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The opera Carmen has been at the centre of vivid debates on Spanish national identity since its premiere. Praised abroad for its Spanish melodies, Bizet’s work could hardy be taken as authentic in the country where Mérimée set his 1845 novella. This chapter explores the interpretation of the opera by intellectuals and music critics from Andalusia and the Basque provinces, the two most prominent geographical references in the work.
The chapter offers a contextualisation and charts the reception of the opera within the Spanish cultural politics of the period which coincided with the blossoming of peripheral regionalisms, and nuances existing accounts of the opera’s reception in Spain. First it surveys the case of Andalusia, placing the arrival of the opera alongside the assimilation of its culture as the quintessential expression of the nation’s identity. Secondly, it shows Basque reactions to Carmen, which further exemplified the difficulty of consolidating the one-size-fits-all idea of Spanishness that the opera transmitted abroad. The chapter presents a cultural history of the reception of the opera together with a discussion of the cultural politics of the rich web of ethnic identities that constitute modern Spain.
The Conclusion begins with some thoughts on two historical changes that seem especially pertinent to the study at hand: the relationship between imperial authority and colonial autonomy, and the rise of British power in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world. The chapter then returns to the microregional framework of analysis presented in Chapter 1 and its specific dynamics in the context of the colonial Leeward Islands, followed by a discussion of the relevance of the concept for global imperial and maritime history more broadly, as well as for the study of nineteenth-century globalization. In exploring the usefulness of the microregional framework for analysis, the chapter discusses other inter-imperial microregions across the nineteenth century, including the Gold Coast in West Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles in the Indian Ocean, Singapore and the Strait of Melaka, the South China Coast, and Shanghai during the period of the International Settlement.
Chapter 1 outlines the arguments of the book, provides a brief introduction to the Caribbean during the age of revolutions, and gives an overview of the geography, population, and political composition of the Leeward Islands, focusing in particular on the Danish West Indies, the British Virgin Islands, and Swedish St. Barthélemy. It then places the book within broader historiographical debates about Atlantic, global, and imperial history, before presenting the analytical model of the inter-imperial microregion. This model draws on relational theory and practice analysis to provide a framework for understanding zones of interaction and integration in the borderlands of overseas empires, emphasizing networks of border-crossing practice involving the subjects of multiple empires and colonies.
The election of Donald Trump and his decision to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represented a shock to the Canadian and Mexican governments and business elites. Drawing on the New Regionalism(s) Approach (NRA), this article reviews the response of the Canadian state to the crisis in the North American regional project. I argue that this newer theoretical approach better explains the dynamics of regionalization or regional decomposition than mainstream theories by integrating the role played by uneven globalization, normative and ideational dimensions, and civil society in processes of regional integration and/or decomposition.
This chapter examines the intersection of regionalisms and queer studies with special attention to US literary studies. It asks what difference, if any, queer critical regionalism as an intellectual approach may make in analyses of literature of the imperial center. Attempting to answer this question, the chapter revisits a short story that depicts queer love – “The Queen’s Twin” (1899) – by Sarah Orne Jewett, a US regionalist writer who has figured prominently in both scholarship on US literary regionalism and queer studies. By analyzing this story, the chapter demonstrates the potential of queer critical regionalism as an approach that both encourages comparative and transnational queer studies research and enables reevaluation of texts like Jewett’s that have hitherto been understood as foundational to a queer Western literary canon.
Mumbai’s industrial character having faded, the city has turned more nativist. Religious riots in the 1990s caused rifts to deepen and Muslims found themselves confined to ghettos. Waes of aggression have also been directed at outsiders, particularly working class labourers from the north referred to as ‘bhaiyya’ or brother. This chapter examines internal migration and the author’s struggle to try and belong to the city as a woman and a female ‘brother’.
Chapter 5 assesses the CCP’s efforts to industrialize China during the Third Front campaign. I demonstrate that the Third Front constrained development by dedicating economic resources to costly projects in the interior instead of focusing on less expensive coastal endeavors. The Cultural Revolution also elevated construction costs by hindering the completion of projects. The Third Front, however, was the sole economic policy that Party leaders formulated at the time to develop inland areas, and despite its many problems, it helped to lessen regional economic differences. The industrialization of inland China in turn provided a foundation for post-Mao economic growth by accelerating the movement of regional resources, linking the interior more tightly into national networks, and fostering the CCP’s aspiration to industrialize whole regions.
Chapter 2 examines how the CCP recruited millions of workers to construct the Third Front. Party officials sought to socially engineer a labor force that embraced Maoist norms and disregarded difficulties that moving to remote inland areas brought to their family or their own person. In practice, people responded to recruitment in various ways. Some thought of expanding China’s industrial defenses as a way of manifesting their devotion to Chinese socialism. Many others were more concerned about the material benefits and burdens that Third Front participation would bring to their region, factory, family, or self. Shanghai leaders urged central planners not to neglect the coast, whereas administrators in inland provinces requested more skilled workers and equipment. Urban residents fretted over what housing, schooling, and cultural activities would be available in China’s impoverished hinterlands. Rural youth, on the other hand, were eager to earn higher wages. But many of their parents were worried about losing household labor and the possibility that their children might be accidentally injured or die. Overall, my research illustrates that the consequences of enlisting in the Third Front were not always clear and that the value of being involved varied according to one’s geographical, social, and economic position.
