Chapter 7 explores how Kenyatta’s presidential authority evolved after the stabilisation of his regime. It first analyses how the politicization of the land market was an exercise of regime-building, establishing a network of shared dependencies, allocating land to local political “big-men”. This is followed by an examination of the early years of the politics of succession. By 1965, the fragile alliance of convenience set up between Kenyatta and his main contenders, Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, was beginning to crack, while Kenyatta’s old age and fragile health revived the question of presidential succession. The government’s merciless repression against any form of opposition and dissidence culminated with the murder of Tom Mboya in 1969. Throughout these years, Kenyatta used the same strategy that had salvaged him during the “Release Kenyatta” campaign: preserving the status quo. He was left with the role of ruling over a divided political family, using his unrivalled access to state resources.

Chapter 4 explores how Kenya became, in 1964, a presidential republic. As the previous chapter showed, the centralisation of state resources (i.e. land) was decided before independence had been negotiated. Kenyatta thus found himself in control of centralized resources that enabled him to defend presidentialism (i.e. the concentration of extensive executive powers in the hands of the president) as the only possible system of rule for the post-colony. The chapter reconstructs the negotiations of presidential power: these were hasty and poorly anticipated by the divided Kenyan elite. The chapter argues that presidential rule emerged out of the weaknesses of KADU and KANU contenders, who depended on the central state to access state resources. The creation of an independent presidential republic in 1964 left Kenyatta not only with a new, but also an extensive set of powers to control a territory that was politically, socially and ethnically divided.

Chapter 3 focuses on the negotiations concerning the decolonisation of land. It analyses how the reshaping of land transfer institutions impacted both the decolonisation process and Kenyatta’s ascension to power. The setting-up of the Central Land Board in 1961 and the peaceful decolonisation of land was central to the independence conferences. The chapter argues that land negotiations prepared the way for a centralized government, even before the debate over federalism versus centralization was settled among the Kenyan political elite. It shows that the British fear of a security breakdown not only led to the creation of centralized institutions for land transfer, but also played a significant role in their favouring Kenyatta as a leader. By doing so, the British authorities abandoned both the European settler’ and the minority ethnic groups, who were arguing for majimboism (regionalism). At independence, Kenyatta would not only be considered the guardian of political order, he would also inherit an advantageously designed institutional framework to control the most valuable political and economic resource in Kenya: land.

Chapter 8 covers the last decade of Kenyatta’s life and rule. As signs of Kenyatta’s age became more visible, the 1970s were not only marked by an increasingly tense struggle for succession, but also by a more acute “tribalisation” of politics. The assassination, in 1975, of the promising young Kikuyu leader J. M. Kariuki, whose dissident politics alarmed the government, signalled a clear descent into factionalism. This chapter shows that Kenyatta was unnerved by factional disputes and rising popular disaffection. Fears of a potential coup against his regime led him to tighten his control over state institutions. The succession of Daniel arap Moi upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978 confirmed that the core of Kenya’s post-colonial state was the president’s isolated status and unrivalled ambiguity, which is the central argument of this book. By expressing his preference for Moi as a potential successor, Kenyatta not only chose a non-Kikuyu, but an isolated political player, like himself ten years earlier. Far from preparing the ground for tribal inclusion in the top sphere of government, Kenyatta’s choice helped the institution of the president to prevail over a divided elite, to compensate for weak institutional ties through presidential favours, and to preserve parochial family interests.

Analysing Kenyatta’s writings and speeches, chapter 1 uncovers how Kenyatta imagined a postcolonial society. It argues that Kenyatta never imagined state authority as an inclusive authority for all. Neither did he preview a creative role for the state, or for himself. This lack of nationalist perspective was inherent in his Kikuyu ethics (the protection of land property and the civic virtues that promoted land productivity). Although it was reinforced by British colonization, Kenyatta avoided reflecting on how he could reconcile Kikuyu history, which he praised, with a social order disrupted by colonialism. The chapter first attempts to situate the concept of the “family” in Kenyatta’s early writings. It then explores the intellectual legacy of his writings after independence, and shows how Kenyatta was at pains to enlarge and adapt his moral discourse to the new Kenyan nation. After examining how his politics were influenced by his discourse on moral virtues, the chapter emphasises Kenyatta’s constant care for family politics, and his mistrust for any nationalist ambitions he saw as betraying his “tribal” origins.

What is ‘heresy’? One answer would be, ‘that which orthodoxy condemns as such’; though we may also wish to consider when conscious dissent invites such a condemnation. The main ‘heresy’ in late medieval England was that usually termed Lollardy, understood to be inspired by the radical theological thought of John Wyclif (1328-1384), which among other things emphasised the overwhelmingly importance of Scripture, and of lay access to Scripture, through vernacular translation. Orthodox repression of heresy began in the late fourteenth century and developed in various ways in the fifteenth. There are small traces of these much wider battles in Chaucer’s oeuvre, but it would be very hard to say quite how he saw them. We might instead see the fluidity of attitude toward aspects of religion in Chaucer as a sign of his times. ‘Dissent’ can encompass more than that which is solidly decried as heresy, and ‘orthodoxy’ can turn out to be more than one mode of religious thought and expression.

The Black Death first reduced England’s population by nearly one half then prevented demographic recovery. Volatility characterised the 1350s and 1360s, due to extreme weather conditions, poor harvests, contracting output, disrupted markets, labour shortages and a high turnover of people. Towns struggled to assimilate the influx of migrants. The availability of land on favourable terms, and of well-paid employment, greatly benefited the lower orders of society, but caused consternation to the ruling elite. The government responded with a wave of legislation to regulate labour mobility, prices and wages, so as to impose upon workers the discipline of manual labour deemed essential to the common profit. By the 1380s equilibrium had replaced the volatility. The economy had contracted, and shifted from arable production to pastoral and manufactured products. Towns were smaller, but their residents tended to be wealthier. The attitude of the authorities to labour had become more realistic and less idealistic, emphasising its noble qualities rather than denouncing its vices.