To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter reads The Golden Bowl and The Waste Land as semaphores for the felt weakening of twentieth-century British and European ascendancy. James’s exquisitely managed novel and Eliot’s encyclopedic poem are not just documents of disintegration, but new totalizations on new architectonic principles. In their respective treatments of shattering, salvage and re-composition, they point to new world orders still only partially emerging into view during the decades immediately after World War I. American wealth and the transfer of art from Europe to America is The Golden Bowl’s subject; The Waste Land is concerned with the collapse of European culture and coherence. However, as James became 'the master' of the English novel and Eliot 'the Pope of Russell Square' American attempts to manage what Europe could no longer do became as evident in cultural as in political fields. After World War II, the United States would proudly reclaim these émigré writers and establish new 'Great Books' and “World Literature' courses to reflect its ambitions as the Cold War era’s major superpower.
Nothing about developing and implementing a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons is easy. While supporters of the TPNW undoubtedly claim a victory in its coming into being, its opponents note its shortcomings warning of the adverse and dire consequences. The degree to which such concerns will materialize remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the adoption of the TPNW has marked the beginning of a new schism in the international community. The word schism is appropriate in this context, loosely defined as “a split or division between strongly opposed sections or parties, caused by differences in opinion or belief.”
Tropical forest hotspots have a high diversity of species but have lost > 70% of their original vegetation cover and are characterized by a multitude of small and isolated fragments. Paradoxically, conservation actions in these areas are still mainly focused on protection of large tracts of forests, a strategy now infeasible because of the small area of forest remnants. Here we use the Vulnerable black-handed titi monkey Callicebus melanochir as a model to study the effects of habitat loss, fragmentation and degradation on arboreal mammals and to provide insights for science-driven conservation in fragmented landscapes in tropical forest hotspots. We surveyed 38 Atlantic Forest fragments in Bahia State, Brazil and assessed the effects of patch area, quality and visibility, and landscape connectivity on the occurrence of our model species. Patch area was the single best model explaining species occurrence. Nonetheless, patch quality and visibility, and landscape connectivity, positively affect occurrence. In addition to patch area, patch quality, patch visibility and landscape connectivity are useful for predicting the occurrence of arboreal mammals in the fragments of tropical forest hotspots. We encourage the assessment of habitat quality (based on remotely sensed vegetation indices) and habitat visibility (based on digital elevation models) to improve discoverability of arboreal mammal populations and selection of fragments for conservation purposes across fragmented landscapes of tropical forest hotspots. Large remnants of tropical forest hotspots are scarce and therefore we require baseline data to support conservation actions and management in small forest fragments.
It is widely acknowledged that we are in the midst of an extinction crisis and habitat loss is generally considered the primary driver. However, providing accurate estimates of extinction rates has proven to be problematic and a range of extinction estimates have been published. Arguably, the most commonly used method for predicting extinctions resulting from habitat loss has been application of the species–area relationship (SAR). The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the many ways in which the SAR has been used to predict the number of extinctions resulting from habitat loss. By doing so, we highlight the pitfalls of using the SAR in such a way and discuss how the SAR has been argued to both over-predict and under-predict extinctions. We also provide examples of the myriad ways in which studies have extended and built on standard SAR models and approaches to better model and predict extinctions. We conclude by arguing that there is a need to recognize that any approach based on a single variable (i.e. area), such as the SAR, is unlikely to provide a perfect extinction prediction, regardless of the specific details.
Chapter 9 addresses the manner in which the case law of international courts and tribunals has influenced the interpretation and application of the remedies of international law before the International Court of Justice. Illustratively, using equity as a tool for awarding compensation for moral damages, the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary satisfaction, are issues that have been dealt with by courts and tribunals such as the International Court of Human Rights or arbitral tribunals that resolved interstate disputes. The Diallo Case confirms that the Court observes the case-law of other bodies that resolve international disputes and this approach is justified, especially because contemporary international law is undergoing a process of fragmentation while the dispute resolution institutions are in a process of proliferation.