Chapter 4 chronicles everyday life in the first Third Front project that Mao proposed – the steel town of Panzhihua in southern Sichuan. I demonstrate that Maoist ideas about how to build Chinese socialism profoundly impacted daily affairs in Panzhihua. In accordance with Maoism’s productivist ethos, officials focused on increasing production and building high-tech industry. Workers, meanwhile, were housed for years in barracks-style tents and provided with minimal consumer goods. Many Panzhihua residents did not experience the austerity of everyday life in ways that the Party considered appropriate to a good Maoist subject. Some recruits did not accept the CCP’s expectation that they be satisfied with building socialism wherever the Party decided was best. Others tired of their hectic work schedule and were bored with Panzhihua’s limited cultural life. Urban recruits desired to be with family in distant locations and move to a city higher up in socialist China’s socioeconomic order. Rural folk also wished to be with family but in contrast to urbanites they considered gaining access to the welfare provisions of a state–owned enterprise to be a route out of rural poverty. On both sides of the urban–rural divide, practices of daily life became the contested ground of Maoist developmentalism.
The early modern period, 1500–1800, was one of the most volatile periods of Vietnam’s long history. It saw three dynastic transitions, the separation of the nation into two autonomous realms beginning in the early seventeenth century, and a succession of popular rebellions that dominated the historical landscape of the eighteenth century. The contours of these upheavals were driven variously by internal political tensions, the expansion of Vietnamese state authority into new regions, questions of dynastic legitimacy, and, ultimately, economic hardships caused in part by a collapse of foreign trade and currency fluctuations. Violent rebellions were a prominent feature of these events, some driven by inter-family rivalries among elites, others sparked from among rural populations in protest at economic woes. The effects of all of these challenges to state authority were profound. Large-scale dislocation of populations was a prominent element, as was forced military and labour service that only caused further discontent among peasant farmers. This chapter traces these events chronologically within a larger analytical framework that contextualises upheaval in terms of large-scale political, economic and sociological phenomena.
Croatia’s monumental second-place finish at the 2018 FIFA World Cup represents the highest football achievement to date for the young nation. This victory, however, masks violent internal divisions between its domestic club football teams. This article examines the most salient rivalry between Dinamo Zagreb and Hajduk Split, two teams that have evolved to represent the interests of Croatia’s north and south, respectively. Using interviews with radical football fans, I argue that the two teams act as reservoirs for regional identity-building while violence between their fans is a microcosm for political and economic tensions between Zagreb and Split. More importantly, this rivalry exposes the dividedness of the Croatian state, as it continues to grapple with the complexity of its radical regional identities in the wake of its independence from Yugoslavia. This article contributes to the existing body of literature on sports identity and regionalisms/nationalism as well as how sporting teams shape the geographies of belonging.
This chapter sketches Jeddah’s transformation from the mid-twentieth to the early twenty-first century. Old Jeddah transformed from a slowly expanding town centre to an urban slum. Only the registration as a World Heritage Site in 2014 reversed this trend. Today, trade and pilgrimage are still important for Jeddah’s economy. However, most of the trade passes through a large container port in Southern Jeddah, and pilgrims are ferried directly from a special terminal at Jeddah’s international airport to Mecca. They no longer pass through the city and have only recently been invited back as tourists. The renewed interest in the old city as a cultural heritage site has made it central to local and Saudi Arabian contests over identity. While ‘strangers’ no longer can integrate easily, the cosmopolitan heritage is celebrated. At the same time, inhabitants of former suburbs also lay claim to the urban history. The ongoing debate about the historical identity of old Jeddah thus reflects wider debates within Saudi Arabian society.
This article examines the theoretical connections between identity and linked fate, extending the latter concept across three countries and four types of (potential) identity groups. This belief, that what happens to one's ethnic group, religious group, region, or class shapes one's own life chances, is an understudied middle ground between ideational and material drivers of political attitudes. The study uses experimental and observational analyses to show that the strength of individuals' beliefs in linked fate and that belief's consequences vary in systematic and predictable ways. From the very material effect of labor market uncertainty to the highly ideational effect of regional identity, linked fate is a cognitive bridge between two very different kinds of social–psychological experiences that can (and should) be applied across a wide range of countries and groups.
One of the most significant components of a formative modern Irish literary canon in the middle decades of the twentieth century is its interaction with a neighbouring British literary tradition. In its emphasis on this mid-century hinterland the chapter seeks to revise existing concepts of ‘resurgence’ in the Irish poetry of the 1970s, and explores instead the aesthetic inheritances, connections and continuities that define this period. It initially discusses how members of the poetic coterie in 1940s Dublin, Austin Clarke and Valentin Iremonger, responded in different ways to the publication of Freda Naughton’s A Transitory House by Jonathan Cape in 1945. In being dismissed or praised for its detachment from Ireland, this – her first and only volume - offered a sounding board for anxieties about these writers’ status in relation to England. A similar kind of anxiety is found in the Ulster poetry and criticism of John Hewitt, Roy McFadden and particularly Robert Graecen during these years, writers who held an awkward position in relation to both British and Irish traditions. It then tracks a series of engagements through the 1950s, when Philip Larkin was in Belfast and Donald Davie was in Dublin, locations which were far more productive for the latter than the former.
