Some people appear to learn more slowly. Could they just be learning different things? Suppose two groups of children are learning words – they have growing vocabularies – but one group acquires the list more slowly than the other. Can we use the structure of the information they learn to gain insight into whether or not they are learning different information? Small worlds are one way of measuring the structure of a community. When quantitatively defined, small worlds have a number of useful properties, including that they compare the structure of a network relative to different versions of itself, thereby providing a kind of ‘control’ network against which to benchmark a measurement. In this chapter, I discuss small worlds and several ways to evaluate them, and then use them to answer a simple question: Are children who learn to talk late just slow versions of early talkers? Or are they learning something different about the world? Along the way, I will enumerate three different approaches to explaining where structure comes from: function, formation, and emulation.

The Introduction explains the relevance of a theoretical inquiry into the purpose and function of belligerent reprisals. It highlights several examples in recent practice where the vocabulary of belligerent reprisals has been harnessed by parties to an armed conflict, pointing to the continued relevance of the institution in contemporary warfare. At the same time, it outlines persisting difficulties in the terminology, regulation and governance of reprisals, and shows that they all derive from the failure by international legal theory to give a proper legal vest to the purpose and function of the mechanism. It points to fundamental fallacies both in how the question has been approached, and in how it has been answered. It proposes an alternative to existing accounts and outlines how it will be investigated in the book.

The proportion of the population living into old age has been increasing worldwide. For the first time in history, there are more older people than children under 5 years of age. The task for public health is to understand the relationships between ageing, health and the environment (physical, social and economic) in which people live, to promote healthy ageing and prevent the disability and subsequent dependency that is often associated with growing old.

This chapter examines the factors that lead to ageing populations and explores the health, social and economic consequences of the change in the population structure. It then goes on to outline strategies that can lead to healthy ageing and other public health actions that could help to manage the challenges posed – and the opportunities afforded – by the relative and absolute increase in the number of older people.

Informal borrowings are used for several reasons. They are used to name things, providing alternative synonyms for things already named in English but also names for things yet to be named. More often, however, they are used instead of standard English to communicate additional information that is social, psychological, rhetorical, or cultural in nature. The social function involves group solidarity and social distancing. The psychological function includes expression of emotions via a repertoire of expressions for a variety of emotional states and emotive labels. The rhetorical function includes informality, conciseness, forcefulness, wordplay, and small talk. The cultural function involves expressing cultural identity and stylization; while expressing cultural identity is often the reason for using such expressions, stylization is another phenomenon accounting for their common use among larger segments of American society.

Aristotle has the resources to solve the Conjunctive Problem of Happiness and thus to vouchsafe the necessity of ethically virtuous activity while clarifying the kind of priority that contemplation has. Among these resources is his theory of predication as articulated in the Organon, his toolkit for all sorts of philosophical inquiry. This theory allows us to understand the coherence of what have appeared to many to be fundamentally discrepant answers to the question about what kind of activity happiness is.

In contrast to Plato, Aristotle allowed and argued for the possibility that all human lives have some non-instrumental value. This valuation of life is premised on his teleological conception of nature: insofar as all human lives are natural ends of some sort, they are thus a good. However, this non-instrumental value of mere living is in itself not sufficient to make a life worth living. As in Plato, whether a life is lived well or badly is the decisive factor, and again the state of virtue or vice is the most important consideration. Vice makes a life worse than death, regardless of the other good things in it, but fully fledged virtue is not necessary for a life worth living. In contrast to those who are fully virtuous, other non-vicious humans may need other goods, or at least freedom from other bads, such as serious illness or grave misfortunes, to pass the threshold of a life worth living. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle is less optimistic about the chances of the non-educated elite having a life worth living, though he does not flatly deny that possibility.

Focusing on the Republic, this chapter argues that Plato regards psychological health, or the virtue of justice, as the necessary – and sufficient – condition of a human life worth living. This healthy condition amounts to a good exercise of soul’s function (ergon), which is premised on a good exercise of an individual’s function, or job, in the city. This account allows even peasants or craftsman in Plato’s ideal city to have a life worth living, even though they fall short of the best possible human life lived by the rulers-philosophers. It is argued that this non-elitist account of a life worth living is compatible with the famous claim from Plato’s Apology that an unexamined life is not worth living for humans. For in the ideal city all citizens live an examined life, at the very least in the sense of being ruled by the wise philosophers. At the same time, Plato decisively denied the possibility that the mere fact of being alive, or the fact of having a soul, would be a good. It can be a good, if a life is lived well, or it can be an evil, if a life is lived badly.

Freud’s intense faith in Jung, a man he had called the “Joshua” to his Moses, and whom he declared would be his successor at a time when psychoanalysis needed a “Christ,” ended in a hermeneutic battle over the Prophet Jonah. This chapter explores how the biblical story of Jonah became the site for working out the differentiation between the Viennese school and Zurich school of psychoanalysis. I argue that the forgotten Jonah trail is worth recovering because Freud’s repudiation of the Biblical hermeneutics surrounding the myth of Jonah largely determined the end of Freud and Jung’s collaboration and, at the same time, influenced Freud’s subsequent attitude to and writings on Biblical prophets. Freud’s taciturn, oppositional, and hitherto unanalyzed discursive relationship with the prophet Jonah sheds new light on psychoanalytic literature on Biblical myth, its reception, and even its consequent influence on the movement after 1913.

