Two intimately related topics are explored here. First is a focus on the different addresses Plato conceives of in writing the Laws. The limitations in understanding of his ‘naïve’ audiences are what are most strongly emphasized: in the first instance the elderly and insular interlocutors Cleinias and Megillus, but by implication the citizens of the community Cleinias is imagined as helping to construct, and first time readers of the dialogue itself. Those limitations will be registered by more ‘practised’ readers. For that more practised readership, some more challenging passages of writing are supplied, with sufficiently indicative reminiscences of more intellectually demanding treatments of subject matter and styles of argument familiar elsewhere in the dialogues. Second is the dominant religious framework within which the Laws mostly operates, which acts as prime vehicle for its philosophical limitation. I illustrate this principally by examination of a passage in Book 4 which includes a myth about the primeval god Cronos, but also by discussion of the strenuously argued cosmic theology of Book 10.

Chapter 8 presents a summary of the findings. The limitations of the study are also discussed, including the subtle nature of function, more cross-linguistic verification, comparisons in greater detail, the need for both diachronic and synchronic investigations, and so on. More significantly, spoken language should also be taken into consideration for further improvement.

In this chapter, three inherent challenges with Systems Thinking is addressed. These are (i) legal uncertainty, due to the case-by-case assessment of control relations that may lead to different outcomes, (ii) information asymmetry concerns, due to information gathering processes, and (iii) enforcement concerns, due to the need of a modified definition of legal terms such as corporate control, beneficial ownership, and controlled and affiliated entities.

Attention has a long history in philosophy, despite its near absence in the twentieth century. This chapter provides an overview of philosophical research on attention. It begins by explaining the concept of "selection from limitation," contrasting it with the more recent "selection for action." It reviews historical texts that discuss attention, focusing on those in the Western canon whose understanding of "attention" aligns with contemporary usage. It then describes the differential treatment of attention in phenomenology and behaviorism in the last century. Finally, it discusses contemporary research by topic: attention, perception, and knowledge; attention and consciousness; attention and action; and attention and the self. It includes work by Allport, Aristotle, Astell, Augustine, Bergson, Berkeley, Block, Bradley, Buddhaghosa, Campbell, Cherry, De Brigard, Dehaene and Naccache, Descartes, Dickie, Du Bois, Ganeri, Hegel, Heidegger, James, Kant, Koch and Tsuchiya, LaBerge, Locke, Mack and Rock, Malebranche, Merleau-Ponty, Mole, Montemayor and Haladjian, Neumann, Pashler, Posner, Prinz, Reid, Rensink, Reynolds and Heeger, Treisman, Watzl, Wittgenstein, Wollstonecraft, and Wu.

This chapter sets out a number of practical implications from the analysis in the preceding chapters. It explains how, on the model of equitable and statutory assignment set out in this book, anti-assignment clauses may have a limited effect even in connection with equitable assignments. It also explains how the ‘rule’ in Dearle v. Hall may still berelevant when a chose in action has been assigned in accordance with the requirements of Law of Property Act 1925, section 136(1). Third, it shows that the English position that it is still possible to make a parol gift of a presently existing legal chose in action is dictated by the limited operation of the Law of Property Act 1925, section 136(1). Fourth, it explains how it is possible to assign parts of a chose in action, whether such chose be one arising at common law, or even in equity. Fifth, this chapter explains how equitable defences such as laches and ‘clean hands’ may have a wider role to play in connection with equtiable assignments than is usually assumed. Finally, this chapter points out that payments to an assignor of the benefit of a common law debt will not attract restitutionary liability.

This chapter presents the rule of distinction as a limitation upon military necessity. Hereunder as an, in principle, absolute prohibition, yet there is no absolute protection of civilians.

This chapter gives an historical account of the legal conceptions of military necessity , with particular weight on the apperances of necessity in the Lieber Code and the St.Petersburg Declaration.

This chapter gives an account of the relationship between military necessity and humanity, the status of ‘humanity’, and the general rule of limitation which denies the resort to Kriegsraison.

In this chapter, we take a step back and consider a range of underlying concepts and metaphors that express something of what it means to participate, in or from another, and particularly to participate in or from God. 'Part of' language is found to have little value, while the idea of 'part in' is more promising. Notions of a limited reception from another have also been significant, as has the language of likeness. Two approaches are found to be particularly valuable: the idea of reception from a boundless source according to the distinct mode of being of the recipient, and the relation of source to recipient that is indicated by causation.

In this chapter, we take a step back and consider a range of underlying concepts and metaphors that express something of what it means to participate, in or from another, and particularly to participate in or from God. 'Part of' language is found to have little value, while the idea of 'part in' is more promising. Notions of a limited reception from another have also been significant, as has the language of likeness. Two approaches are found to be particularly valuable: the idea of reception from a boundless source according to the distinct mode of being of the recipient, and the relation of source to recipient that is indicated by causation.

This chapter suggests that Ian McEwan’s vexed relationship with British modernism can be resolved by understanding modernism as an aesthetic and political resource that his novels adapt to new conditions of life in the twenty-first century. Looking at several of the novels with the obvious connections to modernist literature – Atonement, Saturday, Solar and The Children Act – this chapter explores the ways McEwan engages with and updates three key modernist ideals: the aesthetics of transgression and rupture; the view of human nature; and modernism’s claims for the relevance of the literary. Common to each of these ‘updates’ is a shedding of the grandiose claims of modernism in favour of more modest and minor concepts of literary value better attuned to the indirect and limited ways that literature operates today.