Science always has occupied a special niche in society because of its perceived and proven truth value, which comes from its ostensibly unbiased, rigorous, accurate, precise, dispassionate, and metaphysical nature. After all, isn't science practiced in laboratories and universities quite apart from the "real world," the world of opinion, supposition, business, politics, and religion? But is it? As discussed in this chapter, the answer is "no," because science, in many senses, is a social endeavor, one subject to the vagaries of personal bias, the quest for recognition and funding, peer and social pressure, and tradition. Science may indeed be special relative to other endeavors, but this does not mean that its product – knowledge – should be accepted without question. Science can be wrong, but only temporarily, as it is a self-correcting enterprise that, in light of continual hypothesis testing, eventually fixes its own errors.

This chaper takes the account of democracy developed in chapter three and considers it in the context of his critique of American democracy in the 1960s through a reading of King Lear. Cavell’s distinctive contribution to aesthetics is his claim that tragedy is a site that works through the implications of skepticism as it relates to the other. Cavell’s interpretation of tragedy contributes to three important debates in contemporary political theory. First, King Lear’s tragic abdication exposes the crisis in authority that results from post-sovereign politics. Second, Cavell’s claim that acknowledgement rather than knowledge is the appropriate response to tragedy makes an important intervention into recent debates in political theory over the politics of recognition. Third Cavell’s analysis of tragic downfall underscores important shifts in consciousness that a society must undergo in order to realize justice. Under this reading, the political import of tragedy is as a pedagogy for a politically repressed culture that spurns necessary changes in cultural self-understanding.

The theme of recognition is one of the most intensively discussed topics in the humanities and social sciences in the last decades. This chapter discusses its relevance for moral education. We begin with two examples illustrating lack of recognition in the school class, one concerning cultural difference and the other economic and social inequality. Secondly, we introduce the idea of recognition, its importance for individual and social life and some basic ways to think about its various forms. Thirdly, we discuss some specificities of school education that are necessary to bear in mind when applying the concept of recognition in this context. Finally, we tie these conceptual and theoretical considerations back to the two examples and show how a recognition-theoretical perspective can helpfully illuminate them. The conclusion summarizes our most important findings.

This chapter reconstructs Heidegger’s interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction and addresses the common objection that Heidegger’s interpretation cherry-picks evidence from Kant’s text, failing to address counterevidence adequately. The chapter argues that Heidegger both acknowledges and addresses the counterevidence cited by his critics. Specifically, Heidegger identifies that counterevidence as a component of a traditional strand of argument that is less compelling than other, more radical ideas in Kant’s text. On the traditional strand of argument, Kant attempts to spell out the a priori contact between sensibility and understanding by identifying a form of atemporal self-consciousness, apperception, that uses concepts to actively unify our sense experience. Heidegger is critical of this strand of argument because it remains unclear how apperception, construed as atemporal, can be unified with our temporal sense experience. How do two unlike things come together – time and not-time? Heidegger argues that one arrives at a more convincing account by developing the temporal dimension of apperception, where it holds up expectations for the future. This development helps one appreciate the deeper unity of our passive sensing of the present and our active anticipation of the future – a unity grounded in the temporal structure of the imagination, three interlaced temporal capacities that characterize the human being.

This chapter provides a broad overview of existing anthropological work on exemplars and proposes a new relational way of understanding exemplarity. Most existing philosophical and anthropological work on exemplarity has taken an explicitly functionalist approach. Academics have often valued exemplars because of their ‘articulatory power’ to connect the world of things with the world of ideas. This chapter advances this conversation by examining exemplarity as a relationship between persons and things rather than an attribute of either. In doing so, the chapter explores the social effort that is required to stabilize exemplars in the world, and it shows how the creation of exemplars always goes hand in hand with scepticism and critique. Finally, the chapter investigates whether the modern world has been overcome by scepticism towards exemplars such that we now face a ‘crisis of exemplarity’ in which only ‘everyday exemplars’ can be recognized.