This appendix collects a review of the calculus and analysis in one and several variables that the reader should be familiar with. Notions of convergence, continuity, differentiability and integrability are recalled here.

Oral glands underwent substantial modification during the origin and diversification of snakes. Oral glands have provided rich data for snake systematics, and for informing evolutionary scenarios about the adaptive radiation of snake feeding. However, sampling has been patchy, and many questions remain about gland homology, function and evolution. This chapter addresses labial (supra- and infralabial), temporomandibular, rictal, sublingual, premaxillary, accessory and dental (= venom and Duvernoy’s) glands. We review and synthesize developments and data and present new histological sections and high-resolution tomography of some snakes and lizards, providing descriptions and illustrations of oral glands and associated structures. We comment on labial and dental glands of some toxicoferan and non-toxicoferan lizards, and report the first observation of a possible infralabial gland in a dibamian lizard. There are insufficient data to resolve all outstanding questions about gland homology across lizards and snakes, but the ancestral snake possibly had rictal and lacked dental (venom) glands, the latter perhaps evolving only within colubroidean caenophidians.

Morphosyntax describes the form and function of grammatical constructions in the world’s languages. The form of constructions includes both syntactic structure and relevant morphology. The function of constructions includes both information content (semantics) and information packaging of the content. The same semantic content can be packaged in different ways. The approach in this textbook is crosslinguistic and empirical: we compare grammatical constructions across languages and describe patterns of variation, universals constraining variation, and diachronic processes that give rise to the variation. Crosslinguistic comparison is done using crosslinguistically valid concepts (comparative concepts). Crosslinguistic constructions are defined as all grammatical forms expressing a particular function. Strategies are crosslinguistically defined formal means for expressing a function. The analysis of grammatical structure in a particular language is the categorization of constructions in the language by their form and their function. Language-particular analysis of constructions and crosslinguistic analysis of constructions can be united via the function of the construction.

After a brief overview of the advent of functional approaches to language in the mid– and late 1900s, stressing the importance of investigating pragmatic, i.e. implicit aspects of language use, and of simultaneously approaching language from different perspectives, this overview stresses the importance of understanding – rather than of finding some definite truth about language. The analysis of pragmatic particles (you know, like, well) in the mid–1960s showcased a plethora of challenges for investigations of language function and use that had previously not attracted scholars’ attention. This strand of research has fruitfully continued, especially so within the DiPVaC community, and constantly opens up new avenues of research. This overview lastly offers a reinterpretation of the author’s 1981 study of you know in terms of aspects of responsibility, suggesting that precisely responsibility – and its various facets – need to be given a more central task in future studies of language function and use, discourse, and pragmatics.

When age-related physical impairments affect a person’s performance of functional tasks, rehabilitation may restore function and improve an elder’s independence and participation in society. Included is a review of how to perform a functional assessment, a description of the members of a rehabilitation team, and an introduction to the various settings where an elder can receive rehabilitation. The chapter describes geriatric assistive devices that improve self-care and mobility and reviews specific rehabilitation interventions for common debilitating conditions such as stroke, Parkinson’s disease, hip fracture, and lower-extremity amputation.

Argues that Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms relies on an account of human subjectivity that he deliberately keeps in the background of his writings. Remarkably, even though Cassirer considers a systematic account of human subjectivity to be an essential component of a philosophy of culture, he never seems to develop one (5.1). This omission is the result of Cassirer’s belief that consciousness can only be approached through the mediation of diverse cultural products (5.2). Cassirer solves this difficulty by developing a ‘functional conception of human subjectivity’ that forms the exact counterpart of his account of objectivity and therefore needs no separate treatment (5.3). This conception allows him to characterize the human being as an ‘animal symbolicum’ in An Essay on Man (5.4). Cassirer’s posthumous text The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms then merely translates this view of the human being into the language of his contemporaries ‒ rather than deviating from his published writings, as is usually maintained (5.5). In sum, this chapter retrieves the hidden, anthropological foundation of Cassirer's philosophy of culture.

Reconsiders the stakes of the Davos debate on the basis of my previous findings. I first summarize the established similarities and differences between Cassirer and Heidegger's philosophical projects. Next, I reinterpret their issues of contention in light of the starting point and aim (the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, as they put it in Davos) of their philosophies, which, I argue, Cassirer and Heidegger failed to accurately compare. In this way, I show that Cassirer's and Heidegger’s thought, despite being grounded in irreconcilable ontological and methodological assumptions, can nevertheless positively incite each other. After all, they share a philosophical concern: to comprehend and aid the human being’s capacity to orient itself in and towards the world. This means that the Davos debate was an elaborate disagreement about a shared interest of profound significance for human life after all, or in other words a true philosophical debate.