The devastating events of 9/11 triggered the adoption of Resolution 1373 (2001) by the UN Security Council, a contentious development which was much debated and was widely seen as presaging a new type of activity by the Security Council – legislating for all UN member states. And yet, in the counter-terrorism sphere at least, the Council’s legislative activity in the years following 9/11 was relatively modest. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, that activity has been far exceeded by the Council’s response to the emergence of ISIL in 2014. This more recent activity is of interest beyond the confines of counter-terrorism, but has received far less scrutiny to date. This article will remedy this gap, revisiting, in light of the recent activity, the relative merits and disadvantages of making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions. It makes two main contentions. The first is that – due to some factors which were anticipated in the early 2000s and many which were not – Security Council resolutions on terrorism constitute a distinctive category of international law-making and pose serious challenges for the application of organizing principles and processes of general international law. The second is that, for these reasons as well as doubts as to the necessity and efficacy of recent action, making counter-terrorism law through Security Council resolutions should be the exception rather than the norm.
Bayesian confirmation theory is our best formal framework for describing inductive reasoning. The problem of old evidence is a particularly difficult one for confirmation theory, because it suggests that this framework fails to account for central and important cases of inductive reasoning and scientific inference. I show that we can appeal to the fragmentation of doxastic states to solve this problem for confirmation theory. This fragmentation solution is independently well-motivated because of the success of fragmentation in solving other problems. I also argue that the fragmentation solution is preferable to other solutions to the problem of old evidence. These other solutions are already committed to something like fragmentation, but suffer from difficulties due to their additional commitments. If these arguments are successful, Bayesian confirmation theory is saved from the problem of old evidence, and the argument for fragmentation is bolstered by its ability to solve yet another problem.
This chapter examines the drive for nationality as it took shape in US culture leading into and out of World War I. Considering primarily the war novel but also the broader political discourses surrounding the war and its fallout, it describes the variety of cultural interests—some right, some left, some ambiguously centrist—that sought to compel, through representations of military intervention abroad, contradictory justifications for national unity. Well into the war’s aftermath, US artists and commentators continued to use the occasion of the conflict to foment a culture of national regeneration: sometimes to promote revitalized masculinity; sometimes to challenge the self-serving values of capitalism; sometimes with hopes of assimilating immigrant factionalism; sometimes—especially during the war years—to propagate subservience to an authoritarian state. Throughout, the chapter explores how the tensions underpinning cultural hegemony constrained or advanced the rhetorical project of national renewal. However, it also acknowledges protests and refusals of that culture of collectivization, often driven by invocations of American ideals. After the war especially, faith in militarism’s re-enchantment of the nation unraveled in the face of growing modernist backlash and the wider embrace of cultural pluralism.
British power at India’s northwest and northeast frontiers was only occasionally predicated on categorising and codifying, emanating more often from indeterminacy and upheaval. These were spaces of productive difficulties for colonial administrators, who prized as well as feared the supposed unruliness of uplands and deserts at the state’s fringes. This chapter provides a theoretical outline of how India’s frontiers became spaces of scientific and governmental exception, situating the book’s core arguments in relation to scholarship on power, knowledge, territory, and borderlands. It proposes that although internally fragmented by social structures, terrain, and colonial categories, colonial India’s frontiers took shape through ideational and material connections and comparisons. Following increasingly intense interventions from the later 1860s, by the turn of the twentieth century frontiers were established as crucial spaces of imperial power, science, and self-fashioning.
The promise of constitutionalisation is, according to Kratochwil, the existential comfort that comes from having a coherent framework for judgement and action. This apparent epistemological confidence comes at the price of parting with a realistic assessment of the concrete situation, and it conceals that politics operate across all levels all the time. This paper critiques this vision and points beyond the idea of exhaustive frameworks. Figuring out contextually appropriate configurations of constitutionalisation and fragmentation allows for greater agency and pluralism. A more fundamental tension in Kratochwil's work remains, however, his falling back on the abstract to articulate the experiential.
