To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The expansion of privatisation in health care has been discussed extensively in most European countries and remains a hot topic nowadays. In China, privatisation results in considerable changes in its health care system, especially accelerating the ever-growing private medical institutions (PMIs). The rapid growth of PMIs raises the question of regulation for the Chinese government. Given the fact that few studies are available on the regulation of PMIs in China, I attempted to fill that gap by discussing the development of PMIs with a special focus on legal–regulatory strategies. After assessing current legal–regulatory strategies concerning PMIs, the paper identifies three major concerns regarding effective legal rules (i.e. weak coherence, inconsistency and legislative vacancy) and three difficult issues regarding government capacity (i.e. the negative effects of decentralised political structure, the low professionalism of bureaucrats and lack of reliability) that impede the well-functioning of regulatory agencies in China. As a plausible response, the paper recommends that the newly drafted basic health law should assign a separate chapter to regulate PMIs and also an independent regulatory body should be established to manage the issues of PMIs in China. Detailed recommendations are the practical implications of ICESCR General Comment No. 14.
This chapter analyses the various impacts international human rights law has on international criminal law. Through a careful analysis of the most emblematic cases of this interplay – from the case law of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to the International Criminal Court, it shows that judicial application and interpretation of the Statutes of International Criminal Tribunals and Courts in light of human rights law had a systemic effect on international law. In particular, it formal as well as conceptual legal borrowing from IHRL has led to new interpretations of existing international criminal law; imposed procedural and substantive obligations onto the international criminal tribunals and courts; served as a gap-filler; and qualified existing law. In light of the contextual nuances of international criminal justice, the paper argues that many of the cases demonstrating the systemic effect of IHRL on ICL are not coherent applications of the principle of systemic integration.
This chapter analyses how the International Court of Justice (ICJ) engages with human rights in international law. It first introduces a novel three-dimensional typology: the ICJ as an integrator, developer and globaliser of human rights. The ICJ as an ‘integrator’ of human rights focuses on the extent to which the ICJ has contributed to the integration of human rights into the corpus of international law as humanising or constitutional principles. The ICJ as a ‘developer’ reviews the contributions of the Court to the development of international human rights law as a branch of international law. The ICJ as a ‘globaliser’ examines how the ICJ assumes and globalizes the interpretation of international human rights law by specialised, often regional, human rights bodies. The Chapter argues that human rights at the ICJ do not have a coherent or progressive trajectory over time. Instead, developments are piecemeal, case sensitive and reflect deep disagreements on the role of human rights in general international law. The ICJ fares better as a globaliser of existing human rights law. Yet, it is s reluctant to offer an unambiguous constitutional place to human rights in its case law.
This introductory chapter by the editor discusses the goals of the book, introduces the questions central to it as well as develops a methodological framework. It relates to existing scholarship on the impact of human rights law upon other branches of international law and on the fragmentation of international law. It outlines the methodology that was applied in working towards this volume by presenting a range of distinctions that provide conceptual tools for detecting and assessing the different ways how international non-human-rights courts may refer to human rights. These include categories of human rights, sources of human rights norms, and three contexts for their application, namely due process rights applied in the proceedings of the court in question, substantive human rights norms as applicable law or basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, and interpretive reliance on human rights through systemic integration. The chapter also relates to the legitimacy of international courts by showing that how international courts relate to human rights norms matters for factors of legitimacy.
Africa’s subregional courts have experienced a marked impact by international human rights law notwithstanding the fact that these courts were established primarily to support and enhance the pursuit of economic integration. This chapter argues that international human rights law has become increasingly entrenched as a substantive source of law in African subregional regimes through a combination of uncritical reception and deployment by the subregional courts relying on statements of fundamental principles contained in treaties and the acquiesce of state parties to those treaties. Analysing the practices of the East African Court of Justice and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice as case studies, the charter demonstrates that even though the presence of international human rights law is evident in the work of Africa’s subregional courts, the impact that international rights law has made is significantly different in each regime. It is shown that the impact is more robust where the court is not constrained by jurisdictional limitations in human rights adjudication and allows standing to individuals pursuing human rights claims.
In the concluding chapter, the editor engages in a comparative and theory-building exercise across the jurisdictions covered in the book. There are important differences between international non-human-rights courts as to the legal basis for their application of human rights norms. While due process rights of the parties appearing before it, and systemic integration, are available for all courts, there are marked differences in issues such as standing by individuals, the status of human rights norms as applicable substantive law or basis for jurisdiction, and the patterns concerning which categories of human rights have made their way into other international courts. There are also clear examples of ‘other’ courts widening the scope of justiciable human rights, for instance through applying economic, social and cultural rights, or the right to property, or collective rights of peoples beyond the practice of actual human rights courts. In their application of human rights norms, 'other' international courts have at least so far tended to do so reflecting more the trend of humanisation, rather than constitutionalisation, of international law.
