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We have been invited to consider the memory and significance of the October Revolution on this, its centennial, anniversary, and have been asked to do so alongside the surprise, colour and ineffable promise of Konstantin Yuon’s resplendent New Planet, which can be read ‘either as a will for change or as a fear of what is to come’.1 The year 1917 also saw the adoption of the Mexican Constitution, which had ‘legitimate pride in showing the world that it is the first to consign in a constitution the sacred rights of the workers’,2 and that had occurred in February of that tumultuous year,3 well before the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic of July 1918 delivered its ‘declaration of rights of the labouring and exploited people’.4
With these phrases the president spoke of the Allied Powers’ plan to establish a new organisation – one based on the principles of universality and freedom. Nevertheless, while this association would not ‘shut out anybody’, it was clear that the terms of its creation would be dictated by a limited group – the delegates of the states who would constitute the Commission on the League of Nations. Of course, the leaders who heard this address on 18 January 1919 were by no means representative of the international community. The most notable absences were the former enemy powers, but there were others not present at the meeting in Paris, including Russia and Mexico. While the absence of the former was keenly felt by the Allied Powers, and the ‘Russian question’ was the subject of much discussion, the lack of an invitation to Mexico, as a neutral power, did not excite the same interest, at least in the formal discussions.2
Governments — Status of government — Recognition — Whether particular entity to be treated as the government of a State — Role of national courts — Recognition a matter for the executive — Whether national court entitled to entertain challenge to the constitutional validity of foreign government’s acts — Nature of challenge — Whether upholding challenge would require court to inquire into status of foreign government — Libya — Revolution in 2011 — Existence of competing regimes — Whether United Kingdom Government had recognized one entity as the Government of Libya
Recognition — Governments — United Kingdom policy — April 1980 Statement that United Kingdom Government would no longer make formal statements regarding recognition of foreign governments — Whether precluding statement of recognition in all circumstances — Evidence of recognition — Letters from Foreign and Commonwealth Office — Whether indicating unequivocal recognition — Libya — Competing regimes
Relationship of international law and municipal law — Whether entity the government of a foreign State — Whether determination of that issue a matter for courts or government — Effect of unequivocal recognition by government of forum State — Whether courts entitled to call such recognition into question — Separation of powers — Difference from doctrines of act of State, sovereign immunity and non-justiciability — The law of England
Recognition — States — Acts of an unrecognized State — Somaliland — Whether capable of recognition — Everyday acts of administration — Marriage — Namibia doctrine — Whether court in England entitled to grant declaration of marital status to couple married in Somaliland
Relationship of international law and municipal law — Matters reserved to executive — Recognition — Principle that executive and courts should speak with one voice — Whether English courts entitled to recognize acts of a State not recognized by the Government of the United Kingdom — Marriage in unrecognized State
States — Somaliland — Whether recognized — Consequences of non-recognition — The law of England and Wales
This response takes as its starting point the twofold agenda Winfried Siemerling pursues in The Black Atlantic Reconsidered: his systematic outline of a history of Black writing in Canada from the eighteenth century to the present and his goal to fill a geographical gap in Paul Gilroy’s influential concept of the Black Atlantic, thereby also offering a reconsideration of this concept. I suggest that, although Siemerling is clearly successful with regard to the first aspect, he is only partially so with regard to the second, with the logic of a nation-based literary history to some extent countering the agenda of the constitutive transnationality of the Black Atlantic. This tension between the two agendas, I suggest, results in crucial questions concerning the complex relationship among the national, the transnational, and the diasporic in the specific logic of literary histories.
In this response to the incisive and stimulating discussions by Karina Vernon, Robert S. Levine, Barrington Walker, and Katja Sarkowsky of The Black Atlantic Reconsidered, I focus on the dynamic dimensions of Black Canadian and Black Atlantic time-spaces and temporalities, as well as issues of public, institutional, and pedagogical inclusion, incorporation, recognition, and transformation. In addition, questions of history and its uses, social aesthetics, and contrapuntal national/transnational frameworks are brought to the fore, often with reference to specific texts, to reflect on Black Canadian cultural achievement and its transnational and diasporic contexts both past and present.
The Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently being undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment toward the LIO's status hierarchy, rather than simply by economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semiperiphery, fueled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically, and organizationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.
This paper is concerned with when, if ever, deceptive sex should be criminalised. It defends the idea that it is necessary to distinguish between deceptions that will generally be punishable from those that will not and puts forward a novel framework for carrying out this task. Based on the concept of identity nonrecognition, this framework also offers a new way of understanding what makes certain kinds of deceptive sex wrongful. After setting out this framework, I analyse each of the deceptions that is most often carried out within ‘ordinary’ contexts, explaining why only some of these should generally be punished. The paper concludes by suggesting that identity nonrecognition has the potential to inform criminalisation debates more generally, and that its relevance extends beyond discussions about deceptive sex.
This chapter shows that in the British intellectual tradition, the Scottish moralists, followed by Hume and Smith, saw reliance upon the opinion of others (“recognition”) in a completely different way than the French tradition. Instead of being viewed as something intrinsically negative and self-destructive, such reliance is described – sometimes with the same words – as something positive, contributing to epistemic and moral self-control. The central notions used in the British tradition to describe these positive effects of being dependent on others are “sympathy”, “inner spectator” and “impartial observer”. The chapter also shows that John Stuart Mill adopted the same line of thought by reserving a very positive role for the judgment of others. The chapter also attempts to identify sociopolitical reasons that may explain why such a positive understanding might have prevailed in British culture.
