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This chapter offers a brief historical overview, then describes the formation and work of the Libyan National Transition Council, or NTC. Unlike the TPA, the NTC became an interim government even as the ancien régime was still in place. It formed soon after the anti-authoritarian protests began and aimed to coordinate the defeat of the Qadhafi government and oversee day-to-day governance. The NTC needed to establish itself as a legitimate body which could ensure the representation of the Libyan people by facilitating democratic elections. In so doing, it took many actions and decisions, including recruiting membership, organizing itself, securing international assistance, developing a roadmap, coordinating the defeat of Qadhafi, and preparing for and overseeing elections. Each of these acts would have repercussions in the transitional phases to come.
This chapter explores two doctrines that developed in response to Security Council paralysis or inaction in the face of atrocity crimes. The first is the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, most famously invoked in 1999 to justify the intervention of NATO in Kosovo, although largely dismissed by most states as impermissible, at least under a strict reading of the UN Charter. The second doctrine is the “responsibility to protect” (“R2P”), which was first formulated in 2001 but has since undergone significant modifications. Because the later formulations of R2P require Security Council authorization for any forceful intervention, R2P ultimately fails to address the problem of Security Council paralysis in the face of atrocity crimes. Furthermore, because R2P was invoked as part of the 2015 intervention in Libya, which left a destabilized state, and appears to have been largely ignored with respect to atrocities in Syria, enthusiasm for R2P may be waning; some ideas for its revitalization are explored in the chapter. The chapter ultimately makes the case that until the international community solves the problem of veto use in the face of atrocity crimes, some states still will be tempted to invoke, or engage in, humanitarian intervention because there are currently no satisfactory alternatives to addressing Security Council paralysis blocking forceful intervention; yet, there remain significant dangers to such an approach. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that by addressing the problem of use, and threatened use, of the veto in the face of atrocity crimes, one could both strengthen R2P and lessen any need to invoke humanitarian intervention.
The idea of the Free World emerged in World War II from the struggle of Western liberal democracies against their autocratic and totalitarian enemies. After the war, the Free World consisted of the United States, a group of Western European liberal democracies that re-emerged after liberation from Germany and sought American protection, and the reconstructed and mostly demilitarized war enemies Italy, (West) Germany, and Japan. The US-led anti-communist alliance building in the wake of the Korean War increasingly included Asian and the Middle Eastern countries in the defense of the Free World, although they often were authoritarian . The liberal-democratic nature of the Free World’s core in Europe allowed open political disagreements to emerge, mostly between Charles de Gaulle’s France and the Anglo-American powers but also within the societies of the Free World itself. These conflicts reached their combined peak in 1968 over the Vietnam War and widespread popular protests in several Western countries. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and subsequent changes of government in the West, however, helped to recreate a semblance of unity within the Free World by the early 1970s.
This chapter assesses NATO’s intervention in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, which lasted from March 31, 2011, when NATO took over command and control of all military operations in Libya, until October 31, 2011, when the operation ended. The analysis focuses on the overriding questions of how and by whom collective action in the sense of military enforcement was taken; and on the related question of how international actors employing military force related to local actors in Libya. The chapter analyzes how NATO prepared for Operation Unified Protector and how the operation evolved. While the broad Security Council mandate provided NATO with a wide marge de manoeuvre, the military commanders had to face a number of crucial political predicaments related to the duration of the operation; the unspecified nature of the Security Council mandate; and questions of impartiality, neutrality, and regime change. Finally, the chapter examines the complex relationship between NATO and the United Nations, which had a decisive impact on the manner in which Operation Unified Protector was conducted – and assessed.
The 2011 crisis in Libya represents the first case in which the international community invoked 'the Responsibility to Protect' principle, adopted in 2005 by UN member states, to justify coercive measures including sanctions and the use of military force. In this study, Karin Wester meticulously reconstructs and analyzes the evolution of the Libyan crisis, the international community's response, and the manner in which the 'Responsibility to Protect' was applied. Drawing on a wide variety of primary sources including in-depth interviews with politicians and diplomats, this comprehensive account of the 2011 intervention in Libya redresses popular narratives asserting that the intervention was driven primarily by western (neo-colonial) interests or by a desire for regime change. Instead, Wester reveals how the 'Responsibility to Protect' principle was realized to a considerable extent, but also how it provided a highly fragile basis for military enforcement action. Incorporating perspectives from international law, political science and history, this is a compelling and thought-provoking examination of the real-world application of a principle that is deeply rooted in history but presents daunting challenges in implementation.