Past studies suggest that domestic public support for compliance with international human rights law can constrain governments to comply with human rights law. But the question remains: Why does the public care about compliance? Using a series of survey experiments in South Korea and the United States, this study finds that constituents are concerned about compliance in one issue area—such as human rights—because they believe it will affect the country's reputation in other domains of international law. Cross-national survey experiments demonstrate that past noncompliance negatively affects the South Korean public's second-order beliefs about the likelihood of future compliance across different issue areas. However, past noncompliance has a limited impact on the US public's first-order beliefs across different domains.
The absence of control of a territorial state over part of its physical territory is closely associated with online human rights violations, on the one hand, and the state's restricted (but not necessarily absent) control over the cyberspace, on the other. Notwithstanding the lack of its effective territorial control, the territorial state continues to be entitled to exercise its sovereignty over both territory and cyberspace. The consequence of sovereignty in international human rights law is the territorial state's presumed jurisdiction over its entire national territory. The article claims that the territorial state, while lacking the effective means to control its cyberspace fully as it does in the government-controlled areas, has continuing jurisdiction, and consequently obligations, to protect human rights online from wrongful acts that originate, occur or have effect in the area outside its effective control. Treaty monitoring bodies have recommended various positive measures that any territorial state is required to take while seeking to restore its ‘internet sovereignty’ in the separatist region, depending on the means in its power that are feasible in the particular situation.
International humanitarian law and international human rights law seek to prevent people from going missing, and to clarify the fate and whereabouts of those who do go missing while upholding the right to know of their relatives. When implementing international law at the domestic level, national authorities should plan carefully before engaging in any policy or legal reform that will address the issue of missing persons and the response to the needs of their families. This article seeks to present a general overview of the provisions of international law that are relevant to understanding the role of national implementation vis-à-vis the clarification of the fate and whereabouts of missing persons and the response to the needs of their relatives. It also presents the role that the ICRC has played in this regard and highlights three challenges that may arise at the national level when working on legal and policy reforms.
This article advocates limiting the permissive impact of military necessity on the right to life. It has been argued that military necessity justifies deviations from international human rights law (IHRL) because this body of law is inadequate to deal with the necessities arising out of armed conflict. The article argues that while this rationale is convincing, it should not mean that conduct that is lawful under humanitarian law is necessarily also lawful under human rights law. The degree of force that may be used under international humanitarian law (IHL) is often superfluous. In some instances such violence is tempered by the jus ad bellum, but this body of law does not apply in internal non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The article concludes by exploring the potential for IHRL to play a role in tempering superfluous violence in NIAC that is similar to that which jus ad bellum plays in international conflict.
This article explores how the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court) has dealt with allegations of violations of the right to life during an armed conflict and, in particular, how it has dealt with allegations of violation of the obligation to investigate such allegations. The article notes that international humanitarian law (IHL) was initially used by the Court to strengthen the general obligations of states to protect the rights guaranteed by the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Later IHL began informing the interpretation of specific rights. This change has been more significant in relation to the interpretation of the right to life under the ACHR than in the examination of state compliance with the right of access to justice, which encompasses the duty to investigate allegations of violations of the right to life during an armed conflict. The analysis of the Court's jurisprudence demonstrates that the different ways in which the Court has addressed the relationship between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL) have been informed by its primary effort to ensure that the interpretation of the ACHR provides the widest protection possible to individual rights.
At first glance, it appears that the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – the first pan-continental court of the African Union (AU) for human rights protection – epitomises the advances made by international courts in Africa in the past decade. Since its first judgment in 2009, the Court has taken a robust approach to its mandate and its docket is growing apace. However, a closer look at the overall context in which the Court operates reveals that it is susceptible to many of the patterns of resistance that have hampered other international courts in the region, which cut across the development of its authority and impact. This paper analyses the forms and patterns of resistance against the African Court and the actors involved, emphasising the additional difficulties entailed in mapping resistance to a young court compared to long-established courts, such as the European and Inter-American human rights courts.
The movement of migrants across international borders may result in grave humanitarian consequences and protection and assistance needs for those involved. Although many reach their destinations safely, others may find themselves in a country experiencing armed conflict – either because they live there or are travelling through there – and may endure great difficulties and be particularly vulnerable. In these situations, as civilians, migrants are protected under international humanitarian law (IHL) against the effects of hostilities and when in the hands of a party to the conflict. This article will provide an overview of the protection afforded by IHL to migrants as civilians in international and non-international armed conflicts. It will then examine more closely certain particularly relevant rules for the issue of migration, notably those related to the movement of migrants, family unity, and missing and dead migrants. In this way, this article will show that IHL provides important legal protections for migrants finding themselves in situations of armed conflict.
This article examines the value of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) in the general quest for the regional and global protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs). It contends that the absence of a globally binding legal instrument for the protection of IDPs underlines the importance of the Kampala Convention and the possible contribution it can make to global and regional efforts to create a binding legal framework for the protection of IDPs. While recognizing some challenges that may impact the full implementation of the Convention, the article concludes by noting its various positive elements that are invaluable in overall efforts to create a comprehensive global legal framework to enhance protection of IDPs.
