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In Japan, the brown bear (Ursus arctos) occurs only in Hokkaido. With recent increase and range expansion of the bear population, conflicts among people and bears, as well as the number of control bear kills, have also increased. Recently, bear intrusions into urban areas, such as Sapporo City, as well as agricultural damage to corn and fruits, have increased in various parts of Hokkaido, although there has been little livestock damage. The number of bear kills has increased from 200 to 300 per year in the 1990s to over 850 by 2010. The purpose of >90% of recent kills was damage control. The average cost of annual agricultural damage and number of bear kills between 2010 and 2017 were 13.7 and 679 million yen, respectively. In this chapter, the current situation of bear management issues in Hokkaido is presented, including the paradigm of Brown Bear Management Plan of Hokkaido, urban bear management in Sapporo, and the human resource development and management system to develop proper brown bear management
Two case studies are introduced. First, a quantitative method for assessing the need for ecological networks through modeling the potential geographic distributions of species based on a case study of local populations of Asiatic black bear is presented. Second, genetic variation of Asiatic black bear in Tohoku region, Japan, are reported. To determine how population subdivision relates to management units proposed by the Ministry of the Environment, genetic variation in the mitochondrial DNA control region and seven autosomal microsatellite loci was assessed in bears captured in northern Japan. Geographic distribution of the subpopulations was assessed using landscape analyses to find the best-fit model based on maximum entropy prediction and cost of movement. Finally, how human–bear conflicts, nuisance control, and traditional hunting may affect conservation and management of Asiatic black bears in southern Tohoku area, where large suitable habitats for this species exist, are also shown.
This chapter describes human dimensions studies on black bear management conducted in Japan, by reporting: (1) a study on the media coverage regarding black bear issues in Japan; (2) the results from interviews and surveys that were conducted on local residents of the northern part of Hyogo Prefecture regarding their attitudes and behaviors related to human–bear conflicts; (3) the effectiveness of community seminars in mitigating human–black bear conflicts; and (4) how human–bear conflicts could be used to educate university students and train them to potentially become wildlife managers.
This study aimed to predict disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) rate in Japan through 2040 with plausible future scenarios of fruit intake for neoplasms, cardiovascular diseases (CVDs), and diabetes and kidney diseases (DKDs).
Data from National Health and Nutrition Surveys and the Global Burden of Diseases study in 2017 were used. We developed an autoregressive integrated moving average model with four future scenarios. Reference scenario maintains the current trend. Best scenario assumes that the goal defined in Health Japan 21 is achieved in 2023 and is kept constant afterwards. Moderate scenario assumes the goal is achieved in 2040. Constant scenario applies the same proportion of 2016 for the period between 2017-2040.
DALYs rates in Japan were predicted for the period between 2017-2040.
Human subjects were not utilized.
In our reference forecast, the DALYs rates in all-ages group were projected to be stable for CVDs and continue increasing for neoplasms and DKDs. Age-group-specific DALYs rates for these three disease groups were forecasted to decrease, with some exceptions. Among men aged 20–49, DALYs attributable to CVDs differed substantially between the scenarios, implying that there is a significant potential for reducing the burden of CVDs by increasing fruit intake at the population level.
Our scenario analysis shows that higher fruit intake is associated with lower disease burden in Japan. Further research is required to assess which policies and interventions can be used to achieve an increase in fruit intake as modelled in the scenarios of this study.
To characterise different meal types by examining the contribution of specific meals to the total intakes and the nutritional quality of each meal.
A cross-sectional analysis was conducted based on dietary data collected using 4-d dietary record. Diet quality was assessed by the Healthy Eating Index-2015 and Nutrient-Rich Food Index 9.3.
Adults aged 20–81 years (n 639).
Diet quality was, on average, highest for dinner, followed, in order, by lunch, breakfast and snacks. Breakfast, lunch, dinner and snacks, on average, accounted for 21 %, 32 %, 40 % and 11 % of total energy intake, respectively. For many nutrients, the percentage contribution to total intake did not vary within each meal, broadly in line with that for energy: 18–24 % for breakfast, 26–35 % for lunch, 35–49 % for dinner and 4–15 % for snacks. However, intakes of many foods largely depended on one meal type. The foods mainly eaten at dinner were potatoes, pulses, total vegetables, fish, meat and alcoholic beverages (52–70 %), in contrast to noodles (58 %) at lunch and bread (71 %) and dairy products (50 %) at breakfast. The foods mainly eaten at snacks were confectioneries (79 %) and sugar-sweetened beverages (52 %). Conversely, rice and eggs were more evenly distributed across three main meals (19–41 % and 30–38 %, respectively), while fruit and non-energetic beverages were more evenly distributed across all meal types (17–30 % and 19–35 %, respectively).