After World War II, the US-led international security order exhibited substantial regional variation. Explaining this variation has been central to the debate over why is there no nato in Asia. But this debate overlooks the emergence of multilateral security arrangements between the United States and Latin American countries during the same critical juncture. These inter-American institutions are puzzling considering the three factors most commonly used to explain divergence between nato and Asia: burden-sharing, external threats, and collective identity. These conditions fail to explain contemporaneous emergence of inter-American security multilateralism. Although the postwar inter-American system has been characterized as the solidification of US dominance, at the time of its framing, Latin American leaders judged the inter-American system as their best bet for maintaining beneficial US involvement in the Western Hemisphere while reinforcing voice opportunities for weaker states and imposing institutional constraints on US unilateralism. Drawing on multinational archival research, the author advances a historical institutionalist account. Shared historical antecedents of regionalism shaped the range of choices for Latin American and US leaders regarding the desirability and nature of new regional institutions while facilitating institutional change through mechanisms of layering and conversion during this critical juncture.
This timely book fills an important gap in the literature of international relations, providing a thorough, up-to-date, empirically supported, and theoretically grounded analysis of how and why Turkish foreign policy has changed in recent years vis-à-vis the West. Presenting one of the first balancing studies that employs elite interviews as data, Turkey–West Relations develops a framework of intra-alliance opposition, classifying the tools of statecraft into three categories - boundary testing, boundary challenging, and boundary breaking. Six case studies are examined regarding Turkish foreign policy over the past nine years, exploring an array of topics including Turkey's foreign policy in relation to various nations and organizations, the refugee crisis, defense procurement, energy policies, and more. Dursun-Özkanca demonstrates how international, regional, issue-specific, and domestic factors may serve to explain Turkey's increasing boundary-breaking behavior. This book is crucial for anyone who seeks to understand the recent growing rifts between Turkey and the US, the EU, and NATO.
Under Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine became increasingly autocratic. His concentration of political power and economic assets engendered opposition, but Ukraine seemed stable. While Yanukovych turned Ukraine toward Russia, making significant concessions in return for cheaper energy, he resisted the economic integration that Putin sought, hoping instead for a more popular Association Agreement with the EU. His efforts to play Russia and the EU against one another made Ukraine’s status a zero-sum game internationally. By 2013, it looked like Russia was primed to finally achieve the goal of reeling Ukraine back in, as Yanukovych succumbed to Russian pressure and delayed signing the EU Association Agreement.
The Orange Revolution initially appeared as a victory for democracy in Ukraine and as a geopolitical victory for the West. Those two ideas – democratic revolution and geopolitics – became tightly linked in the eyes of Russian leaders, but whereas western thinkers saw democracy as fostering peace, Russia saw it as a weapon. The Orange Revolution also made Ukraine appear to be the fulcrum of security dilemma politics in central Europe. Both Russia and the West saw the other’s designs on Ukraine as threatening their security and as undermining the status quo. Meanwhile, the Orange Revolution fizzled, Viktor Yanukovych made a remarkable comeback, and Russia reasserted itself, bolstered by Putin’s popularity and by booming energy prices.
D'Anieri explores the dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West, that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce', led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'. He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors - the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's relations with the West, and conflict and geopolitics more generally.
The 1997 Russia-Ukraine Friendship Treaty appeared to confirm Ukraine’s borders and to settle the status of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, but many leading Russian politicians opposed it. Ukraine balanced its fear of Russia by becoming a leading participant in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Meanwhile, the war in Yugoslavia exposed the tension between the western insistence on “European norms” and Russia’s insistence on its prerogatives as a traditional great power. By 1999, Russia was furious at NATO over expansion and Kosovo, and still sought to reintegrate Ukraine. However, the question of Ukraine remained largely distinct from Russia’s broader relationship with the West.
After 1999, Ukraine and Russia both slid toward autocracy. As Leonid Kuchma’s autocracy made him a less fit partner for the West, he moved closer to Russia, and Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election looked set to solidify Russia’s position in Ukraine. The overturning of that rigged election via the Orange Revolution shocked the Russian leadership. In addition to snatching defeat from the jaws of victory in Ukraine, revolution now appeared to threaten the Putin regime. By merging the Ukraine-Russia conflict with the growing Russia-West conflict, this episode made both harder to solve.
As communism collapsed, disagreements emerged that endured until 2014. Russia struggled unsuccessfully to keep Ukraine in a new Moscow-led union and disagreement over the Black Sea Fleet and its base in Crimea proved unresolvable. Meanwhile, Russia and the West advanced different visions for post-Cold War Europe. Pressured by both Russia and the United States, Ukraine agreed to surrender its nuclear weapons in return for security assurances. Already in 1993, the prospect that a “red-brown” coalition of communists and fascists would come to power in Moscow prompted many countries to look for ways to guard against Russian reassertion, exacerbating the security dilemma.
