From Brexit to the rise of China, the deterioration of the special relationship with the United States and the return of war to Europe in Ukraine, this chapter will explore how the UK’s position in the world has faced both challenges and opportunities over the last fourteen years. The analysis will focus on how different Conservative premierships used or wasted these global changes, and how it has affected UK foreign policy and Britain as a whole (particularly Brexit’s influence on domestic policy and politics).

This chapter recapitulates the dual institutional framework and the empirical findings of this book. It then discusses how the findings contribute to ongoing policy and theoretical debates.

The dramatic impact of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington sharply intensified relations between Australia and the USA. The bilateral relationship was reconfirmed as the two states joined in war against an elusive, and unexpected, enemy. As the war on terrorism broadened, Australia enthusiastically joined the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’, sending troops to fight in Afghanistan and, more controversially, deploying forces alongside the USA in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. From late 2001 commentary in Australia invariably accepted that ‘relations with the United States dominated Australian foreign affairs’ or more subtly observed that ‘the central dynamics of Australian foreign policy revolved around the issue of relations with the superpower, and the implications of this relationship’ for the broader exercise of Australian foreign policy.

The first half of the 1990s saw significant developments in the former Soviet and East European region: the attempted coup of August 1991 against Mikhail Gorbachev, the dissolution of the union, and the subsequent struggle in the 15 newly independent former republics to bring about significant social and economic change. There has been armed conflict in a series of these republics. In Russia there has been an armed attack on the parliament and its dissolution at the behest of the president, two national elections, simmering tension with a number of its neighbours, and continuing concern over the effects of economic reform, culminating in the December 1995 electoral success of the communist party. In Eastern Europe countries have been struggling with the legacy left by the communist regimes that collapsed in 1989. In a number of these countries communists returned to power via the ballot box. And, of course, the region was overshadowed by the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars of Yugoslav succession. Despite this record of dramatic and important developments, this region has been of less concern to Australian foreign-policy makers than was the case during the Cold War.

When planning for this volume commenced in 1997, few signs were present of the turbulence that was to engulf Australian policies in the last years of the twentieth century. Prime Minister John Howard’s desire that Australians should feel ’comfortable’ seemed to have been realised in the foreign policy arena. To reinforce this sense of comfort, the new government, which assumed office in March 1996, sought to reinforce relations with ’great and powerful friends’, particularly the United States. The relationship with traditional friends in Europe was also given a boost: the government characterised its new policy direction with the catch-phrase ’Asia first, but not Asia only’.

At the start of 2006, two schools of thought contended over the future of Australia’s defence and strategic policy. On one side stood those who believed that Australia’s principal strategic risks and challenges over the following decades would come from instability on the margins of the international order – from weak and failing states, and from non-state actors, especially terrorists. On the other side stood those who believed that bigger and more important strategic concerns arose from the possibility that the core of the international order would be disrupted by the stresses flowing from changing economic relativities. This was especially true in Asia, as China and other Asian states’ economies grew.

Australia’s extraordinary economic boom continued throughout the period covered by this volume. By the end of 2005, the economy had enjoyed fifty-seven quarters of consecutive economic growth: Paul Keating’s ‘recession we had to have’ was a distant memory. Unemployment fell to slightly more than 5 per cent, the lowest rate for three decades. The government’s budget was enjoying record surpluses. Australia’s economic growth rate in the period was substantially above that of the average for the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the grouping of leading industrialised economies. Australia’s ranking in the OECD on per capita income rose from eighteenth in the early 1990s to eighth by 2005. Astute intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia through the imposition of a marginal increase in interest rates in early 2005 appeared to have succeeded in deflating the housing bubble and in ensuring a soft landing for the economy.

Ever since diplomatic relations were normalised by the Whitlam government in 1972, maintaining a constructive and productive relationship with China has been a challenge for successive Australian governments. The period under study here – from 1996 to 2000 – is further evidence that Australia’s relationship with China is shaping up as the toughest foreign policy task in the twenty-first century. There are three reasons for this. First is the growing power asymmetry between the two countries and the fact that while Australia is essentially a status quo power, China is non-status quo, dissatisfied with the current distribution of power in the region. Second, the nature of Australia’s relations with China has now come to depend increasingly on Beijing’s self-perception of its future role and interests in the region. Last but not least, the wide divergence in the two countries’ philosophical approaches to governance, political culture, and values introduces an element of uncertainty and unpredictability in the bilateral relationship.

