This chapter examines the role of China and the rest of the BRICS countries in the WTO e-commerce and fisheries subsidies negotiations. The analysis suggests that despite China’s self-proclaimed developing country status, the fact that it is now one of the most competitive players in global trade but at the same time still holding the position to stay within the developing countries’ coalition and maintaining protectionist policies has made it increasingly difficult for China to continue to align its negotiation position with other BRICS countries. Over time, the dynamics of WTO negotiations have been transformed. The North-South divide under the GATT, which has later evolved into a three-tiered structure of developed, emerging powers and the rest of the developing countries during the early years of the Doha negotiations, has given away to a more complex matrix of interest-based and issue-specific coalition building which is no longer bound by the developed/developing division in today’s WTO negotiations. Due to its sheer size and unique domestic political and economic system, China has increasingly been singled out in the negotiations due to the difficulties for it to align with either developed or developing countries.

Chapter 3 elaborates on the linkages between technology and international institutions. It also introduces the guiding questions at the core of the book: how do international institutions respond to the promises and perils associated with transformative novel technologies? When do international institutions respond, when do they not respond, and why do their responses differ? Finally, how could institutional responses be designed in order to better facilitate the realization of technological promise and the avoidance of perils? The chapter contextualizes these questions within broader theoretical discussions in international regime theory and cooperation theory. A key point is that international institutions play a limited, albeit indispensable role in the regulation of transformative novel technologies. International institutions are no substitute for regulation at other scales, including at national levels, but are vital for managing the various transboundary aspects of transformative novel technologies.

The United States and China are the primary nodes of the multinodal world order. Together they are the middle third of the global economy, with the world’s biggest military budgets. Their parity makes rivalry inevitable because they are one another’s greatest counterpart. But their parity is asymmetric. China’s power relies on its demographic scale and on its Pacific Asian integration, while the US remains the center of the familiar global system that it created and it is the avatar of the developed world. While a Cold War is unlikely, the dangers posed by global rivalry are profound, ranging from nuclear war to failure to cooperate on global problems. The primary nodes also face asymmetric challenges. The US faces the challenge of adjusting to a central but not hegemonic global role. China faces the challenge of domestic tolerance and a mutually beneficial integration of Greater China and, more generally, of Pacific Asia. Beyond the primary nodes, regional reduction of uncertainties can contribute to the stabilization of world order. Cooperation founded on mutual respect is the prerequisite of successful global governance in a post-hegemonic world.

Since the nineties, international lawyers have increasingly questioned the traditional assumptions regarding the processes of law-making in the international sphere. A state consent-centered approach to the study of global governance, we are often told, has lost its edge due to the increased role of private actors and “soft” norms. Neoliberalism, in this narrative, finally opened the “black box” of the state. While this account contains important truths, it also obscures the long roots of global private transnational regulation. Indeed, states, willingly or unwillingly, have always tolerated the normative activities of private actors in the global sphere, even before the end of the cold war. As an example, I trace the processes through which private and public actors from the North Atlantic competed within the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to set the global standards for containerized shipping. In this “Keynesian” epoch, the lines between the private and the public were as blurry as in our days. Instead of assuming the novelty of private lawmaking, I argue that we much to learn from the long histories of “pre-neoliberal” non-state transnational regulation.

This chapter focuses on a novel transnational governance initiative which was developed after the 2013 Rana Plaza crisis: the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety. We focus on one particularly novel aspect of the Accord, which is the nature of the collective action created through the collaboration of over 200 signatory brands with global labour actors. We first identify the institutional design features including transnational co-determination, industry-wide, pre-competitive collaboration, legally enforceable commitment, developing worker voice, leverage through collective action, accountability through collective oversight, pooling of resources and, finally, the highly focused approach. While successful in improving safety in the industry, we also highlight the political nature of collective private regulation and the political backlash from national actors which ultimately ended its regulatory power.

