Chapter 6 illustrates that household political cooperation begets a system of political organization that centers on men. Using network data from a census survey, it describes the structure of the overall village political network, including gender homophily of political ties, centrality in the entire network, and the average degree of connectivity between individuals and political elites. It shows that village political networks are structured such that men comprise the center of the network, while women remain on the periphery. As a result, influence is concentrated among men, and village politics is structured around men’s other intersecting identities, namely caste. It then compares the size and composition of women’s and men’s political networks and show that women are connected to village politics largely through the men in their household. For men, women do not register as political actors. Household political cooperation thus implies strong limits on women’s access to power, influence, and information and yields a broader gender and political system that perpetuates male dominance.

Chapter 8 demonstrates that such effects can be augmented by stimulating solidarity among women with a focus on gender consciousness-raising, but that such actions generate backlash. It tests the importance of social solidarity in stimulating women’s collective action by exploiting arbitrary variation in the delivery of a gender consciousness-raising program to SHGs. It shows that women are more likely to undertake collective action after identifying shared experiences of deprivation and forming a bond based on their gender identity. This collective action is also more likely to be aimed at women’s strategic interests – their interests rooted in their patriarchal suppression – and therefore garner more resistance from men in the community, including through increased experiences of (public) violence and harassment. It shows that women navigate this resistance through their collective strength and solidarity.

Chapter 7 provides cause for optimism: women’s participation in apolitical women’s groups enhances their political agency and doubles their political participation. Leveraging a natural experiment to identify the impact of access to SHGs, or small women-only credit collectives, it shows that access spaces outside of the household with other women generates solidaristic collective action oriented toward women’s political participation that succeeds in changing women’s political behavior: SHG members were significantly and substantially more likely to participate in politics than nonmembers. Further, this impact is evident in the larger village political network; women are more densely politically connected, and gender emerges as a more salient political cleavage. This positive impact of SHGs occurs despite no change in women’s economic resources.

Chapter 2 defines and describes the manifestations of patriarchy and inequality in India. It describes the system of patriarchy in rural India and how widespread and entrenched patriarchal norms generate a patriarchal social order that centers on women in the household. It demonstrates how patriarchal norms have enabled the use of violence to control and dominate women, including by internalizing the acceptability of this means of coercion. It further highlights the role of legal and political institutions in perpetuating this social order. Finally, it documents the state of women’s and men’s political participation in rural India, revealing substantial disparities in political participation between men and women and, even more strikingly, between different forms of participation within women.

Chapter 4 brings the household into focus and demonstrates how it denies women political agency and constrains their political participation. Drawing on data from a census survey and interviews, it documents the alignment of the household in political decision-making and the authority of elder men in these decisions. It shows that women lack autonomy in their vote choice and are often coerced into compliance with the wishes of the heads of household. It further documents the inefficiency of household cooperation for women and demonstrate its perpetuation as rooted in coercion and strategic political mobilization.

Chapter 3 builds a theory of women’s political behavior under conditions of patriarchy and gender inequality. It argues for the defining role of the household in women’s political lives and describes the conditions that would lead to household political cooperation – joint household political decision-making – and hypothesizes its implications for individual women’s political behavior and the structure of political organization more broadly. It then develops a series of expectations about how and when women will become active political citizens, arguing for the importance of women’s autonomy from the household, their social solidarity with each other, and the potential for women’s collective action to transform their political lives.

This chapter critically reviews the extant scholarship of state formation. It argues that the excessive attention to war and violence produces a confrontational interpretation of state–society relations and neglects the state's role in public goods provision vital to domestic governance. It outlines the main theme of the book, which is to bring state legitimation through public goods provision into the scholarship of state formation. It argues that a public interest-based discourse of state legitimation furnished a common normative platform for state and society to collaborate in various issues of domestic governance. This platform allowed state and society to complement each other's weakness in pursuit of good governance. It also provided a limited yet important space for political participation that could be accepted by the state authorities. Although this space was grounded in the conception of "passive rights" rather than "active rights" – that is, rights granted by the state rather than inalienable to the individual – it allowed for a growing degree and scale of political organization and activity and laid the basis for a rethinking of the role of such rights in state formation.

