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Puritans kept records of disciplinary practices, recording the censures, sins, admonitions, and confessions of members who strayed. By analyzing types of sins, punishments, and the language of confessions, this book reveals how Puritans altered the expression and practice of their faith, creating a “gendered Puritanism.” Examining more than fifteen congregations for the first three generations, this book shows how ordinary laymen shaped the gender conventions of Puritanism, challenging the ideas of ministers and reifying more traditional ideas of masculinity and femininity. Through the gendering of Puritanism, laymen contributed to the modern ideology of separate spheres, reifying public spaces for men and relegating women to the private space of personal piety. Chapter 1 explains the founding of the Dorchester congregation and the establishment of their covenants and disciplinary practices. Chapter 2 explores how laity charged men and women with different types of sins. Chapter 3 analyzes the language of confessions and the varied expectations for men and women. Chapters 4 and 5 explore the censures of John Underhill and Anne Hibbens, to illustrate the gendering of Puritanism.
While theoretical, analytical, and methodological issues surrounding research on generations and generational differences at work have been thoroughly discussed, one topic that has received far less attention is the extent to which the inferences suggested by this research are appropriate. Therefore, the purpose of this effort is to review the recent-generations literature, identify the commonly represented inferences, and offer a critical review of the appropriateness of each. A qualitative review of the last ten years of published research found four main inferences: (1) organizations should adopt customized HR policies, (2) intergenerational conflict is inevitable, (3) generations should be led differently, and (4) the benefits of capitalizing on generational strengths. These inferences are critiqued using several different lenses including legal, methodological, practice, and theoretical. Our conclusion is that these inferences are not supported by the literature and that organizations should instead focus on broader work and workplace trends.
This chapter addresses generational changes and corresponding differences in personality, values, and attitudes. Both popular and academic interpretations of generations are described. We begin by defining generations, which are perhaps best thought of as fuzzy social constructs. Next, we detail key issues related to measurement of generations, notably teasing apart specific effects of age or development, culture or period, and birth cohort or generation. We describe two general models of how generations develop: a sociological model and cultural model. We also detail six models that predict the content of generations, from cyclical models to the no-change model. We argue for what we think are best practices for testing these ideas, while acknowledging the difficulties involved. We then describe some of the findings in the research regarding generational change as well as organizational specific findings. We conclude with a brief discussion of the future of research in this area.
We compare gender gaps in attitudes towards redistribution and social spending across generations in the USA and Britain. We show that the US context, characterized by lower welfare provision, results in consistent or even widening gender gaps for generations born post-1925. On the other hand, the British context, characterized by higher welfare provision relative to the USA, exhibits a narrowing and closing of the gender gap for younger generations, for two out of three indicators of spending preferences. These findings provide some, albeit mixed, evidence that women are more consistently in favour of social spending and redistribution than men in contexts characterized by low welfare provision such as the USA. Where there are higher levels of social support, we argue women could become increasingly more likely to express a preference for levels of spending and redistribution that is similar to men's, narrowing the gender gap among younger generations.
We construct and parameterize an overlapping generations model for an open economy with individuals who differ in innate ability. Key endogenous variables are hours worked, investment in human and physical capital, and per capita growth. The model replicates important data in Belgium since 1960 remarkably well. Simulating it, we observe that behavioral adjustments by households and firms contribute to reverse the negative arithmetical effect of future demographic change on per capita growth. Individuals work and study more. However, with unchanged policies, there remains a net negative effect on annual per capita growth of almost 0.3%-points on average in the next 25 years. This is mainly due to adverse consequences of reduced fertility and a declining working-age population on (the return to) physical capital investment. Model projections also point to rising income inequality induced by demographic change. Differences in the capacity of individuals to respond to increasing life expectancy by investing in education, and by saving, are key.
As a reaction against contemporary democracy's inherent short-sightedness in solving problems that are likely to affect distant future generations, there has been a recent increase in proposals for different kinds of democratic representation of future persons. This article shows that even though there can be no such thing as political representation of future persons, the relevant affected interests of the as-yet unborn can still be taken into consideration in political decision making. This aim is achieved by focusing on the political representation of children as special cases of semi-future members of the class of the represented.
Chapter 5 brings things together with an analysis of the key lessons drawn from the discussion in the preceding chapters. In particular, it makes a comparison among the three generations of constitutional courts by topic, rather than country by country. This last chapter carries out an analysis of the various types of intervention of the constitutional judges, the reasons for the success of the centralized system of constitutional review, as well as the various factors influencing the activity of the courts. The analysis of the three generations shows that thanks to the actions carried out during the transition processes, the constitutional courts have managed to achieve full legitimation in their respective constitutional systems and within the dynamics of their respective forms of government. Although their action was not immune to criticism, the constitutional courts emerged as key players of the substantive transitions, reducing the high degree of uncertainty that characterizes the outcome of every transition process, and heading off the risk of ending up in a situation of constitutions without constitutionalism.