This final chapter not only compares the different approaches in terms of conceptual strategies and theoretical premises but also evaluates their advantages and disadvantages. In particular, it shows that the German tradition provides the most general account of recognition but also lacks the critical observations made by the two other accounts. In the French tradition the emphasis on the potential for domination helps to overcome the “power-blindness” of the German notion of "recognition”; in the British tradition the emphasis on the importance of education and socialization helps to overcome the “educational blindness” of the German tradition. In this spirit the final chapter offers a systematic integration of all three notions of “recognition” that were reconstructed in the earlier chapters.
Recent studies in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) have suggested that AD patients are not always able to rely on their feeling of familiarity to improve their memory decisions to the same extent as healthy participants. This underuse of familiarity in AD could result from a learned reinterpretation of fluency as a poor cue for memory that would prevent them to attribute a feeling of fluency to a previous encounter. The primary goal of this study was to determine whether AD patients could relearn the association between processing fluency and past exposure after being repeatedly exposed to situations where using this association improves the accuracy of their memory decisions.
Thirty-nine patients with probable AD were recruited and asked to complete several recognition tests. During these tests, participants were put either in a condition where the positive contingency between fluent processing and previous encounters with an item was systematically confirmed (intervention condition) or in a condition where there was no correlation between fluency and prior exposure (control condition). The efficacy of the intervention was evaluated at three time points (baseline, posttest, and 3-month follow-up).
Our results indicated that all AD patients do not benefit to the same extent from the training. Two variables appeared to influence the likelihood that participants increase and maintain their reliance on the fluency cues after the intervention: the ability to detect the fluency manipulation and the preservation of implicit metacognitive skills.
These findings indicate the importance of metacognition for inferential attribution processes in memory.
Chapter 2 analyses the dialectic of “determinations of reflection” in the logic of essence. It shows that the relation of “opposition” is more fundamental than the relation of “diversity,” and that, therefore, individuals are constituted through the relation of opposition that obtains between them. Turning to Marx, I argue that the relation between capital and labour is necessarily oppositional in character. Thus, the seeming diversity in labour arrangements in different economic settings in capitalism functions only as an illusion that masks the deeper relations of opposition and domination. Finally, I discuss Catharine MacKinnon’s conception of gender formation, according to which the very categories of male and female are constituted by the relation of opposition and domination that obtains between them.
Chapter eight discusses developments in the apportionment of jurisdiction between arbitrators and courts concerning the validity of contracts containing arbitration clauses, as well as developments pertaining to the severability doctrine and its connection to the U.S. common law on adjudicating challenges to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. The issue of orthodox and U.S. common law arbitrability as a gateway issue also is reviewed.
The fifth chapter consists of a discussion of the International Bar Association (“IBA”) Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, with reference to the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, the Rules of the International Center for Dispute Resolution, and the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration. This section culminates with a synthesis of international arbitration rules analyzed through the prism of party-autonomy and some of the more salient features comprising the very fabric of the common law. Chapter five as well explores the “Prague Rules.”
Consists of a historical analysis of international commercial arbitration in the United States. It traces the origins of international commercial arbitration to the arbitration agreements that follow the 1687 enactment of the Statute of Fines and Penalties in England, and also references the Act of 1854 in England that vested courts with the discretion to stay a legal proceeding in deference to arbitration agreements. This chapter also documents early U.S. common law authority that was antagonistic to arbitration generally. This introduction in abbreviated manner reviews landmark Supreme Court decisions that most descriptively represent the development of international arbitration and arbitration generally as standing in pari materia with judicial proceedings.
Chapter six primarily focuses on the development and application of the common law doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law, and perhaps on its very disappearance. It undertakes this discussion, however, through paradigms exploring methodologies for possibly avoiding 28 U.S.C. §1782.
The third chapter reviews the development and current status of the doctrine of arbitrator immunity-liability. Comparative models between the U.S. common law and civil law jurisdictions are discussed. The role of the Supreme Court’s post-Civil War Reconstruction Era opinions are re-examined as part of the effort of exploring the doctrine’s development. It is asserted that post-U.S. Civil War Supreme Court jurisdiction profoundly has influenced the U.S. common law on arbitrator immunity.
Chapter seven explores the issue of “perjury in arbitration.” It discusses the issue through the lenses of a comparative approach to “truth-telling” and “oath-taking” in non-U.S. jurisdictions, and judicial proceedings.
The fourth chapter discusses the role of 28 U.S.C. §1782 in international commercial arbitration. Specifically, “the taking” or “gathering of evidence” is compared and contrasted to common law discovery. Emphasis is placed on the construction of a new paradigm asserting that when submitted to reasoned examination, the taking or the gathering of evidence has failed to generate sufficient timely transparency to contribute to creating appropriate settlement conditions. It is suggested that American common law discovery is configured and organized by many of the very fundamental tenets that international commercial arbitration seeks to preserve and to promote; most notably, party-autonomy and transparency. It also is suggested that arbitral procedural law in the context of “evidence gathering” has undergone a revolutionary transformation such that it shall require continental law practitioners to appreciate narrow and limited fundamental principles of U.S. common law discovery. Chapter four also focuses on the role of party-autonomy in the gathering of evidence, as well as the taking of discovery in international commercial arbitration.
The ninth and final chapter analyzes U.S. arbitration doctrinal developments and their dialogue with the New York Convention. Four discrete issues are reviewed: (i) the relationship between non-signatories to arbitration agreements and their obligation to arbitrate, (ii) jurisdiction over an arbitral award debtor as a predicate to enforcement, (iii) the interjection of forum non conveniens in arbitral enforcement proceedings, and (iv) the tensions between rendering states and secondary enforcing states with respect to annulled international arbitration awards.