These findings provide the background information on each meal type in Japanese and may help inform the development of meal-based guidelines and public health messages.
This article offers a Japanese perspective on the debate about the international financial system immediately after the first oil shock of 1973–4. Using archival records from the OECD and Bank of Japan, I analyze the three key policy issues discussed at the meetings of Working Party 3 (WP3) of the OECD: petrodollar recycling, balance-of-payments adjustments, and the management of global growth. Documents show that the Japanese approach to capital controls, exchange rate management, state-led growth orientation and international banking strategies was rather strengthened by the impact of the oil shock. By 1975 the OECD viewed Japan, together with Germany and the United States, as one of the ‘locomotives’ that would trigger a revival of economic growth in the industrialized West.
The European war quickly escalated into a world war, owing to the global nature of European colonial empires, commercial interests, and naval presence. The entry of Japan, honoring its alliance with Britain, caused the fighting to spread to East Asia and the Pacific islands. Admiral Graf Spee’s squadron abandoned Germany’s Chinese base at Tsingtao (which Japan took in November 1914), then steamed eastward across the Pacific to the coast of Chile, where Spee defeated a British squadron off Coronel in November before being crushed by another British squadron off the Falklands in December. While Japanese, Australian, and New Zealand troops occupied Germany’s Pacific island colonies, British, French, and Belgian forces attacked Germany’s four African colonies. Three of them fell quickly, but in German East Africa (the future Tanzania), troops under Lettow-Vorbeck resisted Allied forces for over four years, until the Armistice. During and after the pursuit of Spee’s squadron, Allied (mostly British) warships swept the world’s oceans of German cruisers, ending the naval war beyond European waters and the North Atlantic. This decisive success facilitated the unimpeded movement of men and supplies from around the world to bolster the Allied cause in Europe, and led Germany to embrace unrestricted submarine warfare.
Few have interrogated the seeming inevitability of the Westphalian or modern system of international relations. The starting point of enquiry for this project is to question our Westphalian reality historically. It locates the birth of the modern international relations system in the death and erasure of its last viable alternative – the East Asian tribute system, which I call Eastphalia. The analytical focal point of this article is a critical case study of the 1875 Un'yō crisis between Japan and Korea. Like many other systemic changes, East Asia’s induction into Westphalian international relations is most legible retrospectively. The kind of “systems encounter” of interest to this chapter comprises a collision between two constitutive sets of interlinked conceptual and legal regimes, institutional apparatuses, and bureaucratic protocol. Often moving at a glacial pace, such systemic changes are not easily visible to a human eye in the midst of unfolding events, partly because our capacities for observation are not calibrated to appreciate changes that occur at such speeds. I consider these frustrated instances of misrecognition as the fricative encounter of two different systems of knowledge and power. I have specifically chosen a confrontation between two East Asian neighbors with a long history of relations, rather than one between an Eastern and a Western entity in order to reveal the Westphalian transition as a systemic harmonization. Such an approach rejects a triumphant modernist narrative of the so-called “West” and Western values over the East.
This chapter deals primarily with the Company commercial policy in East Asia and mainland Southeast Asia but also discusses extensively the first territorial Dutch colony in Taiwan. It highlights the crucial position of Japan where the Dutch could build on their exclusive trading rights in Deshima to procure the precious metals that were necessary for the India trade. The China trade is discussed in connection with the restrictive policies of the Ming and Qing states as well as in the context of the trading interests of the Dutch headquarters in Batavia. In conclusion, a comparison is made between the Dutch position in Mughal India and Qing China as well as between the Dutch Empire and other European empires in Asia.
This paper discusses the year 1905 as an educational watershed in colonial Vietnam. It focuses on the development of student mobility that transcended colonial and imperial boundaries and gave new momentum to educational training on a transnational scale. In the mid-1900s, the anti-colonial mandarin Phan Bội Châu launched a new nationalist movement called Đông Du, meaning ‘Going East.’ It centred on sending young men to Japan via Hong Kong to train them as effective anti-French activists. These students came from Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina and enrolled in a variety of curricula. Although this initiative collapsed in the late 1900s, it remained a watershed. Regional mobility did not disappear afterwards but mostly redirected itself towards China. This paper brings a great diversity of material face-to-face, including governmental archives and biographies, and challenges the colonial-based vision of Vietnamese education by highlighting its regional dimension, from the early twentieth century to the outset of the Second World War.