This chapter covers three areas of international law that, though distinct, are interconnected. The law of statehood defines which entities qualify as states, the most important actors on the world stage and the international legal persons with the most rights, duties and functions. The law of self-determination accords rights to ‘peoples’ rather than to states, but in limited circumstances it enables peoples to create new states for themselves. That can be a way for a people to seize control of its own destiny, especially if it has been subject to colonialism or oppression. Finally, the law of territory determines the geographical borders within which many of the rights, duties and functions of states are applicable, including how those borders can change.

This chapter opens the third part of the book in which a new theoretical account called collective equality is offered. At the core of collective equality, we find a recognition of the centrality of collectives and their equal relations as the primary pillar of justice and peace. Deeply divided places riven by ethno-national conflicts are characterized not only by national divide, but most often by practices of discrimination, political exclusion, and domination of one ethno-national group over the other(s). While the national divide itself is unlikely to disappear in such places, the way in which the ethno-national “border” is managed, or in other words how the groups and their members relate and interact, can dramatically change. Alongside liberal multiculturalism and liberal nationalism, collective equality introduces the paradigm of equality between the national groups that occupy a specific territory. In the realities of conflict-riven places, this new paradigm must respond to concerns that lay at the root of contemporary conflicts – the objection to or fear of foreign domination – common to both national minorities and national majorities caught in an “intimate conflict.”

The Introduction presents the main idea of the book, namely that populism should be understood and assessed in terms of the kind of recognition for the people that it demands. The debate over the meaning and value of populism is fundamentally a debate over how democracy should recognize the people. Many people in contemporary societies feel disrespected and populism provides the recognition that they feel they have lost or never attained. The populist politics of resentment should not be understood as blindly emotional but as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that can be explained by people’s beliefs and principles. However, not all struggles for recognition contribute to the deepening of democracy, and we must distinguish between different kinds of recognition in order to understand why populism is often a threat to democratic principles and practices. The Introduction explains that the book is a study of the reasons people may have for supporting populism rather than the causes of populism. As a corollary of studying reasons rather than causes, populism is defined as a set of claims that can be assessed for their validity. The last part of the Introduction provides an overview of the book.

Arbitrators derive their jurisdiction from the agreement of the parties. The underlying contractual basis of their jurisdiction and the supervisory powers of the courts over arbitrator’s jurisdictions raises several issues which are examined in this chapter.

The first part of the paper briefly examines the principle of competence-competence and its ramifications on various matters, such as who has, or should have, priority to rule on jurisdiction (the courts or the tribunals) and what should be the appropriate level of scrutiny by the supervising courts.

The second part examines which issues are to be regarded as ‘jurisdictional’. A broader or narrower understanding of the term will reflect on the scope of the courts’ review.

The third part examines who and when is to rule on jurisdiction and the various scenarios that can be triggered depending on how the jurisdictional review is initiated. Prior to the constitution of the tribunal the matter can only be brought before the court. Once the tribunal is constituted, the issue of jurisdiction can be brought both before the court and before the tribunal, and the court may be called upon to review tribunal’s findings. Post-award jurisdictional review can be triggered both in the set-aside and recognition proceedings. Issues of particular importance in this regard are standard of review to be used by the courts and whether the courts should be entrusted to review negative jurisdictional rulings of the tribunals.

The final part of this chapter discusses anti-suit and anti-arbitration injunctions and their perceived pros and cons, form and legal basis.

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is no less important a matter in international arbitration than in national court litigation. Nothing less than the finality of an adjudication is at stake. In principle, a tribunal should decline to adjudicate a dispute if it has already been adjudicated either in a prior judgment or award. Apart from all the disadvantages of duplicative proceedings, a tribunal’s failure to treat a prior adjudication as preclusive made lead to set aside of its award. Even if an adjudication is final and binding, or in the case of an award entitled to recognition, certain so-called “identities” must be established, whether identity of party, identity of claim, or identity of object, or all of the above. But how are they to be defined? Herein lies the difficulty for tribunals. The requirements of res judicata are a matter of forum law and, unlike a national court, an arbitral tribunal has no forum law and derives little if any guidance from the parties’ agreements, arbitration laws or institutional rules. Tribunals have a choice-of-law challenge, their best options being the res judicata norms of one body of national law or another and an international standard if one can be ascertained.