The delay of the Association Agreement spurred protests, and violent repression caused them to grow. Yanukovych’s ouster outraged Putin, who again saw a revolution thwart Russia’s position in Ukraine. He saw an irresistible opportunity to respond. Seizing Crimea regained a territory Russia had always wanted; it showed that Russia could defy the West; it boosted Putin’s domestic popularity; and it hamstrung Ukraine’s new government. The conflict then spread to eastern Ukraine, where the shooting down of a passenger aircraft dramatically increased international outrage at Russia’s actions. The West enacted sanctions, while the conflict itself stabilized territorially in the February 2015 Minsk-2 agreement.
Russia’s incursions into Ukraine shattered any remaining illusions about order in post-Cold War Europe, leaving Ukraine and the West struggling to respond while Russia reveled in its fait accompli and started to come to grips with its isolation. What caused the conflict? The summary stresses that multiple factors interacted. From the outset, the actors’ goals were incompatible, even if that was obscured by the euphoria that accompanied the fall of communism. Viewing the situation as one of conflicting goals in a classic security dilemma not only revises our understanding of what happened, but changes our thinking on what the future might look like. While many choices could have been made differently, the grounds for conflict were deeply rooted, and the actors were much more constrained, both internationally and domestically, than the literature focused on blame would have us believe. The implication is that neither schemes to make Ukraine a neutral country nor waiting for Vladimir Putin to pass from the scene is likely to resolve the conflict.
In June 1991, Croatia declared its independence from the moribund Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia and immediately had to fight a defensive war against local Serb insurgents and the Yugoslav People’s Army, which enjoyed the support of Serbia throughout the four years of war. Franjo Tudjman, head of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), served as president of Croatia from 1990 until his death in 1999 and dominated Croatian politics during those years. Corruption, cronyism, and nepotism were earmarks of the Tudjman era. However, after his death, there was a new start, with the erstwhile opposition party, Ivica Racan’s Social Democratic Party (SDP), winning the election of 2000. The office of prime minister was now strengthened at the expense of the presidency, thus converting the Croatian system into a typical parliamentary system. In December 2003, the HDZ returned to power, and since then the SDP and the HDZ have alternated in office. Among the challenges which Croatian governments have faced since the end of the war in 1995 have been the rebuilding of destroyed and damaged homes and infrastructure, the reintegration of those Serbs who have remained in the country, the fight against corruption, and the endeavor to join NATO and the European Union (EU). This dual endeavor was rewarded when Croatia was admitted to NATO in July 2008 and to the EU in July 2013.
After the seemingly successful reordering of security in Central and Southeastern Europe after the 1989 revolutions, the conclusion of the Yugoslav wars of secession, and NATO and European Union (EU) enlargement, hard security considerations have catapulted back onto the region’s policy agenda. The EU’s Eastern Partnership, intended as a benign project to assist six post-Soviet states between the EU and Russia, instead came to threaten Russian security sensitivities. The Russian annexation of Crimea and the fomenting of violence in Ukraine’s southeast since 2014 have obliged Euro-Atlantic states and institutions to be more proactive toward securing their eastern flanks, including to the point of making new military deployments in the countries neighboring Russia. Despite this turn in European security practice, the chapter also argues that the many regional cooperation formations created since 1989 continue to provide a significant if subtle positive impact both on regional relations and more widely on those across Europe. The chapter, nevertheless, details how the most prominent initiative, Visegrad, has turned from having been a leading proponent of European values in the 1990s and an instrument for Euro-Atlantic integration to a challenger of EU values through its successful but controversial handling of the so-called migrant crisis that erupted in 2015.
Donald Trump assumed office in January 2017, committed to revamping US foreign policy and putting ‘America First’. The clear implication was that long-held international commitments would be sidelined where, in Trump’s view, the American interest was not being served. NATO, in the crosshairs of this approach, has managed to ride out much of the criticism Trump has levelled against it. Written off as ‘obsolete’ by the American president, it has fared better in the Trump era than many commentators had predicted. NATO exemplifies a tendency in US foreign policy, which pre-dates Trump, where open criticism stops short of abandonment. This pattern has continued since 2017 and indicates a preference for voice over exit. As such, it suggests that Trump’s foreign policy is not always as illogical as many have assumed. Logic is borne of institutional context: Trump has chosen to articulate voice where institutionalisation makes exit unviable. Institutional resilience in general and NATO’s case specifically has a wider relevance, both for transatlantic relations and international order.