corresponding to Pd9.07Ag2.22Pb1.78S3.93. The density, calculated on the basis of the empirical formula, is 9.81 g/cm3. The mineral is tetragonal, space group I4/mmm, with a = 7.973(3), c = 9.139(3) Å, V = 581.0(4) Å3 and Z = 2. The crystal structure was solved from the single-crystal and powder X-ray diffraction data of synthetic Pd9Ag2Pb2S4. Panskyite is isostructural with thalhammerite (Pd9Ag2Bi2S4). The mineral name is for the locality, the Pansky massif of the Fedorova–Pana layered intrusion in the Kola Peninsula, Russia.
Stravinsky was a composer frequently given to announcing music’s independence from the other arts – in particular, its independence from literature. ‘In general’, he wrote in a well-known screed of 1924, ‘I consider that music is only able to solve musical problems; and nothing else, neither the literary nor the picturesque, can be in music of any real interest.’1 Almost forty years later he still defined music in anti-literary terms, asserting (in an article for the official newspaper of the Communist Youth League, of all things): ‘The language of music is a special language; it is not the same as the language of literature.’2
The Campanian Beloe Ozero locality within the Rybushka Formation in Saratov Province, Russia, is one of the richest and most diverse Upper Cretaceous pterosaur localities in Europe. It produces identifiable remains of Pteranodontidae indet. and Azhdarchidae indet., as well as bones which can be attributed to either of these groups. The pteranodontid specimens from the Beloe Ozero locality described in this paper include a cervical III, distal scapula, humerus deltopectoral crest, proximal syncarpal, preaxial carpal and complete femur. Based on the femur and proximal syncarpal, the wingspan estimate for the Beloe Ozero pteranodontid varies from 5.2 to 6.5 m. Volgadraco bogolubovi, known from the neighbouring Shyrokii Karamysh locality of the same formation and attributed previously to the Azhdarchidae, is more likely pteranodontid than azhdarchid. The other putative records of the Pteranodontidae in the Late Cretaceous of North America, Europe and Asia are discussed. Pteranodontid pterosaurs had a much wider distribution on the northern continents in the Late Cretaceous than previously thought.
With wavering US support and Brexit unfolding, cooperation between Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, and the United Kingdom, Western Europe's prime military power, becomes crucial for Europe's overall ability to deal with a resurgent Russia. Does institutional and normative disintegration between states, such as the Brexit process, weaken bilateral security cooperation? This article argues that such cooperation persists if both states continue to jointly perceive a third actor as threatening while regarding each other as useful and reliable when it comes to ameliorating this shared threat. The argument is tested on a case of intrinsic theoretical, historical, and political importance: British-German cooperation towards Russia before and after the 2016 Brexit referendum. The article finds, against a wide pessimist consensus to the contrary, that cooperation strengthened during the Brexit process. As the Ukraine crisis had caused converging threat perceptions since 2014, Brexit incentivised both sides to signal ongoing reliability to each other and, consequently, to view each other as more capable allies. The article combines qualitative comparisons and congruence analysis, drawing data from British, German and Russian primary sources in their respective original languages, including foreign and security policy documents as well as interviews with stakeholders involved in policy formation.
The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 caused the United States to sever relations with Germany, though President Wilson held out hope for peace until learning that the German foreign secretary, Zimmermann, sought to turn Mexico against the US and use it as an intermediary to turn Japan against the Allies. Amid these tensions Nicholas II was overthrown and succeeded by a Provisional Government, ultimately led by Kerensky, which made the fateful decision to keep Russia in the war. In April 1917, days after the United States declared war, Germany gave Lenin transportation home from Switzerland, hoping he would foment a second revolution and knock Russia out of the war. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917, Lenin indeed concluded an armistice with the Central Powers, but only after his appeal for a general peace “without annexations or indemnities” failed. The net result of the United States replacing tsarist Russia gave the Allies an ideological cohesion they had lacked previously. While Wilson characterized their war as a fight for universal rights and freedoms, the entry of the United States gave them millions of fresh troops to go with the capital, munitions, and supplies they were already receiving from American sources.
As the war plans of the great powers unfolded, few foresaw the stalemate that would set in by the end of 1914. Under Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, seven of its eight field armies were to attack France and achieve victory within six weeks, after which most of the troops would be withdrawn for action against Russia. In the meantime, Russia would have to be checked by Austria-Hungary, which Germany expected to abandon its own priority of crushing Serbia. The French, with the help of the British Expeditionary Force, won at the Marne against the Germans, who then dug in to consolidate their conquests. In “the Race to the Sea,” a series of failed flanking maneuvers by both sides established trench lines north to Flanders. By December 1914 a continuous Western front existed from the English Channel to Switzerland. Meanwhile, in the east, Germany’s Eighth Army, under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, defeated two Russian armies at Tannenberg, but Austro-Hungarian forces divided between Serbian and Russian objectives failed to conquer Serbia, were defeated by the Russians at Lemberg, and ultimately held the line of the Carpathians in a bloody winter campaign. The Ottoman Empire entered the war, creating another front against Russia in the Caucasus.
Russia is the largest country in the world, ranking ninth by population with 146.8 million people. It contains 30 percent of the world’s natural resources, making it the most resource-rich country in the world. The Russian economy is sixth in the world in terms of GDP (purchasing power parity), according to the IMF. Our study of companies’ strategic capabilities is based on a comparative analysis of five firms operating in Russia. Three of them are domestic – SIBUR (Siberian-Ural petrochemical and Gas Company), Gazprom Marketing & Trading (part of the Gazprom group), and ByTerg, all representing exporters in the high-tech industry. The other two firms are multinational companies – Ecolab and Swilar, representing the high-tech and service industries respectively. This qualitative study, relying on semi-structured interviews, revealed that customer orientation is a crucial strategic capability, highlighted by all firms. Very important strategic capabilities also include product manufacturing and general sales capabilities (highlighted by 80 percent of respondents).