The interruption of animal movement by fragmentation is a major force with far-reaching ecological and conservation consequences. Understanding fragmentation processes underpins our ability to manage landscapes for connectivity, facilitating many ecological processes including gene flow interpopulation dynamics and demographic rescue. Here the current status of fragmentation, connectivity, methods, consequences, and management of the world’s eight bear species is reviewed. The metapopulation paradigm is also considered, i.e. are bears being forced into some form of functioning metapopulation or are they simply being fragmented into a series of isolated populations that, without conservation action, will likely be slowly extirpated, population by population?
In countries around the world, from the United States to the Philippines to Chile, police forces are at the center of social unrest and debates about democracy and rule of law. This book examines the persistence of authoritarian policing in Latin America to explain why police violence and malfeasance remain pervasive decades after democratization. It also examines the conditions under which reform can occur. Drawing on rich comparative analysis and evidence from Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, the book opens up the 'black box' of police bureaucracies to show how police forces exert power and cultivate relationships with politicians, as well as how social inequality impedes change. González shows that authoritarian policing persists not in spite of democracy but in part because of democratic processes and public demand. When societal preferences over the distribution of security and coercion are fragmented along existing social cleavages, politicians possess few incentives to enact reform.
Laws and norms that focus on women's lives in conflict have proliferated across the regimes of international humanitarian law, international criminal law, international human rights law and the United Nations Security Council. While separate institutions, with differing powers of monitoring and enforcement, implement these laws and norms, the activities of regimes overlap. Women's Rights in Armed Conflict under International Law is the first book to account for this pluralism and institutional diversity. This book identifies key aspects of how different regimes regulate women's rights in conflict, and how they interact. Using country case studies to reveal the practical implications of the fragmented protection of women's rights in conflict, this book offers a dynamic account of how regimes and institutions interact, the extent to which they reinforce each other, and the tensions and gaps in regulation that emerge.
The law of state responsibility has been affected by profound changes that have taken place in international affairs. The doctrine that used to concern mainly bilateral state relations has faced numerous challenges on different fronts. Globalization has empowered non-state actors, states have become less powerful and new issues of varying importance have emerged, some clearly demanding global attention such as climate change. Besides these external challenges, different perceptions of responsibility have appeared and gained prominence in the international arena. This fragmentation of responsibility has resulted in the coexistence of multiple responsibility regimes in international law whose relations are debated. The present study tests the law of state responsibility against the framework of functionality in order to see how well the regime and its rules meet the challenges. It is argued that normative significance must be accompanied with practical utility.
The conclusion draws together these different levels of analysis – language and discourse; sociability and equality; and music and movement – to underscore that between them they reproduced a radical culture that was hugely intellectually ambitious, but rooted in sets of beliefs, relationships, practices and experiences that pulled in a very much more conformist direction and that worked to undermine the radical literary culture of wartime London, at the same time as loyalist and government forces further curtailed the scope for individual liberty and deliberative activity.
Adolescents are a particularly vulnerable group of individuals in the global landscape. They are presumed to be healthy and thus garner less attention relative to age groups that shoulder the burden of disease. Greater global investment is merited to ensure the human rights of adolescents as numerous unique societal and structural challenges confront this age group. A difficulty to motivate this change is conflicting definitions of who are “adolescents” between major global agencies and funders; this hamstrings policy makers’ ability to measure or interpret adolescent health indicators. In this chapter, the authors present a case study from Rwanda so as to describe five key barriers to adolescents’ health in the country: challenge with defining “adolescence” in policy documents, fragmented policy planning and coverage, societal pressures and expectations, individual preferences, and gaps in data availability. After exploration of these barriers, the authors describe how Rwanda has progressed through building capacity for adolescents’ rights to health in the country. This model can inform policy makers who seek to bolster policies and resources that can be directed toward more effectively supporting this historically neglected group, which is our future generation.