Commercial parties engaged in international transactions will typically resist agreeing to submit disputes to their counterparty’s national court system due to the real or perceived ‘home court advantage’. While international arbitration solves the problem with respect to the dispute on the merits, the arbitrators’ authority ends with the rendering of their award, and they cannot compel compliance with the award if voluntary compliance is not forthcoming. For that, the prevailing party – now an award creditor – must turn to the national courts, where the ‘home court advantage’ can re-emerge: the place of arbitration may have been located in the award debtor’s state, giving its courts the power to annul the award; or the award debtor’s assets may be uniquely located in its home state, making that the only practical enforcement forum. And problems may be particularly acute where the award debtor is the State itself or a state-controlled entity. The present chapter considers a potential option for an award creditor whose commercial arbitration award is annulled on arbitrary or parochial grounds by the courts of the seat, or wrongfully denied enforcement in that or another jurisdiction: the use of investment arbitration to enforce commercial arbitration awards as a vindication of rights and remedies under international law.

This chapter deals with the German position on States and their organs. It is divided into five parts; territorial sovereignty, political independence, Statehood and recognition, organs of the State and their status and State succession. The first part deals with the legal consequences of Germany’s non-recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea while distinguishing the same from sanctions policies, Germany’s position on the international legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Germany’s views on the presence of Thailand’s king in and his conduct of State affairs from Germany and Germany’s position on Israel’s annexation plans in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The second part addresses Germany’s response to the new Hong Kong national security law, and Germany’s position on Taiwan. The third part, statehood and recognition, encompasses Germany’s opinion on Palestine not being a State party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Germany’s non-recognition of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’, and Germany’s support of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly as an observer.

By the Caroline era, London’s broader theatergoing public contained within it the smaller subset of a theatrical community – those playgoers collectively invested in the cultivation of their dramatic knowledge and interpretive acuity. Chapter 4 offers a phenomenological prehistory of this community, locating its activation in the moment of performance itself. The chapter traces the formation of this theatrical community alongside the dramatic trope of impersonation, which constructed the unknown depths and vicissitudes of individual identity as a function of the bifurcated structure of the playhouse. Through readings of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and The Comedy of Errors, the anonymous Look About You, John Fletcher’s Love’s Cure, and Dekker and Middleton’s The Roaring Girl, this chapter argues that the formation of spatially relational identities in impersonation plots extended from the stage to the amphitheater: constituted as a series of mirror images only partially revealed, London’s theatrical community was produced by spectators’ mutual recognition of their uncertainty about one another.

This chapter focuses on the reconfiguration of land tenure and authority in Marovo Lagoon, a rural area subject to widespread and destructive industrial logging. Women as a social group are known to be largely excluded from formal negotiations regarding logging, and this chapter considers the extent to which this can be traced to a flawed legislative framework, to patriarchal kastom or the erosion of women’s rights by colonisation. Drawing on archival and ethnographic work, it demonstrates that missionaries and colonial officials recognised some idealisations of masculine authority while disregarding other forms of influence, facilitating a simplification of the land tenure system that has enabled some male leaders to consolidate their control over resources. The reproduction of particular idealisations of masculine authority over land continues today, and simultaneously constitutes land control as a masculine domain. While contemporary inequalities can be partially traced to the structural features of the property system, they also emerge from long-term processes of colonial intrusion, capitalist development and the erosion of important aspects of gendered attachments to land.

I begin with an account of the fundamental aims of Hegel’s ‘science of right’ so as to show how his account of property faces two key challenges: justifying the concept of property and any specific form of it, on the one hand, and integrating property into the system of right, which includes subordinating it to any higher moments of right, on the other. I then turn to Hegel’s argument for private property. I distinguish between two interpretations of his argument: the ‘embodiment’ interpretation and the ‘recognition’ interpretation. I identify serious problems with the first interpretation and then argue for a version of the second one that entails the type of triadic model of the concept of property developed by Fichte and already implicit in Kant’s Rechtslehre. I show that this triadic model, and thus Hegel’s full argument for private property, becomes explicit only at the stage of contract. Next, I discuss how Hegel seeks to integrate private property into ethical life, and I argue that the idea of ethical life is, in fact, more compatible with some form of common or collective property because this form of property is more expressive of this idea.