Thinking about humiliation and its consequences informs various areas of political theory – even if latently. Part of the point of classical jus in bello restrictions like the requirements of proportionality and discrimination is to limit the harm we do to our enemies, so as to keep alive the possibility of future reconciliation. Indiscriminate and disproportionate harms undermine the chances of peace, among other reasons, because they are humiliating. In the field of transitional justice, the prospect of ending the humiliations endemic to authoritarian governance can justify the compromise of liberal principles (such as retroactive criminalization and reliance on shaky evidence) that transitional policies often involve. Our discussion also takes up the role humiliation plays in political appeasement. We argued that one of the reasons that appeasement is wrong is that it involves a self-humiliation. By deferring to those who threaten force, the appeaser communicates that survival matters more to them than their self-respect.

This chapter identifies ten lessons for international relations that emerge from the book.

This chapter presents latent nuclear deterrence theory. It explains how it is possible to gain international leverage from a nuclear program if countries do not have nuclear weapons.

This chapter explains why countries obtain nuclear latency. It introduces the drivers and constraints of latency. It conducts a statistical analysis to determine which variables are correlated with nuclear latency onset, and then analyzes twenty-two cases to identify the main motives for getting latency.

This chapter introduces a database on the international spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities. This database identifies countries with nuclear latency and serves as the basis for the empirical analyses carried out in the book.

This chapter conducts a statistical analysis of nuclear latency’s political consequences. Using a design-based approach to causal inference, it determines how the onset of nuclear latency influences several foreign policy outcomes: fatal military disputes, international crises, foreign policy preferences, and US troop deployments.

This chapter presents case studies from ten countries: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Spain. These cases show that many world leaders believe that nuclear latency provides greater international influence.

This chapter provides an overview of the book.

Spying in South Asia’s conclusion addresses the impact of the end of the Cold War, and the onset of a ‘war on terror’, on British and American intelligence relationships with India. It explores the rationale behind Indian governments’ softening of anti-CIA rhetoric from the mid-1980s, and the implications for New Delhi’s intelligence agencies of the precipitous collapse of the USSR, and the abrupt conclusion of the Cold War. It assesses factors underlying the post-Cold War recovery of Western secret services from the position of public pariahs in India to that of New Delhi’s principal partners in intelligence and security matters. In 1947, as the Cold War dawned and the newly independent subcontinent confronted formidable threats to its stability and security, New Delhi turned to London and Washington for covert support. Some half-a-century later, after decades of what might best be described as circumscribed cooperation compromised by conflict and conspiracism, the intelligence services of India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, once more found compelling reasons to put their differences aside, and work together as close partners in a new secret war.

This chapter explores the origins and consequences of national security institution in India from 1947 to 2015. It first discusses the evolution of India’s institutions. It argues that the trade-off between good information and political security explains three major institutional changes: Nehru’s choice to abandon his inherited institutions in favor of fragmented ones that protected his plans to transform the domestic economy; the choice of post-Nehruvian leaders to shift toward siloed institutions that balanced continued threats from national security bureaucracies against new international security challenges from Pakistan and China; and Vajpayee’s choice to establish more integrated institutions as apprehensions about bureaucratic punishment lessened. The chapter then presents a medium-n analysis suggesting that India exhibited better crisis performance under integrated institutions than under siloed and fragmented institutions. Case studies tracing decision-making during the 1962 Sino–Indian War and the 2001-2002 Twin Peaks Crisis illustrate how these institutional changes affected the quality of information upon which Indian leaders based their crisis choices.

The Conclusions reflect on the law outlined in Chapters 1−10. They recall that IHL is essentially an attempt to balance two fundamentally contradictory drivers – the need to wage war effectively, and the need to protect people and property from the excessive effects of warfare. It concludes that IHL largely succeeds in this endeavour, and that without IHL life for those caught up in armed conflict would be immeasurably worse. It notes, however, that while the fundamental principles of IHL are enduring, States can and should do more to develop new or more comprehensive laws where there is a need, such as the under-developed law of non-international armed conflict and the lack of regulation of certain weapons.

Chapter 2 closely examines developments in the South African government’s position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from the mid-1970s to 1981. It starts with an overview of the emerging South African defence sector and the government’s growing parallel interest in building a nuclear deterrent. In addition, it also deals with the relationship between Pretoria and Washington, particularly analysing the way in which the United States under President Carter pressured South Africa to accede to the NPT and the continued defiance of non-proliferation norms by the apartheid regime. In general, the South African government experienced more resistance from the United States following Jimmy Carter’s election as President.

Diplomats work in large and complex bureaucracies, in which structures, duties, responsibilities and authorities should be clearly defined–the alternative is a recipe for chaos at best and disaster at worst. A good officer should be able to work in any bureaucratic situation and be effective. To achieve that, one must have solid knowledge and understanding of policy structures, as well as the parallel, informal policymaking culture that each administration develops. That should be the backdrop against which diplomats inform and influence decision-making and implementation. The U.S. government uses the term “interagency” to describe both a structure and a mechanism through which policies are supposed to be developed, debated and presented to relevant Cabinet members, who head executive departments, and ultimately to the president for decision.