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This chapter on India suggests that the Indian Competition Act of 2002 already had the possibility to offer lenient treatment to a firm that reports the existence of a cartel. However, the details for offering lenient treatment were only elaborated for the first time in 2009, in the Lesser Penalty Regulation. A revision followed in 2017. This resulted in a mere thirteen decisions of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) supported by the leniency programme. This low number may be explained by the discretion the CCI has to judge leniency applications and the uncertainty leniency applicants face in relation to damages claims. The chapter recommends addressing these issues, but also increasing the incentives to apply for leniency by introducing individualised sanctions to directors or immunising successful leniency applicants from debarment from procurement projects. Another recommendation is to avoid creating other pitfalls when the Competition Act is being amended.
This chapter sheds light on the international organisations that have been active in proliferating leniency programmes. This contribution includes the efforts of the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and ASEAN. For each of these organisations, the chapter argues that they have a tendency to look for the common elements among existing leniency programmes and present them as an international guideline or best practice. When the existing leniency programmes diverge, the international guideline or best practice is to offer options. By not further clarifying these options, the chapter holds, the international organisations do no more than summarise local practices and pull them outside of their context. Due to this practice, convergence is unlikely to happen because, when the international guidelines or best practices are consulted, there will be an automatic reflex to also consult existing local practices and the existing literature regarding those practices.
This chapter on the Singaporean leniency programme holds that various elements point to its effectiveness. The leniency programme guarantees immunity for a leniency applicant prior to an investigation, immunity could be obtained by the first leniency applicant once an investigation has started, and granting leniency to subsequent leniency applicants is at the discretion of the Singaporean enforcement agency, the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS). Furthermore, leniency plus, whereby extra reduction can be obtained for revealing participation in another cartel, and the fast-track procedure, whereby extra reduction can be obtained for admitting to the fact, have been introduced as well. It is now also possible for a cartel to be exposed through a reward or whistle-blowing scheme, though this scheme is not available for persons active in the infringement. Because of these elements, the leniency programme has contributed to eight of the fifteen cartel infringement decisions. Some of these cases have led to record high fines. Another element worth mentioning is that some of the leniency applications were only submitted after active solicitation by the CCCS.
This chapter argues that the adoption of the leniency programme in Korea is proof of considering any kind of price-fixing agreements as the supreme evil in society. Since its adoption, the leniency programme has contributed to nearly 55 per cent of all detected cartels. The leniency programme is attractive in its conceptualisation, because of high rewards for a limited number of firms and its conditions that are transparent and predictable. Furthermore, the chapter argues that private actions and criminal sanctions are not necessarily detrimental to a leniency application in Korea. Both are very rare and, in the case of criminal sanctions, there is a court judgment that leniency applicants should be excluded from the indictment. To further improve the leniency programme, the chapter suggests weakening the ineligibility of recidivists to apply for leniency and introducing penalty plus, whereby the sanction increases if a firm refrains from disclosing participation in another cartel, and an omnibus question, whereby a leniency applicant is asked to report information on other forbidden practices it is aware of.
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