During the War in China (1937–1945), the Japanese military combined warfare with the maintenance of a military occupation. To sustain its tentative grasp over the occupied territories, the Japanese military vied to cultivate trust among the local population. This was a challenging task in the midst of a violent war which as many historical works described was accompanied by brutal war crimes. A less explored aspect of the occupation was medical care. This article unfolds this history by analysing medical encounters between Japanese military medics and military affiliated agents, and members of the local population in the rural Chinese countryside. Testimonies reveal that these encounters – some spontaneous and others deliberate – were small moments of humanity and benevolence within a violent environment. Concomitantly, they demonstrate the overarching tension in this unequal encounter and the use of medicine as a pacifying tool that also served as means to build and maintain the occupation through the transference of medical trust towards the military at large. Thus, this article presents a different aspect of the role of trust and distrust in medical care, as well as expanding the analysis of medicine as a ‘tool of empire’ to the context of military occupation.
Anthropologists believe that the Japanese archipelago was settled by migrants from the Asian mainland sometime between 140,000 and 500,000 years ago, when falling global temperatures trapped water in glaciers and the polar ice caps, causing sea levels to drop 120 m or more below their present levels, and opening land bridges to Siberia and the Korean peninsula. Permanent village settlements and a cultural complex known as the Jōmon, after the distinctive, cord-marked slab pottery found at most sites, appeared between 14,500 and 10,000 bce. Around 1,000 bce, a new wave of immigrants spread outward from northern Kyushu, intermingling with the Jōmon peoples and displacing their civilization with a new one, which archaeologists have dubbed Yayoi after the location of the first site discovered, in Tokyo in 1884. The newcomers brought with them bronze- and iron-working skills, advanced agricultural techniques, and more sophisticated forms of political organization.
Over a span of three and a half centuries (1200–1550) Japan experienced profound transformations in the institutions, ideals, and methods of war. Originally a limited, clearly defined and extraordinary event, warfare became an endemic and encompassing element of life in the mid sixteenth century. Earlier, small bands of mounted warriors, skilled in archery, arrived in camp and departed as they saw fit, for no institutional mechanisms existed for them to supply themselves or their followers with food and materials of war. By the sixteenth century, however, powerful magnates (daimyō) were capable of supplying and maintaining large armies, numbering in the thousands, largely composed of pike-wielding foot soldiers.
This article discusses the largely forgotten anti-whaling protests in Norway and Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century. It shows that fishing communities around the world protested almost simultaneously against the introduction of Norwegian-style industrial whaling, even though the protesting fishermen did not compete for the same marine resources as the whalers. Analysing Norwegian and Japanese fishermen’s knowledge reveals that whales played a crucial part in pre-industrial coastal fishing, as they were partly responsible for bringing fish closer to the shore. The article argues that fishing communities around the world had developed ‘coeval moral ecologies’, believing that the killing and flensing of whales caused environmental pollution, hurting coastal flora and fauna, and thus ultimately diminishing the coastal ecosystem on which the fishing communities depended. Fisheries scientists, politicians, and whalers have, however, downplayed this fishermen’s knowledge by presenting allegedly unbiased scientific data that did not indicate a relationship between whaling and fishing.
Notwithstanding the obvious lacunas and lack of documents concerning Trainin’s controversial biography, the author makes an attempt to take a fresh and independent look at Trainin’s personality and scholarship.
Kisaburō Yokota (1896–1993) was one of the most influential, albeit not uncontentious, international lawyers in interwar and postwar Japan, and an eminent early champion of international criminal justice, when this was still highly unpopular in Japan. His internationalist vision inspired by Kelsen and his critique of Japan’s aggressive expansion politics in the 1930s put him in the minority. After Japan’s defeat, this earlier position stood him in good stead and he advanced to being the most influential lawyer and public intellectual in postwar Japan, advising the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) as well as the Japanese government in matters of international law and criminal justice. Thus, he was a strong advocate for the Tokyo Trial of 1946–1948, published widely in support of it and also helped SCAP translate the final verdict into Japanese. The onset of the Cold War soon led to a more realistic repositioning of Yokota, but in his advocacy of international criminal justice, he remained steadfast. A study of Yokota’s writings and discussions serve to understand the historical position of Japanese lawyers and intellectuals towards the Tokyo Trial and international criminal justice even today.
