We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 2 constitutes the core theoretical chapter of the book. It serves two functions. First, it introduces the micro–institutional rational choice approach that is applied throughout the work. It explains why producers targeted by market-driven regulatory governance can be considered boundedly rational actors, what this characterization entails, and how institutional arrangements can help such actors to overcome collective action problems. It then shows how Kiser and Ostrom’s Three Worlds of Action can be leveraged to link institutional design choices to their outcomes. In a second step, Chapter 2 examines market-driven regulatory governance using this approach. It uncovers the institutional design dilemma that standards face as they scale up, and specifies a number of hypotheses on how these choices (e.g., between binding and flexible standard–setting; strict or flexible oversight mechanisms; and a focus on price premiums or on capacity building) will affect the implementation of standards by drawing on institutional rational choice theory as well as insights from the socio-legal literature.
This final chapter summarizes the insights gained and discusses how far they travel beyond the coffee sector. It first concludes that market-driven schemes only show partial effectiveness – and even then only when allowing the goal posts of a ‘sustainable coffee sector’ to be moved a considerable distance from its original definition. In a second step, it discusses the generalizability of the book’s results. It reiterates that the coffee sector – with a relatively easy-to-trace value chain, a consumer-facing product, and a long history of awareness raising in both industry and civil society – exhibits many features that should benefit the proper operation of market-driven regulatory governance. The fact that it did not appear to succeed in this best-case scenario raises serious questions about the ability of private governance to show better results in other supply chains. It closes by putting the book into conversation with recent work and suggesting implications for academics, practitioners, governments, and consumers.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.