We investigate how the relevance of the Lean Production System (LPS) as perceived by employees of a Russian bank depends on whether LPS practices are labeled with transliterated original Japanese words or translated Russian words. Building on organizational translation scholarship contextualized to Russia, we formulate hypotheses about the mechanism through which labels affect the perceived relevance of practices. The results of an experimental study situated in a Russian bank show that transliterated Japanese labels have a negative impact on the perceived relevance of LPS practices by Russian employees. Further analysis reveals that this negative perception is fully mediated by the label's semantic fit, that is, the extent to which the label complies with the linguistic codes of the Russian language. Specifically, we find that, on average, the transliterated Japanese labels have a lower semantic fit than the translated Russian labels, and this difference in semantic fit explains the Japanese labels’ lower relevance as perceived by the bank's employees. By unpacking the causal effect of the labels used for management practices on the practices’ perceived relevance, this study advances our understanding of how organizations could influence employees’ acceptance of foreign management practices.
In a path-breaking study of Russian elections, Regina Smyth reveals how much electoral competition matters to the Putin regime and how competition leaves Russia more vulnerable to opposition challenges than is perceived in the West. Using original data and analysis, Smyth demonstrates how even weak political opposition can force autocratic incumbents to rethink strategy and find compromises in order to win elections. Smyth challenges conventional notions about Putin's regime, highlighting the vast resources the Kremlin expends to maintain a permanent campaign to construct regime-friendly majorities. These tactics include disinformation as well as symbolic politics, social benefits, repression, and falsification. This book reveals the stresses and challenges of maintaining an electoral authoritarian regime and provides a roadmap to understand how seemingly stable authoritarian systems can fall quickly to popular challenges even when the opposition is weak. A must-read for understanding Russia's future and the role of elections in contemporary autocratic regimes.
According to the Mongol imperial ideology, when the Mongols fought with neighboring nations, they not only expanded their empire by conquest but also fulfilled the heavenly task of establishing order throughout the world by subordinating it to Chinggis khan (r.1206–27) and his successors. Therefore, the Mongols demanded the subordination to their empire of all peoples without exception, regardless of whether they were nomadic or sedentary. To be at peace with the Mongols meant unquestioning obedience to them, and other nations could not hope for peace without the official recognition of this subordination.
Throughout the past two decades, the number of studies examining the adaptive capacity of Arctic communities in the context of climate change has been increasing; however, little is known about Arctic communities’ ability to adapt to certain emerging changes, such as increased shipping activity. To address this knowledge gap, this study systematically analyses published scientific articles on community adaptive capacity in circumpolar Arctic, including articles published in Russian which may not be captured in English-only reviews. Throughout this review, the study focuses on three areas: the development of the adaptive capacity framework; the conditions that enable community adaption abilities; and the extent to which shipping developments are addressed in the literature. This study demonstrates that the adaptive capacity framework has been significantly developed both theoretically and methodologically and is broadly used to address new types of climatic and non-climatic changes. Though the impacts from the shipping development are discussed in some studies, there is a clear need for further examination of coastal communities’ ability to adapt to such changes. Additionally, the study reveals limitations in the application of the Western conceptual terminology when exploring community-based research by Russian scholars.
The first formal bone tool in the Central Altai of Russia was found in an Early Upper Palaeolithic assemblage at the Kara-Bom open-air site. Here the authors report the results of AMS dating, use-wear analysis, 3D-modelling and zooarchaeological and collagen fingerprinting analysis, which reveal important new insights into the osseous technology of the Kara-Bomian tradition.
Umbilicaria orientalis Davydov sp. nov. is described and phylogenetic analysis (ITS, mtLSU and RPB2) confirmed its distinctness and indicated a sister relationship with U. trabeculata within the U. vellea group. The species is morphologically similar to U. vellea but differs by simple, cylindrical or strap-like rhizinomorphs and by thalloconidia, developing both on the lower surface and on rhizinomorphs, that are 1–2 (rarely 4)–celled or in aggregates of up to 5–6 cells. Umbilicaria orientalis is described from the Russian Far East and is currently known from a wide range of localities in East Asia, from the Far East to South Siberia and Mongolia in the north, to Hebei and Tibet in the south. New sequences of U. americana were obtained; the species represents an independent phylogenetic lineage within Umbilicaria subg. Papillophora. Diagnostic traits and variability of different developmental stages of U. orientalis, as well as its East Asian distribution pattern, are discussed.
This article assesses Russian strategic narratives towards its interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–16) based on a new database of 50 statements posted on the websites of the Russian Mission to the United Nations and the President of Russia homepage. By looking more broadly at Russian strategic narratives aimed at persuading other global actors and publics abroad and at home, this article identifies how Russia attempted to develop a story that could win global acceptance. This analysis shows that contrary to traditional Russian emphasis on sovereign responsibility and non-intervention, Russia supported claims for self-determination by separatist groups in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia used deception and disinformation in its strategic narratives as it mis-characterized these conflicts using Responsibility to Protect (R2P) language, yet mostly justified its own interventions through references to other sources of international law. Russian strategic narratives focused on delegitimizing the perceived opponents, making the case for the appropriateness of its own actions, and projecting what it proposed as the proper solution to the conflicts. It largely avoided making any references to its own involvement in the Donbas at all. Additionally, Russia’s focus on the protection of co-ethnics and Russian-speakers is reminiscent of interventions in the pre-R2P era.