Why deal with sustainability last in a book about Green politics that has as its premise the need to place sustainability at the heart of global politics? The answer lies in the question. If the global economy, global security, development, the state and global governance had the achievement of sustainability as one of their overriding rationales and objectives, a separate set of policies, institutions and initiatives to undo, contain and offset the excesses of industrial society would not be necessary. There would be no need, in other words, for global environmental policies and regimes. The fact that they exist is an indictment of a system and a society living beyond its means and in unsustainable ways. This chapter develops Green critiques of unsusustainable development and more top-downmmethods of'managing' the environment before articulating Green visions of sustainability and ends with reflections on strategies involving law and protest to reform of the state and the pursuit of just transitions.
Focusing on H. G. Wells’s scientific romances, “The Technology Age” argues that the volatile modernity of Wells’s fiction pivots on a failure of sympathy between the young and the old. This failure generates the deeply ambivalent conditions by which generational antagonism arises alongside modernity’s technological and social progress. Drawing on the work of Charles Booth and tracts by the Fabian society, I illustrate how socialist arguments for a universal pension depend upon youths imagining the older person they one day will become. Analyzing works such as The Time Machine, War of the Worlds, Food of the Gods, and In the Days of the Comet, this chapter highlights the multitemporality of the banal process of aging. In this regard, science fiction provides insight into the reality of aging in a way that conventional literary realism cannot.
“No Plots for Old Men” argues that aging raised a problem for Charles Dickens’s literary project: the novel’s difficulty of representing temporal continuity over long spans of time. For the old man, the meaningful plots of the nineteenth century—such as the bildungsroman or the marriage plot—are behind him. An object of little narrative interest from the perspective of these plots, the old man is continually activated in Dickens’s novels, setting up a competition between the natural death he staves off and the closure of the narrative in which he is enmeshed. By examining three of Dickens’s early novels, this chapter shows how old men are excluded from the youthful plot of development central to the progress of a modernizing society. No longer the subject of the plot and yet bound by ambition, the elderly male engages in a narrative compulsion that underlines the imaginative power of what has been left behind by both the realist novel and the modernity it represents. By doing so, the old man serves as the site through which Dickens addresses an impasse of the novel form, where its duration is marked by its inability to faithfully represent the texture of passing time.
This article explores the shift in Rawls’ just savings principle away from an initial iteration that was indifferent to previous generational savings, to one in which past historical savings are the cornerstone of the motivation to save for future generations. Attention is given to the practical application of the revised principle in the field of the environment. The revised principle is argued to be an improvement on the initial one, because previous generations have an existence and identity that is more tangible than yet-to-be future ones.
This chapter picks up where the previous chapter ended, mainly to discuss how emerging competition impacts the evolution of the modern business school. Several key challenged are identified as potentially slowing down evolution, among which conservatism among key faculty members and the culture in a business school that these create might be paramount. The chapter then discusses how emerging pedagogical innovations seem to further accentuate the need for change. The emerging computer-based technology combined with practical “learning on the job” seem particularly key here. The chapter concludes by discussing what might be some of the key shortcomings that business schools now might face to cope with the challenge to evolve. A fragmented, silo-orientated, organizational structure often seems to represent a particular challenge here.
From its publication, the powerful affective charge of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s best-selling antislavery novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin; or, Life Among the Lowly (1852) crossed national and cultural borders, and had an enormous impact on the abolitionist debate. Australian audiences retained considerable sympathy for UTC’s depiction of slavery, however, such audiences generally failed to recognise the parallels between the plight of African-American slaves, and of Indigenous Australians. Nonetheless, UTC was sometimes evoked to draw attention to the tragedy of Aboriginal child removal under assimilation policies, now known as the Stolen Generations. UTS also reveals how metropolitan domestic ideals were applied to an expanded imperial world, a sentimental investment in the home and family that was the basis for the colonial project of assimilation. UTC’s colonial application raises again the long-standing debate between those who argue that literature helps to cultivate a more compassionate society, and those who believe that empathy masks complicity with oppressive practices. I argue that despite the manipulation, re-working and stereotypical devices that limit the impact of sentimental narratives, we must distinguish between diverse contexts of reading and social action, and their political malleability, focusing on their relationship to contemporary political discourse.