International human rights law (IHRL), international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) have trouble staying faithful to the two pillars of customary international law – state practice and opinio juris. In ICL, the Tadić Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction and the Kupreškić Trial Judgement have even gone as far as enunciating new models to identify customs. In this article, I show that the approaches to customs’ identification postulated in these two cases were conflict-avoidance techniques used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to bring together IHRL and IHL. The crux of the matter in the Tadić and Kupreškić cases was that the human rights of the victims of war crimes committed in internal conflicts required that a new approach to customary international law be adopted. Thus, the criminal aspect of IHL (i.e., ICL) was updated, and conceptual conflicts between IHL and IHRL were avoided.
This paper examines the legality and limits of security detention in armed conflict situations. It particularly investigates the issues of whether the protection of national security is a legitimate ground to restrict the right to liberty of persons in situations of international or non-international armed conflict, and if so, what are the limits to a State's prerogative to restrict the right to liberty of individuals suspected of threatening its national security. On the basis of a thorough analysis of the relevant extant rules of international law regulating warfare, the paper concludes that security detention is permissible in armed conflict situations regardless of whether the nature of the conflict is international or non-international. However, the prerogative of a State to impose security detention is circumscribed by a plethora of fundamental substantive and procedural safeguards against arbitrariness that are provided in the different rules of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. These safeguards affirm that the search for absolute security is neither desirable nor attainable and that the mere invocation of security concerns does not grant an absolute power to restrict or suspend the liberty of individuals in armed conflict situations. Whenever it is imposed, security detention should be preventive in nature, and must aim at safeguarding the basic national security interests of a State from serious, future, direct and imminent threats related to the armed conflict situation. Detainees should also be able to challenge its legality before a competent organ at the initial or later stage of the detention through a system of periodic review.
This article explores the limits and possibilities of international human rights law in protecting cultural heritage from state-led destruction. It does so by focusing on two attempts by activists and non-governmental organizations to have the United Nations and the Council of Europe intervene to save the ancient city of Hasankeyf in Turkey’s southeast region, which will soon be flooded by the reservoir waters of the Ilısu Dam. Adopting a heritage rights focus, these grassroots initiatives have argued that Hasankeyf’s destruction would constitute a violation of human rights because it would deprive people of their right to participate in, and benefit from, cultural heritage. I suggest that, as powerful attempts to link cultural heritage and human rights, these cases demonstrate the need for more effective and legally binding international frameworks to protect heritage rights as an aspect of human rights.
The quarter-century anniversary of Israel's ratification of the major United Nations (UN) human rights treaties is an opportunity to revisit the formal and informal interaction between domestic and international Bills of Rights in Israel. This study reveals that the human rights conventions lack almost entirely a formal domestic legal status. The study identifies a minor shift in the scope of the Israeli Supreme Court's reference to international law, as the Court now cites international human rights law to justify decisions that a state action is unlawful, and not only to support findings that an action is valid. This shift may be the result of other reasons, for instance, a ‘radiation’ of the Court's relatively extensive use of international humanitarian law in reviewing state actions taken in the Occupied Territories. However, it may also reflect a perception of enhanced legitimacy of referring to international human rights law as a point of reference in human rights adjudication following ratification of the treaties.
At the same time, the Court continues to avoid acknowledging incompatibility between domestic law and international law. It refers to the latter only to support its interpretation of Israeli constitutional law, as it did before the ratification. This article critically evaluates this practice. While international human rights law should not be binding at the domestic level, because of its lack of sufficient democratic legitimacy in Israel, it should serve as an essential benchmark. The Court may legitimise a human rights infringement that is unjustified according to international law, but such incompatibility requires an explicit justification. The Court, together with the legislature and the government, are required to engage critically with the non-binding norms set by the ratified UN human rights treaties.
The ongoing Syrian civil war calls for a re-evaluation of using force to protect human rights. This article does not rake over the much-debated issue of whether a right of humanitarian intervention exists as lex lata. Instead, it addresses the little reviewed normative issue of whether the right should exist in international law to support and reflect a pluralistic understanding of sovereignty. Despite advancements in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law, this wider fabric of international law preserves Westphalian sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. It denies any right of humanitarian intervention.
Modern peacekeeping is increasingly expansive, and much of it occurs in Africa. The African Union's attitude to the challenges of regulating this modern peacekeeping is therefore an important source for the associated legal debates, but one that is often neglected (in part because the sources are limited and often in draft form). This article seeks to articulate and then critique the AU's emerging view on the application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law to peacekeeping activity and the relationship between the two bodies of law in this context. It argues that the AU's emerging position treats international humanitarian law as a narrowed lex specialis, only displacing international human rights law in relation to peacekeepers while they are actively engaged in armed conflict. Even this position, however, underestimates the extent to which the pervasive rights-based concerns in AU sources imply a still more pervasive application of international human rights law to its peacekeeping activities.