This chapter discusses the right to freedom of religion, thought, conscience and belief as it is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, other Council of Europe instruments, in EU law and in international instruments. Attention is paid to both the forum internum and the forum externum (religious manifestations). In the final section, a short comparison between the different instruments is made.

Chapter 5 describes the law regarding speech aimed at religion and morality. Against a backdrop of oppressive prosecutions and antiabolitionist violence, Massachusetts saw denials of the constitutionality of libel law and a rising insistence on individual rights to freedom of conscience and expression. Both the pornographic classic Fanny Hill and the first birth control texts became cheaply available in Massachusetts, and lawyers adapted the law to prosecute obscenity. Nova Scotia likely had fewer such texts, and outside Halifax legal actors also had fewer texts to refer to in drafting indictments. On the religious front, Nova Scotia’s basically voluntaristic environment made religion political, with the Anglican elite on the defensive, but disputes over belief reached neither the legislature nor courts. Massachusetts, however, gradually eliminated establishment, leaving winners and losers. Free Thinkers evoked concern, especially the Englishwoman Frances Wright, whose lectures challenged Christianity, capitalism, slavery and patriarchy. Many understood republican ideals as justifying majoritarian violence, a logic that did not resonate in Nova Scotia, where disputes centered instead on configurations of institutional power.

This chapter investigates how South Korean citizens’ petitioning to redress grievances against the state and constitutional adjudication have developed since the end of the 1980s. While de jure there existed a constitutional review system since the founding of the Republic in 1948, it was only after transition to formal democracy that infringement on fundamental rights could be de facto appealed in the Constitutional Court, which was established in 1988. Through an analysis of caseload statistics from the Constitutional Court, the chapter explores how citizens have been making use of the constitutional appeal system for claiming their rights. The study also qualitatively examines shifts in the logic and outcomes of constitutional adjudication of fundamental rights claims concerning major social issues such as gender equality, sexual autonomy, and freedom of conscience.

The human capabilities approach seeks to articulate rights in terms of the conditions necessary for the development and refinement of human capacities. From the perspective of psychological science and the world’s religious traditions, human capacities may be understood as being grounded in notions of the “human spirit” and may be reflected in the proclivity to create, seek knowledge of the self and the world, and engage in moral and/or spiritual striving. In the arena of international human rights, freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) – an important expression of the human spirit – has been clearly established as a universal right. Thus, in a converging view, human rights law and policy may be most effective when they also advocate for the creation of the conditions necessary for the realization of our full humanity, including the moral and spiritual dimensions of human capacity. Given modern conditions of globalization and interdependence, which urgently demand workable, bridging approaches among diverse groups, cultivation of such shared interests and understandings may prove vital. We examine FoRB as one example of an area in which psychological, religious, and rights-based approaches can be mutually reinforcing and ultimately conducive to human flourishing.

This short conclusory chapter summarizes the main claims of the book and summarizes how the book has provided evidence to support those claims. It shows that the book’s overall contribution then is to have demonstrated that there is, and there should be in a liberal state, a general right to conscientious exemption available to a person who objects to any legal obligation on the basis of a religious or non-religious conscientious belief.

The chapter introduces the main claims of the book, how they are defended and their implications. The chapter then makes a positive case in favour of the general right to conscientious exemption and for it being equally available to religious and non-religious conscientious objectors. It argues that a non-absolute right to conscientious exemption is justified by reference to a cluster of moral values, including the demands of the state’s duty of neutral pluralism (the duty being grounded in the value of individual moral responsibility and respect for ethical pluralism), respect for personal autonomy, freedom of conscience and concern for individual well-being. The chapter justifies the institution of the general right by showing that it provides holders of minority moral views with an alternative forum, i.e. a court of law, where they may be able to bring a claim and ask for exemptions from legal obligations which impinge on their conscience. It concludes by showing that the justifications provided for exemptions generally and for the general right cannot justify the right being a privilege of only those that object on the basis of non-religious beliefs. Non-religious conscientious beliefs should also benefit from the general right.

The chapter argues that the general right to conscientious exemption in Canada should not be interpreted to be available only to religious people. This is for several reasons. First, the general right to conscientious exemption is available under the right to freedom of conscience under s 2(a) of the Canadian Charter and s 3 of the Quebec Charter. Albeit there are only a handful of cases on this right and even though the SCC has not unequivocally delivered a judgment on this, it is clear that the existing cases hold that freedom of conscience protects non-religious conscientious beliefs. Secondly, even though the general right to conscientious exemption arising under anti-discrimination statutes appears to be a privilege of only those with religious beliefs, it has been argued that this would violate the Canadian Charter guarantee of equality rights under s 15 and freedom of conscience under s 2(a). The appropriate remedy, for most of the anti-discrimination statutes, would be to read in conscience as a protected characteristic. This would entail that, in relation to all the rules of law which guarantee the general right to conscientious exemption, the right is not a privilege of those that object on the basis of a religious belief.

Kant is critical of many of the practices of Christianity in his time. But when we appreciate the dynamic relation between rational and revealed religion as Kant conceives them, the apparent opposition becomes more questionable and raises more questions than it answers. Kant’s project in the Religion bears important affinities with the religious philosophy of Moses Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn’s philosophy of church and state and their relation involve a number of radical proposals expressive of Enlightenment religious consciousness. Mendelssohn’s concept of enlightened Judaism bears interesting comparison to Kant’s enlightened reflections on Christianity. Mendelssohn defends a form of evidentialism even more radical that Clifford’s. He also defends a conception of the freedom of religious conscience that inspires Kant’s treatment of that topic in part four of the Religion. Conscience is an important theme in Kant’s moral philosophy, which has special application to religious conscience and the freedom of conscience Kant and Mendelssohn both defend.