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2 results

  • 1 - Overview of ERISA

  • from Part I - General Considerations
  • Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Washington University School of Law, Brendan S. Maher, Texas A&M University School of Law
  • Book:
    ERISA Principles
    Published online:
    15 February 2024
    Print publication:
    22 February 2024, pp 3-27

  • Summary

    ERISA regulates most benefit plans offered by private employers, both pension plans and welfare plans. Pension plans systematically defer compensation until termination of employment (or longer), and welfare plans provide other types of benefits designated by statute, of which health insurance is the most costly by far. Because of the importance of ensuring retirement income, health care, and other socially valuable welfare benefits (such as disability income and life insurance), the Code permits plans with certain features to “qualify” for favorable tax treatment, on the theory that such a subsidy encourages provision of benefits that would not otherwise be available. ERISA’s chief policy aims are to promote informed decision making by workers; to prevent mismanagement and abuse of plan assets by administrators; to protect worker reliance on the benefit promises made; and to preserve employer choice with regard to offering benefits and, provided that minimum standards are met, in tailoring benefit programs to serve the needs of the business.

  • Life-cycle patterns in the design and adoption of default funds in DC pension plans*

  • JOACHIM INKMANN, ZHEN SHI
  • Journal:
    Journal of Pension Economics & Finance / Volume 15 / Issue 4 / October 2016
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    26 January 2015, pp. 429-454
    • Article
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  • We argue that we should see a negative relationship between the share of risky assets in the default fund of a defined contribution (DC) pension plan and the average plan member age if trustees design the default fund in line with predictions from the life-cycle portfolio choice theory. Adoption of the default fund should be low in DC plans with high member age dispersion if default funds are indeed designed for the average plan member and members become aware of this. From analyzing a panel dataset of Australian DC pension plans, we obtain results that are consistent with both hypotheses.