Anti-globalist leaders form a distinct set of challengers to the global system because they share a common motivation: the desire to regain national sovereignty and reduce the power of international institutions. This chapter considers three different forms of anti-globalist resistance: (1) attempts to dismantle status quo regimes through unilateral action that challenges existing rules; (2) joining coalitions across states to transform existing multilateral institutions and reduce rules or obligations; (3) building new institutions or seeking alternative venues that favor state sovereignty over interconnectedness. Each strategy could transform the content of international rules, but with different implications for how we understand the nature of institutional authority. If international authority has moved beyond state consent and international institutions themselves now constitute a legitimate source of authority, anti-globalist leaders will find it difficult to escape the confines of institutional commitments through unilateral action. For strategic anti-globalists, then, the optimal way to undermine cooperation may be to work within the system itself, shaking the foundations of the post-1945 international order.

In this chapter, authority and rule are considered as analytical concepts to capture different forms of domination based on recognition. Both concepts involve the social paradox of voluntary subordination, particularly evident concerning global governance and International Organizations (IOs). The chapter discusses three theoretical solutions to the social paradox, thus three conceptualizations of authority. While contracted authority and inscribed authority represent the dominant conceptions in IR, they suffer from several shortcomings. Building on a critique of these variants, the chapter introduces reflexive authority as a third response, which understands authority in global governance as deriving from epistemic foundations that include the permanent monitoring of authorities. Reflexive authority relations involve enlightened and critical subordinates recognizing authority because they acknowledge their limitations. Instead of commands, authority holders send requests to constituencies, who monitor the authorities closely. This recognition of authority as worth observing leads to deference. Primary forms of contestations include non-compliance, delegitimation, and dissidence, which aim at different targets.

The ecology of governance organizations (GOs) matters for what is or is not ruled. The array of actors who comprise the current system of global governance, and especially private governance organizations (PGOs), has grown dramatically in recent decades. Drawing on organizational ecology, I posit that the rise of PGOs is both required and facilitated by disagreements between states that block the creation of what might be otherwise effective intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In a form of “double-negative regulation,” states block IGOs which in turn leave open niches that are then filled by PGOs, which then both complement and sometimes substitute for state law. The organizational ecology approach outlined here extends and refocuses inquiry in systematic ways that give us a fuller understanding of how and why PGOs have emerged as one of the most striking features of the contemporary world order. The key innovations in this paper are to a) shift the level of analysis from single agents or populations of agents to the entire field of GOs, including states, IGOs, and PGOs and b) draw on principles of ecology to understand the composition and dynamics of systems of governance.

Global governance entails a “transnationalization” of what is conventionally described as international authority, vested in multilateral organizations such as the UN. This process entails an increased reliance on private or non-state actors, and on voluntary and marked-based mechanisms of governance. In many cases, so-called “private” authority is central to global governance arrangements. This aspect of contemporary global governance raises questions about how the authority to govern is established. If authority is not delegated by states, but seized by private actors, our theories for explaining its emergence becomes important. I develop an argument about how authority can be established from scratch, without prior authority, by virtue of the sheer facticity of political rule. In this conception, authority is not the basis for political rule, but a result of it. I explore this dynamic with regards to different issue-areas in multilateral settings.

The ideology of the rule of law posits a hierarchical relationship with law and rules in a position of authority over the subjects. In international affairs, this is represented by the popular view that international order follows once governments accept the authority of international law and institutions. The idea that states are subordinate to international law is central to the international rule of law, but it directly contradicts the equally popular image of international affairs as a domain of anarchy. Anarchy presumes that governments are not subordinate to any source of authority while the rule of law says that they are. The fact that two apparently fundamental assumptions of international theory are incompatible with each other suggests an urgent need to look closely at both. This chapter examines the ideology of the international rule of law and compares it with domestic notions of the rule of law and with the idea of international anarchy. Once the rule of law is understood as a language of political justification, we can begin to make sense of its position as a source of authority that is superordinate to governments.

This chapter summarises the argument of the book. Through a discussion of “Brexit”, it then explores the extent to which arguments about expert ignorance could travel beyond rule of law reform, for instance, to studies of governance more broadly. It also discusses the politics of the methods I have proposed to study expert ignorance.

