In ‘The Place of Concepts in Socratic Inquiry’, Terence Irwin examines Socrates’ question ‘What is F?’, which is often taken to be a request for some sort of definition or account of what F is. When Socrates asks, ‘What is courage?’, ‘What is piety?’, ‘What is temperance?’, does his discovery that everyone, including himself, cannot answer such questions in a satisfactory manner imply that these answerers do not know what the words mean? If one cannot answer the ‘What is F?’ question, does it follow that one lacks the concept of F? Irwin argues that conceptual argument has an indispensable role in the arguments that lead to Socratic definitions, but it will not take us all the way to them. To understand Socratic definitions, Irwin compares them with Aristotelian real definitions, and with Epictetus’ views on the articulation of preconceptions.

Cicero’s De natura deorum, De divinatione, De fato, and Timaeus offer a coherent development of some of the questions first raised in De republica and De legibus. In the specific context of the mid-first-century bce debate between Stoics and Epicureans, Cicero raises three far-reaching issues: can a rational discourse on religion be developed without a solid cosmological and theological foundation? What use can be made of historical and anthropological observations of cultual practices? Is it possible to reach a universal definition of the psychological process which accounts for human attitudes towards the gods? Cicero’s authorial strategies frame skeptical arguments so as to suggest constructive answers and preserve human freedom and moral responsibility. A mythopoetical discourse on the universe offers sufficient background as “provisional physics.” Historical enquiries help define precise limits for political thinking on religion. Philosophy explains psychologically how the admiration for the beauty of the world leads to ethical accomplishment.