Chapter 4 traces the accretion of Nauruan administration from 1920 to 1947. According to Article 22 of the League Covenant, C Mandates were to be administered as ‘integral portions’ of the Mandatory’s territory, an ambiguous status that came to pose juridical and diplomatic problems for the League. Australia defended a minimalist interpretation of its obligations in Nauru, as the British Phosphate Commission delivered cheap Nauruan phosphate into the farming sectors of Australia, Britain and New Zealand. For Japan and Germany, however, C Mandate status revealed the hypocrisies of the mandate system. Tensions in the Pacific worsened after their withdrawals from the League in 1933. The chapter revisits Japan’s occupation of Nauru during World War II, the war in the Pacific, and the formation of the UN from 1942. Nauru was re-taken in 1945, and the UN Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru was finalised in 1947, with Australia reappointed as Administering Authority. The chapter concludes that the shift from mandate to trust territory status later proved significant in defining self-government as a trusteeship objective; but that this shift was met with further accretions of imperial form.
The language of shared heritage for humanity holds a central position within UNESCO's World Heritage. However, the “Sites of Japan's Meiji Industrial Revolution” as World Heritage is primarily Japan's national project for globalizing a glorious historical narrative of Meiji Japan. While this national nostalgia matches the contemporary political discourse of overcoming domestic and international challenges in twenty-first century Japan, it also encourages people to forget alternative perspectives related to Korean memories of forced labor, colonialism, and war. Ministry officials and cultural council members expressed concerns over possible critical reactions from South Korea, but the Japanese government accelerated its campaign for UNESCO's World Heritage designation and achieved its objective in 2015. Why did the Japanese government take this step despite the alarming voices within Japan? This paper uncovers the process in which Japan's industrial heritage was constructed and promoted as World Heritage. It points to the role of Japanese and Western heritage experts in a newly established committee outside the conventional procedure for Japan's World Heritage nomination and concludes that Japan's heritage diplomacy pushes alternative historical narratives into oblivion.
This study explores the mental well-being of pregnant women in Japan during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.
We collected 1777 responses from pregnant women through an online survey. Using the Japanese version of the Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale (EPDS), we calculated the percentage of pregnant women above the cutoff (≥ 13), and the factor scores of anhedonia, anxiety, and depression. Regression analyses were performed to identify factors and socioeconomic characteristics correlated with depressive symptoms.
The point prevalence of pregnant women with an EPDS score of ≥ 13 was 17%. The mean scores were 0.73, 3.68, and 1.82 for anhedonia, anxiety, and depression, respectively. The probability of becoming above the cutoff score positively correlated with the cancellation of planned informal support, higher perceived risk for infection of COVID-19, difficulties in household finances, and lack of social support. Moreover, being younger, less wealthy, unemployed, and without a partner showed a significantly higher possibility of having a score above the cutoff.
The present study found a high percentage of pregnant women with depressive symptoms. Notably, COVID-19-related variables, including perceived risk for the infection, fear of decreasing economic wealth, and social support, were significantly associated with depressive symptoms.
This article rethinks the relationship between trade and industry in the development of Indian capitalism, focusing on Tata, pioneers in textile and steel production. It shows how two little-known affiliated trading companies, R.D. Tata & Co. in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Kobe, and Tata Limited in London, played a crucial intermediary role in securing financing and market access for the parent firm in Bombay while simultaneously increasing its exposure to the effects of global crises. Tata's ultimately dominant position in a protected national economy was due to the contingent failure of these trading companies rather than a foregone conclusion.
Chapter 8 examines the land and stock market bubbles that occurred in Japan in the 1980s. In the seven years before its peak, the Japanese stock market appreciated 386 per cent. Similarly, land prices rose by 207 per cent. By August 1992, the Japanese stock market had fallen 62 per cent from its peak, and by 1995, land was 50 per cent below its peak. Both land prices and the stock market continued to fall into the next decade. The chapter then uses the bubble triangle to explain the Japanese land and stock bubbles. These bubbles were purely political creations. Not only did the Japanese government provide the spark, but it systematically cultivated all three sides of the bubble triangle with the explicit goal of generating a boom. This process was clearest in the realm of money and credit, where an expansion was both a central part of Japan’s economic policy and, after the Plaza Accord, an international commitment. The chapter concludes by looking at how the collapse of the Japanese bubbles weakened the country’s banking system, which eventually had to be rescued by the government, and resulted in a stagnant economy for over two decades.