Chapter 5 argues that the UN peacekeepers’ efforts to install stability in Cyprus forged a political environment of stagnation, fostering an entrenchment of hostilities between the divided communities. Once on the ground, peacekeepers improvised and favoured palliative solutions, so as to establish stability as quickly as possible, establishing dependence on external sources of relief and increasing displaced populations’ vulnerability to political instrumentalisation. The mission also expanded armed peacekeeping functions to recruit a UNFICYP mediator. However, the Turkish government’s controversial response to the UN mediator’s report exposed the extent of the UN’s powerlessness in the face of member-state criticism. The repercussions of the second mediator’s report highlighted the stagnation of the Cyprus mission and ignited internal discussions about the damage of the mission’s presence and mandate. It also demonstrated the incompatibility of functioning as an active military participant on the ground whilst simultaneously leading diplomatic negotiations for the resolution of the conflict. By 1971, the UN leadership and contributing nations openly questioned the future role of the UN in international conflict response following the organisation’s experience in Cyprus.

Chapter 3 turns to the Congo crisis, examining the imperial continuities and neo-colonial character of the infrastructural support provided by the ONUC mission during the first phase of the intervention. This chapter establishes the obstructive and productive influences of the ongoing presence of Belgian capitalists and colonial officials on the UN mission. It also examines how the UN staff used the access of technical assistance projects, such as the radio station and airport, to control the political future of the nation. This chapter explores how UN officials’ recast their strategies of paternalistic rhetoric, cultural exceptionalism, and anticommunism as international expertise in security and peacebuilding. UN staff’s political interference in the Congolese constitutional crisis in September 1960 was the first in a series of ONUC crises that ignited international controversy and criticism of the UN leadership’s decision-making, damaging the organisation’s relationship with the Afro-Asian bloc and threatening the future of the UN peacekeeping project.

How did the concept of an international military become a popular diplomatic option in the twentieth century? Chapter 1 establishes how international organisations, such as the League of Nations and the UN, disrupted the state monopoly on war thus helping to pave the way towards the armed peacekeeping project. It traces post-war debates on the UN’s role in nuclear disarmament and examines the UN leadership’s experiments in intervening directly in conflict contexts. Inspired by the UN’s observer presence in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the first secretary-general, Trygve Lie, proposed the creation of a UN Guard to protect the organisation’s field-based staff. Although the UN Guard failed to achieve meaningful diplomatic support, the idea of an international force - organised, trained, and uniformed by the UN - demonstrated the UN leadership’s aspirations for the organisation to shift into militarism. The chapter concludes by examining the diplomatic negotiations and logistical construction of the UN Command in Korea, examining how the UN leadership’s efforts to involve the organisation in the field were limited during this period by US hegemony and logistical superiority.

The end of the ’spirit of Bandung’ in the late 1960s coincided with the passing and retirement of most of the key UN officials involved in the development of the peacekeeping project. By 1971, the Cold War obstructed the UN forums from authorising any new armed peacekeeping missions. Weaving together the contributions of previous chapters, the conclusion reiterates the how UN peacekeepers’ racial prejudices and technocratic logic perpetuated international hierarchies of power, colonial structures, and further suppressed the self-determination of peripheral or minority populations. It addresses the role of the UN peacekeeping missions in supporting - if not, openly enabling - the United States’ anticommunist aggression across the Global South during the decolonisation period. Rather than being passive in this process, however, this book has demonstrated how the UN officials agreed that anticommunism was a peacebuilding strategy for global security. Ultimately, peacekeepers’ unique role in the field shaped the formation of the post-colonial international order, embedding uneven hierarchies of race, expertise, and diplomatic power within newly independent nations and populations.

This book models the impact of UN peacekeeping missions, exploring the variety of diplomatic, geopolitical, and legal functions played by the international UN officials whilst deployed to violent conflicts across the Global South. By adopting a comparative approach to the first armed peacekeeping missions – United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed in Egypt, Opération des Nations Unies (ONUC) in Congo, United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West Papua, and United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus – each chapter traces how organisational interests and racial prejudices shifted from mission to mission, unearthing the granular colonial continuities perpetuated by the field-based staff. Drawing on a wide range of archival material, this book transcends UN headquarters-centred approaches that currently dominate the historiography of international organisations to access the role of mid-level peacekeeping bureaucrats in shaping the post-colonial international order. In doing so, this book traces unexplored continuities between late colonial administrations and the dramatic rise in peacekeeping missions from the late twentieth century onwards. This book illuminates these patterns and ruptures in peacekeeping practices during the formative years of UN peacekeeping and highlights the multifaceted functions played by mid-level UN bureaucrats in shaping the formation of the post-colonial international order.