The author looks at the ‘inherent powers’ of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) and ICSID tribunals. She argues that the key to the exercise of the international judicial function is the principle of inherent powers, which are conferred upon judicial bodies to safeguard the judicial function. Yet, for the WTO Appellate Body and ICSID tribunals , it is often assumed that while ICSID tribunals have broad inherent powers, the AB’s inherent powers are restricted. She asks the question whether this means that these tribunals are fragmented in the exercise of their judicial function, and consequently their inherent powers, and if so, what factors contribute to such fragmentation. This chapter answers the above questions by examining the way the AB and ICSID tribunals perceive their authority to exercise inherent powers through the examples of objections to admissibility of a case and amicus curiae submissions. Using these examples, this chapter challenges absolutist assumptions about the inherent powers of the AB and ICSID tribunals. Instead, it develops a nuanced understanding of the scope of the inherent powers of these tribunals through a study of their respective judicial functions.
Fragmentation, institutional overlaps, and norm collisions are often seen as fundamental problems for the global (legal) order. Supposedly, they incite conflict and disorder. However, some scholars have also emphasised functional and normative advantages of the resulting institutional pluralism. We argue that the consequences of the increasing international institutional density are conditional on whether and how different norms, institutions, and authorities are coordinated. In distinction from the fragmentation framework in international law and the regime complexity framework in international relations, this introduction outlines an interface conflict framework that enables important insights into this question and guides the contributions assembled in this issue. It zooms in on the micro-level of conflict between actors that justify incompatible positional differences with reference to different international norms. In particular, the concept of interface conflicts allows studying the conditions under which overlaps and norm collisions become activated in conflicts as well as the ways in which such conflicts are handled. Foreshadowing the main findings of the contributions to this Special Issue, we hold that interface conflicts are neither inevitable nor unmanageable. Most importantly, it seems that, more often than not, conflicts stimulate cooperative forms of management and contribute to the building of inter-institutional order.
The After Fragmentation special issue unites political science conversations about regime complexity with legal/normative conversations about global constitutionalism through a focus on the generation and resolution of interface conflicts, defined as moments when overlapping elements or rule incompatibilities generate actual conflicts. Yet scholars choosing among these two perspectives actually have different objectives. After reviewing the two literatures, I argue that this special issue is closer to the global constitutionalism perspective, which generally seeks legitimated order. By contrast, the regime complexity literature asks how does the fact that global governance is spread across multiple institutions in itself shape cooperation politics. Investigating what it means to get ‘beyond fragmentation’, I suggest that the potential or actuality of rule conflicts is not necessarily a problem because conflicts are a normal and even salutary aspect of politics. If conflict is not the concern, then what should we be worrying about? Both perspectives, I argue, are amoral because they normalise and help justify an international order where responsibility is spread across institutions, promoting order while failing to address fundamental problems affecting people and the world. In this respect, resolving rule conflicts does not get us beyond fragmentation.
When actors express conflicting views about the validity or scope of norms or rules in relation to other norms or rules in the international sphere, they often do so in the language of international law. This contribution argues that international law’s hermeneutic acts as a common language that cuts across spheres of authority and can thus serve as a conflict management tool for interface conflicts. Often, this entails resorting to an international court. While acknowledging that courts cannot provide permanent solutions to the underlying political conflict, I submit that court proceedings are interesting objects of study that promote our understanding of how international legal argument operates as a conflict management device. I distinguish three dimensions of common legal form, using the well-known EC–Hormones case as illustration: a procedural, argumentative, and substantive dimension. While previous scholarship has often focused exclusively on the substantive dimension, I argue that the other two dimensions are equally important. In concluding, I reflect on a possible explanation as to why actors are disposed to resort to international legal argument even if this is unlikely to result in a final solution: there is a specific authority claim attached to international law qua law.