This chapter presents a novel interpretation of the transcendental deduction which uses judicial imputation as a guide for understanding the structure and aim of the argument. Møller argues that the metaphysical deduction should not be read as the answer to the question quid facti, which should instead be found within the transcendental deduction. The parallel with judicial imputation shows that the transcendental deduction is a proof of an authorisation to judge. Judicial imputation presupposes that the judge has both the authority to subsume the case under the law and to apply the effects of the law to the case. This leads to a two-step interpretation of the B edition of the transcendental deduction, which focuses on appearances necessarily falling under the categories and the authorisation of the understanding to apply the categories to appearances.

This chapter is an investigation of the quid juris metaphor that introduces the transcendental deduction. It focuses on the parallel with legal deductions and the importance of this parallel for the transcendental deduction as a philosophical argument. This importance is explored through an analysis of the analogy between concepts and property, the quid juris metaphor and the historical background of deduction writings in Prussia. This analysis leads Møller to reject Henrich’s understanding of the transcendental deduction as a loosely structured proof of an origin.