After World War II, the US-led international security order exhibited substantial regional variation. Explaining this variation has been central to the debate over why is there no nato in Asia. But this debate overlooks the emergence of multilateral security arrangements between the United States and Latin American countries during the same critical juncture. These inter-American institutions are puzzling considering the three factors most commonly used to explain divergence between nato and Asia: burden-sharing, external threats, and collective identity. These conditions fail to explain contemporaneous emergence of inter-American security multilateralism. Although the postwar inter-American system has been characterized as the solidification of US dominance, at the time of its framing, Latin American leaders judged the inter-American system as their best bet for maintaining beneficial US involvement in the Western Hemisphere while reinforcing voice opportunities for weaker states and imposing institutional constraints on US unilateralism. Drawing on multinational archival research, the author advances a historical institutionalist account. Shared historical antecedents of regionalism shaped the range of choices for Latin American and US leaders regarding the desirability and nature of new regional institutions while facilitating institutional change through mechanisms of layering and conversion during this critical juncture.
The Libyan case study in Chapter 3 reveals how harrowing the introduction of democratic elections can be in countries without national unity or any of the attributes of a modern state. Qaddafi’s ideology of a stateless, egalitarian society based on an idiosyncratic blend of Islamic and Marxist concepts left Libya’s transitional regime largely without a bureaucratic apparatus to implement policies. Qaddafi had also reinvigorated Libya’s tribal system by favoring his own and punishing the region and tribes that were the base of support for the prior monarchical regime. Competitive elections in Libya were implemented in a country without a national military that could monopolize the use of violence. In its place, during the civil war, a welter of regional, local, tribal, and ideological militias – some more powerful than the “national military” – emerged and prevented transitional governments from being able to provide peace and security for Libyans. There was also a military strongman in Libya, General Haftar, seeking to utilize the near anarchic conditions to forge a military authoritarian regime – by reining in the militias and providing desperately needed security.
This article examines change and continuity in the United States' recent foreign policy toward Cuba. In the context of the posthegemonic regionalism of the Pink Tide and regional disputes over Cuba's position in the interamerican system, the Obama administration's rapprochement was driven to protect the institutional power and consensual features of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. The Trump administration reversed aspects of Obama's normalization policy, adopting a more coercive approach to Cuba and to Latin America more broadly. Against the emerging scholarly proposition that the international relations of the Americas have crossed a posthegemonic threshold, this analysis utilizes a neo-Gramscian approach to argue that the oscillations in U.S. Cuba policy represent strategic shifts in a broader process of hegemonic reconstitution. The article thus situates U.S. policy toward Cuba in regional structures, institutions, and dynamics.
Mark Twain can be seen as one of the writers of local color and regional literature during his time. His Western writings and his evocation of the Mississippi River make him part of the movement of local color and regionalism that were important as realism emerged as a literary period. Bret Harte in the West, Harriet Beecher Stowe in New England, and Kate Chopin in Louisiana are just a few examples of the writers in this important trend.
Pan-Americanism’s promotion of liberal internationalism and pan-Africanism’s appeals to transnational solidarity among African people(s) provided useful frames for critics of non-interference to make it the subject of debate. I argue that the content and political salience of pan-Americanism & pan-Africanism empowered – or even inspired – critics of non-interference in these regions. In this chapter I offer a long-term account of the (uneven) erosion of non-interference at the regional level in the global South, an account centering on the contestedness of this norm within the OAS and OAU compared to ASEAN during the Cold War period. This contestation (at the level of discourse) contributed over time to norm erosion (at the level of law and practice). Pan-Asianism did not serve the same function. Since non-interference was less contested in Southeast Asia (and not on these grounds), it was therefore more robust or resilient over time. Because of the history of norm contestation and erosion, the three regional groupings arrived at the 1980s with different normative priors. This meant that Latin America and Africa were more amenable to the intrusive regionalism trend than was Southeast Asia.
Because of variation in the discursive foundations of regionalism and in the degree and nature of norm contestation and erosion, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia arrived at the end of the Cold War with different normative priors. These normative priors interacted with other key variables during the second wave of regionalism, one of which is regime type. Democratization in Latin America during the 1980s was extensive, and, by the end of this decade, the region boasted a high “density” of democracy. The achievement of this critical mass of democracies contributed to the renewal of the development of intrusive regionalism (especially aimed at democracy promotion) in the region. Neither Africa nor Southeast Asia has achieved this density. Although average democracy scores in these other regions have been on the rise in the last twenty years, they remain in the “anocracy” range. Even though high democratic density was not achieved in these two regions, though, individual states democratized, and emerging democracies with regional leadership aspirations, like South Africa and Indonesia, have been at the forefront of regional reform campaigns.