Foreign policy in the period covered in this volume was largely dominated by the Australian response to the events of 11 September 2001 and its consequences. A federal election campaign was keenly anticipated at that time, but foreign policy issues – beyond the question of the treatment of asylum seekers – were not expected to be a major concern. Little that had happened so far in that year prefigured what was to come. The new George W. Bush administration in Washington had signalled its intention to adopt a distinctive and less internationalist stance, refusing to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol (intended to restrain the global emission of greenhouse gases) and taking a much more critical view of the rising power of China. Although there were signs that on these issues Australia was likely to follow the US lead, and the initiation of studies on the impact of a free trade agreement with the USA was a further indicator of the potential similarities in outlook of the two governments, the closeness post-11 September of the Howard Government’s alignment with its Washington counterpart surprised even some conservative commentators.

Australians visiting Europe often complain about how little they see or hear of their own country in the European media. On the face of it, there is much to justify these reactions. It is exasperating to turn the pages of British newspapers and read the trivia they contain when one knows of the much more reportable, entertaining or significant stories they could print about other parts of the world. But is the situation much better when viewed in reverse? Are not the Australian media as guilty of parochialism when it comes to coverage of the outside world? The sad but very basic fact of the matter is that all politics are local politics. All of us who specialise in international affairs have been frustrated by the leverage of local issues on the attention of politicians, journalists, other academics and public opinion. We, when all is said and done, focus on issues such as whether certain countries will continue to exist, or whether the world will be at peace or war in months or years ahead. Sadly, these topics compete poorly with less vital topics such as the love lives of the Royal family or tales of petty corruption, both in Britain and in Australia.

Australia’s relationship with China is one of its most difficult and challenging: it constitutes a crucial test of the success of Australia’s ability to engage with the region in a way which gives full expression to its energy, initiative and unique identity. While relations have continued to be both cordial and mutually beneficial, and have matured considerably, two major developments in the post–Cold War era are likely to have an enduring impact on their long-term stability. At the international level, the end of ideological confrontation between the superpowers, and of the alliance system that buttressed it, refocused the political and economic attention of both China and Australia at the regional level. At that level, the most significant development, the emergence of China as a dominant economic and military power within a region that was itself shaping up as a financial and commercial powerhouse, opened up new windows of opportunity for Australia, while at the same time highlighting asymmetries in power between China and Australia, which had hitherto been disguised by a confluence of circumstances.

In March 2008, newly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced plans for a two-day national summit to be held in Canberra. The Australia 2020 Summit brought together 1000 of Australia’s ‘best and brightest brains’ to develop long-term strategic policies for Australia. Of these participants, 100 were given the task of presenting a strategic vision and recommendations on ‘Australia’s future security and prosperity in a rapidly changing region and world’. The 2020 Summit seemed to be one of the defining images of Prime Minister Rudd’s term of office from 2007 to 2010. It certainly marked a new development in the formation of Australian foreign policy. The summit was supplemented by school summits, a Youth Summit, various community summits, regional town hall forums and an open submission system that allowed all Australians directly to submit their policy ideas and recommendations. The inclusion of the broader public in a dialogue about Australia’s future role in the world was a notable departure from traditional foreign policy-making.

Compared with its relations with Asia, Australian engagement with the countries of the African continent was not extensive, and was defined even in the government’s view by a ’period of neglect’ by all sectors of government, including diplomacy, trade, aid and defence. That said, increased communication and involvement occurred in the period under reiew in this volume, as African immigration continued and as the Australian government sought African support in its bid for a United Nations Security Council seat for 2013–14. Formal government ties between Australia and the nations of Africa continued, however, to be limited. In this sense, there was little significant change in the period 2006–10 from previous periods.

There were significant changes in the quality and direction of Australia’s relations with Southeast Asia between 1990 and 1995. These changes were symbolised by the new directions set out in Foreign Minister Gareth Evans’s statement on Australia’s Regional Security of December 19891 and at the end of the period by the signing of the Australia–Indonesia Security Agreement in December 1995. The signing of this agreement signalled a historic change in Australia’s relations with Indonesia and Southeast Asia, surprising observers in both countries. Yet the seeds of that agreement lie in the groundwork of the new approach to regional security set out by Evans in 1989, and in its antecedents in earlier ’moves to Asia’ of the 1970s and 1980s.