The proclaimed duty of the state to safeguard the public interest provided a space for subordinates to engage with ruling authorities. It entailed the right of the ruled to remind the state to fulfill its obligation in the case of specific welfare grievances of its subjects. Such a right was passive, as it was derived from the state's duty to protect the public interest. The patterns of state response to popular claim-making were similar across Tudor and early Stuart England, Tokugawa Japan, and Qing China. The right to petition authorities was granted to individuals; yet the state did not allow crowd petitions, which were universally treated as disrespectful to authority and as a threat to social order. However, the state across these three cases was tolerant of collective petitions caused by cross-regional or cross-sectoral conflicts of interest, and it tried to arbitrate disputes as an impartial guardian of the public interest. The increasing scale of conflicts of interest that arose with population growth and commercialization led to larger-scale and well-organized popular petitions that were still accepted by the state. Such petitioning represented a political space that had great potential to expand with socioeconomic development.

There is a direct and important relationship between elections, clientelism, and the system’s legitimacy. Urban Iranians may be skeptical toward the efficacy of their vote. But rural Iranians seem to view their electoral rights differently. The fact that participation levels in remote and comparatively underdeveloped provinces has been consistently high shows that at least among the less privileged, the system enjoys continued legitimacy. Local elections help further enhance the system’s legitimacy. This is particularly the case in voting districts outside of the major metropolitan areas, in places where the local elites who get elected to the city council or the Majles serve as critical links between the system, the nezam, and the local population. In the smaller cities and towns, elections tend to be more vigorously contested because the rewards are more immediate. Legitimacy and system effectiveness are different matters altogether. One of the biggest consequences of electing clan and tribal leaders has been the apolitical marginalization of technocrats and other professionals and their diminished chance of getting into elected office.

Among the requirements of a liberal order is the ability to pursue collective goals through enduring private organizations. Such organizations contribute to political checks and balances, which sustain individual freedoms. In the Islamic Middle East, a possible starting point for autonomous nonstate organizations was the Islamic waqf, a trust that an individual formed under Islamic law to provide designated social services in perpetuity. Waqfs came to control vast resources. They might have used their enormous wealth to constrain the state and advance the freedoms of their constituents. The resulting decentralization of power could have placed the Middle East on the road to liberalization and perhaps also democratization. However, despite their immense wealth, waqfs remained politically powerless. A key reason is that they were governed according to their deeds, not the preferences of their caretakers or beneficiaries. In these respects, Islamic waqfs differed from European corporations, which were self-governing organizations enjoying legal personhood. In the Middle East, waqfs supplied services that the corporation provided in Western Europe. For instance, whereas churches and universities operated as corporations, mosques and madrasas (Islamic colleges) were financed by waqfs. This institutional difference contributed to the interregional divergence in political patterns.

This chapter presents key findings about people’s opinions on the EU as well as their participation in EP elections and referendums. It shows how evaluations of the EU have evolved from a permissive consensus in the early years of European cooperation to a constraining dissensus that has emerged since the 1990s. The chapter outlines the factors that determine people’s votes in EP elections as well as the different types of referenda that member states have organized with respect to EU affairs. Support for the EU can be explained by the benefits people derive from it, the beliefs they have about politics and identity and benchmarks. Citizens also take cues from political parties and politicians in making up their minds about the EU. Issues of identity have become more prominent in determining people’s stance towards politics, both at the national and at the European level. The more critical stance of EU citizens towards European integration has increased the support for Eurosceptic political parties, which want to see a smaller role for the EU.

In Chapter 6, we consider the personal and political costs of varying domestic violence policies in the United States and we describe the challenges women face for civic participation due to being victims of domestic violence. There is ample evidence that domestic violence can be a barrier to voting and political participation for women, particularly women of color. We also discuss disparities in different communities based on race, ethnicity, and immigration status in terms of the investigation and prosecution of domestic violence crimes and the way domestic violence laws have used criminalization as an answer to domestic violence especially in communities of color. Women of color are much more likely to be accused of domestic violence instead of being seen as victims of it. Those victims who are treated as offenders must live with a conviction on their record, and in most states have their most fundamental right to vote removed while they serve their sentence or are on probation. In the last part of this chapter, we delve more deeply into the current system in place to protect women in light of public health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.