This chapter explores how restraint functions within, through, and from democracies. It delineates generational analysis and how restraint fits into that theorization. It provides illustrations of generational conflict through three centuries of US history. Restraint appears in the form of a reactive generation’s rejection of the ideologies and practices of actionist generations. The infrequency of restraint in US settings over the past three centuries can be explained because (1) reactive generations are only one of four types to emerge in US political settings and (2) reactive generations are recessive (as opposed to dominant) and play a prominent role in the political, social, and cultural institutional settings of a polity for only brief (roughly one or two decades) periods of time.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the relationships between reproduction and life cycle. We start by illustrating the classical division of life cycles on the basis of the alternation of nuclear phases (haplontic, diplontic, haplodiplontic). Then we move on to the alternation between sexual and asexual generations (metagenetic cycles), amphigony and parthenogenesis (heterogonic cycles), gonochoric and hermaphroditic (heterogenic cycles), solitary and colonial, unicellular and multicellular, to conclude with short sections on the alternation of generations dependent on seasonal polyphenism and the different ways in which different reproductive phases can be distributed within one generation.
And even though the impact of the Inquiry’s findings has led all state and territory parliaments to express such practices as abhorrent, determining that they will not happen in their respective jurisdictions, there is still a prevailing attitude in the broader community that what was done, was done ‘with the best intentions’ and ‘in the best interests of the child’. I would like to suggest an alternative perspective that may better explain the actions of early 20th-century politicians, pastoralists and developers.
Population aging, along with a secular decline in real interest rates, is an empirical regularity observed in developed countries over the last few decades. Under the premise that population aging will deepen in coming years, some studies predict that real interest rates will continue to be depressed further to a level below zero. In this paper, we address this issue and explore how changes in demographic structures have affected and will affect real interest rates, using an overlapping generations model calibrated to Japan’s economy. We find that the demographic changes over the last 50 years reduced the real interest rate. About 270 out of the 640 basis points decline in real interest rates during this period was due to declining labor inputs and higher saving, which themselves stemmed from the lower fertility rate and increased life expectancy. As for the next 50 years, we find that demographic changes alone will not substantially increase or decrease the real interest rate from the current level. These changes reflect the fact that the size of demographic changes in years ahead will be minimal, but that downward pressure arising from the past demographic changes will continue to bite. As Japan is not unique in terms of this broad picture of changes in demographic landscapes in the last and next 50 years, our results suggest that, sooner or later, a demography-induced decline in real interest rates may be contained in other developed countries as well.
This paper reexamines the Serendipity Theorem of Samuelson (1975) from the stability viewpoint, and shows that, for the Cobb–Douglas preference and CES technology, the most-golden golden-rule lifetime state being stable depends on parameter values. In some situations, the Serendipity Theorem fails to hold despite the fact that steady-state welfare is maximized at the population growth rate, since the steady state is unstable. Through numerical simulations, a more general case of CES preference and CES technology is also examined, and we discuss the realistic relevance of our results. We present the policy implication of our result, that is, in some cases, the steady state with the highest utility is unstable, and thus a policy that aims to achieve the social optima by manipulating the population growth rate may lead to worse outcomes.
This article locates itself at the intersection of the social history of postcolonial migrations and the intellectual history of leftism and Third-Worldism in the aftermath of May ’68. It is the first study of the radical political group Révolution Afrique. From 1972 until its ban by the French government in 1977, this organization forged by African and French activists mobilized against neocolonial ideologies and policies on both sides of the Mediterranean. By tracing the organization's rise and fall through extensive archival research and in-depth interviews, the article explores the changing meanings of transnational activism by weaving together the biographical paths of the activists, the institutional and political constraints they faced, and the ideological framework within which they operated. During this short time frame, the transnational agenda that made sense among African workers and students in the early 1970s became irrelevant. The increasing repression of political dissent in Africa and France, the suspension of migratory flows, and the French government's implementation of return policies in the late 1970s forced the group's African activists to adopt a more national approach to their actions, or simply withdraw from high-risk activism. Despite the dissolution of Révolution Afrique, this collective endeavor appears to have been a unique experience of political education for African activists, transcending distinct social and national boundaries that until now have been left unexamined by social scientists specialized in the complex history of the relationships between France and Africa.
We set up an overlapping-generations model with endogenous fertility to study pensions policies in an ageing economy. We show that an increasing life expectancy may not be detrimental for the economy or the pension system itself. On the other hand, conventional policy measures, such as increasing the retirement age or changing the social security contribution rate could have undesired general equilibrium effects. In particular, both policies decrease capital per worker and might have negative effects on the fertility rate, thus exacerbating population ageing.